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Abstract of Thesis 
The aim is to understand Aquinas' discussion of the Gifts as they 
are presented within the larger philosophical and theological context of 
the Summa Theologias. This involves a dual process of analysis: under- 
standing his interpretation of the Gifts by reference to the context in 
which they are treated; and using Aquinas' treatment of the Gifts to 
highlight the unity and significance of his theological principles with- 
in the larger presentation. 
Part One is a detailed analysis of Pars Prima Secundae, question 
68. From this close study wider issues emerge: the notion of both in- 
trinsic and extrinsic principles of man's activity, that is reason and 
God; and Aquinas use of two models, that of movement, (motio) and dis- 
position, (habitus). The significance of these two models is discussed 
in relation to developments within Aquinas' theology of grace. 
Part Two looks at the metaphysical background to question 68. 
One chapter examines the model of movement in Aquinas' theology. The 
other two chapters study the relationship between the extrinsic and in- 
trinsic principles of man's activity by examining Aquinas' use of the 
De bona fortuna, cited in question 68, and by looking at the intercon- 
nections between reason, law and grace in Aquinas' thought. 0 
Part Three examines Aquinas' detailed treatment of the seven in- 
dividual Gifts in the Pars Secunda Secundae. Again the study stresses 
the need to analyse the Gifts from within the context of Thomas' whole 
moral theology. 
Aquinas' treatment of the Gifts cannot be appreciated if wrenched 
out of the context in which it is presented. The strength of his work 
lies not in dependence on the text of Isaiah or on the tradition of the 
Gifts of the Spirit but on his use of the basic principles which also 
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INTRODUCTION 
SECTION ONE: THE TEXT 
1. THE TEXT OF QUESTION 68, ARTICLE ONE 
a. ' The Context: 'Conseauenter, considerandum est 
de donisI 
b. ' The Question: 'IItrum dons differant a virtutibust 
c. 'Responsio: Dicendum ouod ... '. Thomas' analysis 
of the problem. 
d. The State of the Question. 
e. " Thomas' answer to the Question - 'Inspiratio autem 
significat auandam motionem ab exteriori ... ' 
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The aim of this dissertation is to understand Thomas' discussion 
of the Gifts of the Spirit as they are presented within the larger philo- 
sophical and theological context of the Summa Theologiae. This involves 
a dual process of analysis: understanding his interpretation of the 
Gifts by reference to the context in which they are treated; and using 
Thomas' treatment of the Gifts to highlight the unity and significance 
of his theological principles within this larger presentation. 
Thomas dealt with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in his, Commentary 
on the Sentences and in his Commentary on Isaiah. These works fall 
outside the scope of this dissertation. Similarly, Thomas? treatment 
of the Gifts has been the subject of centuries of study, -prayerful medi- 
tation and intellectual argument and debate. These too are beyond the 
scope of our study, except in as much as we have learnt from them. . 
Various scholars have written on the history of the Church's use of the 
Isaian prophetic text and on the course of theological speculation on 
the 'sevenfold' Gifts. These too lie beyond the area of this study, 
except in as much as we have learnt from them. 
1 
This dissertation concentrates on the Summa Theologiae. The 
"basic premise is that the treatise on the Gifts in that text is not a 
monograph but part of a larger work. Thomas' theology of the Gifts 
cannot be properly appreciated if it is detached from the wider theology 
in which it is embedded. - The strength of his work on the Gifts lies 
not in his use of the Isaian prophecy but on his use, in this area, of 
the-same basic principles which also structure the whole SummaTheoloeica. 
1. On all the areas mentioned in this paragraph, excellent in- 
troductions and bibliographies can be found in: G. Bardy, F. Vanden- 
broucke, A" Bayez, M. Labourdette, C. Bernard, 'Dons du Saint-Esprit', 
Dictionnaire de sniritualite, III, cols. 1579-1641; and E. D. O'Connor, 
Summa Theologiae, vol. 24, (IalIae, a. 68-70), The Gifts of the Spirit, 
Blackfriars edition, General Editor, T. Gilby. 
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These principles interlink his work on the Gifts with other major areas 
of his anthropology and theology. It is in this light that Thomas' 
treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit'have been studied in this 
dissertation. 
Section One is a detailed analysis of Prima Secundae, question 
68. From this close study wider issues emerge: the notion of both 
intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's activity, that is, reason 
and God; and Aquinas' use of two. models, that-of movement, ' (motto), 
and disposition, '(habitus). ' The significance of'these two models is 
discussed in relation to developments within Thomas! theology of grace. 
, Section Two looks at the metaphysical background to question 68. 
One chapter examines'the model Of movementTin'Aquinas' theology. The`` 
other two chapters study the relationship between the intrinsic and ex- 
trinsic principles of man's activity by examining Thomas' use of the De 
bona fortuna, cited'in question 68,. and'by looking at the interconnections 
between reason, law and grace in Thomas' thought. 
The Third Section is an examination of Thomas'"detailed'treatment 
of the seven individual Gifts in the Secunda Secundae. Again, the study 
stresses; the need to analyse the Gifts from within'the context of Thomas' 
whole moral theology. 
The Latin text is that used in the Blackfriars edition, (ed. T. 
Gilby), the Leonine edition. There are no serious textual problems in 
this area of study. 
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(a) Conseguenter considerandum est de donis. 
We should begin by looking at the force of this term, conseauen- 
ter; in other words, at how this question fits into the structure of 
the Prima Secundae. Throughout the Summa, there are occasional pre- 
views of blocks of related questions which serve to articulate the 
framework of the books. Hp 'articulate' here, I mean that such pre- 
views both hinge the work into iss sub-sections and make the overall 
trend and direction of the Summa explicit. Now the four prologues 
obviously act in this way, but, to take the Prima Pars as an example, 
so do the introductions to q. 1, q. 2, q. 3, q. 14, a. 27, q. 29, q. 39, q. 44, 
q. 47, q. 50, q. 65, q. 75, q. 103, q. 106. Let us look now at the similar 
articulations of the text in the Prima Secundae as they concern our 
present'quaestio. 
The Articulation of the Prima Secandae 
Prologue: 
Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit homo factus ad imaginem-Dei dicitur 
secundum quod per imaginern significatur intellectuale at arbitrio 
liberum at per se potestatativum: - postquam praedictum est de, exemp- 
lari, scilicet de Deo, at de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate 
secundum eius voluntatem (cf. 1, q. 2 introd. ), restat ut connideremns 
de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum 
operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens at suorum operum 3 
potestatem. 
q. 1 introd. 
Ubi primo considerandum occurrit de ultimo fine humanae vitae; 
et deinde de his quae homo ad hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab 
eo deviare (q. 6): ex fine enim oportet accipere rationes eorum quae 
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ordinantur ad finem. Et quia ultimus finis humane vitae ponitur 
esse beatitudo. , oportet primo considerare de ultimo fine in 
communi; deinde de beatitudine (q. 2). 
q. 6. introd. 
Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est 
pervenire (cf q. 5, a. 7), oportet consequenter de'hnmanis actibus 
considerare, ui sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, 
Qel impediatur beatitudinis via (cf q. 1 introd. ). Sed quia oper- 
ationes et actus circa singularia aunt, ideo omnis operativa scientia 
in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur conside- 
ratio, quia humanoram actuum, primo quidem tradenda est in2univer- 
sali secundo vero, in particulari (2-2). 
Circa universalem autem considsrationem humanorum actuum, 
primo quidem considerandum occurrit de ipsis actibus humänis; 
sec=do de principiis eoram (q. 49). Humanorum autem actuum, quidam 
aunt hominis proprii; quidem autem aunt homini et-aliis animalibus 
communes. Et quia'beatitudo est proprium hominis bonuni, proprin- 
quius se habent ad beatitudinem actus quae sent proprie humani., quam 
actus qui sent homini aliisque animalibns communes. Primo ergo 
considerandum est de actibns qui"sunt proprie humanis; secundo de 
actibus qui suet homini aliisglie ani nmal i bus corm ithes, qui dicuntur 
animae passions (q. 22 ). 
Circa primum duo consideranda occurrunt: primo, ", de conditions 
humanoram actuüm, secundo de distinctione eornnº (q. 18). cam, autem 
actus humani proprie dicantur qui suet voluntarii, eo quod voluntas 
eat rationalis appetitus., qui eat proprius hominis: oportet conside- 
rare de actibus inquantum sunt voluntarii. 
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q. 22 introd. 
Post hoc considerandum est de passionibus animae,... 
q. 49 introd. 
Post actus at passiones, considerandum_. est de principiis 
humanornm actuorum, (cf q. 6 introd. )., Et primo, de principiis 
intrinsecis; secundo de principiis eztrinsecis (q. 90). 
Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; secs 
gnia de potentiis in Prima Parte (q. 77) dictum est, nunc restat de 
habitibus considerandum. Et primo quidem., in generals; secundo 
vero, de-virtutibus at vitiis, at aliis huismodi habitibus, qui Bunt 
huinanornm actuum principia (q. 55). 
Within this sub-section of the Summa which q. 49 intro- 
duces there is one particular further division of the 
text which relates directly to the Gifts, and so it will 
be included here. 
q. 55 introd. 
Consequenter considerandum est de habitibus in speciali 
(cf q. 49 introd. ). Et quia habitus., ut dictum est. (q. 54, a. 3), 
distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus 
bonis, qui suet virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona, beati- 
tudines et frnctus (cf q. 68ss); secundo de habitibus malis, scilicet 
de vitiis et peccatis (q. 71). 
Now to return to the general structure of the IaIIae: 
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q. 90 introd. 
Consequenter considerandum est de principiis exterioribus 
actuam (of q. 49 introd. ). Principium autem exterius ad maluni 
inclinans est diabolus, de cuius tentatione in Primo (q. 114) dictum 
est. Principium autem exterius movens ad bonuni est Deus, qui et . 
nos instruit per legem, at iuvat per gratiam. Unde primo de lege; 
secundo de gratia dicendum est (q. 109). 
This is the context, in which the questions of the Gifts of 
the Spirit are situated. In this thesis we shall use this context 
to try to understand Thomas' treatment of the gifts in the Summa 
and we shall use the study of the Gifts as a thread to draw out the 
interconnections of his thought. 
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(b) Quaestio: Utrum dona differant"a virtutibus; Are the Gifts distinct 
from the Virtues ? 
This title of the question opens-up the entire problem. ry 
Thomas has analysed the virtues and the notion of habitus already. 
1 
If the Gifts are. the same as the virtues then any further discussion 
is redundant. If they are merely refined forms of the virtues then 
the subsequent discussion might be edifying but not-disturbing. 
2 
On the other hand, if-they are totally different from the virtues, 
then the principles of Thomas' anthropology, as presented so far, 
are. not sufficient and a wider basis is needed to support moral philo- 
sophy and theological anthropology. But if the Gifts are distinct 
from the virtues and yet allied to them, does this point towards 
another dimension of the moral philosophy he has so far expounded; 
a dimension not yet focused upon, but essential to a proper-under- 
standing of it ? 
1. IaIIae, q. 49-67.2. See the first objection and its 
answer. 
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(c) : Responsio: Dicendam Quod .. ' Thomas' analysis of the problem. 
He begins, as is so common in his approach, by setting out 
how the important terms are to be understood in his answer to the 
question. 
'So far as the meaning of the words is concerned ... 
He will not base his discussion on current terminology. Any such 
attempt is vitiated, as he himself'points out, by the fact that the 
virtues of faith, hope and charity, and the infused moral virtues 
of prudence, justice, courage and temperance, are virtues that are 
"given" by God, 'infused' and not 'acquired'. So Thomas, as in a 
scholastic debate, concedes this point. 
'Unde secundum hoc (secundum rationem nominis) donum 
a virtute distingui non potest. ' 
It is important to realise what line of approach Thomas has 
renounced here because it is all too easy to return to this line 
of thinking while reading his further discussion of the Gifts. If 
he has conceded this point, then to follow his thought correctly, 
we also must abandon it. 
Thomas does not build up his theology of the distinctiveness 
of the Gifts on the basis of their origin as gift from God. Where 
he uses this notion he will use it equally of the Gifts and the in- 
fused virtues and he will, in fact, see the Gifts as secondary to 
the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. 
1 The concept 
of 'gift' cannot then be used as a distinguishing factor. 
2 The 
1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 8 2. -In Common Sent. III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, ad. 2, 
Thomas admits that 'gift' can be used of all that is given to man 
from God but still: thinks that the concept can still be used to dis- 
tinguish all the virtues from the gifts of the Spirit. Here he re- 
nounces that attempt. See M. M. Labourdette, 'Dons du Saint-Esprit, 
IV, Saint Thomas et la th6ologie thomiste', Dictionnaire de Spirit- 
ualite 3, col. 1615. 
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vital distinguishing factor which Thomas will use will not be some- 
thing in God but something in man: something anthropological and 
not theological. 
What can this last assertion mean ? It is obviously contro- 
versial and far from clear; justifiable as yet only in the provoca- 
tion it might offer to help us see just how much Thomas has conceded. 
What it actually means and how, accurate it is, will be clear only 
when we have finished our study of Thomas, positive exposition. 
Edward O'Connor, discussing the theology of the Gifts of 
Anselm of Laon, points out just how dominant this concept of , 'gift' 
was to the early scholastics in, this area. 
'So far as the Gifts are concerned, however, it should 
be noted that the very notion of ft seems to have 
been the controlling factor in Anselm's synthesis. -. That is to say, he determines the role of the Sacred 
Seven from the term which had come to be applied to 
them since the 9th century, rather than from what is 
said of them in Scripture or even in'the patristic 
writings. So decisive is this concept of gift that 
the Gifts seem. to function practically as an equiva- 
lent for grace in Anselm's crude system. Even in 
later theologians, until about the time of Thomas,. 
the theology of the Gifts seems to be governed largely 
by,. this concept. ' (1) 
So Thomas has given up what appears tobe his strong card. 
He, admits. that, having, conceded so much, some-of his contemporaries 
and. predecessors have decided that there is no difference. between 
the virtues and the (ifts. 
2 
'Et ideo quidam posuwant quod done non essent a 
virtutibus distinguenda' 
And yet,, having renounced the apparently strongest line of defence., 
1. E. O'Connor, The Gifts of the Spirit, Gilby Edition and 
translation of the Summa Theo o iae vol. 24, IaIIae, q. 68; 70), p. 101. 
2. William of Auvergne, (died 1249) took this line in his later 
years, and the Oxford scholastic Richard Rufus, (writing c. 1250) 
also.. See O'Connor p. 105 and D. Lottin, Psychologie et morale 
aux %IIe et XIIIe siecles III9 pp. 357,411. 
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he continues-to propose, an important distinction between the Gifts 
and the virtues. Why ? Or rather, what is the reason he gives 
here ? 
'Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, -ut scilicet 
rationemassignent quare quaedarn virtutes dicantur 
dona, et nön omnes; et quare aliqua computantur 
inter dona quae non computantur inter virtutes, ut 
patet de timore. ' 
The weakness of this defence is highlighted rather than camouflaged 
by the phrase, non minor difficultas. Are there any real diffi- 
culties ?. Can the problem-not be dismissed as no problem at all; _ 
as merely a matter of rhetoric ? Long before Ockham there were theo- 
logians who could take this option. 
1 Why then did Thomas not do-so ? 
This is-a very serious question because it raises an anxiety 
about Thomas' sincerity in his presentation of the Gifts, and, -con- 
sequently an-anxiety about the significance of, this dissertation. 
One possibility that can be suggested to account for Thomas' possible 
"theological insincerity" here is that he is so conservative a theo- 
logian that he could not allow any of the terminology he had inherited 
to lapse. One.: can. cite the example of his discussion of the Beati- 
tudes in this, respect: there he, confines himself to a traditional 
framework based on a piece of Augustinian rhetoric; 
2 despite all. its 
difficulties and limitations, Thomas never allows himself to break 
free of its terminology. and its obvious artificialities. But if 
Thomas is conservative. he is not, an unthinking-conservative and even 
in this case of the Beatitudes he can use old wineskins to present 
new thought: the very first line of his exposition of the Beatitudes 
shows an Aristotelian teleological thrust which links this apparently 
1. Apart from Richard Rufus and William of Auxerre., see Lot- 
tin's article, 'The Thomistic theory of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost 
in the last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century' Dominican Studies, 1949, 
vol. III, no. 2, pp. 104-144.2. See O'Connor,, Appendix 2, PP. 90-92. 
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insignificant question with the central question of the IIa para, 
IahIa, q;, 1=5 on the whole purpose of human existence and activity, 
"Beatitude". 
... beatitudo est ultimus finis'hominas vitae ... ýý 
A link forged between St. Matthew and'Aristotle; '- "beatitude" and 
"Eeatitudo". 2 The charge against Thomas therefore might be, not 
that he is an unthinking conservative but that'his desire tolpre- 
serve all the elements of the theological legacy led'him to confine 
his'own thoughts in unwieldy and unsuitable terminological frameworks. 
This' is Lottin's view. 
3 It is a position made stronger by our know- 
ledge that the Summa was designed as a basic text-book for men begin- 
ning their formation within this`theologicaltradition'of scholasti- 
cism.. Are we misled then, if we take Thomas' exposition of the 
Gifts as a serious theological statement ? Is he merely trying to 
get the jig-saw pieces of scholastic categories to form a single'co- 
herent pattern, " unwilling to admit that some pieces just do not 
belong and should be jettisoned ? 
It is not clear how this'charge-can be met by any simple and 
direct answer. . On some issues - including the important one of 
charity4 and also of the nature of the human soul5 - Thomas was pre- 
pared, to break quite radically with the patristic 'authorities', and 
with his predecessors and contemporaries. The question before us 
is how we are to read this text ? The weakness of the charge'against 
1. IaIIae, q. 69, a. 1.2. See the final chapter of this 
dissertation, p. 301f. 3. Lottin, op. cit, p. 144.. 
4.. IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2 where he disagrees-.. with both IDmbard and Aug- 
ustine. 5. Ia, q. 75. For the condemnation at Paris see, among 
others, Copleston, A History of PhilosophyYvol II, 1950, PP. 430-434 
in a section'entitled "Opposition to Thomist 'novelties 'llo See 
also E. Gilson, "Pourquoi S. Thomas a critique S. Augustin", Archives 
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, t. 1,1926, pp. 5-127. 
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Thomas lies actually in its strength, in the very simplicity of its 
underlying hypothesis, which-is that Thomas used his considerable 
intellectual, genius to underpin a minor point of the-tradition. 
Does this attractively simple hypothesis account for the several 
different essays'on this-topic which Thomas attempted during his 
career, of which this is the most mature ? It may or itýmay not. 
It does not seem that a direct answer to this charge can be found. 
Rather, it seems as if the charge can be met only by presenting-an 
alternative hypothesis based on reading Thomas' text as a serious 
theological statement. This-alternative hypothesis would-need to 
do more than explain the text; it would need to show up the-posi- 
tive insights gained by taking Thomas' exposition, seriously, pointing 
out insights lost if the text is seen, in our modern terms, as 
'insincere'. 
To refocus our discussion on the text before us, let us probe 
the significance of the reference to the Gift of Fear. 
ý........ ut patet de-timore. ' 
There is-more in this casual example than at first-meets the eye. 
I 
We might'see the problem here as merely one of classification. 
The tradition has called some elements of the Christian Life virtues 
. 
and Gifts, some just virtues, some just Gifts. Is this important 
or merely a question of labelling"? The question remains open until 
we look at Fear. " There is no way in which Fear can be classedxas a 
virtue in either a Greek classical sense or in the Christian modifi- 
cation of that classical legacy, or at least, the latter only with 
1. With the-Lombard's text., and in Thomas Commentary on the 
Sentences, this problem raised by the notion of religious fear in in- 
troduced at the very beginning of the treatise on the Gifts and takes 
up a great deal of the space of the treatise. In Sent. III, 34 and 
34, q. 2. And in the Secunda Secundae Thomas devotes twelve articles 
to this topic: far more than to any other Gift.. IIaIlae, q. 19. 
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some difficulty. The 'erratic' of Theological Fear posea a prob- 
lern: as it is classed among the Gifts it might be that the Gifts 
present some dimension of man's nature which the virtues do not 
relate to directly. ' 
The reminder that Christianity's use of language of the vir- 
tues has classical roots also reminds us that already, long before 
Thomas, two systems had already been interfused - the Biblical and 
the Greek. I Indeed one solution to the difficulties here might 
be to accept that the semantic jig-saw pieces of scholasticism actu- 
ally belong to two separate jig-saw puzzles,, one Greek, one Bibli- 
cal; all that is needed is to separate them out. -This might be, -, 
a modern, Biblical approach, but it is not Thomas. 
t 
%k should also bear in mind, Thomas' bitter attack on the Aver- 
roist theory of equal but incompatible truths. -- It is not that 
he is unaware of the difference between faith and reason, -or even 
of the primacy: of Revelation. -- 'Indeed it is his reliance on the 
Scriptural text which leads to his break-through, the ending of the 
semantic log-jam, in the fifth paragraph of the corpus: 
'... debemus sequi modem loquendi Scripturae... ',, 
Thomas is, after all, a Master of the Sacred Page. But this same 
paragraph, which presents the germ of his answer, is itself a mar- 
vellous example of the unity of his vision:, it begins with scrip- 
ture and ends with Aristotle: 
1. As early as the Second Letter of Peter, on this see W. Q. 
K mmel, Introduction to the New Testament S. C. M., 1975, PP-431-432. 
Stoic philosophy was obviously influential in Patristic thought. 
For 12th century scholasticism, see O'Connor, p. 101. 
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t... et etiam Philosophus licit ... ' 
What is it then that Thomas is searching--for in these first 
few paragraphs of the corpus ? "' `" 
'Unde alit dixerunt dona a virtutibus esseý'distin-'" 
guenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientiem dis- 
tinctionis causam, quae scilicet ita co miunis 
esset virtutibus quod nullo modo donis, auf e 
converso. ' 
'A notion which is common to the virtues without applying in any way 
to'-the-Gifts, or conversely. r'Note here the common Thomistic term 
convenientia. What is its significance ? He is not just playing 
with words but, as we shall see, is"searching for clarity of'expres- 
sion which will fittingly and accurately describe the range of prin- 
ciples in man's `activity. r' 
The distinction between the Gifts and the virtues was first 
affirmed by Philip the Chancellor only a generation before Thomas. 
l 
The distinction which'he is defending, "therefore, does not'go'back 
very far in the tradition, even though Thomas himself seems to claim, 
for example in the sed contra, that it has a venerable antiquity. 
This lack of historical perspective on the part of the scholastics 
is one of their major weaknesses, and is so alien'to our on general 
cultural awareness since the rise of scientific history in the 19th 
century. Nevertheless we should hold back from a patronising atti- 
tude because the matter is not quite so simple. The general ques- 
tion of the relationship between the Gifts and the virtues goes back 
to Anselm of Leon in the beginning of the 12th century, 
2 but the 
problem took on a new dimension and a new urgency only a generation 
before Thomas, in the 1220s, in Paris, with the introduction of an 
Aristotelian notion of virtue. This threw into flux all earlier 
1. O'Connor, p. 5, footnote "f". ' 2. O'Connor, p. 100. 
-15- 
attempts to state this . relationship. 
I What Thomas and his contempo- 
raries are attempting to do is to re-establish such a relationship 
but now within a whole new conceptual framework. Our present con- 
cern of the theology of the Gifts is a minor area within a problem 
which Thomas is so often, and quite rightly, identified with; namely, 
how Christian theology is to absorb valid, insights from outside, itself. 
It might be as well to note here that it is possible to, sepa- 
rate out three stages in scholastic thought on the relationship be- 
tween the Gifts and the virtues. The first, up to the time of the 
writing of the Sentences by Lombard, understands the Gifts as pre- 
ceeding the virtues; the second, from roughly 1150 to-the end of 
the century, when, following Lombard, the Gifts and virtues are seen 
as identical: and the third, up to the 1270s where the Gifts are 
understood as subsequent to the. virtues. By. Thomas' time this latter 
view was almost universally accepted and he is arguing in this context. 
2 
1. See below chapter 3.2. O'Connor, pp. 102,103,108-109. 
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(d) The State of the Question . 
(Paragraphs 2.. 3 and 4) 
Thomas presents a status gvaestionis. This is not a catalogue 
of all that has been said on this topic, but is a summary of various 
views analysed along the main approaches and the main dualities of 
scholastic thought. The first is an attempt in terms of metaphy- 
sics based on the duality of reason and will. The second one uses 
the auctoritates and is played out along the theme of purgative and 
perfective powers; a negative dimension of resistance to sin and a 
positive one of the actions of the virtues. The third takes Scrip- 
ture as its starting point and distinguishes virtues and Gifts in 
terms of moral philosophy and Revelation; the merely natural and 
the super-natural. 
This status Quaestionis is not to be taken with too much em- 
phasis: according to Lottin, such prefaces to the magisterial utter- 
ance were common form. 
1 Nevertheless, if this summary of views is 
not unique in form it still has its interest, even in terms of its 
form, in'that it is so short. Although he makes no claims to be 
exhaustive, Thomas has Hissed out some important views. 
2 It is a 
schematic presentation rather than a catalogue. The Summa is, 
after all, a basic text-book for beginners. Why these three exam- 
ples ? There is actually a fourth which he mentions at the very 
end of the corpus : 
'Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perfi- 
ciunt hominers ad altiores actus quam eint actus 
virtutem. ' 
1. On the Gifts of the Spirit, see P. et M., IIIe, ch. XVI, 
pp. 329-456; Eabourdette, col. 1616.2. For example, that the 
Gifts are prior to the virtues, (Anselm of Laon), or subsequent to 
them, (Stephen Langton). On the different lay-out of the status 
quaestionis in the Commentary see A. Gardeil, 'bans du Saint-Esprit, 
1. Partie doctrinale et speculative', Dictionnaire de theologie cat- 
holigue IV, col. 1774. 
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This is a position he himself accepted prior to the writing of the 
Summa and which he is still prepared to, accept in. the terms of his 
new exposit: on. 
1 But let us first look more closely at these three. 
The first is an argument based on, metaphysics. 
ý.... po: suerunt quod dona perficiebant libernm 
arbitrium secundum auod est facultas rationis, 
virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas volun- 
tatis .... 1 
This first argument raises the important element of libernm arbitrium. 
As we have already seen in the overview of the Prima Secundae above, 
this is one of the major underlying presuppositions of the Seunda 
Pars, although Thomas has discussed it already in Prima Pars, q. 83. 
Perhaps merely to see its relationship to the Prima Secundae and to 
the matter in hand., the following quotation might suffice of Thomas' 
view of liberum arbitriumin Ia, q. 83, a. 1, ad. 3um. 
'... liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia 
homo per liberum, arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. ' 
And, farther, from Ia, q. 83, a. 4 : 
... et liberurn arbitrium, quod nihil, aliud eat 
quarr via electiva. ' 
We'xill see later that Thomas' mature presentation of the intercon- 
nections of Reason and Will differs from the rather unsophisticated 
"black-and White" presentation here. At this point Thomas merely 
has to point out the inadequacy of this approach within its-own 
terms. His own positive exposition of the intellectual Gifts will 
be within a much more complex and subtle analysis of man's freedom. 
It is, after all, man's freedom which is the point at issue here. 
The shape of the presentation might make us think that we are only 
1. For the development of Thomas' own thought, see O'Connor 
pp. 110-131. On the scholarly and historical problems associated 
with the last line of the text see below p. 100 on the change in 
Thomas' thought between the Commentary and the Summa. 
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watching the scholastics playing with the building-blocks of their 
trade but the matter in reality is far more serious. Although Tho- 
mas will not accept the reasoning offered here, he will agree that 
the Gifts - all of them - perfect the power of "free choice", 1libe- 
rum arbitrium). If he can show this, then both philosophically and 
theologically, the Gifts are of major concern and are not peripheral. 
Thomas here is not attacking any one theologian. All the 
scholastics, including himself, accepted the distinction between 
the four intellectual Gifts and the three others, and actually all 
agree that this distinction cannot be used as. a lever to separate 
the Gifts and the virtues. 
2 The point of producing the argument 
here is to rule out a superficially attractive but inevitably un- 
fruiful line of approach and to raise issues which will need to be 
dealt with in a satisfactory solution. 
The second argument is based on Patristic authority. 
'Quidam Vero, considerantes quod Gregorius licit ... I 
The second approach begins with the presentation of an auctoritas, 
Gregory the Great, Nor is it just by chance that Gregory is men- 
tioned here and not some other authority; his Gloss on Job and his 
Gloss on Ezekiel were the two most important focal points for the 
discussion of the Gifts. Augustine's De Sermone Domini in Monte 
and a small quotation from Ambrose's De Spiritu Sancto -(quoted as 
3 
the sed contra of article 6), were two other important texts. 
-- 1. For example, 
Philip the Chancellor, see text cited in 
Lottin, P. et M., III, p. 366.2. For example, William of Aux- 
ere, see text cited in Lottin, P. et M., III2 p. 345, and, arguing 
for the identity of the Gifts and the virtues, Praepositinus of 
Cremona, ibid., p. 339. No author ever seriously questioned this 
distinction, although Philip the Chancellor raised the possibility 
of it, but only dialectically, O'Connor, p. 7, refering to Lottin, 
P. et M., III, p. 362.3. F. Vandenbrouke, in D. S. XXII, col. 
/ 
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Ambrose's text was very important for the Lombard who used it to , 
affirm the identity of the virtues with the Gifts, but Thomas uses . 
it, in article 6, to explain the continuation of the Gifts in hea- 
ven; of these authoritative texts it is the least important for 
Thomas. As for Augustine, his influence is dominant in the over- 
all structuring of questions 68,69 and 70, rather than in the in- 
ternal argument of q. 68. His rhetorical device of linking the - 
Gifts with the Beatitudes - to which St Albert had added the Fruits 
of the Spirits - controlled Thomas' exposition at this point in the 
Sumcna. I But as regards q. 68, it is undoubtedly Gregory who is the M 
authority that Thomas has to contend with. A bare list of the times 
that Gregory is cited makes this clear. A list which is all the 
more striking in that there is not a single reference to Gregory in 
q. 69 or q. 70 - Augustine and Ambrose are used there. 
. Question 68, 
article one: objection one : Moralia 1.272 The gifts referred 
to as virtues 
sed contra : Moralia 11.49 
corpus : Moralia II. 49 our present text. 
article two: objection three: Moralia-II. 49 the preventative` 
role of the Gifts. 
article three: objection one: Moralia-II. 56 only in the Mediator 
does the Spirit abide 
for ever. 
abjection three : Homil. in Ezech. I. 1 the spirit of prophecy 
is not-always present 
in the prophets. 
i(con). 1588, gives a slightly fuller list regarding Augustine: 
De Sermone Domine in Monte, I., 3,10; II., 11,38 PL 34,39-40. 
Cuaestiones Evangeliorum, I., 8, PL 35. 
De Doctrina Christiana, II., 7,9-11, PL 34; 39-40. 
Gregory: Moralia in Iob, I., 27,38,32,44-45,48, PL 75,544,547-549. 
II., 49,76-78, and 56,89, PL 75,592-593,597. 
Ambrose: De Spiritu Sancto, I., 16,156-159,, PL 16,740. 
1. O'Connor, pp. 90-92 includes a translation of this impor- 
tau t text. - On St Albert., ibid., p. 107. ' 2. The references are 
taken from O'Connor where the reference to tae can also be found. 
-20- 
ad prim= : Moralia II. 56 
article five: objection three: Moralia 1.32 
Gregory himself answers 
this. In essential Gifts 
the Spirit abides in the 
Elect. 
Interconnections of Gifts 
and virtues. 
ad tertium : ibid. Gregory makes his posi- 
tion clear, in a passage 
before this quotation. 
sed contra : ibid the Gifts are intercon- 
nected. 
article six : objection one : Moralia I. 32 Nate how Thomas para- 
phrases Gregory, and 
objection two : ibid uses the term 'Gift' 
which is not in his text. 
objection three: Moralia VI. 37 
ad primum 




It is noteworthy that Gregory is not mentioned in either article 
four or article seven where the questions relate more directly to 
the relevant passage in Isaiah. 
article sight:. bbjection two : Moralia II. 49 Thomas inserts "id est 
donis". 
objection three: Moralia I. 35 The virtues are superior 
to the Gifts., 
corpus .,: 
Mo_ 1.27 Thomas inserts "id est 
septem dons. ". 
ad'tertium : 'Et hoc est Quod Gregorius dicere intendit' 
It is this last reference which is most illuminating: et hoc 
est Quod Gregorius dicere intendit; 'this is what Gregory means to 
say'. Thomas' tactics here are quite clear but if we briefly look 
at the other examples we might see something of how he wrestles with 
the auctoritas of Gregory. In the answers to the objections in art- 
icles three, and five, he uses Gregory's own text against the quota- 
tions taken from it. In other words, he appeals to a wider reading 
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of Gregory. This is not just the obvious point it might seem, given 
that Scholastics relied on florilegia as moderns rely on secondary 
sources: he is basically only saaring that the texts are taken out 
of context. The references in articles six and eight, ` however, lead 
us on to the crux of*the problem, which is that Thomas wants to re- 
read a patristic authority within the terminological framework of 
scholasticism. Gregory nowhere uses the term 'Gift' and its special 
scholastic reference to our present topic arose only with the Carolin- 
gian theologians. 
1 Similarly Gregory does not use the term 'vir- 
tue' Kith the scientific rigour and the Aristotelian reference of 
the thirteenth century Scholastics: nor does he use it to refer to 
faith, hope and charity but only to the cardinal virtues. Hence it 
is in his own anachronistic terminology that Thomas paraphrases Gre= 
gory in the first objection of article six: 
'Dicit enim Gregorius quod Spiritus Sanctus contra 
singula tentamenta septem-DONIS erudit mentem. '. 
And in article eight, the second objection, admits his eisegesis: 
... et sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus (id- est. DONIS) temperat ... 
What conclusions are we to draw from this ? One obvious 
point is that Thomas is working within a tradition. He is not the 
first to tackle the problem of the Gifts and, like his predecessors 
and contemporaries, he begins by confronting the accepted auctoritas. 
Scholasticism arose out of trying to find theological coherence in 
the collections of patristic and scriptural texts which had been 
preserved and collated in the Carolingian period and again'in the 
Renaissance of the 12th century. The authority accredited to the 
"Sancti" of the Patristic' period was such that the Scholastics rarely 
1. O'Connor, p. 94. 
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found the courage to fault them directly. We are bound to find 
this subservience dismaying at times but, nevertheless, it cannot 
just be written off as intellectual cowardice. The Church had acc- 
epted that the Fathers and Doctors of the Church had reached various 
insights into the mystery of God's working with men in Christ. The 
Scholastics accepted this but were not content with just a collec- 
tion of such insights - as had their Carolingian forerunners - but 
aimed for a systematic and coherent corpus of such truth. It was 
in this way. that the scientia of sacra doctrina, of theology was born. 
The tools, of, this scientific theology of the Schools - in contrast to 
the lectio divina of, the monasteries1, - were philosophical; and thus 
the science of philosophy was reborn. 
The Scholastics are quite rightly not noted for their sensi- 
tivity to language. Their language is almost mathematical in its 
limited and technical vocabulary. Yet this exact and stunted ter- 
minology grew up precisely out of an awareness of the complexity of 
language; out of the recognition that the 'Saints' and 'Authorities' 
did use different expressions to formulate similar insights into the 
mysteries of the faith. What the Scholastics lacked above all was 
a historical sense. Where they could, they read back into the texts - 
often just snippets and quotations collected in florilegia - 
their own questions and presuppositions: where they could not, they 
had to use their considerable philosophical and semantic talents to 
re-read them in conformity with the thrust of their own theological 
expositions. The underlying concern of the Scholastics was to pre- 
sent in a scientific way the sometimes poetic insights of the Fathers. 
Hence that peculiar -'but not unusual - combination of logic, allegory 
1. On this, see J. Leclercq, The Loge of Learning and the 
Desire for God, tr. C. Misrahi, 1961. On Gregory in particular in 
this Monastic Culture, see chapter 2, pp. 33-44. 
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and mathematics we find in article eight: 
... Linde Gregorius dicit quod neaue ad 
denarii per- 
fectionem septem filii, (id est septem done 2rr- 
veniunt, nisi in fide, spe et caritate fuerit omne 
cauod aEunt. 9 
And in the sed contra to article five: 
'Sed contra est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit. 
dicens, Illud in hoc-filiorum convivio perscrutan- 
dum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem pascunt. Per 
Eilios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designantur 
dona Spiritus Sancti. Ergo dona Spiritus Sancti 
sunt connexa, per hoc quod se invicem reficiunt. '. 
Thomas was working in a tradition of scholarship then, and, 
in regard to our present question, the tradition focused on Gregory. 
All the Scholastics developed their theories of the Gifts by ques- 
tioning the meaning of Gregory's allegorical expositions. 
1 John of 
La Rochelle's anachronistic paraphrase can be taken as typical: 
'Sancti distinguunt inter virtutes et done. Unde 
Gregorius Tobit in Glossa distinguit ibi 7 filios 
Iob intelligens 7 dona, per tres filias tres vir- 
tutes theological, per quatuor angulos auatuor vir- 
tutes cardinales; *ergo vid'etur quod non sunt idem 
done quod virtutes ... ' 
(2) 
It is interesting to note that 'dona', 'virtutes theologicas' and 
'virtutes cardinales' are all technical theological concepts of the 
13th century read back into the patristic text. 
3 
Thomas, working within this tradition is bound to come to 
terms with the authority of Gregory. 
4 He is not arguing against 
Gregory directly but against possible contemporary interpretations 
of Gregory which will clash with his own theory. -It is necessary 
1. Lottin, P. at M., III,; Allan of Lille, p. 333; Pre- 
vostin of Cremona, pp 340; Stephen Langtai, pp. 341-2; Gode- 
froid of Poitiers, p. 343; William of Auxerre, p. 347; Hugh of 
St Cher, pp. 352-354; Philip the Chancellor, pp. 361,362,364-365, 
370; Alexander of Hales, p. 347; Ogdon Rigaud, pp. 390-395; Bona- 
venture, p. 403; Richard Fishacre, p. 407; Bombolognus of Bologna, 
pp. 418-423.2. ibid., p. 381.3. O'Connor, p. 100. 
4. On Gregory's own thought on the Gifts, see D. T. C., t. I7, pt. II, 
col-1765 and D. S., fasc. XMII-XXIII, 'Dons de S. Esprit', col. 1587. 
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for Thomas to show how the older texts from the Moralia are-to be 
re-read alongside his newer text-book, thus pre-empting appeals back 
to Gregory against his own position. To a large extent the prob- 
lem is one of terminology for Thomas, and the scholastic apparatus 
of objections and answers is sometimes used solely for providing 
terminological clarity - thus the answers in a. 5, ad. 3um., and a. 6, 
ad. lum. Despite the great respect, almost subservient, to authori- 
ties, this dialectic does allow the scholastic room to develop his 
own insights within the old wine-skins of the tradition. - We can 
take O'Connor's summary as our own: 
'Thomas' work was on the one hand, deeply rooted 
in tradition and, on the other hand, so original 
that it revolutionised the theological approach to the Gifts. ' (1) 
To return now to the immediate reference to Gregory before 
us, Philip the Chancellor was most responsible for the development 
of this particular elaboration of Gregory's text, although Hugh of 
St Victor, much earlier, had suggested something simi. lar. 
2 
... dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur ad bene operan- dum, done vero ad resistendum tentationibus. Sed 
nee ista distinctio sufficit. ' 
What we have here is a theory playing with a basic duality of medie- 
val thought: the virtues produce good actions, the Gifts prevent 
bad ones. It is a theory that occurred to most writers but none 
of them accepted it as a valid way of distinguishing Gifts from vir- 
tues. 3 There were several variations on the theme however, inclu- 
ding an attractive one from Bonaventure who suggested that the Gifts 
healed the effects of sin. 
4 The problem with this attractive theory, 
1. O'Connor, p. 93.2. O'Connor pp. 102-104 and p. 101; 
Lottin, P. et M., pa 362,364-365,370,371" 3. O'Connor, pp. 6-7, 
footnote 'h'. 4. O'Connor, p. 104. 
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e 
as Thomas points out is that it either undermines the significance 
of the virtues - 
'Quia etiam virtutes tentationibus resistunt, induc - 
entibus ad peccata quae contrariantur virtutibus: 
unumquodque enim resistit"naturaliter suo contrario. ' - 
- or, given this understanding of the virtues, makes the Gifts re- 
dundant. Thomas has a stronger role for both the virtues and the 
Gifts: he will present both as having perfective and purgative roles. 
The reference to charity here is again not insignificant. It hints 
at Thomas' positive development of this central infused virtue as 
'in-forming' all the virtues and Gifts. 
1 
The third approach is based on scripture and develops in three 
stages. The first is the interpretation of the Isaiah text as a 
Messianic prophecy: it follows from this that the text should first 
be applied to Christ, and then, only through Christ, to Christians. 
'Alai vero considerantes quod ista dona traduntur 
in Scriptura. secundum quod fuercnt in Christo, 
ut patet Isa ... ' 
Secondly, it is then put forward that the Gifts are given to conform 
men to Christ whereas the virtues relate to conforming men to the 
standards of human morality, 'ad bens oDeranduml. 
'... diaernnt quod virtutes ordinantur simpliciter 
ad bene operandum; sed done ordinantur ad hoc ut 
per ea conformeniur Christo ... 
This is the weak point of what seems to be a simple and attractive 
argument. It presents a great rift between human morality and 
Christian morality. Now obviously the two are not"identical - 
martyrdom for the faith shows that - but Thomas will not allow that 
'nature' and (supernaturel are, as it were, two layers, one on top 
1. article 8, ad. 3tun. , but 'also IIaIIae, q. 23 and chapter 9, below on Charity and the Gift of Wisdom. 
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of the other. As opposed to this simple picture, Thomas will hold, 
firstly, that by 'virtue' he includes the theological virtues as 
well as the cardinal virtues; secondly, that these latter, the 
cardinal virtues are re-structured by grace; and, thirdly, that 
the Gifts gear up man's whole moral being into a new projection. 
For Thomas, it is not just that grace perfects and does not destroy 
nature; it does not just 'lie on top' of nature but perfects it from 
within. Hence the whole theme of the Christian life as a conforma- 
tion to Christ is much more complex than the position given here. 
The third stage of the argument narrows the emphasis. The 
Gifts are said to relate to conformity to Christ specifically re- 
garding his suffering. 
1 
I... praecipue quantum ad ea quae passus est, quia 
in passione. eins praecipue huiusmodi dona resplen- 
duerunt. ' 
Thomas' reply to this is that various virtues as well as Gifts were 
manifest in Christ's passion; his humility,, his meekness and above 
all, his love. - -Hence,, the Gifts and the virtues cannot be isolated 
in this way. 
, 
1... hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. ' 
This third approach, though inadequate, has thrown out some 
important elements which,, as in a kaleidoscope, are not yet in a 
fixed-pattern, but which, nonetheless are suggestive of a rich theo- 
logical development. Bonaventure and Philip the Chancellor, among 
others$2 accepted the position outlined here, and Thomas himself 
3 
will, give an exposition of the grace of Christ in the tertia pars. 
But by that time, Thomas will have completed his philosophical psy- 
1. see Lottin, III, PP. 361,378,389,401,417,444. 
2. O'Connor, PP. 103-105.3. De gratis unionis, q. 2-6; de 
gratia eins secundum guod est singularis homo, q. 7; de gratia eius 
secundum cuod est cäput Ecclesiae, q. 8. 
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chology of man as the 'Image of God'. '! ' His theology, moreover, 
unlike Bonaventure's, is theocentric and not Christocentric. 
2 
This is not to disparage the unique role of Christ but to give jus- 
'tice to the mysteriousness both of God and of man. In this schema, 
Christ is not seer3as the answer to questions which man never asked, 
but as the way, the truth, and the life by which man, as the image 
of God, returns with more than his own fullness to his source, God. 
'Quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae 
doctrinae est Deicognitionem tradere, et non 
solem secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secun- 
dum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, 
et specialiter rationes creaturae ... ... ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo 
tractabimus de Deo; secundo de motu rationalis 
creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui sec- 
undum quod homo via est nobis tendendi in Deum. *' (3) 
The Christocentrism of Bonaventure, Hugh of St Victor, or of modern 
theologians is attractive but, in the Summa, is left to the Tertia Pars, 
and is there located within a greater theocentric vision. Our pre- 
sent task remains with a less elevated analysis of the God-given moti- 
vations within man. 
One theme which this third approach has exposed is the one 
of whether the Gifts relate to man's passivity rather than to his 
activity. Philip the Chancellor had presented the role of the Gifts 
4 
as rectifying man in the things which he had to endure or suffer. 
He could do this because not only are Gifts like Fear or Fortitude 
passive, but, in an Aristotelian sense: Understanding is a passio, 
and Wisdom is a 'savouring' of Divine Truth. Nov Thomas will say 
5 
a great deal which sounds similar to this but it is important to 
1. Introduction to the IaIIae - see above p. 3.2. For 
a good discussion of this see Gilby, vol 48, Introduction by R. J. Hen- 
'nassey, esp. p., xv. 3. Ia, q. 2 introduction. 4. O'Connor, 
p. 104.5. ibid., footnote. 
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make it clear that he is saying something quite different. For him., 
the Gifts are principles of action in man. Their passivity relates 
to their origin not to their function. They are receptivities by 
which man acts. They are not principles of endurance. 
That the discussion above has been disjointed cannot be denied. 
We have followed the text, lifting up phrases like stones to see what 
lies underneath them. In doing this we have followed a method which 
Thomas himself, as an educator, disapproved of; we have not followed 
the ordo discipline: 
ý... non traduntur secundum ordinem discipline, sea 
secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel 
secandum quod se praebebat occasio disputandi; par- 
tim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio et fasti- 
dium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum. ' (1) 
The path will be clearer from now on as we move to Thomas' positive 
exposition of his case. Nevertheless, we have discovered something 
of the dimensions of the context within which he was working. 
1. Introduction to the Summa. 
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(e) Thomas' answer to the question: Insuiratio autem significat quandam 
motionem ab exterior. 
We now turn to the kernel of the question: Thomas' positive 
exposition of the nature of the Gifts. I will first paraphrase the 
argument state by stage. This is a dangerous procedure in that the 
paraphrase may cover up important complications in the text, but it 
seems best to get a simple over-all picture, and then to look in de- 
tail at'the various parts of the text itself. 
The argument takes place in two stages - marked by two para- 
graphs in the Gilby edition. 
1. (A) To distinguish the Gifts from the virtues we ought to fol- 
low Scripture's own terminology and we find in Isaiah that 
the text speaks of "spirits" and not "gifts". 
(B) By this use of the term "spirits" the text would seem to 
make us understand that the seven Gifts are in us by div- 
ine "inspiration". 
(C) Now by "in-- spiration" we understand a motto coming from 
outside man. 'Inspiratio, autem significat guandam motio- 
nem ab exteriori. ' 
(D) There are two principles of motio in man; one is intrin- 
sic to him, reason, and one is extrinsic to him, God. 
The Gifts, therefore, relate to that motio which is ext- 
rinsic to man, God, as the virtues relate to that which 
is intrinsic to him, reason. 
I the Mt attested to translate motio because I wish to draw attention 
to its central significance and because I intend to devote a later 
chapter specifically to it. In section (D) I have slightly elabo- 
rated and extended Thomas' own treatment by anticipating what follows 
in the second argument. This second argument can be seen as exa- 
mining in what particular way the Gifts and the virtues relate, res- 
pectively, to God and to human reason. This argument too is in two 
parts: first a general metaphysical argument and then its particular 
application. 
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Z. (1). (ß) For a thing to be moved it must be in some relationship 
with the thing which moves it. 
(B) It will be moved "well" by that which moves it in as 
much as it is in disposition to be moved by that mover. 
ý. ' (C) The "higher" the mover., the more perfect must this dis- 
position be in relation to the mover. 
Now this series of statements bristles with difficulties. It pre- 
supposes a whole metaphysical system which is alien to us and which 
we need to examine. In (A) I have used the loose term "relation- 
ship" to gloss over what Thomas might mean by the "proportion" neces- 
sary between mover and moved, but this is obviously the key to an 
understanding. It is in the light of this "proportion" that the 
term "disposition" in (B) is to be understood and the phrase "to be 
moved well" must therefore mean more than successfully, but with 
ease, with fluency, without violence, "proportionately". But if 
the term "proportion" is the key, what can "higher" mean in (C) ? 
presumably, another sort of proportionality between the moved and 
an "unusual" mover ?A sort of proportionality which does not come 
into play in the "usual" relationship between this moved and its 
usual movers ? But these are all points we shall look at later, 
let us carry on to try to grasp an over-all view of the argument. - 
There now follows the application of the argument of 2. (1). to what 
was presented in argument 1. 
2. (2). (A) The human virtues perfect man as it is in his nature to 
be moved by reason in the things he does both interiorly 
and exteriorly. 
(B) In the same way the Gifts perfect man to be moved by God 
by giving him dispositions to be moved by this higher 
mover. 
(C) The Gifts dispose man to be moved readily, (prompte mo- 
bile) by divine inspirations. 
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Section 2. (2). (A), appears to relate to man as moved within the pro- 
portionality of his reason-directed movements: part (B) relates to 
the "unusual" proportionality of man as moved by the "higher" mover, 
God: and part (C), referring back to section 2. (1). (C), presents the 
Gifts as making man perfectly open to such movements so that he is 
. moved prompte 
Argument One 
- Thomas breaks the log-jam of terminology by moving the dis- 
cussion away from the term "Gift" on to the term "spiritus". - This 
is a decisive shift. By jumping from "Gift" to "spirit"-he can ., 
now jump from "spirit" to "in-spiration" and from there to the im- 
portant phrase 'motio ab exteriori', the solid ground of his theory 
and the very heart of the matter. Before moving on there, however, 
let us first examine Thomas' 'log-jumping! skill. 
'Debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae ... ' 
Thomas quite accurately claims Scriptural support for his first move. 
He is, after all, a Master of the Sacred Page and has, by this stage 
in his career lectured or provided a commentary on most of the New 
Testament and much of the Old Testament. But the break-through 
here cannot be accounted for merely as the recognition of a hitherto 
unnoticed detail in Isaish's text. The whole mood of his later theo- 
logy reflects the type of change taking place here. Many conanen- 
tators on Thomas have noticed a change in his later works from a 
static notion of grace to a more dynamic one; a shift in emphasis 
from created grace to untreated grace., to put it in other words. 
1 
We are witnessing such a change here in the move from ! don=' to 
3. 
I 
1. see below, chapter 
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°motio ab exteriori". An Aristotelian philosophy of motion will 
be used to develop this, as we shall see in a following chapter. 
I 
It is the present writer's contention that this opening reference 
to Scripture is'not idle or peripheral. Thomas' insight into the 
dynamism of grace was developed by his use of Aristotelian physics 
but it has its roots in a deeper penetration of the New Testament 
Writers, notably Paul and John, and of the Patristic writers, espec- 
sally the later Augustine. 2 In this wider understanding of Scrip- 
ture Thomas could now find greater significance in the exact words 
of the'Isaiah prophecy. For the time being, let these assertions 
stand, the point at the moment is merely to pause to allow some dig- 
nity to-this opening phrase; it may be that it is not just a pious 
overlay to a philosophical transposition but a hint of a new reading 
of Scripture as a whole and the dynamism attributed to the Spirit in 
both Paul and the Old Testament. 
Given that the term in Isaiah is "spiritus", a simple reading 
of the text, Thomas claims, leads us directly to the notion of in- 
spiration. 
ffEr quibus verbis manifeste datur intellegi quod ista 
septem ... Bunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. ' 
it is it so 'manifestly' clear ? For the young Thomas, in the 
early commentary on Isaiah, it did not lead so clearly on to this 
line of thought. 
3 At that early stage he immediately understood 
the Gifts of "Spirits" as 'aids to the virtues', as had Albert and 
4 Philip the Chancellor before him. Then the text was slotted into 
an existing entitative theology of grace; now it is being used to 
introduce a quite different approach. 
1. Below chapter 6.2. Below p. 72-ff. 3. For the evi- 
dence of an early date for this Commentary on Isaiah, see O'Connor, 
p. 110.4. ibid. 
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The key to this new approach is "inspiratio", which he imme- 
diately develops as 'motto ab exteriori'. What lies behind this 
term inspiratio ? It is interesting to note the fact that after 
this first article of question 68, Thomas never uses this term again 
in. relation to the Gifts. Instead he replaces it with the term 
instinctus. Like a key, Thomas uses "inspiratio" to open up the 
question and then he has no further use for it. Its main use here 
is to move the discussion on to the metaphysical principle of Rrnotio 
ab exteriori". What is more, as a common and well established term, 
in theological usage, he is using the known and familiar to introduce 
the unknown and unfamiliar. This latter is O'Connor's view in an 
Appendix he dedicates solely to this change in terminology, 
1 
'After a minute examination of the way Thomas uses - fr these terms, my conclusion is that instinctus was 
chosen in order not to specify in any way whatso- 
ever the nature of the Holy Spirit's action. In- 
spiratio, the term traditionally used for the ac- 
tion of spirits upon man, designated a type of 
action ...... Instinctus, however, does not desig- 
nate a type of action at all. It refers to that 
by which an action is provoked or elicited. In 
present context, it does not designate the action 
of the Holy Spirit directly, but only indirectly, 
as that which somehow initiated the human action 
under consideration. Moreover, it is free from 
all associations with which the term inspiratio 
has been coloured by a long theologicalytradition 
about divine (and diabolical) inspirations. 
Hence when a man is said to act by the instinctus 
of the Holy Spirit, all that this means, so far 
as the force of the word is concerned (we are not 
concerned here with the doctrine), is that the 
action was brought about by the influence of the 
Holy Spirit, Nothing whatsoever is specified 
about the nature of the influence, or the form it 
has taken, e. g. whether it was an impulse, invita- 
tion, illumination, strengthening, or the like. ' (2) 
What O'Connor does not mention here, is that the term instinctus 
also probably occurred in the text Thomas used of the-2e Bona 
1. O'Connor, pp. 131-142, especially pp. 131-132. 
2. O'Connor, p 131-132. 
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Fortuna. 1 We will look at the term instinctus again when we deal 
with the influence of that book. 
So Thomas' log-jumping is not totally finished when he arrives 
at inspiratio; another leap will take place when he replaces ins i- 
ratio with instinctus. For the moment, however, inspiratio allows 
Thomas to enter into the first major stage of his exposition. 
'Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab 
., exteriors. 
Est enim considerandum quod in hom- 
ine est duplex principium movens; unum quidem 
. interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, 
quod est Deus ... 
... Manifestum eat autem quod virtutes huýnanae 
perficiunt hominem secund m quod homo natus est 
movers per rationem in his quae interius vel ex- 
_ 
terius agit. Oportet igitur in esse homini al- 
tiores perfections secundum quas sit dispositus 
ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et ista per- 
fectiones vocantur dona: non solum quia infun-; 
duntur a Deo; quia sed secundum ea homo dispo- 
nitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspira- 
tione divina. ' 
Whereas other Scholastics, as we have seen, tried to analyse the 
relationship between the virtues and the Gifts in terms of the facul- 
ties of reason and will, or of perfective and purgative virtues, or 
in terms of. nature and super-nature; Thomas uses his metaphysical 
structure-of the two principles of motio in man. 
2 Having already, 
by this stage in the Prima Secundae, established the nature of the 
virtues, he can use them as a pattern to explore the nature of the 
Gifts as counterparts within a different ordering - hence just as 
the virtues are habitus, so are the Gifts, but not in the order of 
3 
reasoning but of receptivity. Then, _in 
the Secunda Secundae, 
having already established the nature of the Gifts, he can unite 
1. O'Connor, pp. 144-145, see below p. 164 . 2. First 
mentioned in the important articles, which we shall examine below, 
IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4 and a. 6. Also IaIIae, q. 49 intro. Fully dis- 
cussed in IaIIae, q. 90 - q. 114.3. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 3. 
-35- 
virtues and Gifts in the dynamism of the Christian life under grace. 
1 
Together they will account for the perfection of man's activity and 
receptivity under grace. 
As for the internal principle of man's motto, our over-view 
of the Prima Secundae, 
2 has shown that it is a basic axiom of Tho- 
mas' philosophy that man's autonomy is based in his reason. It is 
as a free-agent, by the exercise of his intellect and his intellec- 
tual appetite, the will, that man images God. 
'Ouia sicut Damascenus dicit homo factus ad imagi- 
nem Dei dicitur secundum cuod per imaginem signi- 
ficatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per 
se potestativum. ' (3) 
To talk about men's iitellectuality is to talk about his freedom; 
to talk about man as he is a 'self-mover', an autonomous agent and 
not merely a passive recipient of "movement'. Thomas has spent 
the latter part of the Prima Pars and most of the Secunda Pars ana- 
lysing the ramifications of man's intrinsic principle of motio. 
Now, with the Gifts, he is pointing out that this is not the fall 
analysis of man's being. Within - and that must be stressed - with- 
in man's freedom of thought, action and will.. there is not a single 
principle of man's autonomy but another principle of motto, an ex- 
trinsic principle., 'quod est Deus'. The question of what this means 
will occupy'- us for some time to come. 
Argument Two: part one; the general metaphysical structure. 
'Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur 
necesse est proportionatuin esse motori; et 
haec est perfectio mobilis inquantum est 
mobile, dispositio. qua disponitur ad hoc 
quod bene moveatur a suo motore. ' 
What does Thomas mean by this 'proportionality' which must exist 
1. See below, sectth three, p. 223ff 2. see above pp. 3-6.3. IaIIae, 
Introduction. 
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between the-mover and the moved ? It does not seem as if he means 
more than a certain kind of relationship. 
1 In Ia, q. 12, a. 1 in the 
fourth objection, Thomas uses similar language of proportionality 
fait, in this case, regarding the proportionality necessary between 
knower and known. 
'Praterea, cognoscentis ad cognitum opertet esse 
aliquam proportionem, cum cognitum sit perfectio 
cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio intellec- 
tus creati ad Deum; quia in infinitum distant. 
Ergo intellectus creates non potest videre es- 
sentiam Dei. ' 
Thomas replies: 
'Ad quartum dicendum, quod proportio dicitur dup- 
liciter. Uno modo certa habitudo unius quanti - 
tatis ad alteram secundum quod duplum, triplum 
et aequale aunt species proportionis. Alio modo 
quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio 
dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae 
ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus 
ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum: et secundum 
hoc intellectus creatus proportionatus esse pot- 
eat ad cognoscendum Deum. ' 
It seems as-if it is in this second sense that we are to understand 
0 
'proportionality' - 'any kind of relationship which one thing may 
have to another' - but here we are to understand it within'the terms 
of movement. If this is so, then he appears to be saying no more 
than that we can account for why a tree is uprooted by a strong gale 
but not by a gentle breeze by talking in terms of the different re- 
lations between them. 
But there is, however, something more, and this becomes clear 
when we look at the term dispositio. 2 This relates to the relation- 
ship the moved thing has towards the mover in an actual motion. To 
talk about the 'perfection' of a motion is not to say that one action 
ja-tree fal}. ing)_is more perfect than another (a train moving) but ' 
1. See on I roportionality', IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4, ad7,3 and Ia, q. 80, a. 2. 
2. In Aristotle, %06 
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refers to. the particular motion as such - the train will move better 
if it is in good working order, the tree will fall with less effort 
if it is rotten. To put it in Thomas' terms: the perfection of the 
mobile qua mobile, (and in no other respect), depends on its disoositio 
to be moved by this particular mover. Dispositio is the key factor 
in this analysis of motion. A well-oiled piece of machinery is bet- 
ter, as a moving piece of machinery, than a rusty one: a more recep- 
tive listener will be more open to new insights than a bored or anta- 
gonistic listener. It is difficult for us to grasp how Thomas can 
use this-analysis in terms of motio and dispositio to cover such a 
wide range as natural changes, planned effects and emotional states 
and human understanding, but that is what he does. For him this ana- 
lysis isýall-embracing. Where the notion of proportionality comes 
in, is that a 'mobile' may be 'well-disposed' in proportion to one 
type of mover but not to another. The Gifts will be seen as habitus 
which provides the 'dispositio= in man for movement by the divine 
external principle of his motto. The virtues provide the disoositio 
within the proportionality of his reason-directed motio but not in 
regard to this external-principle. 
Thomas' argument continues: 
'Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est 
quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportio- 
netur ... I 
'The higher the mover the more perfect must be the disposition by 
which the mobile is proportioned to it'. Why should this be so ? 
And what does 'higher' mean here ? anhat has to be assumed to make 
this contention valid ? It might, after all, -be suggested that the 
more powerful the mover is, the less important is the dispositio of 
the thing moved. A very strong wind can destroy both healthy and 
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rotten trees alike: and the faith which can move mountains needs 
no element of mobility in the mountains themselves. What is Tho- 
mas assuming to such an extent that he gives no place at all to such 
a viewpoint ? 
What is presupposed, is a whole cosmology already sketched 
out in the Prima Pars and in book three of the Summa Contra Gentiles. 
God's Providence governs all creatures without exception and without 
any possibility of frustration. But this Providence does not work 
violently but as a harmony through the natural workings of the God- 
given natures in creation. And this harmony is not just one bet- 
ween God and his creation but, within creation, is hierarchical in 
structure. 
'- 'Higher' causes give 'lower' causes their ability to 
act; hence, in creation, no one thing is the sole explanation for 
its action, even less its being. When any one thing acts, all the 
'higher' causes which account for its being brought into being, its 
preservation, and-its stimulation to motio at this particular time, 
all these - in terms of this harmony - are involved in an analysis 
of the particular act itself. What we have here is the opposite 
of the 'laboratory conditions' method of our modern sciences. There 
most of the operating factors are eliminated so that the working of 
one particular factor can be examined, for example temperature and 
atmospheric pressure will be kept at a constant level, various gases 
might be removed from the atmosphere, etc. Here the opposite is the 
case. One might say, then that Thomas allows for three possible 
types of explanation for any phenomenon - and all of them valid. 
One would be in terms of the natural working of any one thing - an 
explanation in terms of the sciences of physics or psychology or 
1. On this point see the interesting exposition in J. M. Wright, 
The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, Ana- 
lecta Gregoriana, Rome, 1957. 
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whatever. "'T"second would be an explanation in terms of God the 
Creator who creates, conserves and governs all things. And a third 
would'be in terms of this cosmic and hierarchical harmony by which all 
things arein-asensa involved in any one thing. The influence of Pseuio 
Denis., and'the whole Neo-Platonic tradition is obviously dominant in 
this latter position. . is in the third book of the Contra Gentiles, 
that Thomas presents a union of these last two types of explantions. 
There, in discussing God's providence, the whole universe of crea- 
tion is'seen as inter-linked within itself and as such - precisely 
as'such - is interfused with the will and the power of the divinity. 
Hence while God's providence is immediate to every creature, the exe- 
cution of that providence takes effect through the working of secon- 
dart' causes. 
1 
1Cuia vero ad providentiam divinam pertinet ut 
ordo servetur in rebus; congruus autem o rdo est 
ut a supremis ad infima proportionaliter descen- 
datur; oportet quod divina providentiasecundum 
quandam proportionem usque ad res ultimas perven- 
iat. Haec autem proportio est ut, sicut supremae, 
creaturae Bunt sub Deo et gubernantur ab ipso, 
ita inferiores creaturae sirrt sub superioribus et 
regantur ab ipsis. (2) 
'Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute 
superioris agentis, inquantum superius agens d3t 
virtutern ipsam inferiors agenti per quarr agit; 
vel conservat earn; auf etiam applicat earn ad agen- 
dum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad pro- 
prium effectum; cui tarnen non dat formam per quarr 
agit instrumentum, nee conservat, sed dat ei solum 
motum. Oportet ergo quod actio inferioris agentis 
non solum sit ab eo per virtutern propriam, sed per 
`virtutem omnium superiorum a entium: a¢it enim in 
virtute omnium. 1 
We ill examine this vision of cosmic., hierarchical., harmony-in more 
detail below. 4 
But while we must bear in mind the activity of God, and the 
1. S. C. G., III, c. 77.2. S. C. G., III9 c. 78.3. SC. G., 
III, c. 70.4. below p. 133ff. 
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action of.: these: 'higher' causes, we must not forget that each thing 
has its own proper and natural activity, within this causality; its 
own proprius effectus. God governs his creation through the hier- 
archy of causes and through the distinctive principles of activity 
which he has implanted in each distinctive nature. It is axiomatic 
with Thomas that God does-not frustrate the various natures of his 
own creatures. The quotation from the Book of Wisdom - 
'Et disponsit omnia suaviter' 
- is one of Thomas' favourite textsr. 
1 Even in the case of super- 
natural grace - in fact, especially in this case - this holds true. 
"'Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet, ut non 
solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam 
largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, quae 
sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas in- 
clinentur ad hujusmodi motus. Et sic motus qui- 
bus a Deo moventur fiunt creaturis connaturales 
et faciles, secundum illud Sap., 'Et disponit 
omnia suaviter'. Molto igitur magis illis quos 
movet ad consequendum bonuni supernaturale aeter- 
num infundit aliquas formas, seu qualitates super- 
naturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab 
ipso moveantur ad bonuni aeternum consequendum ... 1 (2) 
The key notion comes across in the phrases; 'connaturales et faciles'; 
'suaviter'; and, 'suaviter et promote moveantur'. God does not 
use violence on his creation. He does not need to, because it is 
his creation. He does not wish to, because he loves it. 3 Each 
thing moves in the harmony of God's providence with a motion 'conna- 
turales et faciles'. 
4 
Given all this., we can now assess why the notion of dispositio 
is so important. To avoid all ideas of violence when the highest 
and first mover acts on a creature, we have to posit a dispositio 
1. Wisdom 7, v. 1. For its use see: Ia, q. 22, a. 2, q. 103, a. 8, 
q. 109, a. 2; IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2; IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, q. 165, a. 1; IIIa, 
q. 44, a. 4, q. 46, a. 9, q"55, a. 6, q. 60, a. 4.2. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2. 
3. ibid. 4. Ia, q. 22, a. 2, see also IaIIae, q. 112, a. 3. 
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for such movement on the part of the creature. 
'Quanto igitur movens est altior., tanto necesse 
est quod mobile perfectori disposition ei pro- 
portionetur ... I 
What we are talking about here is not the general action of God through 
'higher' causes and the natural activity of things, but a direct stimu- 
lus from God. This will be violent unless the creature is in 'propor- 
tion' to this movement, that. is, unless it has a different kind of re- 
lationship of disposition to God other than its usual one. 
Now so far we have taken the absence of violence as the key 
factor in this theory of motio but in the example he now gives, to 
clarify this last assertion, another dimension of the theory seems 
to come into play. 
I... sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse dis- 
cipulum dispositum ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam 
capiat a docente. ' 
It is not violence butreceptivity which is the key notion. The 
matter here is not that the teacher will try to cram knowledge into 
the pupil but that if the subject matter is more difficult - 'altior' 
- then the pupil will need to be more sensitive, more receptive. 
With less difficult subjects, the pupil's ordinary ability might be 
adequate (i. e. In proportion') to the task: with 'higher' subjects, 
he will be adequate for the task only if his receptivity and sensi- 
tivity are stretched to the utmost. 
Now although this case of the pupil is only an example it does 
show the drift of Thomas' thought. The motio we are talking about 
here, between God-and man, is not the same as the way God would act 
towards inanimate objects - like holding back the Red Sea. God 
deals with his intellectual and, therefore, free creatures in a way, 
as we would now expect, which is in conformity to. their nature. 
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Grace is not something impersonal but a relationship -a 'proportiona- 
lityl - between God and man which Thomas characterises as one in which, 
... in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognos- 
cente et amatum in amante'. (1) 
Argument Tiro : part two. 
Thomas now moves on to apply what he has established so far. We 
have already covered much of this. 
'Manifestum est autem quod virtutes humane perfi- 
ciunt hominem secundum quod homo natus est noveri per 
rationem in his quae interius vel exterius agit. 
Oportet igitur anesse homini altiores perfectiones 
secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus 
moveatur. Et istae perfectiones vocantur dons: non 
solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed quia secundum ea 
homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab in- 
spiratione divina sicut dicitur Isa., 'Dominus aperuit 
mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico retrorsum non abii'. 
The reference to Isaiah echoes the pupil-teacher example which imme- 
diately precedes this passage and re-emphasises the point we have just 
made. We are not discussing God's movement of irrational creatures 
but God moving his rational creatures freely by means of a receptivity 
to him. Moreover what we said about love and knowledge is focused here 
in the term prompte which is used elsewhere in reference to the virtues 
as well as the Gifts. 
'Alia autem difficultas est circa opera virtutem in in- 
terioribus actibus, puta quod aliquis opus virtutis 
exerceat prompte et delectabiliter. Et circa hoc dif- 
ficile est virtus; hoc enim non habenti virtutem est 
valde difficile; sed per virtutem redditur facile ... 
... Hoc autem est difficillimum non habenti virtutem, 
sicut etiam Philosophus dicit quod, 'operari ea quae 
Justus operatur, facile est; sed operari ea eo modo 
quo Justus operator, 'scilicet delectabiliter et prompte', 
est difficile non habenti justitiam. Et sic etiam 
dicitur I. Joan., quod 'mandata ejus gravia non sunt'; 
quod exponens Augustinus dicit quod 'non sunt gravia 
amanti, sed non amanti sent gravia'. 2 
1. Ia, q. 43, a. 3 see also below p. 261ff. 2. IaIIae, q. 107, a. 4. 
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%I 
Part of the fascination of this passage is the fusion of Aristotelian 
moral philosophy and Augustine's theology of the dynamism of love. 
The delight which the virtuous man has in the reason-governed acti- 
vity of the virtuous life is paralleled in the love, (caritas/amicitia 
Dei) which the friend of God has in the exercise of the Gifts and the 
virtues. Thomas will make it clear in this very question 68, that 
it is love, caritas which is the root of the Gifts. 
' 'secundum quad 
homo habet guamdam societatem spiritualem cum Deo'. 
2 The point being 
made here is the same as one made by a modern theologian who is also 
concerned to redress the balance between created and untreated grace. 
'Here his (God's) work is really himself, since it 
is he who is imparted, Such grace, from the very 
start, cannot be thought of independently of the per- 
sonal love of God and its answer in man. This grace 
is not thought of as a 'thing'. It is something that 
is only 'put at man's disposal? in that act of 'let- 
ting oneself be disposed oft which is the proper gift 
of the freest grace, the miracle of love. ' (3) 
But the theological virtue of charity is the root not only of 
the Gifts but also of the infused virtues and we must be careful not 
to put at risk Thomas' hard-won distinction between them. The promp- 
titude of the theological virtues is based on a love which is working 
through man's rationality: the promptitude of the Gifts is based on 
the same love but is not rational. It can hardly be less than ratio- 
, but how can it be more than rational ? We can be reassured that 
we are following Thomas' own line of thought because he continues his 
exposition in this way: 
'Et philosophus etiam dicit in cap. De Bona For- 
tuna, quod his qui moventur per instinctum divi- 
num non expedit consiliari secundum rationem huma- 
nam., sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum; 
quia moventur a meliori princivio quarr sit ratio 
human. ' (4) 
1. q. 68, a. 4, ad. 3, a. 5, a. 8.2. Iallae, q. 109, a. 3, ad. lum. 
3. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations vol. IV, 'Nature and 
Grace', p. 177.4. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 1. 
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But if we are following Thomas' own line of thought, it is not clear 
where'we are being led. Can we rationally claim that there is a 
principle of human action better than reason ? Thomas - and the 
author of the De Bona Fortuna - think that we can. - Thomas' own ratio- 
nal exposition of this claim does not appear in our own article but 
primarily in his treatise on Law, 
' but there is one small reference 
to it in his reply to the second objection. 
Here, -Thomas is dealing with. the argument that as the vices are 
contrary to both the virtues and the Gifts, the Gifts cannot be dis- 
tinct from the virtues. He replies: 
'Ad secundum dicendun quod vitia, inquantum aunt 
contra bonum rationis, contrariantur virtutibus, 
inquantum aunt contra divinum instinctum, con- 
trariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo at 
rationi, cujus lumen a Deo derivatur. ' 
'For one and the same thing is opposed to both God and reason'; 
few theologians could proclaim this with such assurance. What un- 
derlies Thomas' ability to do so ? For him, the two principles of 
human activity are seen as working in harmony; the intrinsic one 
of human reason, and the extrinsic one of God. God and reason are 
not to be seen in opposition to each other but the flight of reason' is 
to be understood as derived from God. We will need to look more 
closely at the nature of this 'derivation. 12 It is significant that 
the answer to this objection is not at the moralistic level of the 
objection itself but at the metaphysical level of these two principles. 
It has become clear now, after this examination of the text, that 
Thomas' exposition of the Theology of the Gifts succeeds or fails 
on the basis not of his scriptural exegesis or his moral theory, or 
his adherence to Patristic authorities, but on the basis of his meta- 
1. See below A. 196ff. 2. below, Ratio, Lex et Gratia, chapter 8. 
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physics relating to these two principles in man. 
1 The Gifts seem 
to relate to both'these principles. It is then,, to the more general 
metaphysical arguments which underlie this text that we shall have to 
turn in Section Two. 
Before leaving this section, however, there is one matter in 
need of clarification. It is clear from the text that the Gifts 
relate to the external principle of motio in man but is it as clear 
that they relate to the internal principle in man also ? At the 
beginning of this chapter, I made the following claim: 
'The vital factor which will be used ... 
(to dis- 
tinguish the Gifts from the virtues) ... will not be something in God but something in man: 
something anthropological not theological. 
Although the Gifts relate to this divine principle of motto, they 
are something in man and not in God. It is in article three of this 
question that Thomas makes this clear and it is significant that this 
article is without any precedent in any of Thomas' works or in the 
writings of any other earlier theologian. 
2 One is reminded here 
of the comment of a modern Thomist that the mysteriousness of grace 
in Thomas' later theology is not its divine nature but its human 
nature; the single divine motio of grace creates in man a whole diver- 
sity of created effects. 
3 Article three raises the question, 'utrum 
done Spiritus Sancti sint habitus' ? Thomas answers that they are 
habitus and his-viewpoint is presented most succinctly in the answer 
to the second objection. The objection itself is: 
'Praeterea, done Spiritus Sancti perficiunt homi- 
nem secundum quod agitur a Spiritu Dei, sicut dic- 
tum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a Spiritu Dei 
1. See Lottin's conclusion in P. et M., IV, p. 733. 
2. O'Connor, p. 16 footnote. For a detailed discussion of this article 
see chapter 4, p. 82ff below. 3. C. Ernst, The Theology of Grace, 
1974, P. 53. 
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se habet quodannodo ut instrumentum respectu 
eius. Non autem convenit ut instramentum 
perficiatur per habitum, sod principale agens. 
Ergo dona Spiritus Sancti non suet habitus. ' 
Thomas replies: 
'Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit 
de instrumento cuins non est altere, sed solum 
agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; 
sed sic agitur a Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam 
agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii. Unde 
indiget habitu. 
In whatever way the Gifts perfect man's actions it is man who is acting; 
he is not just 'moved' but 'moves' himself; and he does this through 
A. 
the exercise of his liberum arbitrium. As habitue, then, the Gifts 
are part of man's intrinsic principle of motio. 
'Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus1.2 
The fascination of Thomas' theology of the Gifts is that the Gifts 
are presented as 'loci' where the two principles cohere. As habi- 
tus they belong to man as part of his freedom as a self-determining 
agent, yet, of their nature, they relate to man as moved by something 
extrinsic to his own nature. 
1. IaIIae, q. 49, introduction. Above p. 3.2. IaIIae, 
q. d5, intro., see above p. 5. 
._, 
2. QUESTION 68, ARTICLE TWO 
r, 
-47- 
In this second chapter we will examine article two of question 
68.:, utrum dona sint necessaria homini ad salutem. , In article. one 
Thomas has shown.: that for a man to receive the promptings of the Holy 
Spirit it-is necessary for him to be open and docile to such promp- 
tings, and it is presupposed throughout this guaestio - and never 
argued --that the Gifts alone provide this receptivity. But what 
is the role of this receptivity within man's movement towards God ? 
Is it an added extra of the Christian life, reserved perhaps for mys- 
tics.. and, saints ? Is it part of a particular form of the Christian 
life, for. mm*s. and. nuns,. in a way akin to the distinction between 
the gospel precepts and the gospel counsels ?1 Or is it a recepti- 
vity necessary only for extraordinary acts of goodness ?2 Thomas 
answers in the negative to all . these questions. The receptivity and 
docility Which the Gifts give to man under grace are an essential part 
of his graced being. Without the Gifts a man cannot achieve salva- 
tion. This is a very strong claim and one not made by any scholas- 
tic before St Thomas. 
3 
Thomas' basic argiunent can be restated briefly. If there 
are areas of human endeavour where man's reasoning - his intrinsic 
principle of activity, (motto) - is not sufficient and the promptings 
of the Holy Spirit are necessary, then, given that the Gifts are the 
dispositions which make man receptive to the Spirit's promptings, the 
Gifts of the Spirit are also necessary in these areas. It remains 
only to show that man's movement towards salvation is precisely such 
an area where reasoning alone is not sufficient. This is the burden of 
article two. 
1. q. 68, a. 2, ad. lum. 2. ibid. 3. O'Connor, p. 11, 
footnote 'a'. 
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The matter is however slightly-more complicated. We need to 
analyse not only man's-faculty,, _(potentia) of reasoning 
but also the 
dispositions, (habitus), within that faculty. This is clear from 
the very-positioning of question 68 within the Prima Secnndae; it 
follows on from, and indeed forms part of, Thomas' analysis of the 
various kinds of habitus in man's faculties. 
1 By this stage in the 
Summa it has already been established that man's reasoning as per- 
fected by the acquired virtues is insufficient in his movement to.. 
Wards his- supernatural destiny. 
'Dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad 
actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur ... Est 
autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas 
... Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad 
quam sciliwt homo pervenire potest per princi- 
pia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitude 
naturam hominis excedens, ad quarr homo sola divina 
virtute pervenire potest, secundam quamdam Divina- 
tis, participationem; secundum quod dicfEur, quod 
per Christum facti sumus consortes divine natu- 
rae. Et quia hujusmodi beatitudo proportionem 
. 
humane naturae excedit, principia naturalia homi- 
nis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum 
suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum 
hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde opor- 
tet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua 
principia per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem 
supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordi- 
natur ad finem connaturalem; non tarnen absque adju- 
torio divino. 'Et hujusmodi principia virtutes 
dicuntur theologicae. ' (2) 
The question of the role of the Gifts is therefore tied up with the 
nature of these infused theological virtues. N re.: precisely, the 
question of the necessity of the Gifts for salvation thus becomes 
a question of the reasons for positing the insufficiency of these 
theological virtues. How can it be that this 'participation in 
the Divinity' is insufficient ? Thomas already hints at an answer- 
1. See the overview of the Prima Secundae on p. '5 above., 
especially on q. 55, '... de habitibusLbönis ui sunt virtutes et 
alia eis adiuncta, scilicet donis ... 1.2. IaIIae, q. 2, a. 1. 
-49- 
even in this passage which emphasises the elevated status of these 
theological virtues: 'non tarnen abs cue adjutorio divino'. 'hat 
is the nature of this further divine help ? Why is it needed ? 
It is this question in mind that we need to approach the argument 
of article two. "" 
Within the thought of St Thomas,, it is a common procedure to- 
employ a three-fold analysis of the metaphysical structure of the 
being and activity of any living thing. This analysis proceeds 
firstly in terms of the essence or nature of the thing, then as re- 
gards its potentialities or powers or faculties, which it has because 
of having such a nature, and, thirdly, the characteristic activities 
and acts which flow from it having such powers. 
' Man, in this schema 
of 'nature', is said to have a rational soul, the powers of reason 
and rational appetite (will), and is thus capable of voluntary acta- 
2 91- vities. Now the argument of article two of question 68 can be re- 
constructed in terms of this tripartite division of essence, powers 
and acts: paragraph two deals with the essence of the soul, paragraph 
three with its powers or faculties, and the answer to the second ob- 
jection with the acts which flow from the graced dispositions of the 
theological virtues and the Gifts within the faculties of man. It 
cannot be claimed that this is the most obvious way of analysing this 
text but it is one which will bear considerable fruit by highlighting 
presuppositions within Thomas' discussion of the question. 
Firstly, as regards the essence or soul of man: 
1. Most clearly presented, on angels, Ia, q. 54, a. 3, on man, 
Ia, q. 74, and, with qualifications, on God, Ia, q. 14, Prologue. On 
the history of this line of thought within, -12th century scholasticism, 
see Lottin, P. et M., Is p. 483-501; also T. Suttor in Gilb 
vol. 11, P. 2 2ý and F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 1950) 
vol. 2, p. 376 ff. 2. Ia, q. 77. 
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'Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod per- 
fecte habet naturam vel formam aliquam auf virtutem 
potest per so operari ... Sod id quoll imperfecte habet naturam aliquam vel formam auf virtutem non 
potest per se. operari, nisi ab altero moveatur, ' (ý) 
To understand this passage we need to look ahead to Thomas' presentation 
of the-nature of grace in IaIIae, q. 110. -There grace is seen as creating 
a new nature within man in consequence of the re-birth or re-creation 
of man in Christ. 
2 
Thomas denies that grace merely affects man's poten- 
tialities but, following this tripartite schema, holds that it relates 
primarily to the essence of man. As potentialities follow from essence, 
so the new en-graced potentialities of man are to be understood as flowing 
from a new quality in his essential being. 
3 
The theological virtues and 
the infused moral virtues are derived from this new form of being, man's 
new nature. Thomas goes so far as to call this new nature a 'deifica- 
tion' of man, but this is qualified in two ways. 
4 Firstly, man's ori- 
ginal nature is not destroyed. 
5 Grace, perfecting and not destroying-- 
nature, is not actually a new essence but a new quality within the ori- 
ginal essence of man: - it is an accidental form and not a new nature 
strictly speaking. 
6, 
_ And secondly., God does not absorb men into his 
own Being: He does-not make them gods but god-like., 'secundum quamdam 
similitudinem naturam divinam'. 
7 
... Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinae 
naturae per quamdam similitudinis participationem... ' (8) 
1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2.2. Iallae, q. 110, a. 4.3. ibid, and 
adlum.. 4. IaIIae, q. 112, a. 1, and In Ionnem, 15.2.5. Man is by 
nature capax Dei, even though the actuation of this capacity comes as a 
gift over and above his nature. 6. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2, ad2um.. On the 
difference between 'accidental' and 'substantial' forms see IaIIae, q. 110, 
a. 2, ad3um. and Ia, q. 77, a. 6. An 'accidental' form does not cause existence 
but causes what already exists to exist in such-and-such away or manner. 
7. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 4. God Himself is not the formal cause of the soul's 
graced activity but its efficient cause. As such he creates this new 
accidental formal cause of man's graced potentialities, dispositions and 
acts. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 1, ad2um; a. 2, ad2um; q. 111, a. 1, adlum. This is 
why Thomas breaks with the Lombard on the nature of Charity, IIaIIae, q. 
a. . On'divinisation', see H. T. Cones, 'Divinisation: St. Thomas', in D. _S., col. 1426-1432.8. IaIIae, q. 112, a. 1. 
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Man participates in the divine nature but, true to the modal logic of 
the participation model, participates in it in a human mode, (as the 
angels participate in it in an angelic mode). Man shares in the life, 
of the Deity then, not in its fullness, but in a human, derivative and 
partial way, and he holds it not by his own nature but as a gift, fra-. 
gile and at risk. 
'... dicendum quod omnis substantia vel est ipsa 
natura rei, cujus est substantia, vel est pars 
naturae ... Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia auf 
forma substantialis: sed est forma accidentalis 
ipsius animas. Id enim quod substantialiter est 
in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante 
divinam bonitatem ... Secundum hoc ergo quia anima imperfecte participat divinam bonitatem, ipsa 
participatio divinae bonitatis, quae est gratia, 
imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quarr anima 
in seipsa subsistat; est tarnen nobilior quarr 
natura animae inquantum. est expressio vel parti- 
cipatio divinae bonitatis, non autem quantum ad 
modum essendi. ' (1) 
A3-'a. result, the potentialities, or rather, the dispositions or habi- 
tus-within it, of man's original nature are more 'certain' than those 
of his divine 'Inature#. Thomas, in our present text, gives two exam- 
pies to clarify the point. 
-'Eicut sol, quia eat perfecte lucidus, per seipsum 
potest illumina. re; luna autem, in qua eat imper- 
fecte natura lucis, non illuminat nisi illuminata. 
Medicus etiam qui perfecta novit artem medicine 
potest per as operari; sed discipulus ejus, qui 
nondum eat plene instructus, non potest per as 
operari, nisi ab so instruatur. ' (2) 
The ability to succeed in an action is presented here not as a matter 
of autonomy but of a continuous relationship of dependence on the 
originary source of;. the ability to so act.. What Thomas is pointing 
out is that a man under grace does not have an inherent facility as 
regards the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, such that 
1. IaIlae, q. 110, a. 2, ad2um. 2. . IaIIae, q. 
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he does not need tuition, assistance and support in exercising them. 
Now in the text before us, there is no discussion of grace in 
the essence of the soul. The text concentrates solely on the effects 
of grace upon the powers of man.. The advantage we have gained by 
looking ahead to question 110, is that we are now in no danger of mis- 
understanding Thomas as he opens up his argument. When he writes, 
'imoerfecte-enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum', he is not suggesting 
that this imperfection is merely the result of sin of one sort or ano- 
ther but that there is a radical and intrinsic insufficiency in the 
theological virtues. The imperfection lies not primarily in our 
actions but in our 'possession' of these virtues: they do not come 
to us as if 'second nature' to use as do the acquired virtues. We 
might recall Thomas' approval of Averroes' maxim on virtues - 'habitus 
est o guis agit cum voluerit' - which Lonergan translates as, 'one 
merely has to want to, and the thing is done, if one has the habit'. 
1 
what we lack as regards the theological virtues is a certain sponta- 
neity of use of them. The Gifts of the Spirit will be seen as pro- 
viding this spontaneity or promptitude. 
Hence, in this second paragraph of article two, Thomas can 
say: - 
'Et quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit major quarr 
prima, tarnen prima perfectiori modo habetur ab 
homine quasi plena possessio; secundum autem habe- 
tur quasi imperfecta; imperfecta enim diligimus 
et cognoscimus Deum.. ' (2) 
Our use of q. 110 has allowed us to locate the root of this imperfec- 
tion in the relationship of grace to the essence of the soul. 
The third paragraph of article two might be read as merely a 
continuation of the argument of the second paragraph but the discus- 
1. In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. Cited by Lonerean, p. 43. 
2. IaIIae, q. 8, a. 2. 
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sion here is not in terms of our imperfect 'possession? of the theo- 
logical virtues, but in a second intrinsic imperfection in that they 
relate to the potentialities of the human soul, reason and the ratio- 
nal will. 
'non sufficit ipsa motio rationist. 
If'man participates in the divine nature, he does so in a human mode. 
Man alone of all sub-lunar creation is capable of this participation 
- caps dei - pre cisely - because of the kind of nature he has, viz. 
a rational soul. 
' Man's human mode of participating in the divine 
nature is therefore expressed, exercised and articulated in terms of 
his natural human powers of reason and will. 
2 The characteristic 
activity of man., which follows from the interplay of his powers, is 
3 that of judgement, liberum arbitrium. Now Thomas, more than most 
theologians, ` is loath to understate the dignity of man's nature, but 
he sees man's intellectuality not as the peak of creation but as'the 
lowest form on intellectual life in creation. 
4' Mans decision making 
has to take place under the conditions of time and space, "by analysis, 
bp comparing and contrasting ideas, " volitions and'information. 
5 
Even at its'best; ther3 and under grace, man's intellectual ability 
and his judgement cannot be certain and secure. Within the condi- 
tions of time and space, and dealing with matters'propdrtionate to 
his nature, man's judgements are adequate'and sufficient but not cer- 
tain. But in relationship to his supernatural destiny, to which 
grace gives him access, their deficiency is even'greäter. 
'Rationi humanaefnon sent omnia cognita, neque 
onmia possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta 
perfectione naturali, sive accipiatur ut per- 
1. Ia, q. 8, a. 3. On homo capax Dei, see Ia, q. 12, a. 1.; IaIIae, 
q. 3, a. 8.; IIaIlae, q. 2; a. 3 and T. C. O'Brien in Gilbp, vol. 31, pp.. 70- 
73.2. Prologue to IaIlae above p. 3.3. ibid. 4. Ia, q. 55, 
a. 2; q. 58, a. 3.5. Ia, q. 58, a. 3; a. 4; Ia, q. 85, a. 5. 
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fecta theologicis virtutibus. linde non potest 
quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia 
hujusmodi, de quibus ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus, 
cujus scientiae et potestati omnia subsunt, sua 
motione ab omnia stultitia et ignorantia et hebi- 
tudine et duritia et ceteris hujusmodi, nos 
tutos reddit. Et ideo dona Spiritus Sancti, 
quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ip- 
sius, dicuntur contra hujusmodi defectus darf. (1) 
Reason and the rational appetite., no matter how elevated by the theo- 
logical virtues are, by their mode of operation, unwieldy and uncer- 
tom. 
'Sic igitur quantum ad-ea quae absunt humanae 
rationi, in ordine scilicet ad finem connatu- 
ralem homini, homo potest operari per judicium 
rationis ... Sed in ordine ad Einem ultimum 
supernaturalem, ad quem ratio secundum quod est 
aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per theolo- 
gicas virtutes, non. sufficit ipsa motio ratio- 
s, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio 
Spiritus Sancti ... ' 
(2) 
So Thomas has shown the insufficiency of the theological vir- 
tues by reference to their 'root' --man's qualified participation 
in, the divine nature in-the essence of his soul - and by reference 
to their operation through man's characteristic mode of operation, 
'dividendo et componerido'. He has shown that man's graced life is 
not to be seen in terms of strict autonomy but of a continuous relation- 
ship of dependence and tutelage. It is here precisely that the 
Gifts come into play. Before concluding however., we should look 
at-three other points embedded in this text. 
In the second paragraph there is one clause which disturbs 
the flow of argument and it may be important to focus on it for this. 
reason. It occurs at the very centre of the argument. 
... non tarnen exclusa operation Dei, qui in 
omni natura et voluntate interius operatur. 1 
. 1. a. 2, ad3um. 2. a. 2, corpus 
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why does Thomas introduce this qualification ? What is gained by it ? 
What follows immediately after it is a statement of the need to situate 
'created grace', (in the essence and the powers of the soul), within 
a wider context of 'uncreated grace', (the operation and the promp- 
tings of the Spirit). What this insertion seems to be pointing to 
is something like a parallel in the natural order: all created'causa- 
lities need to be understood as acting within the over-arching causa-- 
litt' of God's Providence. Now again and again Thomas stresses the 
reality of 'secondary' causes. Each nature or form has a capacity' 
for action in accordance with its particular nature or form. Nothing 
needs to be added, within the natural order, for this capacity to be 
actuated. But, that any nature exists, continues to exist or acts 
to fulfill its nature, is itself also a manifestation of the opera- 
tion of the First Cause. Al]. things, in as much as they move from 
potentiality to'actuality in any respect, exhibit both their own na- 
tures and the operation of God. 
1 This is the sense of the inserted 
clause but what is its purpose ? We need not go ay further into 
the metaphysics behind this clause at the moment: we shall look 
at this in detail later and it is not the main thrust of the argu- 
meat here. 
2 The purpose of this insertion is that it makes ea- 
plicit the distinction between this general operation of God in all 
things and the particular operation of the Spirit in those- who have 
received the infused theological virtues. 
3 We are presented then 
with a general picture of the divine ? movement' in all things, and 
within this general model, an important distinction between this gene- 
1. Ia, q. 103, a. 7; q. 104, a. 1; q. 105, a. 5; IaIIae, q. 109, a. 1. ' 
God is the efficient, exemplar and final cause of all things, Ia, q. 44, 
a. 1. As for the human will, see, IaIIae, q. 9, a. 6 and also above, 
P. 190.2. See below, chapter 6, 'Motiot, esp. p. 133ff. 
3. Labourdette, D. de Sp. 'Dons', col. -171-8. 
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ral efficient causality of God and the particular operation of God in 
those who have the infused virtues. 
1 The special movement of God 
through the receptivity of the Gifts is not to be confused with this 
general operation of God in all creatures. This is the point of 
this insertion. In regard to the 'accidental" form of grace in the 
essence of man's soul there is this yet further need for God's spe- 
cial operation; and this need is of absolute necessity for salvation. 
This tells us something of the diversity of the single opera- 
tion of God in his creatures but it also tells us something about the 
status of the infused nature and powers of man under grace. The two 
examples given by Thomas are examples of dependency and tutelage: 
the moon in relation to the sun, and the medical student and his pro- 
fessor. Bouyer gives a good twentieth century account of what Thomas 
is presenting here. 
. The fact that sanctifying grace is a habitus in i; 
e Thomistic sense, does not mean that it gives us 
a separate, independent power of acting supernatu- 
rally without further need in every instance of a 
special intervention of God; the exact opposite is 
the case. Sanctifying grace does not conceal the 
necessity of a particular actual grace for each 
meritorious act. The habitus of sanctifying grace, 
far from establishing us in some sort of autonomy 
in regard to God, involves precisely a permanent 
hold of God, not only in our actions, but on the 
source of our being, in so far as this could have 
been alienated from God by sin, and has to become 
his again, in the strictest possible sense, in Christ. 
In consequence, sanctifying grace, so far from con- 
ferring any power of our own to perform independent 
supernatural acts, is simply a disposition main- 
tained in us by God to act no more than under the 
inpulse of actual grace. (2) 
This seems to be what Thomas is saying here., although two qualifica. - 
tions have to be made. Bouyer seems to see sanctifying grace purely 
as a habitus whereas for Thomas it is both habitus and motio; 
3 
and 
1. See Boulliard on this, below p. 106 . 2. L. Bouyer, The 
Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, (1956), p. 207.3. IaIIae, q. 110, 
a. 2; q. 111, a. 2. 
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Bouyer sees this need for the impulse of actual grace as arising from 
man's sinfulness and alienation, whereas Thomas, as we have discovered, 
sees the need as a metaphysical one. 
1 The relationship of dependence 
and tutelage arises from this. 
Now just as acua]. ifying clause was inserted into paragraph one 
by Thomas, so here, in the second paragraph, there is a sentence which 
in itself adds nothing to the theme of the argument but yet is placed 
at the very centre of it. 
'Si tarnen etiar in hoc homo adjuvetur a Deo per 
specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis 
bonitatis: ende secundum philosophos, non qui- 
cumque habebat virtutes morales acquisitas habe- 
tat virtutes heroicas vel divinas. ' (2) 
Again we need to press for the significance of this sentence. 
The idea of divine or herioc virtues is part of the classical 
legacy to the West. Thomas refers here to 'philosophers' and not 
just to Aristotle. Presumably, as Albert his master did before him, 
he is referring to Plato and to the Stoics as well as to Aristotle. 
3 
Nevertheless at the only other point in question 68 where Thomas 
mentions these divine or heroic virtues he refers explicitly to the 
: ýiioomachean Ethics. 4 The attractiveness of the idea Aristotle 
presents can be seen from a reading of the text itself. 
'Let us now make a fresh beginning and point out 
that of moral states to be avoided there are three 
kinds - vice, incontinence, brutishness. The con- 
traries, of two of. these are evident - one we call 
virtue, the other continence; to brutishness it 
would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue, 
a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has 
represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very 
good, 
"For he seemed not, he 
The child of a mortal man, but as one that of 
God's seed ' came. " 
Therefore., if as they say., men become gods by excess 
1. IaIIae, q. 109, a. 2.2. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2.3. . 
O'Cr, 
14, n. 7.4. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 1. 
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of virtue, of this kind must evidently be, the. state 
opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has . no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state 
is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a 
different kind of state from vice. 
Now since it is rarely that a god-like man 
is found - to use the epithet of the Spartans, who. 
when they admire anyone highly call him a 'godlike 
man' - so too the brutish type is rarely found 
among men ... ' (1) 
A passage like this stimulates the theological imagination. 
The question is however whether it can be used as anything more than 
such a stimulus. Can it be a useful conceptual tool ? And, it it 
can, does Thomas employ it as such here ? 
The scholastic tradition had already used the notion of 'divine 
virtues', following Macrobiiis however rather than Aristotle. 
2 
Within the Summa Thomas employs this line of thought in dealing with 
the theological virtues. 
3 There the 'divine' virtues are, strictly 
speaking, the exemplars in the mind of God, or, speaking less precisely, 
the theological virtues in man. 
4 What we have here, however, is the 
same term used in a different sense, used in relation to something 
more perfect than the acquired virtues in the natural order. 
The sentence itself is ambiguous. The phrase, 'superabundan- 
tia bonitatis' could refer to either man or God. We can provide two 
paraphrases: 
A. Man's reasoning is sufficient as regards his connatural 
end. If, even in this area, God inspires some men, by 
a special prompting, (heroic or divine virtues, as the 
philosophers call them - virtues not possible to all 
who have the acquired moral virtues) it is because of 
the excellence of their lives. In the case of the 
1. Nic ^thics VII, 1. (1145a20), trans. D. Ross. 
2. O'Connor, pp , 113.3. IaIIae, q. 54, a. 3.; q. 61, ä. 5; q. 62, 
a. 1, ad2urý. 4. IaIIae, q. 61, a. 5; q. 62, a. 1, ad2nm. 
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supernatural end of man, no activity of reasoning is 
sufficient without the prompting and movement of the 
Holy Spirit from above. 
B. Marls reasoning is sufficient as regards his connatural 
end. If, even in this area, God helps man by a "special 
prompting, this will be out of his superabundant good- 
ness; hence according to the philosophers not everyone 
who had the acquired moral virtues had heroic or divine 
virtues. In the case of the supernatural end of man, 
no activity of reasoning is sufficient without the promp- 
ting of the Holy Spirit from above. 
In neither of these options are the Gifts equated with the heroic or 
divine virtues. They are compared to them only in as much as both 
are given over and above the acquired moral virtues as a result of a 
special linstinctus' from God. As with the parallel case in the 
first paragraph, there may be an attempt here both to point out and 
yet distinguish an action of God within the natural order, albeit un- 
usual, with a farther action of God in the supernatural order, through 
the Gifts. There are similarities but they must be kept as distinct 
phenomena. 
We can follow a theme through article one and article two with- 
in which Thomas tightens up his use of_the notions suggested byt3iis 
motif of the divine or herioc virtues. In the last sentence of 
article one, Thomas concludes: 
'Et hoc quod. quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt 
hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtu- 
tem. ' 
This is reinforced by the reply to the first objection where there is 
a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics. Now the first objection of 
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article two follows this line of thought: 
'Dona enim ordinantur ad quardam perfectionem ultra 
communem perfectionem virtutis. 1 
The reply to this objection takes up the last line of the corpus of 
article one, but asks in what way are the Gifts directed to 'higher 
acts' than those of the other virtues ? In keeping with the gains 
of the argument in article one, this question is answered in terms 
of the principle of their operation. They are 'superior' not in 
terms of their object but in terms of the mode of achieving their 
object: not that more perfect things are done but that things are 
" done more perfectly. Now the ease with which Hector acted perfectly, 
according to Priam, can be taken as a model of the Gifts: we have 
already noted the use of the terms tsuaviter' and rop mpte' in article 
one. Bat this model cannot be used to present the Gifts as ? super- 
erogatory', as matters of counsels rather than the precepts of the 
gospel life, as a perfection available only to a few. 
If the Gifts were super-virtues then Thomas would be adding 
yet another layer on the already elaborate edifice of infused and 
acquired virtues. But the Gifts, though 'good dispositions' and 
in that sense "virtues", relate to something outside man, the 'move- 
ment' of the Spirit. Arguing for the ultimate insufficiency of all 
the virtues, even at the height of their perfection, Thomas is using 
the Gifts at this stage to point to a perfection which comes as a 
'motto' or an 'instinctual from outside man and not anything in man. 
In article three Thomas will argue for the nature of the Gifts as 
habitus but it is significant that here, before that stage in the 
argument, he argues for them-in terms of the motio of-the Spirit. - 
It is significant too that'the idea of the divine or heroic virtues 
is used at this stage and not in article three. 
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.. 
The phrase, 'heroic or divine virtues' was ofmore use to 
Thomas as he understood and presented the Gifts in the Commentary 
on the Sentences. 
1 There the Gifts were, seen precisely as super- 
Virtues which acted according to a divine and not a human standard. 
There, this passage from the Nichomachaen Ethics is explicitly re- 
ferred to at the centre of Thomas' analysis of the Gifts. 
2 Here, 
in the Summa, it is used only in these two passages - an aside with- 
in a text and in a reply to an objection, a. reply which as we have 
noted, is further modified in the subsequent article. Now, in his 
late theology, Thomas holds that man can never have such a perfectly 
divine mode of operation: his participation in the divinity is never 
that Isecure,. 3 As we have seen in our analysis of the metaphysics 
of grace in the essence of the soul, man always has an 'imperfect 
possession' of his divine nature. .. The Gifts do not complete man's 
divinised nature, but, accepting its inevitable incompleteness., point 
to the constant need for divine assistance in the life of grace. 
4 
This is the crux of the argument of article two. 
The divine or heroic nature of the rifts cannot be reduced to 
a perfection available only to. the few, for those already perfect in 
the acquired or infused.. virtues; they cannot be reduced to an op- 
tional extra of the Christian life, like gospel counsels rather than 
gospel precepts. 
5. The basic drift of the arguments of articles one 
and two is that of the need for the constant movement of the Holy 
Spirit in. all who have. the infused virtues. . 
The Gifts as disposi- 
tionsýof receptivity to this necessary 'motion' are consequently them- 
selves radically necessary for the Christian life. Article two has 
1. See below p. g7f, for a discussion of this. 2. -III. Sent. 34.1.1.3. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2. See also De Vertate, q. 27, - a. 5, ad3nm, and p. 51.4. See above p. 54 . 5. IaIIae, 
q. 68, a. 2,9st obj. 
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proved its point: the Gifts are necessary for all for salvation 
That our interpretation of Thomas' use of the phrase 'heroic 
or divine' virtues is correct can-best-be shown in terms of the over- 
all argumentation of articles 1,2 and 3. It can also be confirmed 
however by the way Thomas uses the phrase in the Tertia Pars. We 
have claimed that Thomas uses the phrase as a convenient stimulus to 
thought but that he corrects it and refines it as a theological tool 
and uses it sparingly as such. On the question of whether Christ, 
as the most perfect man, had the common run of virtues or the 'heroic 
or divine virtues', Thomas reduces. the status of these super-virtues 
to that of describing the common virtues in a sublime state of per- 
fection. 1 
There is one other important matter in article 2 which could 
be overlooked because of over-familiarity with the terms'used. This 
movement which supplements and aids the theological virtues is attri- 
buted to the Holy Spirit and not just to the Godhead. On the one 
hand this is obviously a matter of custom and the tradition of study 
on the Isaian Gifts, and one might think that too much should not be 
made of this. But, on the other hand, Thomas' later theology has a 
distinct and central role for the 'mission' of the Holy Spirit in the 
economy of divine predestination. 
2 The Spirit is said to abide in 
us by charity, but the role of the Spirit is not just one of 'abiding' 
but of energising, providing a dynamism, a motio within creation and 
Providence as a whole but also, especially within the realm of grace 
and Predestination. 
3 This-drive and dynamism will be analysed by - 
1. IIIa, q. 7, a. 2, abj. 2 and ad2um. ':. 2. The New Law of the 
Gospel is described as 'gratia Spiritus Sancti, quae datur per fidem 
Christi'. IaIIae, q. 106, a. 1.3. See especially S. C. G. IV, chs. 
19-22 where the motus hominis ad deem is appropriated to the Holy 
-63- 
Thomas in terms of Aristotelian notions of movement, but the root of 
his theory lies in scripture and the patristic legacy. We should 
not then., take the scriptural quotations in article 21 as merely casual 
embellishments. 
1 
IOU Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei suet, si 
filii, et haeredes, ' (Romans ch. 8, v. 14,17) 
'Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam'. -(Ps. 142,.. 10) 
What we have in this article - and it is of central theological signi- 
ficance - is a statement of the insufficiency of 'created! grace, and 
the absolute necessity of. 'uncreated' grace, the direct intervention-, 
of the Spirit. The significance of this will be clear-when we have 
examined the development of Thomas' theology of grace and seen this 
article in-. that context. In the Summa, Thomas hardly uses the theo-' 
logical tool of 'appropriation' to describe the actions of the Triune 
God in his creation. 
2 The-present writer would agree with modern -- 
critics that this isa regretable feature of the Summa,, but, to digress 
a, little, -it is illuminating'to, look-at how Thomas deals in a'quite= 
different fashion with this same-point in the Summa Contra Gentiles. 
'Ex hoc etiam quod Spiritus Sanctus per modum amoris 
procedit, amor autem vim quamdam impulsivam et moti- 
vam habet, motus qui est a Deo in rebus Spiritui 
Sancta proprie attribui videtur ... 
... F haus: reram gubernatio a Deo secundum Guam- dam motionem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus 
amnia dirigit et movet in proprios fines. Si igi- 
tur impulsus et motio ad Spiritum Sanctum, ratione 
amoria, pertinet convenienter rerum gubernatio et 
propagatio Spiritui Sancto attribuitur ... 
... Item, vita maxime in motu manifestatur; moven- tis enim seipsa vivere dicimus, et universaliter 
quaequmque a seipsis aguntur ad operandum. Si igi- 
tur, ratione amoris, Spiritui Sancto impulsio et 
motio competit, convenienter etiam sibi attribuitur 
(3 con. ) Spirit. On this, Y. Conger, 'Le Saint Esprit dans 
14 theologie thomiste de L'agir morale' in Tommaso, _. 
d'Aauino nel suo VII 
centenario, Congresso Internationale Rome-Naples 1974, vol. 5. pp. 9-19. 
1. see above p. 137 f. 2. For example, on the Divine Govern- 
ment of Creation, Iä, q. 103-9., 
-64- 
vita ... at in symbolo fidei nos in Spiritum Sanc- tum vivificantem credere profitemus. ' (1) 
Thomas has shown the insufficiency of infused created grace as 
regards both the essence and the powers of the soul. Man's partici- 
pation in divinity is such that along with the habitus of grace, we 
have to posit the permanent need for the constant movement of the Spi- 
rit. Our detailed examination of the two 'insertions' into the major 
arguments of the article have allowed us to distinguish this movement 
of the Spirit in the case of the Gifts from both the general efficient 
causality of God in all things, and from the special inspirations of 
the Holy Spirit of gratia gratis data.. Thomas' theology of grace 
uses both the models of habitus and motio. In article three he will 
turn his attention to the receptivity to the Spirit in man and hold 
that this too must be a habitue, but before moving on to that article, 
we shall look at the wider context of Thomas' later theology of grace 
to see how this balancing of habitus and motio in question 68 takes 
place within this larger reorganisation. 
1. S. C. G. IV, 20. 
3. 'MOTIO' AND 'HABITUS'. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE'' 
EMPHASIS ON 'MOTIO' IN THOMAS' LATER THEOLOGY OF 
GRACE 
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It is difficult for those of us whose knowledge-of scholasti- 
aism is limited to St Thomas to appreciate not only how he was an 
innovatory genius within his theological tradition but also how re- 
cent and how innovative-in itself that tradition was, in, comparison 
with the religious writers of the twelfth century. Let us begin 
then with some of the major achievements of early thirteenth century 
scholasticism which Thomas inherited. 
1 
Among others, Philip the Chancellor, (died 1236), William of 
Auvergne, (died 1249) and William of Auxerre, (died. 1231), by intro- 
ducing certain new theoretical constructs into, scientific theology 
brought about a revolution in the discipline, allowing old questions 
and confusions to be re-located and resolved. . We-can placeýthese- 
achievements under three headings. Firstly, the concept of the-_ 
'supernatural' allowed a coherent articulation of the relationship. 
of grace and 'nature'. Secondly, these theologians established, 
as a basic model, the Aristotelian schema of 'nature' with the tri- 
partite division of essence, "powers and acts, which we have already 
looked at. . Thirdly, they introduced the Aristotelian concept of 
A. ' For the general intellectual background, G. Leff, Medie- 
va7. Thought: St Au stine to Ockham London, 1958; E. Gilson, La 
philosophie aumoyen age, des origines patristiaue ä la fin de XIVe 
siecle, Paris 1944. To appreciate the distinction between monastic and 
scholastic theology, on the former, J. Le clerq, The Love of Learning 
and the Desire for God, New York, 1961, and on the latter, G. Leff, 
Paris and Oxford, New York, 1968. 
On Thomas' changing theology of grace: H. Rondet, Gratia, 
Christi, Paris 1948; H. Bouillard, -t onvers ion et - Gr ee s elan " S. 'T'ho- 
mas d'Acmin, Paris 1944. Bouillard's book provoked an enormous con- 
troversy, producing numbers of reviews and articles; a good. example 
of such is T. Deman's review in Bulletin Thomiste, VII, pp. 46-58. 
A response can be found in, 'A propos de la grace actuelle chez S. Tho- 
mas d'Aquin', R. S. R., (1946), pp. 46-58. More recent works include; 
B. J. F. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the thought of 
'St Thomas Aquinas, London, 1971; J-M. Laporte, Les structures d ami- 
aue de la gräce, Montreal, 1973, and-more concise y, the same author's'Dynamics 
of Grace in Aquinas', T. S., 34,1973, pp. 203-226. A brief 
introduction. to Thomas' theology of grace can be found inýthe Introduc- 
tion to the Gilby Edition of the Summ vol 30, by C. Ernst. 
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habitus, (hexis), a settled disposition, and so concentrated all atten- 
tion in the theology of grace on to the concept of virtue. All the 
great scholastics of the thirteenth century built on these foundations 
using and developing further these basic paradigmatic theoretical 
1 tools. 
By articulating a concept of the 'supernatural' the Parisian 
theologians had resolved the dilemma of distinguishing grace from 
'nature'. One twelfth century writer had actually asked why, if 
everything was a free gift from God, why was not everything called 
'grace' ?2 The other side of-the coin to this, was a pessimism, 
acutely conscious of man's 'fallen' state-, which doubted the possibi- 
lity of any sort of 'natural' goodness without grace. 
3 The achieve- 
ment of Parisian theologians was to create the theorem of the super- 
natural. 
4 This is not to say that grace was not seen as supernatu-, 
ral before this: what it means is that now the theoretical construct 
of the ? natural' could be elaborated without confusion between man 
within and outwith the Christian dispensation of grace. In this 
way, there could be a place fora natural love of God quite distinct 
from 'grace', although not independent of the action of God. 
5 
From the 1220's onwards, the scholastics were concerned with 
the reordering and development of their discipline in the light of 
these advances. As regards questions on grace, we can, do, them the 
injustice of presenting the general outline of their thought as, seeing 
grace as a 'supernatural habitus in the essence of the soul'. The 
Aristotelian notion of habitus served two main purposes: it pointed 
to grace as a settled disposition and not just a transitory motion; 
1. Loner an, pp. 1-39; Ernst, pp. xv-xvii. 2. Lonergan, 
p. 14.3. ibid., pp. 14-15.4. Lonergan, p. 13.5. For 
Thomas on this, see IaIIae, q. 109, a. 1, a. 2, a. the marvellous cul- 
mination of this development. 
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and,, as a virtue it was an operative disposition by which one had the 
ability to act perfectly in a certain area of'activity. Given the 
tripartite metaphysical structure we have already examined it could 
thus be shown that grace must first be in the essence of the soul: 
'Oportet ergo quod primum donum quod gratis homini 
inf nditur, hunc habeat effectum ut per ipsam 
essentiam animas in quoddam divinum esse elevet, 
ut idonea sit äd divinas operationes. ' (1) 
The virtues in man's potentialities or powers flow from his new 'divi- 
nised' being - altere sequitur esse - and, through the virtues, man 
acts meritoriously. 
2 
Now obviously this over-view is something of a caricature. 
Bonaventure, for example, placed grace in both the essence and the 
powers, but this can still be seen as a disagreement within the same 
paradigm. 
3 What we can say about the general movement of theologi- 
ca]. thought is that grace is primarily seen as something entitative; 
an esse spirituale Zratuitum, 
4 
a habitus faeiens esse bonum. 
5 This 
is the Western adaptation, under the influence of Aristotle, of the 
Greek Patristic notion of 'Divinisation'. 
6 
Sanctifying grace is 
habitual grace. In as much as mention is made at all of operative 
grace it is restricted to the act of infusion of the habitual grace 
at the moment of justification, or it is left to the peripheral and 
miscellaneous collection of gratia gratis data, acts of providence, 
charisms and admonitions. 
7 The discussion of grace, then, is al- 
most totally in terms of created grace. As Thomas' career progresses, 
1. II,, Sent.,, 26.1.3.2. Ernst, pp. xv-xvi. .. -3. 
Loner- 
pp. 24-25.4. De Veritate, 27,1, ad3.5. St Albert, II. 
Sent. 26, A, 2 quoted by Ernst, p. xvi. 6. On 'di'vinisation',. see 
M-. Conus, 'Divinisation,. Th'eologiens du 13e siecle' in D. S., 'Divini- 
sation' col. 1413-1431.7. Not until IaIIae, q. 111, a. 1, was the 
distinction between gratia graturn faciens. and gratia gratis data de- 
finitively established; the latter now limited to the Pauline gifts 
of 1. Cor. 12,8-10. See Lonergan, pp. 24-26. 
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however various modifications are introduced. By the time of his 
later writings, the notion of habitual grace remains central but-it 
is now sited within a wider context-of the dynamism (motto) of uncreated 
grace, and habitual cooperative grace'°is, set alongside cooperative 
and operative actual grace. Tte, have seen something-of this already 
in our discussion of article two'above, but to appreciate its"signi-- 
ficance we need to follow through the'thread of its development. 
Thomas' awareness of the limitations of the tradition he had 
received can be followed along two lines., The first is in terms 
of the insufficiency of the engraced virtues in man, the second in, 
the problem of justification and the whole question of Pelagianism. 
In the Commentary on the Sentences, (1252-56) Thomas holds 
that the internal change brought about by sanctifying grace is suf- 
ficient to give man the ability to act meritoriously through the 
virtues; Having been given a new (second) nature, the justified 
man is perfectly equipped and can avoid sin. 
1 This positionnhowever, 
is-modified in the de Veritate, (1256-59). -Thomas now seems to focus 
on the actual difficulties of living under grace. Even with the divi- 
nised dispositions of grace, man still lives in a world surrounded by 
temptations; to be perfect he would need to be constantly on his 
guard and such constant vigilance is an impossibility. 
2 Along with 
the supernatural dispositions, then, man also needs some form of di- 
vine assistance. In-addition, Thomas also presents a further refine- 
ment of the participation model: although man participates in the 
divine life, no set of dispositions can make him as impeccable and 
perfect as God. Only if God were the source and principle of his 
activity would man act perfectly. Along with the created disposi- 
1. Lonergan, pp. 60-61.2. ibid., p. 51. 
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.. tions of grace., it is necessary then to posit also divine interven- 
tions to aid the activities of those dispositions. 
1 We can see 
here the beginning of a movement of thought which will culminate:, 
in the treatise of the Gifts in the Summa Zheologiae. 
But the development seen here is only one case of a wider de- 
velopment. which centres rather on the beginning of justification and., 
consequently, Thomas' increasing awareness of the ramifications of 
Pelagianism. The difficulty caused by theology's focusing on the 
essence of the soul and its in-formation by grace is clearly seen 
in the question of the initium justificationis. 
. 
As man cannot pre- 
pare himself for grace, Thomas, along with his contemporaries, held 
that God moves man's will to prepare for grace by external acts. of 
providence, such as admonitions, misfortune or sufferings. In this 
way man is led to prepare himself to accept sanctifying grace by the 
act of his free judgement. 
2 The emphasis here is on God's, inter- 
vention through external acts of providence and man's response in 
terms of liberum arbitrium. As Ernst writes: - 
'It would be difficult to defend his (Thomas') 
early views from the charge made by Haxnack 
that all the medieval theologians were semi- 
Pelagian in their treatment of grace. ' (5) 
But Thomas soon moves on to attempting a more sophisticated 
analysis, the focus of his attention moving away from liberum arbi- 
trium to an analysis of what is presupposed by it, that is, the ratio- 
nal appetite, the will. Given this more sophisticated analysis - 
which we shall look at in detail later4 - Thomas now posits on the 
part of God's intervention an activity internal to man. Already, 
in the De Veritate, Thomas mentions a 'divinus instinctus secundum 
ouod Deus in mentibus hominum o-Deratur. By the time of the second 
5 
1. ibid., P. 43.2. II. Sent. d. 28, q. 1. a. 4.3. Ernst, 
P. xvii. 4. Below, p. 176ff. 5. De Veritate, q. 24, a. 15. 
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Paris Regency - in the Qdodlibeta Prima (1269) --the beginning of 
conversion is attributed solely to this internal operation and any 
other view, presumably including his own earlier ones, is now termed 
IPelagian I. 1 
All commentators now agree that before 1259 Thomas had little 
awareness of the problem of Pelagianism and certainly"had not had' 
access to the decrees of the"Church Councils condemning it. 
2 At 
the time of writing the Commentary on the Sentences, he seems to under- 
stand Pelagianism as"a view that held that the natural virtues alone 
were sufficient for the Christian life; a negation of the supernatu- 
ral order. 
3 Bat by the time of the Contra Gentiles-(1258-64) and r 
the Summa Theolo iae (1268-73)., his attack on Pelagianism is stated 
in terms not only of needing to posit a divine, operation intrinsic 
to man at the moment of justification, but also as the need to envi- 
sage a divine motus throughout the whole spectrum of the realm of 
grace. 
4 
Significantly, his analysis is stated in terms of Aristo- 
telian physics - 'motio moventis nraecedit motum mobilis'. 
5 Thomas 
achieves his movement away from semi-Pelagianism by giving priority 
6 to motion rather than 'form', and by emphasising the intrinsic na- 
ture of the 'divinus instinctus' by which man is'affected by this 
motion.? Are these elements interlinked ? 
1. Quod I.,. I, a. 7.2. Deman's review of. 3ouillard 
in Bulletin Thomiste VII, pp. 46-58, is highly critical but acknow- 
ledges that Thomas' ignorance of semi-Pelagianism before this time 
is now established beyond doubt. 3. Lonergan, p. 60.4. S. C. G., 
III, 149.5. ibid. 6. Ernst, p. xxiv. 7. The term 
! 'Semi-Pelagianism' appeared around 1594 at the time of the IN Auxi 
liis' controversy. 'The theologians of the thirteenth century who 
knew nothin of the Council of Orange, were not only unfamiliar with -I 
the term 'semi-pelagianism' but made no distinction between Pelagia- 
nism and semi-Pelagianism', H. Rondet, Gratia Christi, tr. T. W. Guzie, 
New York, 19 , p. 145n. See also, Bouillard, pp. 92-102; H. Jaquin, 'A quelle date apparait he terme semi-pe1 agiere ?r 'R. S. P. T., 1907, 
pp. 506-508; and also the articlQ, 'Semi-Pelagiens' by E. Amann in 
D. T. C., XIV, col. 1796-1850. 
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So far we have outlined the movement of Thomas! thought in 
terms of his growth out of the limitations exercised by the paradigm 
which the scholastic tradition offered him. There were, however, 
other influences outside scholasticism which helped to focus his 
unease, gave him the intellectual tools to elaborate a new paradigm, 
and encouraged him with its enlargement. The ground we are about 
to cover is by no means untrod territory. Bouillard and Seckler 
have done the basic detailed research and scholars including Schille- 
beeckx and Chenu have incorporated their results into their own work. 
The following paragraphs are in many ways a compendium of their writ- 
ings along with others. 
1 We can begin with a quotation from Schille- 
beeclac using Seckler. 
'Seckler proceeds from Bouillard' correct finding 
that, during his first period in Italy (1259-60), 
Aquinas, either indirectly or directly came across 
the documents of the ecclesiastical condemnation 
of Semi-Pelagianism. From a certain point on- 
wards (in the middle of the period in which he was 
writing his third book Contra Gentiles), three 
ideas which are not found in Aquinas' earlier 
works suddenly make an appearance in his writing: 
greater stress was placed on God's initiative; an 
auxilium divinim was seen to be directly active 
in the human will; and the older doctrine of habi- 
tus fides, faith as a habit, was subordinated to a 
more dynamic view of justification, so that the 
movement of God, the motio divina, came to occupy 
a central-place. (2) 
It is possible to suggest five inter-connected influences on Thomas 
during this Italian period. It would be foolish however, to imagine 
that a mind as complex as St Thomas' can be analysed by a mere list 
of influences upon it, or that each of such influences can be studied 
1. H. Bouillard, Conversion et Grace chew S. Thomas d'Acuin, 
Paris., 1944. M. Seckler, Instinkt und Glaubenswille nach Thomas von 
Acuin, Mainz, 1962. E. Schillibeeclcc, 'The Non-Conceptual Intellec- 
tual Element in the Act of Faith: A Reaction', in The Concept of 
Truth and Theological Renewal, London, 1968, pp. 30-72. N-D Chenu, 
Introduction a l'etude de S. Thomas d'Aauin, Montreal and Paris, 1950. 
J. Weisheiul. Friar Thomas d'Aouino. his life. thought and works. 
Oxford, 1974.2. SchiUebee-cvcx, p. 36. 
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adequately in isolation from each other, or that Thomas merely'ai. 
sorbed their ideas and did not radically restructure what,. he received 
from them. Nevertheless the following were important. 
1. A reading of the works of St Augustine, especially the 
de Präedestinatione Sanctorum. 1 
2. 
_ 
An intensive study*of the Bible, read now in a diffe'-' 
rent light. 
2 
3. His discovery of the de Bona. Fortuna. 
3 
4. A reading of the Conciliar texts on Semi-Pelagianism. 
4 
5. A wider reading of the Greek Fathers. 5 
As for the first two of this list, this is no new discovery 
of twentieth century scholarship but was noted by Soto in the six- 
teenth century. 
'Cum II Sent. opinionem communem insecutus affirmas- 
set turn quod ... tum quod ... postmodum eloquia sa- 
cra et Patrum, cum primis Augustini, sententias medi- 
tatius e, lorans, utrumque retractavit. ' (6) 
It is difficult - and presumptuous - to attempt to analyse so as to 
isolate, the influence of scripture of ä mind so'religious as St Tho- 
mas'. Ernst warns us, on this'very topic: 
'In the growth of a mind like St Thomas, intellec- 
tual and religious insights proceed jointly in an 
interplay more complex than any dialectic. ' (7) 
The interplay of philosophy, Augustinianism, and scriptural 
1. Chenu, p. 236, and Bouillard, pp. 109-114 for arguments 
to show that Thomas was reading Augustiners texts rather than glos- 
ses at this time. 2. See below p. 73,76.3.9ouillard, Seek- 
ler and Schillebeeckx, see below p.. 74 and chapter 7.4. Seck- 
ler, see Aböne p. 71 . 5. Weisheipl, pp. 163-176. Weisheipl 
points out, p. 171,, that,. Thomas was working simultaneously on the 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Contra Errores Graecorum and the Catena Aurea. 
The latter involved him in commissioning latin translations of the 
Greek Doctors, p. 173, of whem he quotes fifty seven in the course 
of the work, p. 173. See also below p. 76 . 
6. De natura et gra- 
tia, II, 3; cited by Chenu, p. 236.7. Ernst, p. xviii. 
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meditation can be seen in a relevant passage from the Commentary on 
John, chapter six., on verse 44: Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, 
cui misit me, traxerit eum'. 
1 Thomas discusses whether this ttractus' 
by the Father is to be seen as something coercive and violent. He 
dismisses this and says the Father draws men, 'persue. dendo, ratione ... 
demonstrando eum esse filium suum ... alicuis trahit alium alliciando ... 
ý. 
Then he refers to Augustine who presents a psychological analysis of 
man's will seduced by the beauty of truth. 
'Si enim, ut Augustinus dicit, trahit sua quemque 
voluptas, quanto fortius debet homo trahi ad Chris- 
t, si delectatur veritate, beatitudine, iustitia, 
sempiterna vita, quod totum est Christus ? Ab 
isto ergo si trahendi sumus, trahamur per dilec- 
tionem veritatis ... ' (2) 
But - and this is the significant point - Thomas does not just passi- 
vely receive and report from the various influences upon him, he crea- 
tively restructures what he receives. Immediately after this refe- 
rence to Augustine.. Thomas presents a transposition of Augustine's 
psychological. solution into ontological terms. We can see also here 
how far he has moved from his views in the Commentary on the Sentences. 
'Sed quia non solum revelatio exterior, vel objectum, 
virtutem attrahendi habet; sed etiam interior in- 
stinctus impellens et : covens ad credendum, ideo tra- 
hit multos Pater ad Filium per instinctum divine 
operationis moventis interius cor hominis ad creden- 
dum ... 3 
There then follows, among two others the important quotation 
'Cor regis in manu Domini: quocumque voluerit in- 
clinabat illud. ' (Proverbs 21, v. 1). 
Am example of a similar movement can be seen in his, commentary 
on the Epistle to the Romans, onrchapter eight, v. 14 'Ouicumaue enim 
spiritu_ Dei aguntur, hi suet filii Dei. ' Here we will merely quote 
Thomas. 
1. In Joan, c. 6, lect. 5.2. ibid. 3. ibid. 
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... potest sic intellegi, 'Quicumque ... ', id est, 
reguntur sicut a quodam ductore et directione, 
quod quidem in nobis facit spiritus, se. inquan- 
tum illuminat nos interius quid facere debeamus. 
... Sed quia ille qui ducitur, ex seipso non ope- 
ratur, homo autem spiritualis non tantum instrui- 
tur a Spiritu Sancto quid agere debeat, sed etiam 
cor eius a Spiritu Sancto movetur: ideo plus in- 
telligendum est in hoc ... lila enim agi'. dicuntur, 
quae quodam superiori instinctu moventur. Unde 
de brutis dicimus quod non agunt, sed_aguntur: 
quia a natura moventur, et non ex proprio motu ad 
suas actiones agendas. Similiter autem homo spi- 
ritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis 
principaliter, sed ex instinctu Spiritus Sancti 
inclinatur ad aliquid agendum ... Non tarnen per 
hoc 
excluditur quin viri spirituales, per voluntatem et 
liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum volun- 
tatis et liberii arbitrii Spiritus Sanctus in eis 
causat ... ' 1 
Here the ? instinctu Spiritus Sancti inclinatur ad alinuid agendum', 
is presented as something which is not contrary to free judgement or 
freedom of the will because it is prior to the movement of the will. 
This is a highly significant development. The focal point of ana- 
lysis is no longer man's free choice or judgement, but the very sponta- 
neity of the human will which precedes any deliberation, and the 'in- 
stinctus divinus' will be said to operate at this primary fount of. 
human autonomy. 
The term 'instinctus' here shows that our several sources are 
interlinked. Seckler's great discovery was to-find that both the 
Liber de Bona Fortuna, and the conciliar decrees against Semi-Pela- 
gianism both used the term Tinstinctus'. Together these texts and 
Thomas' use of the intellectual tool which the term 'instinctus' pro- 
vided, allowed him to develop a metapbysicalranalysis which was more 
profound and, which at the same time, undermined Pelagianism. We 
2 
shall see this from our detailed study of the de Bona Fortuna., 
The conceptual framework which Thomas created around the term 'ins tinc- 
1. In ad Rom., c. 8, lect. 3.2. See chapter 7. 
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tus' led him to change radically his understanding of the autonomy 
of man., positing a receptivity in the will itself, even prior to the 
exercise of free judgement. Let us quote Schillebeeclcc's approval 
of Seckler1s research: - 
'It struck him, (Seckler), that the transition of 
Thomas' texts was quite abrupt. The evidence of 
this is to be found in many different elements, 
both in the terminology and the contents of his 
writings at this time. Suddenly one finds re- 
peated references to gel aeiani (Semi-Pelagianism), 
each time connected with a quotation from the Eude- 
mian Ethics (for the first time in Contra Gentiles 
III, c. 89,147,149). Bouillard, however, had not 
noticed that the concept instinctus also appeared 
at this very point in Thomas' works-in connection 
with the act of faith. And. it is a remarkable fact 
that the term 'instinctus' played a part both in 
the Church's documents condemning Semi-Pelagianism 
and in the Latin traslation of the Eudemian Ethics. 
The word 'instinctus' is the only connection that 
can be established in Thomas' thought between anti- 
Semi-Pelagianism and these Ethics of Aristotle. 
Just as the danger of Semi-Pelagianism was averted 
in the writings of the Church Fathers by an appeal 
to the instinctus divinus, so too did this same 
term play a similar part centuries later in the 
works of Aquinas. ' () ) 
The references to Eademian Ethics in this passage are to be taken to 
refer to the Liber de bona fortuna. 
2 Schillebeecloc goes on to point 
out,, as we have done, the creative inter-reaction of these various 
influences on Thomas. 
'On the basis of the Bible, the affirmation of the 
instinct of faith was given scope in Aquinas' doc- 
trine thanks to his knowledge of the later works 
of Augustine, an ontological structure thanks to 
Aristotelianism and finally an anthropological 
form thanks to the Roman philosophy of law and 
Stoic ethics. ' (3) 
We shall deal with this latter element in the chapter, 'Ratio, Lex 
et Deus. 
4 
But there is yet another factor, another dimension to the 
1. Schillebeeclcc pp. 36-37. - 2. See below p. - 140. 
3. Schillebeeclac, p. 36.4. Below p. 196. 
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growth of Thomas' thought at this time. A dimension in which we 
might see the influence of Greek thought, especially Pseudo-Denis, 
along with scripture., especially Ephesians., but a factor which really 
arose out of the very task that Thomas had set himself in the Summa 
Contra Gentiles. There his aim was to exhibit the harmony of the 
Christian universe as a whole. Divine Providence reaches from end 
to end. of the universe and is the absolutely certain cause of every 
kind of celestial or terrestial cause and of every combination of 
such secondary and derivative causalities, whether seen as fortui- 
tous, accidental, coincidental or purposive. The theological con- 
cern of grace - the realm of Predestination - is now seen as a spe- 
cial part of divine Providence as a whole: ' that part which is con- 
cerned with rational creatures, angels and men, who by their nature 
are capable of more than their nature. 
1 To achieve what is beyond 
their natural potentialities, such creatures need an auxilium divi- 
num, which Thomas identified as grace. 
2 In this total vision of 
the universe, all the various-'finalities', rational and sub-ratio- 
nal, are seen as part of dynamism, a motto, issuing from the 'missions, 
of the Trinity; behind all of them and in all of them is an ener- 
gising drive which unites all of them into an 'assimilation' to God.. - 
their source and origin. -by the fulfillment of their natures. This 
drive and dynamism is seen as love. 
'While he was writing the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
he was also composing his major commentary on 
the de Nominibus Divinis of Pseudo-Dionysius; 
and his theological conception of grace finds 
its place in a larger context, Dionysian in pat- 
tern, of return by assimilation to a source. 
. In the chapter of the Contra Gentiles (III 150) in which, he identifies the divinum auxilium 
with grace, he cites the opening of Ephesians (1.5): 
1. S. C. G. III, c. 111.2. S. C. G. III, c. 147-151. 
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"Who has predestined us to the adoption 
of children through Jesus Christ unto 
himself, according to the purpose of 
his will, to the praise of the glory 
of his grace, in which he has graced 
us in his beloved Son. " 
It is tempting , but probably misleading, to ask 
whether it was the renewed appreciation of the 
movement of thought of Ephesians which led to the 
exploitation of the Dionysian procession of amor 
or eros, or vice versa. (1, 
Here we-should not try to isolate and identify any particular philo- 
sophy. Rather it is a matter of appreciating a widening of horizons, 
a change in perspective. Within this vision of a cosmic whole, Tho- 
mas could co-ordinate all the achievements of his predecessors and 
his new insights into one masterly whole. - 
This Neo-Platonic cosmology is not just a-poetic conception. 
Its detailed operations are analysed by Thomas in-terms of Aristote- 
lian physics. Again the basic theme is that of motion, and we shall 
look at this in detail in chapter 6. At the moment, to, give a sum- 
mary over-view, we can say that Thomas accepted, with various theo- 
logical modification, the Aristotelian system of a First Mover, celes- 
tial spheres and terrestial process. He also accepted the Platonic 
idea of universal causes, that is, causes which are the cause of any 
effect within a given category subordinate to that cause. All lower 
causes are therefore said to be 'instruments' of higher causes within 
the same category and this is to be understood in terms of their tparti- 
cipationt in the causality of the higher causes. 
2 What is called 'Fate' 
then, is "the order of secondary causes: it is their disposition, ar- 
rangement, seriation; it is not a quality and much less is it a sub- 
stance; it is in the category of relation. "3 
1. Ernst, p, xviii. 2. S. C. G. III, c. 77-83, c. 91-95; Ia, 
q. 110-q. 119.3. Lonergan, p. 84; S. C_G. III, c. 94; Ia, q. 116; 
IIIa, q. 62, a. 4, ad4um. 
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In terms of grace, this general instrumentality shows itself 
in man's nature as both self-mover and moved. There are therefore 
two dimensions to grace in relation to man and angels: ' the divine 
dynamism of grace effects intellectual creatures as 'mens mota et 
non movens, AND ALSO as 'mens mota et movens'. The first is opera- 
tive grace, the second, co=operative grace. The interplay between 
the theological virtues and the Gifts of the Spirit exists within 
this field. As we shall see, in article three, when we talk about 
the Gifts of the Spirit we are not only talking about the movements 
or impulses from God, but also about the settled dispositions of re- 
cep tivity within the faculties of man under grace which allow him to 
cooperate receptively with these instincts or promptings. We need 
then to appreciate not only the movement of the Spirit but also the 
nature of these created dispositions in man. 
1 
To conclude this section on the development of Thomas' concept 
of grace., 'let us look at a key passage to illustrate his final achieve- 
menti IaIIae, q. lTO, a. 2. 
'Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est, in eo qui 
dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse 
quidacn effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis. Dic- 
tum est autem supra quod dupliciter ex gratuita 
Del voluntate homo"adjuvatur. Uno modo inquan- 
tum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cog- 
noscendum, vel volendum, vel agendum;, et hoc 
modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est 
qualitas, sed motus quidam animae: actus enim 
moventis in moto est motus, ut dicitur in 3 Phy- 
sic. 
Alio modo adjuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, 
secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animae 
infunditur; et hoc ideo quia non est conveniens 
quod Deus minus provideat his quos diligit ad super- 
naturale bonum habendum quam creaturis quas diligit 
ad bonum naturale habendum. Creaturis autem natu- 
ralibus sic providet, ut non solum moveat eas ad 
actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis Formas et 
1. In our analysis of article one, we pointed out the central 
importance of the term 'disnositio', see above p. 36ff. 
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virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia actuum, ut 
secundum seipsas inclinentur ad hujusmodi motus. 
Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur fiunt creatu- 
ris connaturales et faciles, secundum illus San., 
Et disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis 
illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum superna- 
turale aeternum infundit aliquas formas, seu quali- 
tates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et 
prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonuni aeternum con- 
sequendum; et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaed- 
dam est. 
The title to this question is, 'utrum Pratia sit cualitas'. 
It is a question then which fits into the-thirteenth century tradi- 
tion of speculation about grace as we have discussed it here. What 
is significant is that Thomas now describes grace first of all as a 
movement by which God moves the mind and will of men. He then quotes 
a basic Aristotelian dictum from the third book of the Physics. 
The rest of the article deals with habitual grace but this is 
now clearly sited within an over-all context of movement, The sig- 
nificance of the 'dispositions' for action of nature and of grace 
- forms or habitus - is that they allow this movement caused by God 
to be a self-movement on the part of creatures. 
i... sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes, 
quasdam quas sunt principia actuum, ut secundum 
seipsas inclinetur ad hujusmodi motus. Et sic 
motus quibus a Deo moventur fiunt creaturis con- 
naturales et faciles ... I 
And once more he quotes the text which more than any other sums up 
his serene confidence in the harmony of creation in its relationship 
with its benign Creator. 
'Et disponit omnia suaviter., 
Grace is not nature, and Thomas never confuses them; yet his confi- 
dence in the order of creation is such that he can present them as 
analagous forms of self-actuation. 
'Molto igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequin- 
dum bonuni supernaturale aeternum infundit aliquas 
'formas, seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas 
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suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum 
aeternum consequendum ... t 
This article highlights the achievements of St Thomas. A 
harmony is presented between God, his providence in creation, his 
predestination as regards to men and angels, and their dignity of 
self-actuation within this predestination. In a later article de- 
pendent on this one he will further distinguish between operative 
and cooperative grace in regard to both the divine 'movement' and 
the habitual graced form in men. 
1 
In this chapter we have seen how this synthesis was not pre- 
sented to Thomas by his tradition but is the achievement of his theo- 
logy after years of study and teaching; a synthesis of his insights 
after several decades. Having now seen something of the inner mo- 
mentum and structure of his later theology of grace, we are in a bet- 
ter position to appreciate the significance of article three of ques- 
tion 68 - utrum dons sint habitus. 
1. IaIlae, q. 111, a. 2. 
4. QUESTION 68, ARTICLES THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SEVEN AND 
EIGHT. THE GIFTS AS 'HABITUS' 
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At one level it is not surprising that St Thomas describes 
the Gifts as habitus. Given the scholastic tradition which he in- 
herited, and which we have looked at in chapter three, the notion of 
habitus was an obvious, ready-to-hind, intellectual tool. One might 
seriously claim therefore - as many commentators have done - that the 
notion of habitus is presupposed in all his earlier writings on the 
Gifts, and presupposed too by his contemporaries. Nevertheless, 
if this is so, it still remains a fact that neither St Thomas in those 
earlier works, nor any other scholastic actually treats the subject 
explicitly. Here an entire article. is dedicated to the matter. it, 
follows from this, so it seems to the present writer, that whether. the 
Gifts were habitus or not was of no major or crucial significance to 
others but that in the context of the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theo- 
logi. ae, that the Gifts are habitus is of central and crucial impor- 
tance, not only for the understanding of the Gifts themselves, but to 
safeguard the two basic axioms of Thomas' theology of grace; the free- 
dom of man under grace and the infallible efficiency of God's Predes- 
tination. The reason for this is that if it becomes necessary to 
posit the insufficiency of the infused virtues without further divine 
prompting and assistance - article two - then it becomes necessary 
both to suggest such promptings and necessary to remove any suggestion 
of violence in such 'in-spirationes I. 
I 
The Aristotelian concept of habitus, (hexis), will be used to 
overcome any notion of violence. But, what is more, as this model 
of habitus is sketched out and developed in the course of articles 3, 
4..., 5's 7 and 8, the key theme of article 1, that the Gifts give, man a 
ý.. Lonergan, p. 44. 
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dispositio, a receptivity to the impulses of the Holy Spirit, will be 
given further refinement and specification. 
1 We can trace this develop- 
ment along four themes interlinked with the habit-Us model. 
7. that the receptivity provided by the Gifts is not a transi- 
tort', occasional docility but a permanent, abiding dimension 
of man's graced being. (article 3) 
2. that as the various habitus of man's moral life affect all 
his potentialities, so do the Gifts of the Spirit. (arti- 
ales 4 and 7). 
3. that as these moral virtues form a unity under the virtue of 
prudence so are the Gifts and all the infused virtues united 
under the theological virtue of charity. (articles 5 and 8) 
4. that as ramifications of charity, all the infused virtues 
and Gifts make man connaturally responsive and cooperative 
to the operation , (rsotio) of Cod. _ 
(article 8) 
article three 
We can begin by looking at the objections and Thomas' answer 
to them. The second of these is the most significant. Is man 
'moved' by the Spirit as a man might move a stick to hit a ball or to 
clear*a drain ? Is man merely used by the Spirit without any form 
of cooperation on his part ? The third objection presents a situa- 
tion, that of prophecy, where this is precisely the case. 
2 Are the 
Gifts of the Spirit similar then to the Pauline gifts of 1 Corinthians 
12.8-10, which Thomas analyses as gratin gratis data, that is, charisms 
given for the salvation of others ?5 The answers to all these object- 
1. - Article six will be discussed in relation to the-Beatitudes 
and the Fruits of the Spirit, see below p. 297 . 2. At least. as Thomas analyses it, see IIaIIae, q. 171-q. 174.3. IaIIae, q. 111, a. 1, 
a. 4, a. 5. IaIIae, q. 171-178. The clear distinction made between 'sanc- 
tifying grace', gratia Pratum"faciens, and 'freely bestowed graces' 
-83- 
tions repeat the conclusion of article two; the Gifts of the Spirit 
are to be understood as part of gratia eratum faciens, 'sanctifying 
grace', graces necessary for one's own salvation. The answer to the 
first objection is a neat interweaving of the authority of Gregory 
with Thomas' reasoned argument of-article two: the Gifts of grace 
necessary for salvation, (and the Gifts of the Spirit are such), are 
abiding dispositions and not transitory impulses. 
But the answer to the second objection is the crucial one. In 
the case of the Gifts of the Spirit, man acts from his extrinsic prin- 
ciple of activity and not from his intrinsic principle of reasoning, 
(article one). If he does not have the initiative in this action, is 
he then, acting merely as a servile instrument ? If man is merely 
such an instrument under these impulses from the Spirit then he has 
no need of any habitus. Thomas replies: 
'ratio illa procedit de instrnmento cujus non est 
agere, sed solum agi. Tale instruinentum non 
est homo; sed sic agitur a Soiritu Sancto, quod 
etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii. Unde 
indiget habitu' (1) 
This is a crucial statement but it needs to be clarified. Although 
the Gifts do not operate through man's free judgement, as do the infused 
virtues, and although man has no initiative in regard to the Gifts 
yet, precisely because he does have free judgement and all that is 
implied in that, he cannot be seen as a mere tool. Man is not only 
acted upon but acts from himself. 
At this point we need to be absolutely clear about the distinc- 
tion between the infused virtues, which operate from man's intrinsic 
principle of activity, and the Gifts which operate from his extrinsic 
principle. 
(3 con. ) gratiae gratis datae, is itself an achievement only of 
Thomas' mature theology of grace: as late as de Veritate, q. 27 this 
distinction was not made, see Lonergan, p. 25. 
1. a. 3, ad2um. 
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'Cette grace (des vertus) nous laisse une large 
part d'initiative, eile depose en nous des puis- 
sances d'activite; mais il nous appartient de 
deployercette activate, comme nous voulons, a 
notre gre et selon nos procedes; la grace, dans 
ces vertus bien en train, peut=etre plus cooper- 
ante qu'operante. Mais la grace des dons est 
fort differente; eile est foncierement une grace 
opeerante; on peut dire quelle sa reserve toute 
1'initiative et quelle seule regle de mouvement; 
eile depose en nous des puissances de passivite et 
de receptivite: eile fait de nous les sujects de 
la divine inspiration, eile nous rend aptes a subir 
la touche du divin, pati divine. ' (1) 
But what is the nature of this 'passivity' ? Is it of an absolute 
kind-? This question has provoked a controversy among the commenta- 
tors., -- A. Gardeil has enrohasised the passivity of man in relation to 
the Gifts of the Spirit and M. Labourdette has taken him to task over 
his interpretation of this ad secundum of article three. 
2 Our own 
interpretation, which coincides with Labourdette's, will be based not 
on the term liberum arbitriurn, the term used here, but on what is to- 
be presupposed by that term, man's rational appetite, the will. 
3 
Certainly the Gifts are not 'cooperative' with grace in the 
way that the virtues cooperate with grace. -. _Peason and will are-not 
'activating' but receptive in the activity of the Spirit in man through 
the Gifts. But is Thomas not presenting some more subtle notion of 
a receptive form of cooperation by affirming the Gifts are habitus ? 
We can clarify and develop the argument here by referring to some texts 
earlier in the Prima Secundae. In these questions on the voluntary 
nature of the will's activity, Thomas is probing whether any 'exter- 
nal' intervention in the will is necessarily violent. 
... hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti quod 
principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nihil 
1. R. Bernard, Ia Vertu, (II), Editions'de la Revue des Jeunes, 
IaIIae, q. 61-70, pp. 61-70.2. A. Gardeil, La structure de L'. 1ime et 
1'exnerience mystioue, t. 2, Paris, 1947, p"176ff, and in 'Dons du S. Es- 
prit', D. T. C., t. 4, col. 1738.11. Labourette, 'Dons du S. Esprit', D. S., 
XIII, co].. 23.3. For. the justification for this shift in empha- 
sis see p. 175M below. 
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conferat vim patiens, quod non contingit dum volun- 
tas ab exterori movetur; nam ipsa est quae volt, ab 
alio tarnen mots. Esset autem motus iste violentus, 
si esset contrarius motui voluntatis, quod in propos- 
ito esse non potest, quia sic idem. vellet et non 
vellet. ' (1) 
If we apply this to the activity of the Gifts, we must posit a volun- 
tary movement of man's own will; man is not just acted upon - that 
would constitute violence - but allows himself to be acted upon. We 
must posit then some form of cooperation on man's part, and as this, 
cannot be cooperation by deliberation - that is the role of the vir- 
tues - it must be by some form of action as it were by second nature, 







contra inclinationem interiorem passivi. 1 (2) 
The will, therefore voluntarily takes up and accepts a drive, an in- 
stinct, which did not originate with itself; and it does this because 
it is given a new kind of disposition within itself which is as if by 
second nature. We can posit such a kind of habitus because the will 
is not just active by nature but also passive. And by passive here 
we do not mean in relation to the intellect - that would take us into 
the area of deliberation and the realm of the virtues - but a volun- 
tart' passivity at its most originary level,, (aue®d. exercitium). 
ý... voluntarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: 
uno modo secundum actionem, puta cum aliquis volt 
aliquid agere; alio modo secundum passionem, 
scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Bnde 
cum actio infertur ab aliquo exteriors, manente 
in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non est sim- 
pliciter violentum, quia licet ills qui patitur 
non conferat agendo, confert tarnen volendo pati; 
ende non potest dici involuntarium. f (3) 
'The subject contributes to the deed by his acceptance though not by 
1. IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4, ad2ui. 2. IaIIae, q. 6, a. 4, ad2um. 
3. IaIIae, q. 6, a. 5, ad2um, see also . Ia, q. 83, a. 1, ad3um. 
-86- 
his efforts'. This is the type of 'passivity' we are to envisage in 
the case of the Gifts of the Spirit. By saying this we are not claiming 
that the Gifts are part of 'cooperative' grace because these habitus of 
receptivity are prior to man's reasoning and free judgement. 
1 Never- 
theless, it is fitting that even in the area of 'operative' grace, other 
than the case of the moment of justification, man's dignity as a creature 
capable of being the principle of his own acts, should receive the in- 
spirations of God in a way that is voluntary. The relationship between 
'operative' and 'cooperative' grace in regard to the Gifts of the Spirit, 
is described with great clarity by W. J. Hill: - 
'This divine motion, (in the gifts) is called rga- 
tia operans, wherein man is totally moved by God 
so that he does not move himself, i. e., the will's 
action does not proceed in virtue of a prior dis- 
cursive process of mind, the basis for man's self- 
determination in the use of the will. This is 
only in the very inception of the total act; once the divine initiative is received passively but 
freely, (for the will consents to its own act) the 
human person becomes the active cause of his own 
consequent activity and the divine causality pro- 
longing itself into these latter phases is called 
gratia cooperans. ' (2) 
The point we are emphasising at the moment is that., 'the divine ini- 
tiative is received passively but freely, ' since, 'the will consents 
to its own act'. 
3 
Thomas is using the common intellectual tool or concept of 
habitue but he is using it in an unusual area of analysis. To move 
from the known to the unknown, in the corpus of the article he imme- 
diately introduces the model of the moral virtues. It is commonly 
accepted that these are permanent dispositions within the virtuous 
man by which his emotions are receptive to the drive of reason and 
1. On this distinction between 'operative' and 'cooperative' 
grace, see IaIIae, q. 1113a. 2.2. W. J. Hill, in Gilby, vol. 33, 
(IIaIIae, q. 17-22), pp. 167-168.3. For a full analysis of this, 
see below p. 172. 
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the rational appetite, (the will). Now the Gifts are presented as 
being similar receptivities but ones which relate to the extrinsic 
and not the intrinsic principle of man's self-activation. 
Now the concept of habitus or hexis belongs to Aristotelian 
moral theory. According to this philosophy there is a crucial dis- 
Unction between analysing a single, isolated moral act, and analysing 
a moral life; a man can do a good moral deed without possessing the 
habitus or disposition to do it, but he cannot lead a good moral life 
without such a disposition. Aristotle takes the example of justice. 
1 
It is easy to do what the just man does but it is not easy to do it 
as he does it; that is, at all times and with promptitude and plea- 
sure, as if by second nature. The habitus of justice is a constant 
and permanent will and ability to render to each man what is his due. 
It is not a transient emotion or act but a constant disposition so to 
act. The habitus or virtue of justice is not merely doing 'the just 
thing' but being just. 
Now if the Gifts are to be understood as habitus then their 
operation is not to be seen as a series of discrete, disconnected 
responses to the divine initiative but as a permanent dimension of 
receptivity within the being of man under grace. Our analysis of 
article two has shown that, according to Thomas, man can never have 
a completely divinised being in the sense of 'possessing' such a diva-- 
nised nature. The Gifts do not complete man's divinised nature but, 
precisely as relating to its inevitable incompleteness, point to the 
2 
constant dependence of man on God's assistance. In this way, by 
introducing the notion of habitus, article three has given a further 
refinement to the conclusions of articles one and two. 
1. Nic. omachean Ethics, II. 4.1105b, 5-S. 2. See above, p. 61. 
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Articles four and seven: the range and diversity of the Gifts. 
The analogy between the receptivity of the moral virtues to 
reason and the receptivity of the Gifts to the initiative of the Spi- 
rit is now taken as a basic model of explanation for the rest of this 
question. In article four it is used to show the extent and range 
of the Gifts of the Spirit. As the command of reason governs the 
appetitive faculties of man, through the receptivity of the moral 
virtues, so the promptings of the Spirit govern both the appetitive 
and the rational faculties of man through the receptivity of the Gifts 
of the Spirit. The range of"these receptivities is therefore larger 
than that of the moral virtues because all the faculties of man are 
open to the promptings of God. 
'Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dons sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte 
sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti, sicut virtu- 
tes morales perficiunt wires appetitivas ad obe- 
diendun rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae 
natae Bunt moveri per Lnperium rationis, ita omnes 
wires humane natae aunt moveri per instinctum Dei, 
sicut a quadam superiori potentia. Et ideo in 
omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse princi- 
pia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam 
aunt dona: scilicet in ratione et in vi appetitiva. (1) 
The same powers of reasoning and appetite which are perfected by the 
intellectual and moral virtues are brought to an even greater perfec- 
tion by these other dispositions, (habitus), which are the Gifts. 
To put this in other words, the potentialities of man's nature 
are totally perfected only the virtues and the Gifts together. This 
will be Thomas' explicit teaching throughout the Secunda Secundae. 
2 
Here., in the Prima Secundae, he arranges each of the seven forms of 
receptivity of the Gifts alongside one of the seven types of activity of 
1. article four. 2. See Ila Mae, Prologue. We shall 
discuss the changes between the arrangement of the Gifts in the Prima 
Secundae and Secunda Secundae, below on p. 223. 
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the potentialities of man's nature. The arrangement of the Gifts 
can be set out in tabular formI 
REASON 
ýSoeculative: apprehension ... ... ... the Gift of UNDERSTANDING judgement ..... ... '... the Gift of'WISPOI1 Practical : apprehension ... ... ... the Gift of COUNSEL judgement ..... ... ... the Gift of 
KNO LGEDGE 
APPETITE 
re. others : ... ... ... ... ... ..., the Gift of PIETY 
re. oneself: against fear ... ... ... the Gift of FORTITUDE 
against concupiscence .. the Gift of 
FEAR 
This scheme may strike us as forced and over-systematised, but the 
point Thomas is making is an important one: the Gifts, while not 
within control of man's powers, are rooted in his nature, in the very 
powers of his autonomy. The divine initiative to which the Gifts 
make man receptive is not received by him as a supernatural formless- 
ness, but as a mysterious impulse from within his own sensibilities, 
purposes, understanding and interrelationships. The diversity among 
the seven Gifts comes from the fact that the divine initiative elicits 
acts from the particular powers of man; these acts are therefore both 
divine in origin and yet characterised by the human activity of these 
divine powers. 
2 The basic axiom established by article four and used 
in article seven is: 
'dona ad omnes potentiarum animae perficiunt homi- 
nemn ad quos perficiunt virtutes' (3) 
We can see this as an example of Thomas' dictum: on grace, that grace 
does not destroy but perfects nature. 
4 Here even the irascible and 
concupiscible appetites of man are endowed-dith an abiding recepti- 
vity to the divine initiative. There is no part of man's autonomy., 
1. article four and seven. 2. Labourdette, p. 205. 
3. a-7- 4. Ia.. q. 1, a. 8, ad2uin. 
-9a- 
perfected by the virtues, which does not also exhibit the dimension 
of free consent to the movements of the Spirit. Only in this way, 
through this dimension of man's dependence on the movement of the 
Spirit, is man's divinised nature complete. How we are to understand 
this interrelationship of the virtues and the Gifts in detail and in 
practise can be left until we analyse Thomas' discussion in the Secun- 
da Secundae. 1 In question 68, Thomas asks more general questions: 
how are the Gifts related to each other, and how are the Gifts re- 
lated to the virtues in general ? These questions are posed in art- 
isle five and article eight. 
Articles five and eight. 
In these articles Thomas advances the discussion in two stages. 
The first is that the Gifts are not to be understood as discrete re- 
ceptivities such that a man might have one and not another, but rat- 
her, like the moral virtues united by prudence, are to be seen as 
forming an interlinked whole covering all man's human activities. 
2 
The second is that they, and indeed all the infused virtues, intel- 
lectual and moral, are united as ramifications of the theological 
virtues. 
Within Aristotle's moral theory, where the moral life rather 
than individual moral acts are the focal point of discussion, it is 
argued that the moral life is not only an interconnection of all acts 
within a moral life but also an interconnection of all the virtues 
within such a life. A man cannot be just unless he also has the 
dispositions of temperance and fortitude, which are subordinate to 
justice, and unless he also has the disposition of prudence which 
1. see below section 3.2. On the distinction between what 
a man does and his moral, human activity, see IaIIae, q. 1 , a. 1. 
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governs justice. Man's rational control over'himself - over his lower 
appetites is neither infallible nor dictatorial. He needs, within his 
appetites these various dispositions of receptivity in regard to the 
ordering'öf his rational will. With these receptivities he can res- 
pond in his wholeness to what he sets himself as his purposive activity. 
The virtuous man then, acts in his wholeness, ' with the whole drive of 
his appetites, and not as a man divided against himself. As a result 
he achieves his aims, his purposive activity, with sureness, constancy 
and promptitude. The crucial virtue here is that of prudence which 
unites man's moral and intellectual virtues. 
1 This is what Thomas 
presupposes in his concise-argument in article four. As the virtue 
of prudence perfects man's 'practical reasoning and also'unites all his 
appetites within his purposive activity, so charity both perfects man's 
openness and receptivity to the Spirit and also unites all the recep- 
tiveness and capabilities of man's nature under grace. 
'Dictum est enim supra quod sicut'vires appetitivae 
disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione 
ad regimen rationis, ita omnes vires animae dispo-` 
nuntur per dona in compartione ad Spiritum Sanctum 
moventem. Spiritus autem Sanctus habitat in nobis 
per caritat h, uiý d Rom., Caritas Dei diffusa est 
in cordibus nostris per SAiritum Sanctum, aui datus 
est nobis: sicut et ratio nostra perficitur 
per prudentiam. Unde sicut virtutes morales connec- 
tuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, ita dons Spiritus 
Sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate; ita 
scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona Spiri- 
tus Sancti habet; quorum nullum sine caritate hab- 
eri potest'. (2) 
The argument here is designed merely to show that the Gifts are 
united under the theological virtue of charity but given a wider 
reading of Thomas' thought in the Summa - on the nature of the infused 
3 
virtues, on charity and on grace - it is clear that here we have only 
1. We7shall discuss the virtue of prudence in-more detail later, 
see below, p. 2 . 2. Article 5.3. IaIIae, q. 62, a. 4; IIaIIae, 
q. 23, a. 8;, IaIIae, q. 110, a. 3, a. 4. 
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a particular aspect of a larger view, that charity is 'the mother 
and root of all the virtues' 
1 
. All the infused virtues and recep- 
tivities, the Gifts, the intellectual and moral virtues and 'informed' 
faith and hope, are all ramifications of charity. 
But charity for Thomas is not synonymous with grace. 
2 Charity 
is a virtue, an infused disposition within man's will; it presupposes 
then man's new divinised nature in the essence of his soul. 
3 Yet it 
is by his potentialities of intellect and will that man expressas his 
nature,, and so it is by the activity of the theological virtues in 
man's faculties of intellect and will that he expresses and estab- 
lishes his union with God, not only in terms of this 'created grace 
in his essence but also in terms of the 'uncreated' movement of the 
Spirit within him. 
Now up to article eight, Thomas has used this model of the 
relationship between reason and the moral virtues in terms of the 
receptivity of the latter. Now he, reverses, as it were, this line 
of argument while keeping to the same model, and looks at how reason 
itself is perfected by the intellectual virtues of wisdom, knowledge, 
(scientia), understanding and prudence. Obviously the analogue here, 
in terms of the Gifts of the Spiritt cannot be some perfection of the 
Holy Spirit. What must be presupposed is what'is stated in the ad3um 
of article four. 
I... animus hominis non movetur a Spiritu Sancto, 
nisi ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur: sicut 
instrumentum non movetur ab artifice nisi per 
contactum, auf per aliquam aliam unionem. 
Primo autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et 
caritatem. Unde istae virtutes praesupponun- 
tur ad dons, sicut radices quaedam donorum. 
Unde onmia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, 
sicut quaadam derivationes praedictarum virtu- 
tum. ' (4) 
1. IaIIae, q. 62, a. 4.2. IIaIIae, q. 23, a. . 3. see above, 
p. 49fC 4. a. 4, ad3um. 
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The movements of the Spirit to which the Gifts are receptive are them- 
selves then part of an already existing relationship between God and 
man under grace. What is it that structures this relationship, this 
union ? Faith, hope and charity; the theological virtues. The ana- 
logate to the intellectual virtues in article eight is then the theolo- 
gical virtues. 
'Virtutes quidem theologicas sunt quibus mens human 
Deo conjungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales 
sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem 
morales sunt quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur 
ab obediendum rationi. Dona autem Spiritus Sancti 
sunt quibus omnes wires animae disponuntur ad hoc 
quod subdantur motioni divinae. 
Sic ergo eadem videtur esse comparatio donorum ad 
virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur SDiritui 
Sancto moventi, sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes 
intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est 
virtutum moralium motiva'. (, i) 
The Gifts are ramifications of the life of the infused virtues, set- 
ting up a dimension of receptivity to the movements of 'uncreated' 
grace within the relationship and union established by these virtues. 
The Gifts work with them and with all the other virtues, covering the 
whole range of man's potentialities, as receptivities within the realm 
of man's extrinsic principle of self-actuation, the Spirit of God. 
Here we can see how Thomas holds in a synthesis his ideas of grace 
as a habitus and grace as a motio, an auxilium divinum. 
We can set out the conclusion of article eight in tabular form. 
TIE INTRINSIC PRINCIPLE 
reason - perfected by the in- the appetitive po- by the recepti- 
tellectual virtues - wers perfected - vity of the moral 
virtu--s 
THE EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLE 
God/The - in union with man the perfection of - 
by the recepti- 
Spirit through the theolo- - all man's capabi- vity of the Gifts 
gical virtues lities in all these facul- 
ties. 
1. a. 8. 
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Thomas uses the model of the moral virtues to explain the per- 
manent nature of the Gifts as habt (a. 3), their range and scope 
(a. 4,. a. 7), and their link with one another (a. 5), and their place 
within the whole life of'grace (a. 8). No one before Thomas had ever 
considered using such a parallel and Thomas introduces it here for the 
first time in his own writings. 
1 Yet, on consideration it is not 
surprising that this model was never used before because it depends 
on the breakthrough Thomas made in article one. There he analysed 
the Gifts along the fundamental duality of the intrinsic and extrin- 
sic principles of man's self-actuation: a duality which structures 
the whole of the Prima Secundae. 
2 This is his greatest achievement 
and the model we have looked at in this chapter'is dependent upon it. 
'What this analogy with the moral virtues adds to its parent'model is 
a clarification of how we'are to understand the Gifts in'action., as 
they were outlined in article one. The impulses of the Spirit are 
not to be seen as merely transitory motions unconnected with the rest 
of man's moral or 'theological' life. They occur within a way of 
life rooted in the friendship-knowledge and love between man and God 
which is structured by the theological virtues. They evoke a coop- 
erative receptivity within all of man's autonomous drives; a recepti- 
vity which is a permanent disposition within his freedom under'grace. 
But, as with all analogies, there are some difficulties with 
this particular one. Thomas uses it asa framework-of exposition, 
as'an aid to understand the Gifts, but it is not itself a demonstra- 
tion öf how the Gifts actually do exist. 
3 But if this analogy were 
merely a pedagogic device in article three, then Thomas would not be 
1. O'Connor,. p. 16; footnote 'a', p. 123. . 2. See above 
p. 5.3. O'Connor raises this difficulty, O'Connor, p. 123. 
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able to use it to establish his arguments in the subsequent articles. 
It seems then that we must take it that this analogy is designed to 
show how the Gifts actually do operate, even though Thomas never actu- 
ally proves this. Or perhaps, rather than seeing the matter in terms 
of 'proof!, we might see his presentation of this analogy as a theory 
which alone provides space and makes sense of the totality of his in- 
sights regarding all aspects of man's divinised and moral life. 
There is one final question however which Thomas does not deal 
with directly. If man consents to the action of the Spirit within 
the receptivity of the Gifts, can we posit the theoretical possibi- 
lity of his refusal to consent ? Or, to put a similar question, can 
man choose when and where to be receptive ? The answer to both ques- 
tions is in the negative and it follows quite -clearly from an under- 
standing of the real nature of the Gifts and their difference from 
the virtues. A man cannot choose to use the Gifts or not because 
'choice' refers to the area of deliberation and the interplay of the 
reason and will in the realm of the virtues. The operation of God 
through the receptivity of. the Gifts is prior to such a response. 
That a man does receptively consent to the movement of the Spirit 
is itself a result of the life of charity and this in turn presup- 
poses the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in him. If a man does 
not have charity he does not have the Gifts. 
1 If he does have cha- 
rity then he both has the Gifts and freely consents to the impulses 
of the Spirit within him. What can be suggested however, is that 
just as a man can grow in the life of charity, so along with this 
growth and in proportion to it, a man's sensitivity to the Spirit 
would be heightened., _ 
This would seem to make sense even though Tho- 
1. q. 68, a. 4, ad3um; a. 5; a. 8, adlum, ad3um. 
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mas never raises these particular issues himself. The basic prin- 
ciple would seem to be that to have the Gifts is part of what it means 
for someone to have the theological virtues. 
I In as much as one fails 
to lead a life of 'faith working through love', 
2 
which is the life 
which the theological virtues establish, so one 'binds the Holy Spirit. ' 
1. a. 68, a. 4, ad3um. 2. IaIIae, q. 108, a. 1. 
,. _>ý.. 
5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOMAS' 
TREATMENT OF THE GIFTS IN THE SUMMA AND IN THE 
COMMENTARY CN THE SENTENCES 
- The Commentary on the Sentences 
- The Relationship between the Treatise on the Gifts 
in the Commentary and in the . ma 
- The Significance of the Change between the Commentary 
and the Summa 
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The Commentary on the Sentences. 
As we have already noted in chapter one, the scholastics be- 
fore Thomas - and indeed, after him - had no consensus on the in- 
terpretation of the Gifts and on how to relate them to the infused 
and acquired virtues. 
1 In his early work of the Commentary on the 
Sentences, Thomas had already produced an original analysis. 
I... dico quod dons a virtutibus distinguuntur in 
hoc quod virtutes perficiunt ad actus rzodo humano, 
sed dons ultra humanum modum. ' (2) 
This distinction, set out in terms of 'modo human' and ? ultra (supra) 
modem humanem', is the key to his analysis. We can see it as a fur- 
ther ramification of the notion of the 'super-natural' which Philip 
the Chancellor introduced into the discipline of sacra doctrina: man 
has a 'natural' and in keeping with his human nature, and a 'super- 
3 
natural' way of life, by grace. Thomas' original approach is that 
he stresses that the infused virtues and the theological virtue of 
faith operate within the 'human model and that there is therefore 
an inherent weakness in their activity. 
4 
'... quia modus operandi qui eat in virtutibus, 
est secundum conditionem humanam, quazavis sub- 
stantia habitus sit ex divino munere ... 1 (5) 
Here we have a foretaste of what he puts more clearly in the Prima 
Secundae where he shows the absolute necessity of the Gifts because 
of the insufficiency of the infused virtues. In regard to the vir- 
6 
tue of faith and the gift of understanding, he writes: - 
'Connaturalis enim modus humanae naturae est ut 
divina non nisi per speculum creaturarum et 
aenigmate similitudinem percipiat; et ad sic 
percipienda diving perficit fides, quae virtus 
dicitur. Sed intellectus donum, ut Gregorius 
1. See above p. öff. 2. III Sent., 34.1.1.3. See 
above p. 65 . 4. Others traced this imperfection to the effects 
of sin, not to an intrinsic imperfection. Only Albert, before Tho- 
mas, drew attention to this as a possible line of approach. See 
01Connor , p. 107.5. III Sent., 34.1.1. ad2.6. See above 
P" 47ff. 
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licit ... 'de auditis mentis illustrat, ut homo 'etiam in hac vita praelibationem futurae manifesta- 
tionis accipiat'. Et ad-hoc"etiam consonat nomen 
doni. Illud enim proprie donum dici debet quod 
ex sola liberalitate donantis competit ei in quo 
est., et non debito suae conditionis. ' (1) 
The four intellectual Gifts perfect man's reasoning by offsetting 
the inherent limitations of his human mode of understanding by giving 
him a mode of operation and insight which is 'auodammodo divina', 2 
The three other Gifts provide divine standards which supplant those 
of merely human reasoning. Together these provide a new standard 
or measure for man's purposive activity; a standard and measure which 
is divine and not human. 
'Dicendum quod modus unicuique rei ex proria mensura 
praefigitur. Unde modus actionis sumitur ex eo 
quod est mensura et regula actionis. Et ideo cum 
dona sint ad operandum supra humanum modem, oportet 
_quod 
donorum operationes mensurentur ex altera reg- 
ula quarr sit regula humane virtutis, quae est ipsa 
Divinitas ab homine participata suo modo, ut jam 
non humanitus sed quasi Deus factus participation, 
operetur. ' (3) 
Through the Gifts, man is given a divine standard for his behaviour 
and a divine mode for his understanding. As in the Summa, the root 
of these Gifts is seen to be charity which unites man to God in such 
a way that he participates in the divine life itself. 4 The Gifts 
are. part of the overflow of this participation in divinity. If 
man is'to achieve his super-natural end, it is necessary for him to 
have a standard for his life which is higher than the one that rea- 
son - even perfected by grace - can provide: it is necessary for 
him to have God as his 'rule' and Imeasuret. 
5 
1. ' III Sent. 34.1.1. -- 2. ibid. 3. III Sent. 34.1.3. 
4., ibid., see also III Sen . 36.3.5. II. 36.3-. äd4. 
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The relationship between the treatise on the Gifts in the Commentary 
and 'in the Summa. 
Now there are obvious points of continuity between the analy- 
sis of the Gifts in the Commentary and in the Prima Secundae. The 
question is whether the differences are significant or not. The 
great commentators of the'first part of this century were vehemently 
opposed to ary`suggestion of a major change in Thomas' thought. 
1 
Lottin writes: - 
Les formales de la Somme n'expriment done rien d'essen- 
tiellement autres que les formules du Commentaire. t (2) 
In this., as R. Garrigou-Lagrange makes quite explicit, they were 
doing no other than'following their predecessors from the fourteenth 
century onwards. 
3 John of St Thomas, the acknowledged authority on 
Thomas' treatise on the Gifts, quotes freely from both texts as if 
they were written at the same time and in the same work. The com- 
mon methodology of the tradition of commentators was to take the no- 
tion of a #super-human' mode from the Commentary and use this as the 
basic tool for understanding the treatise in the Summa. 
4 
The first challenge to this widespread assumption came in an 
article written by J. de Guibert in 1922. He held that the crucial 
phrase, 'modus supra (ultra) humanum', was no longer used in the 
1. For what follows, the basic bibliogranhy. is.; J de Guibert, 
'Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d'agir "ultrahumaine" d'apAs Saint 
Thomas', Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique, 3 (1922), pp. 394-411. 
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 'Le mode supra-humaine des dons du Saint-Esprit', 
Vie Spirituelle A (1922), pp. 124-136. Reproduced in Perfection 
chretienne et contemplation, II, 1923. * The entire debate was tied 
up with a larger battle between 'orthodox' Thomists and 'Molinists' 
as Garrigou-Iagrange makes clear in La Predestination des saints et 
la grace, Paris, 1936, p. 294. For a useful history of these, and- 
related ted debates, see P. Murray, The Mysticism Debate, Chicago, 1977. 
O'Connor has a useful synthesis, pp. 118-123.2. Lottin, P. et. M., 
IIIj p. 430.3. O'Connor, p. 118.4. As in the French trans- 
lation and commentary on the Summa, Editions de la Revue des Jeunes 
t. 2, IaIIae, a. 61-70 Bernard. la VeEjyý 
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Summa, and that this corresponded to a major change in Thomas' under- 
standing of the Gifts. He claimed therefore that the definitive 
treatment of the Gifts in the Summa was quite different from that 
of the Commentary, 
1 
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. Lottin, M. Labourdette and others 
have strenously denied these claims,, using two sets of counter ar- 
guments. Garrigou-Lagrange denied that the term 'modus supra huma- 
nwn' is totally absent from the Summa and pointed out that similar 
phrases do occur in the text: - 
'dona e-ccedunt communem perfectionem virtutum ... 
quantum ad modum operandi', (2) 
and., reggrding the use of wealth and honour: - 
'A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic 
ut moderate eis utatur: per donum autem excellen- 
tiori modo ut scilicet homo totaliter ea contem- 
nat. ' (3) 
Lottin, on the other hand, was prepared to accept that the phraseo- 
logy had changed but held that the thought remained substantially 
the same. 
'la formale ultra modem humanem du Commentaire des 
Sentences a dispara: mais il serait aase de prouver 
qua theorie de la Somme thgologioue reste done dans 
la ligne de pensge du premier e^_. ri d S. Thomas. ' (4) 
More recent commentators like M. Labourdette also accept this under- 
lying continuity. 
5 Iabourdette points out that in the last line 
of the corpus of q. 68, a. 1, Thomas does not deny the argument of''cer- 
tain ones' who present an analysis of the Gifts similar to his own 
earlier one. 
ý... et hoc est quod quidam dicunt quod dona perfi-" 
. 
1. J. de Guibert, op. cit. 2. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2, adlum. 
3. IaIIae, q. 69, a. 3.4.0. Lottin, Principes de Morales, Louvain, 
1947, t. 2, p. 232.5. M. Labourdette, 'Dons du Saint-Esprit', 
Dictionnaire de Spiritualit6 1610-1635; Cours de theologie morale 
Les principes des actes humaines (IaIIae, q. 49-70 , mimeographed 
Toulouse, n. d. 
4 
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ciunt hominem ad altiores actus ... quarr sint 
actus virtutem. ' (1) 
Iabourdette accepts however that there is a development of thought 
from the Commentary to the Summa. The general consensus at present, 
then, would seem to be that Garrigou-Iagrange's identification of the 
thought of the Sentences with that of the Summa is now untenable, but 
that the continuity is greater than the discontinuity. 
'Des Sentences a la Somme, il y'a un tres reel appro- 
fondissement de la pens6e et J. de Guibert a ete bien 
inspire de souligner 1'evolution du vocabulaire; 
mais c'est un approfondissement dans la meme ligne, 
le passage d'un consequence a son principe 'Modus 
a mensurae causatur'. La mesure d'un acta vient de 
la notion qui le regle. ' (2) 
The point being made here is that the two texts are consistent with 
each other: the earlier one focuses on the activity of the Gifts, 
the second, on the two principles presupposed by grace working through 
reason and through the Gifts. O'Connor agrees with this and presents 
an excellent snnunazy. 
'Thus it is evident that the two expositions are 
fundamentally compatible. The commentary con- 
trasts the human mode of action with one.. that is 
superhuman and divine; the Summa contrasts a 
human principle of movement with one that is di- 
vine. The latter gives the ultimate grounds for 
the former. The earlier approach was that of a 
moralist and psychologist, observing the contrast 
between two ways of acting; the latter is that 
of a theologian and metaphysician, designating the 
ultimate source of these two ways. (3) 
We are therefore to see the two expositions as two different theo- 
logical approaches to the same topic. We should also bear in mind 
that the two texts belong to two different genres of theological litera- 
tune. The first is a commentary patterned alongside its parent text, 
the second is a free creative exposition aiming to be a textbook of 
1. Labourdette, Cours., p. 199f. 2. Labourdette, D. S., 
col. 1617.3. O'Connor, p. 119. 
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the whole of theology in its order and interconnections asfThomas 
sees them. Thomas never wrote 'a monograph on the Gifts of the Spi- 
rit. ' This is a simple fact which it is only too easy to lose sight 
of:, his treatises on the Gifts are always part of a larger whole. 
We cannot, then, take a comparison of the two texts to be a simple 
matter. 
However, if we rule out that the two expositions are neither 
identical in substance, (Garrigou-Lagrange), nor incompatible, (Gui- 
bert), we'must decide whether the-development between them is merely 
a development along a trajectory, (Lottin), or a major and signifi- 
cant change. It is time for us to present our own interpretation. 
The significance of the change between the Commentary and the Summa. 
The term (supra humanum modem' was not merely a common phrase 
in the Commentary on the Sentences, it was the structuring principle 
of the argument. That it does not occur explicitly, and does not 
occur implicitly in the major arguments of the Summa, is significant. 
It has been replaced by another structuring principle, that of the 
two sources of movement in man. It is now redundant. Where it is 
echoed'iinplicit]y, it merely serves as exposition for some minor point. 
Against all this, however, one might refer to the point raised 
by Iabourdette. He cites the last line of the corpus of article 
one, of question 68, to prove continuity between the two expositions. 
He shows that this last line is identical with a phrase Thomas uses 
in the Commentary. The only difference is that there Thomas adds, 
'Et haec opinio inter omnes vera videtur'. Iabourdette' claims that 
the fact that this line. is missing in the Summa shows that Thomas now 
wishes to qualify his acceptance of it. 
1 
My own interpretation is- 
F 
1. Iabourdette, Cour s p. 199. 
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that Thomas neither affirms. nor denies the validity of this particu- 
lar exposition. He merely notes it as a possible interpretation 
which, 3n some respects, is not too far from his own. He does not 
think it is wrong, like the three earlier views which open up the 
corpus, but it is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He now 
has a better way of explaining the matter. He keeps it, but it is 
now . 'fossilised' within a newer theory which can accommodate all it 
provided and be more fruitful. 
Thomas&use of his new model, that of the two sources of move- 
went in man, is not confined solely to his treatment of the Gifts 
of the Spirit. On the contrary, the whole second half of the'Prima 
Secundae is sited within the working out of this model. 
' In the 
Commentary, Thomas had little freedom to manoeuvre; here, after a 
decade in which his theology matured, and in a situation where he 
-had freedom to be creative in structuring the over-all exposition 
of his theology, he places-. the Gifts within the discussion of man's 
autonomy. The Gifts are now explicitly defined as habitus, just 
as the other elements within man's intrinsic principle of movement, 
which are dealt with in this section, are defined as either habitus 
or potentiae. 
2 This alone must make us read q. 68 in a different 
light from the exposition of the Commentary on the Sentences. 
The earlier= work has been described as that of a 'moralist--- 
or psychologist, and the later as that of a 'theologian or metaphy- 
sician'. This could be partly accounted for by the genre of the 
two works, but this would not be sufficient. We have seen that Tho- 
mas' theology of grace developed during the period between these two 
works. Can his treatment of the Gifts not be seen in this context 
1. See above p. 5.2. IaIIae, q. 49. 
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and seen therefore as a similar deepening of awareness ? Above 
all, his later theology of grace centres on the theme of motion. 
The Creator moves his creation by his providential and predestined 
purpose; he gives connatural 'forms' of motion to his rational crea- 
tures; he acts within them, in their interiority and freedom, to 
prompt them, guide them and sustain them. It is within this context 
that Thomas presents his treatise on the Gifts. He does not only 
give a more metaphysical analysis: he gives a metaphysical analysis 
based on motion. 
We have briefly analysed the development of Thomas' thought 
on man's-divinisation in chapter 2 above. Whereas in his earlier 
work Thomas sees this as completed in the infusion of the virtues 
and the Gifts., in his later works he accepts the inability of man 
to be fully conformed to the divine nature from his own graced re- 
sources. 
1 In the Commentary the Gifts complete man's divinised na- 
ture; in the Summa, accepting the inevitable incompleteness of divi- 
nisation in terms of ? created' grace, the Gifts are presented as an 
inherent openness to the Spirit, by whom alone is man fully conformed 
to God. In the Summa man is divinised not by receiving tsuper-vir- 
tues' wt}ich act in place of reason, but by receiving dispositions of 
receptivity to the inspirations, instincts or impulses of the Spirit 
in all his faculties, by which he becomes still more radically depen- 
dent on the movements of the spirit acting within him. 
Let us recapitulate the flow of the argument in article one. 
There Thomas moved the discussion through a series of terms. First, 
fdona, was replaced by 'in-svirationes', and then finsDirationes' 
was replaced by linstinctns'" It is this last term which Thomas 
1. IaIIae, q. 109, a. 9, see Lonergan, pp. 42-44. 
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uses constantly from this point onwards in relation to the Gifts 
but it is the term I inspirationes I which allows him to introduce 
the fundamental arrangement of the study along the lines of the two 
principles of self-activation in man. Or rather, perhaps we should 
reverse this statement and say, in the light of the entire context 
of the Prima Secundae, that the Gifts are introduced into this struc- 
turing arrangement, In either way, the term 'insvirationest is the 
conceptual key: - 
'Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab 
exteriori'. (1) 
The rest of the articles of q. 68 fill out this basic framework and 
while they do introduce important new themes - that the Gifts are 
hab itus, their relationship with the infused virtues änd the analogy 
with the moral virtues - these are secondary and subordinated to what 
is established in article one. 
Article one., then, replaces the structuring principle of 
'ultra modum humanem', with that of the two principles of movement 
in man. We may see this as a move from a moral level to a metaphy- 
sical level, but it is not sufficient just to note such a transposi- 
tion. . Is need to pull out the significance of this change. Why 
is the whole Prima Secundae based on a metaphysics of movement and- 
not on a moral or psychological analysis ? Above all, our questioning 
has to focus on the significance of the model of movement in Thomas' 
mature thought. 
Now we have examined this already in"chapter 3 above, and we 
will look at these questions in detail in Part Two. Our present 
task is merely to see the change between the Commentary and the_ 
within this wider context and so grasp its significance. H. Bouil- 
1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 1. 
a 
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lard in his book, Conversion et Grace, was the first to show how 
Thomas' thought changed in his mid career. 
' Despite his insights 
however., Bouillard overstated his case and many commentators were 
concerned that he seemed to fail to distinguish the general move- 
ment of providence in all things with the divine instincts and im- 
pulses of grace. Schillebeeckx, more recently, has attacked Seckler 
for confusing 'instinctus divinus' at the origin of man's willing in 
any respect, with the 'instinctus fidei' of grace. 
2 We might add 
ourselves, that so to confuse the various differentiations of the 
divine motion in creation and predestination is to neglect the hard- 
earned distinction of the 'super-natural' which Philip the Chancellor 
introduced into scholastic theology. 
3 Nevertheless. Bouillard rep- 
lied to his critics in a masterly fashion, part of which we shall 
quote. 
'(La motion divin) ... n'est ni le concours naturel, 
ni la grace actuelle, au sens de theologiens moder- 
nes, macs leur common denominateur, leur genre com- 
mun non encore differencie ... la motion universelle 
est analogique ... I1 n'y an a qu'une. Mais., comme 
eile est'analogique' en meme temps qu'universelle, 
eile sa diversifie sans perdre son unite. Elle est 
grace quand eile ordonne a la grace sanctifiante. ' (4) 
Without going into too much detail here, we might say that Bouillard 
is pointing out the importance of the cosmic sweep of the divine move- 
ment initiating movement within creatures. This happens in diffe- 
rent ways in different kinds of creatures and in a different way in 
man under grace within the supernatural order from how it occurs 
1. H. Bouillard, Conversion et Grace, chez S. Thomas d'Acuin, 
Parrs 1944. The first three chapters were generally accepted, but 
the latter part of the book provoked a great controversy. 2. M. 
Seckler, Instinkt und Glaubenswille, Mainz, 1962. Reviewed by E. 
Schillebeeclcs in Tidschrift voor Theologie, i, (1961), pp. 17-46, re- 
printed in Concept of Truth and Theological Renewal, London, 1968, 
pp. 30-72.3. See above p. 65 . 4. Bouillard, 'A propos de la 
grace actuelle chex S. Thomas d'Aquin', Recherches de Science, Reli- 
srieuse: , 1946, pp. 92-114, Pp. 106-111. 
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within man's dynamism within the natural order. These differentia- 
tions must be accepted while also accepting Thomas' vision of the 
unity of this over-all dynamism. In this respect the Summa Contra 
Gentiles is Thomas? masterpiece. 
1 
Now, as regards the Gifts, it is clear that the exposition 
of the Commentary makes no use of the notion of divine inspirations 
while the whole weight of the exposition of the Summa is based on how 
the Gifts make man docile to these 'inspirationes' within the order 
of grace rooted in the virtue of charity. While being careful not 
to confuse nature and supernature, as Seckler has done so, it is 
fruitful to locate the particular question of the divine instinctus 
in the realm of the Gifts within the larger context of God's initia- 
tory impulses within man's natural dynamism outside the area of grace. 
Here too we can locate changes in Thomas' mature thought and these 
changes are not without significance for the obmWs in his presen-ý 
tation of the Gifts. 
It is significant that the Commentary relates all the Gifts 
to man's rationality. The four intellectual Gifts perfect man's 
understanding in a more-than-rational way. The three other Gifts 
do not inhere in man's appetites, as one might expect, but present 
the will and the other appetites with a standard other than that of 
reason: they act in place of reason. At this stage, the will is 
2 
seen as passive in relation to the intellect. It is the inadequacy 
of reason therefore which the gifts overcome in the Commentary. 
Hence no gifts are assigned to the-two theological virtues located 
in, the will, 'that is Hope and Charity. 
1. On the idea that it was precisely the task of composing 
this overview of the unity of God's dealings with all his creatures 
which led Thomas to envisage the unity of the divine motion(s), see 
above, p. 76.2. Lonergan,, p. 94; Ia, q. 80, a. 2. 
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Now by the time Thomas is writing the Prima Secundae, he has 
developed a much more subtle and complicated notion of the will. 
' 
No longer is it seen merely as passive before the intellect, (quoad 
specificationem), but, at a deeper metaphysical level, one has to 
posit an active power within the will itself, (guoad exercitium). 
Furthermore, for several years, before the writing of the Secunda 
Pars, Thomas had been studying, as it were, the archeology of the 
human will and had found it necessary to posit further, behind the 
activating power of the will, (auoad exercitium), a receptivity to 
the divine instinctus. 
2 The human will, at its most originary level, 
was 'open-ended', open to divine initiatory impulses. This analy- 
sis is of man in nature and not under grace but, as grace builds on 
nature and brings it to natural and supernatural perfection, this 
analysis has implications for the working of grace in man. 
The picture of man which Thomas presents in the Secunda Pars 
is, then, a much richer, more complex and more mysterious one than 
that of his earlier works. At the very originary level of man's 
self-actuation and purposive activity, man is mysteriously open to 
the divine movement. More subtle too is the analysis of the stages 
of man's act of choice, the focal point of his freedom. It is a 
3 
description of man's movement towards beatitude by means of his free 
acts of intention and choice which open up the Prima Secundae and 
structure its entire development. 
4 
Now the explicit statement that the Gifts are habitus in art- 
icle three of q. 68 is of major importance here. The activity which 
the Gifts account for is not just the result of divine prompting, it 
1. We shall discuss this in detail in chapter 7, p. 169$ 2. Ia 
IIae, q. 9, a. 3, a. 4, a. 6.3. IaIIae, q. 13-16. A. Prologue; 
Q. 1, a. 1; q. 6 prologue; q. 12; q. 13. 
-109- 
is also to be understood as a human response to that prompting. The 
activity resulting from the Gifts is not just divine, it is also hu- 
man. This is why O'Connor is right, but not completely right when 
he pinpoints the essential difference between the Summa and the Com- 
mentary. 
'The commentary contrasts the human mode of action 
with one that is superhuman and in fact vine. 
the Summa contrasts a human principle of movement 
with one that is divine. ' (1) 
The Summa does not contrast a human principle against a divine one, 
it contrasts a human principle with a divine one working through man's 
human potentialities. This q. 68 on the Gifts also forms part of the 
analysis of the intrinsic principles of human activity. 
'Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et 
habitus. ' (2) 
The Gifts are habitus. They are intrinsic principles of human acti- 
vity which yet relate specifically, in their docility, to the extrin- 
sic principle of human activity. They are then not just divine but 
also human. 
This seems to be a point which none of the commentators have 
focused upon and yet it is a point which links the treatise on the 
Gifts not only into the anthropology of Thomas' maturity, but also 
3 
into his later theology of grace. It places the treatise on the 
Gifts, in fact, within the flow of thought of the Prima Secundee. 
We can quote a passage from one of the central articles on grace - 
q. 110. a. 2 - and show the similarity of thought there and here in 
the Gifts. 
'Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet, ut non 
solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam 
1. O'Connor, p. 119.2. c. f. the introduction to q-45 
which forms the major articulation of the latter half of the Prima 
Secundae; see above p. 5.3. O'Connor raises the issue but 
does develop it. O'Connor, pp. 122-123. 
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jargiatur eis formae et virtutes quasdam; quae 
sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas in- 
clinentur ad hujusmodi motus. Et sic motus qui- 
bus a Deo moventur fiunt creaturis connaturales 
et faciles, secundum i11ud gip., 'Et disponit 
omnia suaviter'. Multo igitur magic illis quos 
movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeter- 
num infandit aliquas formas, seu qualitates 
supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte 
ab ipso moveantur ad bonuni aeternum consequendum; 
et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedpLm est. ' 
Here we have an explicit parallel between man under nature and man 
under grace. In both cases there is the idea of a motion which is 
both divine and human; a motion which is both from mans own self- 
actuation - secunduin seipsas inclinentur - and from God -a Deo moven- 
tur. The theme of motion is counterbalanced by the use of the Aris- 
totelian category of 'quality' (formas seu cualitates), the genus of 
which habitus is a species. 
I In this way, the two movements, divine 
and human, are understood as a single motion; one which is described 
with the same words used of the Gifts - connaturales et faciles, sua- 
viterý prompte As regards the single yet diversified movement'of 
grace, the lend' is the eternal supernatural good - ad bonum aeter- 
num supernaturale - which man cannot achieve by his own potentiali- 
ties, "but which, under grace, he can achieve through his own poten- 
tialities. It is this last point we are trying to make here. It 
means that, given this wider context, the treatises on the Gifts in 
the Commentary and in the Summa, are quite different. 
The second major change between the Commentary and the Summa 
follows on from this. If the phrase, 'ultra modum humanuml, is the 
structuring key of the earlier exposition, a common refrain, and de= 
velopment of this is the other phrase: - 
1. IaIIae, q. 55, a. 4. 
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... modus unicuique rei ex propria mensura prae- 
figitur. Unde modus actionis sumitur ex eo quod 
est mensura et regula actionis. t (1) 
What 'inspiratio' or rather 'instinctus' is to the Summa, the phrases, 
're a' and 'mensura' are to the Commentary. The Gifts in the Com- 
menta act as substitutes for human reason; they provide different 
standards, (re a) for man's purposive activity. Now just as in 
the Summa the human principle of motion 
. 
is not contrasted solely with a divine 
principle but with a divine and human principle, so, in this respect 
also, the Gifts are not contrasted with reason. The Gifts do pro- 
vide an appreciation, a value, an instinct, which reason alone can- 
not provide - this is not denied - but the analysis of the Summa is 
more subtle and more difficult to grasp hold of. The Gifts do not 
act in place of reason but prior to reasoning and therefore can act 
also within human reasoning. It will take us some time to make this 
clear. 
Firstly, it is quite obvious that the notion of 'measure' or 
'standard' is significantly absent from question 68. As O'Connor 
remarks, this is all the more outstanding in that Thomas uses these 
terms frequently elsewhere in the Secunda Pars, especially in the 
relationship between reason and the Lex Aeterna, and, in a topic 
even-closer to our own, in his study of, the acquired and infused 
virtues. 
2 Thomas does not merely fail to use such terminology in 
question 68, it seems to the present writer that he systematically 
refuses to use it. We can ground our argument by examining q. 68, 
a. 1, adlllum. Here the flow of the argument leads almost inevitably 
to a parallel between the 'measure' of reason and the 'measure' of 
1. _IIT sent., 34.1.3; 34.2.2.1 and elsewhere. 2. O'Connor, 
p. 121. 
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the Spirit. But Thomas does not complete this obvious symmetry. 
'Unde si volumus. definitionem. (donum. est bona quali- 
tas mantis qua recte vivitur) restringere ad virtu- 
tes prout distingauntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc 
quod dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est 
de rectitudine vitae quas accipitur secundum regu- 
lam rationis. Similiter autem-donum, prout distin- 
guitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur 
a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet 
facit hominem bene sequentem suos instinctus. ' (1) 
Instead of positing a divine standard akin to the standard of reason, 
Thomas uses the nation of-responding to the divine 'instinctust. 
He deliberately uses this undefined term and does not specify in 
what form man's response to this might be. It seems to the present 
writer. that there is a great reluctance to specify too exactly how 
the GLfts might operate in terms of morality or psychology. Yet 
most of the commentators take it that Thomas has completed the sym- 
metry of this passage. 
2 We can take John of St Thomas., as the clas- 
sic authority, on this very text. 
'Nam D. Thomas ih hac quaestione LXVIII, articulo prima 
ad tertium, distinguens dona a virtutibus penes definitio- 
nem, dicit quod in definitione virtutis prout distinguitur 
a dono, quando dicitur quad est qualitas qua recte vivitur, 
inquit, quad debet intelligi, qua recte vivitur secundum 
mensuram rationis: si ergo in hoc distinguitur definitio 
virtutis a definitione dons, oportet quad in definitione 
doni inteUigatur, qua recte vivitur secundum mensuram 
divinam, quae est altior mensura rationis'. (3) 
John of St Thomas is obviously reading the principle of the Commen- 
taT7 - modus a mensura causatur - into the text of the Summa. 
Now we must be careful not to allow our case to be overstated. 
What John of St Thomas is concerned about is the 'formal object of 
the 'Gifts'. For him God is not just the efficient cause of the 
movement is man through the Gifts, he is also the 'regulating and 
- -1. IaIIae, q. 
68, a. 1, ad3um. 2. I exclude O'Connor from 
this list, and am indebted to him for the followinv example, 0! Con- 
not, p. 123.3. . Toannis a S. Thoma Cursus Theoloeicus in Summam 
Theoloeicam D. Thomae, IaIIae, q. LXX, disp. %VIII, art. 2, Paris, 1885, 




'Eodem modo dona sunt dispositiones quaedam, sea habitus dis- 
ponentes, intellectum, et voluntatem ad sequendum instinctum 
et motionem Spiritus Sancti non solum ut moventem, sed ut 
regulantem, et mensurantem objectum, ita ut constituat for- 
male objectiwm talium donorum, et specificativun, nempe bo- 
num, sue verum ut regulatum, et mensuratum non ratione, sed 
illustration, et mensuration divina ... '. (2) 
Now we can agree with this conclusion. Our disagreement is based 
on the use of. a phrase like, 'regulating and measuring principle' 
in order to establish it in relation to the text of the Summa. Our 
mutually acceptable conclusion - that man is given an appreciation and 
insight greater than that naturally available to him - is reached on our 
part. by the use of the tern instinctus. And this corresponds to Thomas' 
own usage. We can take part of article four as a further example. 
'Dona Bunt quidam habitus perficient? s hominem ad hoc ouod 
prompte seguatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti, sicut virtu- 
tes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obediendum 
rationi. Sic-at autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri 
per imperium rationis, ita omnes wires humanae natae Bunt 
moveri per instinctum Dei ... '. (3) ,. 
Here again., Thomas does not complete the parallel between reason and 
the Spirit by applying the same terms to both. Instead he uses the 
vaguer notion of 'a ready following of the instincts of the Spirit'. 
Instinctus is a far less defined term and is not something that 
either works with or without reason but is prior to it. Thomas,, 
in the Summa is not concerned with the 'formal object' of the Gifts 
but with the originating principle at work in them. There is no 
disagreement on this; it is a divine principle. Is it purely a 
divine standard or the collaborative assimilation of the divine in- 
stinctus, (in whatever form it must take) within the realm of human 
potentialities ? This latter is our own understanding of Thomas' 
refusal in the Summa simply to contrast reason and Spirit but rather 
1. - ---ibid. - 2. ibid, p. 597.3. q. 68, a. 4. 
3 
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reason and the Spirit working through all man's potentialities. 
'Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt 
esset principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt vir- 
tutes, -ita etiam sunt dona; scilicet in ratione 
et in vi appetitiva. ' (1) 
This would also account for the changes in Thomas' various re-arrange- 
ments of the Gifts. In the Commentary, they provide divine standards 
for the contemplative and active lives; in the Summa they are the 
working out of the divine instinctus in the two faculties of man's 
nature, reason and will; and, in the Secunda Secundae, this is fur- 
ther refined to be this same operation with the operation of the in- 
fused virtues. 
To make the debate more concrete we might say that Thomas 
holds in the Summa that the operation of the Gift is determined not 
just by the nature of the giver but also by that of the recipient. 
This is clear in the case of the Gift of Counsel, a Gift which, per- 
haps more than the others might be seen as over-riding man's normal 
connatural form of operation. 
'Est autem proprium rationali creaturae quod per 
inquisitionem rationis moveatur ad aliquid agendum; 
quas quidam inquisitio consilium dicitur; et ideo 
Spiritus Sanctus dicitur per modum consilii crea- 
turam rationalem movere. Et propter hoc consi- 
lium ponitur inter dona Spiritus Sancti. ' (2) 
The Gift of Counsel is envisaged here not so much as an alternative 
is reason but as an. -activity of human decision-making which has its 
origin outside of man's own deliberative abilities. The mode of 
activity is human but the roots of it are divine. 
'Ad tertium dicendnm quod filii Dei aguntur a Spiritu 
Sancto secundum modem eorum, salvo scilicet libero 
arbitrio, quod est face to s voluntatis et rationis; 
sic inquantum ratio movetur a Spiritu Sancto, vel 
instruitur de agendis competit filiis Dei donum con- 
silii. 1 (3) 
1.. IaIlae, q. 68, a. 4.2. IIaIIae, 4.52, a. 1.3. IIaIIae, 
q. 52, a. 2, ad3um. 
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There is'only one'point at which Thomas uses the notion of 
regula in relation to the Gifts and that is in their connection with 
41 the theological virtues. 
'Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales pra, 94eruntur 
virtutibus morales et regulant eas; ita virtu- 
tes theologicae praebruntur donis Spiritus 
Sancti, et regulant ea. ' (1) 
This may be a 'matter of loose speaking, or, more likely, it seems to 
be a matter of Thomas extending the analogy between the moral virtues 
and the Gifts beyond its limit. All analogies have limits and this 
analogy is a fruitful one when Thomas uses it in terms-of the modes 
of receptivity attributed'. in different regards to the moral virtues 
and to the Gifts. Here, however, he changes the usual focal point 
of the model and speaks not of the elements of receptivity and doci- 
lity but those elements to which they are receptive; that is, in 
each case, the intellectual virtues and the theological virtues. The 
resulting model seems to suggest a domination which is alien to both 
the role of reason over the other faculties, and to the relationship 
between charity, faith, hope and the Gifts. 
2 Certainly one cannot 
accept'this passage at its face- value. 
3 To suggest that the theo- 
logical virtues, which work through human reasoning, govern the dis- 
positions of'the same faculties which make the.. -m sensitive to the in- 
stinctual promptings of the Spirit, would be to destroy Thomas' basic 
theme of the two principles, God and reason. The only way in which 
we can interpret this passage is in the light of the rest of ques- 
tion 68. 
The theological virtues unite man to God. They establish 
the relationship between man and God in charity, (above all), 'in 
1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 8.2. Reason's government of the other 
faculties is not that of a despot, see below p. 183 . 3. O'Connor, 
pp. 38-39. 
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faith and in hope. The Gifts, which reveal a wholly other dimension 
of receptivity to the Spirit are not given to anyone who has not re- 
ceived these other 'gifts' of the infused virtues. 
' The two dimen- 
sions of man's graced abilities are to be seen, then as working through 
what is established by faith, hope and love. 
'Ad tertium dicendum quod animus hominis 
movetur 
a 
Spiritus Sancto, nisi ei secundum aliquem modum 
uniatur: sicut instrumentuin nonmovetur ab arti- 
fice nisi per contactum, auf per aliquam aliam 
unionem. Prima autem unio hominis est per fadem, 
sperr et caritatem. L'nde istae virtutes praesup- 
ponuntur ad dons, sicut radices quaedam donorum. 
Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, 
sicut quaedam derivationes praedictarum virtutem. (2) 
What this passage emphasises is that the inspirations of the Spirit 
in man do not come as impersonal forces but come about within a union.. 
'secnndum aliguam modum uniatur' . 
et union structured by the theolo- 
gical virtues and above all, by love, by charity-friendship. 
... ita dona Spiritus Sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate: ita scilicet quod qui 
caritatem habet omnia dona Spiritus Sancti habet; 
quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest. ' (3) 
The Gifts are ramifications of charity, flowerings of the life of 
friendship with God; expressions and manifestations of the union 
of, love between man and God. 
,. 
This cannot be seen in terms of domination, nor even of mea- 
sure. Rather we need to return to the 'notion' of ! disaositio' of 
article one and see it now within the structuring relationship created 
by charity. This is the purpose of this analogy. The basic theme 
of the treatise on the Gifts in the Summa is that of receptivity to 
motion from outside oneself: but a motion which is not alien but 
from within this already existing relationship of love. What is 
being articulated is not conformity to some standard, even a divine 
1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. . 2. IaIIae, q. 
68, a. 4, ad3um. 
3, IaIIae, q. 68, a. 5. 
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standard, but openness to the infinity of God and the expression of 
this openness in the almost infinite diversity of human existence. 
'"In the gift of the holy Spirit, the position of 
the human mind is of one moved- rather than of 
mover. " And therefore here ... there can be no 
question of how and how much. It would after 
all, be absurd arrogance to attempt to discover 
the 'rules' by which the Holy Spirit of God per- 
meates man's reflections and decisions. We can 
at most say that the quasi-infinite variety of 
choices which operate in the realm of natural 
prudence and make any general and abstract pre- 
determination possible, must be multiplied by 
an utterly new infinity in the supernatural order. 
This emerges clearly when we recall how incompar- 
able and unique the life of every single saint is. 
Here then is the truest applicability of the dic- 
tum of Augustine: 'Have love, and do what you 
will. ' (1) 
The 'gift' of the infused theological virtue of charity - in which 
all the Gifts are united and rooted - iss in a sense, the most basic 
receptivity of man under grace. It is, as A. Gardeil puts it, 
I... la ports d'entree permanente du Saint-Esprit 
dens notre activite surnaturelle. ' (2) 
In-the Commentary there is nothing of this notion of habitual res- 
ponsiveness within the relationship of grace. It can be seen as 
the achievement of the synthesis of habitual and actual grace, of 
created and uncreated grace; as a synthesis of the models of nature 
and movement. 
1. J. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, Notre Dame, 1966, 
p. 38.2. Quoted by Labourdette, D. de Sp. (Doris), col. 1629. 
SECTION TWO: THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND TO CUESTION 68 
6. THE MODEL OF MOVEMENT: 'MOTIO' 
- 'MotioI 
- 'Actus Primus' and 'Actus Secundus' 
- Secondary Causalities and the Certainty of Providence 
- The Cosmic Sweep of the Divine Movement 
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Our problem here is not to attempt too much. Our analysis-of 
Thomas' theology of the Gifts so far has led us to see the importance 
he attaches to the concept. of motio. It will become clear in the fol- 
lowing discussion thatýThomas takes over Aristotle's theory of motion: 
indeed our sources are his commentaries on the Physics and the Meta- 
physics. But Aristotle's theory of motion is itself the material for 
a doctoral thesis; it has its own complications which we cannot afford 
to go into in great detail. 
While =using Aristotle however., Thomas' analysis of motion fol- 
lows on directly from the most basic principles of his own metaphysics. 
God alone is actus nurus, total. actuality. Matter alone is total poten- 
tiality. All beings other than God are describable in terms of actua- 
lity and potentiality. 
I Meyer gives a neat introduction: 
'Act denotes actuality and if things are exclusively 
act, any further becoming is impossible. Since., 
_ however, every creature possesses potency and priva- 
tion, and since there is a real distinction between 
substance and accidents, the necessary conditions 
are given for change and becoming something else. 
We have becoming of a thing whenever something new 
is predicated of a thing, whether this new thing is 
the thing itself or some property, whether it is a 
condition or a relation of a thing. ' (2) 
Potency and act are two of the primary categories by which being 
is understood and, as prior to movement, are to be used in understanding 
it. But not all change, mutatio, is to be called motion (motto), be- 
cause both Thomas and Aristotle understand motio as occurring within a 
subject, and the change from non-being to being (generatio) and the 
change from being to non-being (corruptio), are not changes within a 
substance but the beginning or the destruction of a substance. Motion, 
then, refers to change within a substance or subject. 
3 
1. In Meta., XI lea. 9.2. Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of 
St Thomas Aouinas, trans. F. Eckhoff, St Louis, 1946, p. 251. 
3. In Meta., XI, lee. 11. 
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As we'can distinguish between substance and accidents, so we 
can distinguish between types of motion. Regarding the thing moved, 
we can say it is moved essentially when the whole thing is moved acc- 
ording to its natural, formal, potential; or in a secondary sense, 
when we say the- whole is moved because a part is moved, e. g. we say 
a"man is healed when his blind eye is healed. Accidental movement, 
similarly, involves-the movement of a part of a greater whole, e. g. 
a sleeping man in a moving boat is moved per accidens. The same 
schema applies in regard to the cause of movement. An agent acts 
essentially as a fire heats by its nature; it acts, 'moves', in a 
secondary essential sense by one of its parts, as whe-ifire smoke kills 
house plants. It acts per accidens by one of its parts, as we might 
say a fire causes community togetherness. 
1 
Now the concept of motio must be further limited. Motion is 
not to be seen as another category along with the ten categories in- 
to which all being is to be divided. It is not a category distinct 
from them but the actualisation of what is potential in three of the 
categories; that is, the categories of quality, quantity and place. 
Within each category a thing is describable within a reference to two 
contraries: - thus within the category of quantity a thing is describ- 
able as lesser or greater, and within the category of-substance some- 
thing is aform or a privation. Change can only be described within 
these categories and within these contraries. There can, then,, - be - 
no one description of change for all the categories but only descrip- 
tions within the terms of each one and so there are as many kinds-of- 
change as there are kinds of being. To put this in technical scho- 
lastic language, change is not a category but a post-predicament. 
2 
1. ibid. 2. In Meta., XI, lect. 12 also Meyer, op. cit. 
p. 252. 
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Now although change, mutatio, relates to all the categories, 
motion relates to only three of them. Motion refers to change within 
a subject and not the coming to be, or ceasing to be, of a subject; 
therefore the category of substance does not provide termini for a 
description of motion but only of generation and corruption. More- 
over, just as action and passion are used to account for motion, so 
is the concept of time because motion takes place within a subject 
and therefore within time. This leaves only the three categories 
mentioned above and the category of relationship. But Aristotle and 
Thomas will not allow a relative change to be called a motus in the 
strict sense, because to say, for example, that a son outgrows his 
father is not to imply any change in the father. So, the concept 
of motio is restricted to change within a subject in regard to the 
categories of quantity, quality. and place. 
1 
Thomas makes Aristotle's definition of motion his own: 
'Now since each class of things is divided by poten- 
tiality and actuality, I call motion the actuali- 
sation of what is potential as such. ' (2) 
This definition is not quite as simple as at first appears. 
3 The 
crux of the problem is how we are to understood this last phrase, 
? potential as such', potential qua potential. The subject of motion 
is not the thing itself but is the potential the thing has to be moved 
in this particular way. Motion is an actualisation of this potential 
and not an actualisation of the thing itself which has this particu- 
lar potential. A piece of bronze is perfectly actualised as bronze; 
if it is made into a statue this change, this motio, is not the actua- 
lisation of its potential to be bronze, but the actualisation of its 
1. ibid. 2. In Meta., XI, lect. 9.3. See In Meta., 
XI lect. 9 and also L. A. Kosuran, 'Aristotle's definition of motion', 
Fhronesis 1969, (14), PP. 40-62. 
-121- 
potential, as bronze, to be a statue. Motion, then, is the actua- 
lisation of a particular potential process and not of form. The word 
rprocessI is used here because just as motion follows from form so it 
ends with form. For example, once a house is built, the process of 
building is ended. The form of the house is now actualised but the 
actualisation of the potential., the motio, took place in the building 
process. Each stage in the building process was an increasing actu- 
alisation of the potential. Motion of its meaning, is no more than 
an imperfect actuality because as long as the motion, the process, 
lasts., the potential is still in potential to further actualisation; 
only in rest is final actualisation achieved. 
1 Motion is always to 
be understood as 'poised between a prior potentiality and a further 
2 actuality'. 
Any motion can be described, then, in terms of the starting 
point from which the motion began, (the terminus ate), and the ter- 
minus to which. it proceeds, (the terminus ad uem). 
There are two other basic points to be clarified. The first 
concerns our descriptions of the relationship between the mover and 
the moved. When something is moved we can describe this as the actu- 
alisation of this particular potential in the moved, and, as we shall 
see, we can also describe it as the actualisation of a potentiality 
to cause motion in the mover. Now as there are two*actualisations 
here, are we to posit, therefore, two motions or only one ? Aris- 
ly ý" 
totle and Thomas claim that there is in fact only one motion which 
can be described in two different ways as the actualisation of two 
different potentials. To elucidate their claim they draw a paral- 
lel with the relationship between the number one and the number two; 
1. Kosuran op. cit. 2. Kosman op. cit., p. 53. 
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there is one relationship here but it can equally be explained in , 
terms of halfing or doubling. 'Inasmuch as motion is predicated of 
the subject in which it is found i;: constitutes the category of un- 
dergoing; but in as much as it is predicated of that from which it 
comes, it constitutes the category of action'. 
1 
The second point raises a matter of semantics. 
2 In English 
the verb 'to move' is both transitive and intransitive: I can move 
a chair or I can move out of the room. In Latin the intransitive 
sense of 'move' is expressed by using the passive mood of the tran- 
sitive verb. There is therefore in Latin no easy way of distin- 
guishing between 'it is moving I (intransitive), and fit is being 
moved'; the verb form 'moverit serves both. It is therefore impor- 
taut to take note of Thomas' use of the terms motus and motto. 
'Motto has an active sense, designating the cause 
of movement, whereas motus has 
,, 
a passive sense, 
designating movement undergone by something. 
Thus, S. C. G. III, 149 says, "The motio of the mo- 
ver precedes the moths of the mobile. " 1 (3) 
Given all this as fundamental., the question before us now is 
what causes movement ? We have isolated movement from the wider con- 
cept of change to mean change within a subject within time. It is 
relevant to ask, therefore, why a particular motio takes place at a 
particular time or in a particular space. 
Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. 
4 This axiom is basic to 
Thomas' thought. It follows on from the definition of motion given 
above. 
"Now since each class of things is divided by po- 
tentiality and actuality, I call motion the actu- 
1. In Meta., XI, lect. 9.2. see A. Kenny, The Five Ways 
Oxford, 1980, pp. 8-9.3. O'Connor, p. 134, footnote 22. 
4. Physics VII, p. 241. b. 24. In Physic VII, lect. 1. In Meta. V, 
lect. 14. 
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alisation of what is potential as such. ' (1) 
Movement is, the actualisation of a potentiality. A thing can at 
one and the same time be potential in one respect and actual in ano- 
ther, but cannot be both in the same respect. Therefore that which 
is potential cannot actualise itself in respect of its potentiality; 
it must be moved by something else. T. Gilby, commenting on the 
prima via, points out the formal analysis of this axiom: 
'Note that this (axiom) should be taken with for- 
mal precision; it means that the passive is not 
as such the active, not that one and the same thing 
or substance may not initiate its own movements 
within a particular frame of reference, as is the 
case with living things. ' (2) 
We will deal with the case of living things - 'animating' things - 
below, but first we need to see how in the single situation of motto, 
ac do and passio are con-joined but not confused. Thomas presents 
his argument in its briefest form in the Contra Gentiles: 
'Nihil idem est simul actu et potentia resoectu 
eiusdem. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huius-. 
modi, est in potentia ... Omne autem quod movet 
est in actu, inquantum huiusmodi: quia nihil agit 
nisi secundum est in actu. Ergo nihil est res- 
pectu eiusdem motus movens et motum. Et sic ni- 
hil movet seipsum. ' (3) 
The important phrase here is, "in the same respect". 
Movement per accidens, as outlined above, 
4 
presents us, at the 
moment, with no major problems as regards this axiom. 
5 A man in a 
bus is moved by something other than himself; a man's hand is waving 
because he is moving it. But What of movement per se ? Obviously 
there can be violent movement per se - the tree can be felled, the 
rock can be thrown - and there the thing is clearly moved by something 
1. In Meta. XI, lect. 9.2. T. Gilby, in Gilbe Ed., vol. 2, 
p. 193, Appendix b. 3. S. C. G. Is 13.4. see above p. 119 . 5. There are some difficulties here which, for the present purpose, we 
need not go into, but see A. Kenny, The Five Ways, pp. 13-15. 
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else. But how°can there be movement per se which is not violent 
and which supports this axiom ? Thomas claims that even in inani- 
mate objects there is a natural (non-violent) motion which is per se 
and which is caused by something other than the particular potentia- 
lity which is in a process of actualisation. A rock, 
for example, has a natural tendency to move downwards. One could 
therefore, to preserve this basic axiom, posit two possible movers: - 
Firstly, ' the Creator, who gave it this particular tendency, and who, 
by conserving its existence preserves its natural potentialities and 
allows for their actualisation at any moment. Thomas takes the natu- 
ral'tendency of the'thing as an intrinsic principle of its motion; 
but this itself does not solve the problen of why the rock moves 'here' 
and Inow'and not (there" and 'then?. It is important to clarify that 
Thomas does not say, as some scholastic commentators have claimed, 
that God adds something to the natural tendency in order to make it 
act - this would destroy any meaning of natural tendency. 
' Hence, 
secondly, and more usefully, one can posit a 'mover' in the removal 
of"the obstacles which prevent the natural tendency, of gravity in 
this"case, from operating, e. g. the roof 'moves' when the supporting 
pillars are taken away. 
Whereas inanimate objects have natural tendencies then, which 
will inevitably initiate movement unless there is some external impe- 
diment, 'living things have a much wider range of potentialities and 
are moved not just by the removal of impediments to natural movement 
but are, in some sense, the source of their own motion. But how can 
there be self-movement if all movement is initiated by something other 
than what is moved per se ? Interestingly enough, Thomas here differs 
1. see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, ch. 4, pp. 63-91. 
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from Aristotle's own theory in the Physics. Aristotle's theory 
there is not 'everything in motion is moved by something else', but 
'everything in motion is moved by something'. 
I Aristotle therefore 
holds that animals and other living things are moved by themselves. 
Thomas however holds that all living things are moved by their souls, 
by their anima, by that which makes them what they are and which is 
the source of their 'animation'. 
2 This is obviously a more diffi- 
cult theory and one is tempted to ask whether it is not a case where 
Ockham's razor might be applied, but we cannot, at this point, enter 
into a study of the Thomistic notion of the anima in great detail. 
For our own purposes we can ask what is is that Thomas gains by not 
following Aristotle. If all living things are moved by their souls, 
then any activity, any motion of living things can be analysed not 
as motion per se but as motion per accidens. Only God is a movers 
011o movetur. 
3 
The essential form of a living thing is its principle of acti- 
vity. Anything moves in that it has active and passive abilities 
(virtutes) which follow from its form, for only in whis way can it 
animate, move, itself. The actuality of a thing is first of all 
its essential form, (actus nrimus) and, secondly, the activities, 
(open do or actus secundus) which flows from this. Only in God 
are essence and existence, being and operations identical: is man 
we have to posit a threefold division into essence, powers and actual 
acts. . It is, in man, 
the powers of the soul (potentiae) and not 
the soul itself, which are the immediate principles of activity and 
these are primarily the powers of intellect and will. 
4 Privation 
1. A. Kenner, The Five Ways, p. 14 and Physics, 154, b. 25. 
2. Ia, q. 75, a. 1 and IA, q. 18, a. 1.3. Ia, q. 2, a. 
4. Ia, q. 77 and q. 78. The other powers, which man shares with the 
animals, and which therefore do not mark out his distinctive diffe- 
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is essential to the actus secundus of a living thing because if the 
thing were actual in every respect then no motion would be possible 
or necessary. 
'Dicendum quod impossibile est dicere quod essentia 
animae sit ejus potentia. ... '. Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si 
ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operatio- 
nis principium, semper habens anirnam actu haberet 
opera vitae, sicut semper habens animam actu est vi- 
vum. Non enim inquantum est forma est actus ordina- 
tus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus gen- 
erationis. Unde quod sit in potentia ad alium actum, 
hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquan- 
"tum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic 
ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dici- 
tur actus primus ordinatus ad actum secundum. ' (2) 
This distinction of the essence and powers in man, and all crea- 
tures, is vital both to Thomas' metaphysics and his theology of crea- 
tion. God is who he is because he simply is his doing: God acts 
per essentiam; he is total actuality without any further potentia: 
litt'. Man acts per potentiäm: his soul, his essence, moves his po- 
wers, (Dote ntiae), as an actualisation (actus secundus) of potentia- 
lities he possesses by his existence (actus primus). For man, any 
'doing' is being-in-act and this is not a permanent state nor a self- 
actualisation of his being. 
The introduction of the terms actus primus and actus secundus 
leads us on to an analogical extension of the notion of motio, and, 
in our general study regarding the Gifts it is this analogical use of 
the term which is employed and not the strict use which we have exa- 
mined so far. 
'Motus which can be translated 'movement' or 'mo- 
týin its proper sense denotes a process of de- 
velopment, from a state or condition imperfect in 
regard to a further completion, it is a process 
(3 cont. ). rence from them, are the vegetative and sensitive 
powers and the power of local motion. 
1. Privation is however a principle of motion per accidens and 
not per se - see Meyer, p. 260.2. Ia, q. 77, a. 1. 
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undergone by an imperfect, being, thus a passage 
from potentiality to actuality. But because 
knowing or loving are thought of as processes going 
on, motus is applied to them 'in a transferred 
sense. Soused, it signifies 'the act of a per- 
fect thing', i. e. the expression of the vital re- 
sources of the knower or lover, not a process 
from potentiality to actuality, but the exercise 
of the endowments of a high degree of actuality. ' (1) 
Thomas himself'quotes Aristotle in justification of this extension: 
fSecundum quod dicit Philosophus in De Anima quod --- 
sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidem, prout 
-motus dicitur actus perfecti. ' (2) 
and, regarding contemplation: 
t... operatio intellectus, in qua consistit essen- 
tialiter contemplatio, motus dicitur secundun 
quod motus est actus perfecta, ut Philosophus di- 
cit in II De Animas (3) 
Here we have an application of another basic Thomistic dictum: apere 
sequitur esse, the manner of a thing's acting follows its mode of 
being. 
4 In this way the notion of motto can be extended even fur- 
ther to include all expressions of life and spontaneous activity, in 
contrast to what is dead or inert or in potential onltiy. Moreover,, 
as the immanent acts of knowing and willing in man are forms of 'move- 
ment' which characterise his dignity, by a further extension, motio 
can be applied even to God's immanent self-expression. 
5 
Actus Primus and Actus Secundus. 
'omne quod movetur ab also movetur'. 
This is the basic axiom we are dealing with, and we have seen how Tho- 
mas sees the anima of living things as the animating force, the active- 
mover in the self-moving of living beings, with the powers (potentiae) 
1. J. Äumann in Gilby, vol. 46, p. 76fn. 2. IIaIIae, q. 179, 
a. 1, ad3.3. IIaIIae, q. 180, a. 6.4. Meyer, p. 264 who cites 
Ia, q. 89, a. 1; S. C. G., III, 69; De pot. IX 1, ad3.5. Gilby in 
Gilbt', vol. 2, appendix 6, p. 192. See also Ia, q. 9, a. 1, ad1; q. 1, a. 2, ad2; 
q. 27, a. 1; q. 58, a. 1, adl. 
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of the soul as the potentialities which are in the process of actua- 
lisation which we can term a motio. Each thing acts according to 
its form; its actus secundus follows the kind of actus primus it is. 
And each thing acts for the purpose of fulfilling itself, for achie- 
ving greater actuality. We have thus introduced the notions of for- 
mal, and now, final causality. The-question remains of efficient 
causality and this is an important question because if things are 
moved- whether in the strict sense or in the extended sense - they 
are moved in time. The problem arises of why they are moved here 
and now and not there or then. in other words what activated this 
particular motion at this particular time ? 
In the lowest grades of life, that of plants, movement is re- 
gulated by the fixed direction of the natural form and the movement 
is stimulated by external factors - light, heat, soil type, etc. 
In-animals the stimulus to movement is a form of knowledge acquired 
through the senses: the more refined the sense mechanism, the more 
refined will be the response patterns - thus the different forms of- 
motio in a mussel and in a wolf. With man, however; the stimulus 
to movement, while presupposing the sensory abilities of animals, is 
governed by his intellectual powers. Man is able to prearrange and 
predetermine his purposes; he can create his own meanings and signi- 
ficances. Thus the world he 'senses' is full of historic, cultural 
and personal significances and it is in the light of these that he 
exercises his further freedom, not of just responding but of deter- 
mining whether to act or not. This freedom and majesty of man we 
have already looked at in the prologue to the Prima Secundae. 
Given this view of man, it is clear that although man's poten- 
tiality to movement can be stimulated by simple sensory elements - he 
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moves his finger when it is too near a flame - in general, his par- 
ticularly human principles of action are his powers of intellect and 
will. The will, in fact, is often referred to by Thomas simply as 
motus; it is the driving power, the dynamism which moves all the other 
powers of the soul, except the vegetative. 
1 But the human will is 
more than the innate appetitive drives of the animals: just as man's 
intellectuality distinguishes his perception from that of the sensory 
knowledge of the animals, so his appetitive drive is an 'intellectual 
appetite', which works on the presentation of 'objects' understood as 
good and desirable. The intellect, therefore, is the power which 
can be seen as the initiator of human motio. 
2 But we must beware 
of oversimplifying the complex relationship between the will and the 
intellect; for example the will can move the intellect to desire to 
understand something more deeply. Moreover, as we shall examine in 
chapter 7, we also need to posit the will as an agent of motto prior 
to the intellect: this will be important for our own topic of the 
Gifts, but let us first sketch out a simple analysis of man's self- 
movement, before we complicate it in this way. 
3 
The simplest sketch of man's self-movement is set out by Tho- 
mas in IaIIae, q. 9, a. 1, and, for the present, we need to go into no 
greater detail. 
'Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse 
in potentia ad diversa: uno modo quantum ad altere 
vel non agere; also modo quantum ad agere hoc vel 
illud ... 
... Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet 
quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus, et quantum ad 
determinationem actus; quorum primum est ex parte 
subjecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, 
quandoque non aoens; aliud autem '... 
1. Ia, q. 82, a. 4. For the phrase "cognitio.. at motus" see 
e. g., Ia, q. 75, a. 1, and also IIIa, q. 8, a. 1, obj1, where the Augustinian 
influence is clear. 2. IaIIae, q. 8, a. 1; q. 9, a. 1.3. All the 
questions of IaIIae, q. 6-17 are concerned with this complex interrela- 
tionship. 
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est ex parte objecti, secundum quod specificatur 
actus ... ' 
(1) 
It is the first of these kinds of motion which we will have to exa- 
mine in more detail later as having special reference to the Gifts. 
Thomas carries on, in this present article, to associate this motto 
with the will, because the activity of the will is man's purposive 
activity and by willing the 'end', the purpose of the activity, the 
will actualises the potentialities of man's abilities. Here the 
will alone is seen as the efficient cause of man's action but let 
us, for the present, take the second form of motio as our norm, where 
the understood object, grasped by the intellect, is the efficient 
cause of man's volition and therefore of all his activity. 
I... id quod apprehenditur sub ratione bons et con- 
venientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti. 1 (2) 
But the sources of human action, the intrinsic principles of 
I 
human activity, are not only the faculties, (potentiae) of intellect, 
will, memory, etc., but are also the habitus. 
8... considerandum est de principiis humanorum act- 
uum; et primo de principiis intrinsecis; secundo 
de principiis extrinsecis. Principium intrinsecum 
est potentia et habitus. ' (3) 
The human will is not just found to be in act or in potentiality but 
also, as having a disposition, having a habitus. Now how this fits 
into our present discussion of mo_ is clear in the terms in which 
Thomas defines habitus. 
'habitus sunt dispositiores quaedam alicujus in 
potentia existentes ad aliauid, sive ad naturam, 
sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. ' (4) 
t... subjectum habits non est nisi ens in uoten- 
tia. ý (5) 
Motto was defined above as the actualisation of what is potential as 
1. Iallae, q. 9, a. 1.2. IaIIae, q. 9, a. 2.3. Prologue 
to IaIlae, q. 49.4. IaIIae, q. 54, a. 1.5. IaIIae, q. 50, a. 6. 
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such: here we have the potentialities of the intellect and will. 
It should also be kept in mind that Thomas will describe the Gifts 
of the Spirit in terms of habitus. 
Anthony Kenny lists the range over which Thomas uses this term 
habitus in the Prima Secundae q. 49-q. 54: 
'... we are told that habitus includes sickness and, 
health, beauty and toughness, virtues such as jus- 
tice, courage, temperance and charity, vices such-_: 
as intemperance and insensibility, traits of charac- 
ter such as mildness or modesty, knowledge of prin- 
ciples of logic or of scientific facts, knowledge 
of the Bible, knowledge of foreign languages, be- 
liefs of any kind, gifts of intelligence, memory 
and imagination and the possession of concepts. 
We are told that different men have different habi- 
tus, and that dumb animals do not have habitus, 
though the effects of training in them look very 
like habitus. ' (1) 
Given this list, Kenny takes the English term, 'disposition' to be the 
closest translation of the term habitus. 
'The notion of disposition is best approached via 
the notions of capacity and action. Human beings 
have many capacities which animals lack; the capa- 
city to learn languages, for instance, and the 
capacity for generosity. These capacities are 
realised in action when particular human beings 
speak particular languages or perform generous ac- 
tions. But between capacity and action there is 
an intermediate state possible. When we say that 
a man can speak French we mean neither that he is 
actually speaking French, nor that his speaking 
French is a mere logical possibility. When we 
call a man generous we mean more than that he has 
a capacity for generosity in common with the rest 
of the human race; but we need not mean that he is 
doing something generous at the moment of our utte- 
rance; States such as knowing French and being 
generous are dispositions. A disposition, said St 
Thomas, is halfway between a -capacity and an action 
between pure potentialit and full actuality (q. 50, 
a-4). ' 2 
A man., within the wide limits of his human nature, forms him- 
self, by acquiring through his actions, or by being given by God, 
1. A. Kenny in Gilbt', vol. 22, pp. xx-xxi. 2. A., Kenny 
in Gi , vol. 22, p. xxi. 
I 
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various 'dispositions', virtues or vices. A man makes himself for 
good or for evil. These dispositions, 'half way between a capacity 
and an action I. determine whether or not a man can move towards the 
fulfillment of his potential as a human being through his various 
activities. Vices are dispositions which limit the range of a man's 
possibilities: by them a man diminishes his freedom and becomes more 
and more determined by his own physical and psychological drives. 
Virtues are patterns of behaviour by which a man's freely chosen aims, 
fixed upon by his will and not determined by- his psychology, are ach- 
ieved with mastery, ease and with spontaneity. 
1 The moral education 
of the virtuous life is the task of freely ordering one's own inner 
nature so as to acquire the ability to act within all one's human 
potentialities. A, habitus is not a habit: it is more like the spon- 
taneity of a highly trained musician: it is an ability to do the 
things one freely wills to do. 
Inne habitude se contra cte, un habitus se cultive12 
'Un veritable habitus s'entourera d'habitudes; en 
lui-meme il en est fort different: il facilite 
. un acte 
precisement par le cote oü il est volon- 
taire. Ce 9u'il accroit, c'est la domination 
de la vol mte sur les facultes qu'il rend de plus 
en plus souples et dociles a la motion de la vol- 
ontg et da la raison.... Le vertueux. est tout le 
contraire d'un homme de routines; c'est meme 
1'homme. le plus imprevisible, parce qu'il ne re`a- 
git pas a l'evenement selon des automatismes plus 
ou moms durcis, mais selon la decision chaque 
fois inventee et nouvelle de sa prudence. I1 
est meme beaucoup mieux que 1'homme simplement 
"consciencieux" en qui se d4cele la raideur dune 
adaptation difficile a des regles qui ne sont pas 
encore entrees dans sa spontaneite vivante. ' (3) 
Both Thomas and Aristotle hold that a man moves himself towards 
his fulfillment, his beatitude, by his actions. 
4 The notion of habi- 
1. For a fuller discussion of this, see below, p. 283 if. 
2. M. Labourdette, Dictionaire de suiritualitg, 'Dons', col. 1613. 
3. ibid. 4. Nich. Ethics X. 117 b, X. 7 1170a10. S. C. G., III, 
150; IaIlae, q. 3,. a. 2. 
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tus'is an essential part of how they see ti- working out of this fulfill- 
ment. In as much as Thomas holds that this fulfillment of man's pot- 
entialities is of a super-natural nature, man needs, as we have seen 
already the infused habitus of grace. 
1 These infused dispositions, 
'half way between a capacity and an action', are central to Thomas' 
theology. One prime example of the use of this notion is in regard 
to faith: a baptised infant has the disposition, habitus of faith 
but not yet the activity of the life of faith. 
2 
This discussion of moral philosophy and theology has not moved 
us away from the theme of motion in Thomas' thought. In fact we should 
recall that this model of movement is not only common in the Secunda 
Pars, it is its structuring principle and its subject matter; the 'motus 
rationalis creaturae in Deum'. 
3 We need now to place all that has been 
said so far into a larger context, that of the movement of God's provi- 
dence and predestination within all creation. 
Secondary causalities and the certainty of Providence. 
St. Thomas, again and again, emphasises the reality of the 
causalities exercised by created things. 
4 God has given creatures 
the dignity of being the cause of changes within creation, each accor- 
ding to its-own nature. Nothing needs to be added to them by God 
for them to fulfill their natures. Any hint of lOccassionalism' is 
sharply attacked by him. 
'detrahere actions proprias reram est divine 
bonitatis derogare. ' (5) 
But also any notion of Deism, of God being remote from his creatures 
and not involved in their activity is also attacked. These created 
1. See above p. 47ff 2. IIIa, q. 69, a. 6.3. See above 
P. 3-6,. 4. See S. C. G., III 70.5. S. C. G. III 69. 
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causes of movement and change exist within a divinely ordered and 
divinely governed cosmos. Each thing has its own capacity to change 
and act and be acted upon, but not as independent of God. Things 
act from their own nature and from God. 
I... quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel 
spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum 
actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo; quae quidem 
motio est secundum suae providentiae rationem ... ' 
(1) 
We are not to see this as the coincidence of two equal causalities - 
as if God added 'heat' to fire to cause it to burn. God is a trans- 
cendent: "cause" not another causality within creation. There are 
not two effects here but only one. 
Thomas characterises God's trrrcausality"'t within the real secon- 
dary causalities of his creation in four ways; and all of these must 
be taken together - God does not just move things and cause them to 
change by merely conserving them in being. 
This conservation in being and nature is, however, the first 
aspect of his activity, (motio) in creation. Created things act, 
(actus secundus), in as much as they exist according to a definite 
nature or form, (actus primus). But existence is proper only to 
God. The conservation of any one thing in being is not so much a 
mere 'letting be' on God's part but a continuous creative act proper 
to Him alone-. At each moment in time, therefore, he not only 'moves' 
to conserve each thing in being, but also in its potentiality to act, 
(actus secundus), and to be acted upon, (privation) according to its 
nature. He is 'in' each thing by his power. 
2 
Secondly, God acts in each thing by 'application'. For man, 
the world around him seems to be full of coincidences and accidents 
as well as exhibiting certain orderings. Aristotle had used this 
1. IaIIae, q. 109, a. 1.2. Ia, q. 8, a. 3. 
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basic experience to argue against any form of determinism.. - Aquinas 
uses it to show the compatibility of divine providence, infallible in 
its purposes, and creaturely contingencies. What appears to man as 
coincidental or the working of 'fate', is part of the divine plan: 
nothing is outside God's ordering. 
1 God brings together various cre- 
ated agencies for them to operate upon each other. He 'applies' 
them to their activities by means of proximity, relationship, dispo- 
sition and contemporaneity. 
But if this were all that were to be said, then God's causa- 
tion of 'movement' in creatures would still be something external to 
them. Thomas' vision of the ordering of creation is an unique com- 
bination of the Aristotelian cosmic system of first mover, celestial 
spheres and terrestial process, with the Neo-Platonic idea of univer- 
sal causes. All lower causes act in as much as they participate in 
the causality of a higher nature, that is, the celestial spheres, 
angels and, the highest and unmoved mover, who causes all lower move- 
ments, God. We must understand this as a hierarchy and not a series. 
It is not the answer to a question such as 'what does fire need to 
heat water' but what has fire needed to be such that it can heat water. 
If we understand this method as the direct opposite of our modern 
scientific methodology of 'laboratory conditions' we might be able 
to comprehend it. Modern science operates by eliminating all other 
factors except the relevant ones for the experiment; here we are 
to grasp the interconnection of all things, and an interconnection 
which is hierarchical in nature. Each thing acts by participating 
in the causality of a higher nature, or reversing this, each thing 
is an instrumental cause of the higher nature. Now each created 
1. On fate, see Ia, q. 116. 
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thing, no matter what its hierarchical status, is similarly an instru- 
ment of God's causality. All events-and changes., then, are the re-, 
suit of God's providence. Or, rather, if we take providence to re- 
fer to the divine 'plan' and God's government in creation to be the 
putting into action of that plan -a division appropriate only to our 
human thinking and not to the singleness of God's Being-in-Act - then 
all events and changes take place as instruments of his government of 
creation. God acts in the activity of all things both mediativvely - 
through the hierarchy of causes and immediately as the universal mover 
of all things. 
'Deus non solum dat rebus virtutes sed etiam nulla 
res potest propria virtute altere, nisi etiar agat 
in virtute ipsius. ' (1) 
All created agents then, act in that they act within God's activity: 
a divine activity in and through all things which created agents par- 
ticipate in as cooperators by reason of the supreme goodness and gene- 
rosity of God. As E. Gilson writes of this combination of Aristote- 
lianism and the Neo-Platonic tradition: - 
t..;. a universe like Aristotle's demands as its 
cause a God like the God of Denis the Areopagite. 
Our highest glory is to be coajutors of God through 
the causality we wield ... 1 
(2) 
The fourth, and final way in which Thomas characterises the 
movement of God within all creaturely changes is in terms of final 
causality. All creatures exist in potentiality and are therefore open 
to 'movement' in as much as they are in potential and not fully ac- 
tual. God alone is Actus Purus, and alone, then, is the source of 
all change. But also as Actus Purus, He. is also that which all beings 
strive to become like through their operations; according to their own + 
1. S. C. G. IIi, 89.2. E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy 
of 'Thomas Aquinas, London (1957), p. 184. 
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natures. 
1 In striving to fulfill themselves they strive to imitate 
in their own mode, his fullness of Be-ing. In this, as in all else, 
they exhibit the purpose of his providence. All the various causa- 
lities of creation form a single symphony, a dynamic unity, and God 
is the common end of all that exists. 
The cosmic sweep of the divine movement. 
Our discussion of the relationship of divine causality and 
creaturely causalities has had to be sketchy because of space. Never- 
theless, it is only within the context of this over-all vision of the 
single yet variegated dynamism of providence that the Gifts of the 
Spirit can be understood, as Thomas presents them. , These Gifts are 
analysed by Thomas by using the model of 'motion'. But this use is 
only a small part of the dominance of this model in a far larger area. 
... rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quamdam motio- 
nem esse intelligitur, secunduzn quod Deus omnia 
dirigit et movet in proprias fines. ' (2) 
The whole of creation is presented as being in motion, in rest- 
less motion, like trees in the wind or the waters of ariver, but not, 
like debris in a wind-storm, in directionless, meaningless movement 
of chaos but - for those with vision - ordered and governed and pur- 
posively moving towards its consummation. The drive, the motus, of 
this cosmic growth is the-Spirit of God, the 'life-giver': the prin- 
ciple of vitality: let in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum et vivificantem', 
as the Creed puts it. 
3 As the existence of all things arises only 
out of the divine goodness, which is 'appropriated' to the Holy Spi- 
rit, all things are seen as in a movement"of return to that goodness- 
1. S. C. G. III, 17,18,19,. 20. Ia, q. 44, a. 4.2. S. C. G. IV 
20.3. See, Thomas' commentary on this article of the creed in 
the Compendium Theologicae, I. 147. 
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Which is their source. 
' 
'... rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quamdam'motio- 
nem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus omnia 
diriget at movet in proprios fines. Si igitur 
impulsus at motio ad Spiritum Sanctum, ratione 
amoris, pertinet, convenienter rerum gubernatio 
at propagatio SpirituiSancto attribuitur. 
... vita maxima in motu manifestatur; moventia 
enim seipsa vivere dicimus, at universaliter quae- 
cumque a seipsis aguntur ad operandum. Si igi- 
tur, ratione amoris, SpirituiSancto impulsio at 
motio competit, convenienter etiam sibi attribui- 
tur vita; dicitur enim (Joann. VI. 64): Spiritus 
est aui vivificat; at (Ezech. XXXVII. 6) Dabo vo- 
bis spiritum, at vivetis; at in symbolo fidei nos 
in Spiritum Sanctum vivificantem credere profite- 
mur. Quod etiam at nomini spiritus consonat; 
nam etiam corporalis vita animalium est per spiri- 
tum vitalem a principio vitae in cetera membra 
diffusum. ' (2) 
The influence behind this theological perspective is not only 
that of Aristotle - in his theory of motion - but also that of the 
Greek Fathers and especially Pseudo-Denis and the Damascene. 
3 With 
this wider perspective, Thomas not only goes beyond the static cate- 
gories of grace of his scholastic predecessors, but also, in a cer- 
tain sense, returns to a perspective of grace older than Augustiners. 
This is quite clear in the Contra Gentiles, but also evident in the 
Summa. The 'Fall' of Adam is no longer the context within which 
grace is discussed - although grace is said to be both sanans as well 
as elevans - but rather grace is introduced within this over-all move- 
ment of the divinum auxilium or Lex Aeterna which moves through all 
things. 
But just as Thomas does not dismiss Augustine, for from it, 
but reintegrates Augustinianism within this larger perspective of 
cosmic movement, so also does he take up the achievements of the scho- 
lastics before him. Man's participation in this movement of love 
1. S. C. G. IV, 20,21,22.2. S. C. G. IV, 20.3. See 
Ernst, pp. xvii-xix. 
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must be a continuous one; a stable and not intermittent participa- 
tion. It is therefore by habitus of grace that man is moved by God. 
Moreover, as man reaches his Beatitude through his operations, the 
human motus, (passive) of the divine motto, (active), cannot be seen 
as a total passivity. There must be a human movement as well as a 
divine one, not in any Pelagian sense, because the divine movement is 
all-embracing, but in the sense of co-operation and participation in 
causality. Hence the theme of the Secunda Pars, that man, as a rat- 
ional animal, as the 'image of God', is a self-determining agent, free 
to initiate and enact prudential and providential purposes. 
7. THE DE BONA FORTUNA 
- Problems Relating to the Text 
-A Modern Reconstruction of the De bona fortuna 
-A Brief Commentary on the Reconstructed Text of the 
De bona fortuna 
- St Thomas' Use of the De bona fortuna 
1. The Receptivity o the Will at its most origi- 
nary level.. Quoad exercitium 
2. The De bona fortuna and the role of Rationality 
3. Divine Providence and the Act of Choice 
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The De bona Fortuna. 
Problems relating to the text. 
In IaIIae, q. 68, a. 1, at precisely the point where he'introduces 
his own solution, Thomas refers to a particular work of Aristotle: 
'"Est enim considerandum cuod in homine est duplex 
principium mavens: unum auidem interius, quod 
est ratio; aliud autem exterius, güod est Deus, ' 
ut supra dictum est; et etiam Philosophus dicit, 
in cap. de Bona Fortuna'. 
The centrality of the distinctions made herein this quotation is now -- 
clear. "There can therefore be little need to justify focusing our 
attention for a short time upon the text explicitly referred to, at 
this point. 'Thomas, in fact, makes another explicit reference to 
it at the'end of the same article. 
'Et Philosophum etiam dicit, in cap. de Bona Fortu- 
na quod his qni moventur per instinctum divinum 
non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, '' 
sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum; quia 
moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio human. ' 
, 
The first question before us is-what exactly was the'De bona fortuna ? 
Thomas refers to it as if it were a book in common circulation 
in his time but no other, earlier scholastics mentions it and Thomas 
himself either did not know of its'existence, or, at least, never 
makes an explicit reference to it, before writing Summa Contra Gen- 
tiles, book III, chapter 89. Lottin states that the De bona Fortuna 
was put together about 1266, but he gives no evidence to back up this 
statement'. 
1 Daman argues, from the evidence of book III of the'Summa 
Contra Gentiles, that Thomas became aware of the work in 1259. or-1260.2 
The book itself is obviously a compilation of the Magna Moralia II, 8, 
. 
1. Lottin, t. III, p. 430.2. T. Deman, 'Le "Liber de bona 
fortuna" dans la theologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin", Revue de Sciences 
philosophiaues et theologiques, 17 (1928),. pp. 35-38, henceforth refer- 
red to as Deman. See also O'Connor, p. 145, ft. 19. 
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(Bekker edition 1206b 30 - 120Th 19), and the Eudemian Ethics VIII, 2, 
(or, VII, 14 in some editions), (Bekker edition, 1246b'37 1248 b 11). 
1 
For this reason modern editors,, from the sixteenth century onwards have 
omitted the work from editions of Aristotle's work and it is therefore 
almost impossible to find the work in print. 
2 
There are latin manuscrl^ts extant which appear to date from 
the fourteenth century but as Thomas never quotes the De bona fortuna 
verbatim we cannot determine what translation or translations he used. 
3 
No greek manuscripts have been found - although there is one fourteenth 
century greek and Latin manuscript - so we cannot assess whether the 
original compilation was in greek or in latin. 
4 When Deman was doing 
his pioneering work on this text in 1928, only one manuscript tradi- 
tion was known, that referred'to as the Habitum autem utique, version, 
which was printed in Venice in 1482.5 Since then, however, the edi- 
tor of the Aristoteles Latinus has shown that there are at least two 
distinct, (yet not fully independent), translations represented among 
the extant medieval manuscripts. 
6 
The editor points out that it is 
? 
not possible to ascertain which of these two traditions is'older. 
The translation Habitum autem utique is by far the most widespread, 
and therefore O'Connor suggests that it is the one more likely to 
have been used by Thomas, but there'can be no certainty of this. 
8 
But even if we were to accept the translation Habitum autem 
utique, and thus use the 1482 printed text, we would still be faced 
with major difficulties. O'Connor has studied this printed edition 
--, 1. Lacombe, G., Aristoteles Latinus, Codices. Pars--prior, Bruges-Paris, 2nd edition, 1957j, p. 72.2. O'Connor, p. 142. 
3. O'Connor, p. 145, Lacombe, op. cit., Pars Secunda, & etc., pp. 
1141,1142,1143, and L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus, Sup- 
plements Alters, 1961, p. 141 and p. 184.4. O'Connor, p. 142 
and Lacombe, op. cit., Is p. 73.5. O'Connor, p. 142. 
6. O'Connor, p. 145.7. Lacombe, op. cit., Is p. 73. 
8. O'Connor, p. 145. 
-142- 
and describes it ast. 'very-, literal and in places unintelligible'. 
I 
-. 
'It is practically unintelligible. - This seems to 
be due in part to mistakes made by the editor. 
But it is due also to, the fact-that the trans- 
lation itself, like so many medieval translations 
of Aristotle, is slavish, mechanical and unintel- 
ligent. Finally, the original Greek text from 
which all translators have had to work is very 
poor. F. Susemigl, one of the chief modern edi- 
tors of the Eudemian Ethics, speaks of VIII, 2, 
from which the greater part of De bona fortune is 
drawn, -as capiti corruptissimo, and adds that in 
many places it is impossible to recover the origi- 
nal sense with any certitude. ' (2) 
O'Connor, therefore, despite all his arduous work on the 1482 edition, 
finally decides, in the main, to make use of modern Greek and English 
editions of the Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics. 
3 
We shall take the same option in this chapter and perhaps with 
less need of justification, because our aim here is not quite the same 
as that of O'Connor in his excellent Appendix on the De bona fortuna. 
O'Connor's aim is to try to estimate how this work influenced Thomas' 
thought and terminology, especially how it might have led him to use 
4 the term instinctus in relation to the Gifts of the Spirit. For 
this reason he is led to use scholarly hypotheses, based on the var- 
ious translations still extant, to speculate on what the actual words 
of Thomas' translations ýrýht have been. Our project is quite dif- 
ferent, although we will use OfConnor's work below. In the main, 
our plan for this chapter is to present Thomas' actual use of the De 
bona fortan, in the Summa and other works. If we present 
and analyse Thomas' use of this work, then we will have a firm foun- 
dation upon which to construct theories about its influences on him. 
1. O'Connor, p. 145.2.01 Connor., p. 142.3. G. C. 
Armstrong., OEconomica and Magna Moralia, Loeb, Harvard, 1947, and, 
A. Beckham, The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Vir- 
tues and Vices, Loeb, Harvard, 1952.4. O'Connor, p. 144. See 
above Ch. 1, p. 33 for the discussion of this important term ins_c- 
tus. 
-143- 
What is more,, as Thomas never quotes the work, verbatim but always gives 
a paraphrase, we are not too dependent on, any- extant manuscript because 
our basic data is his paraphrase;, that is, what he actually produced 
rather than what he might have read. The major part of this chapter 
will follow later but, first of all,, we will present a reconstruction 
of the De bona fortuna from the Loeb editions of the Magna Moralia and 
the Eudemian Ethics and follow this by a brief commentary highlighting 
certain themes which might prove significant for our study. 
-144- 
A modern reconstruction of the De bona fortuna. 
The following text is given as a guide only. It combines 
what seem to be the best modern editions in Greek and English of the 
two original Aristotelian. works. 
1 The reconstruction is made up of 
Magna Morialia, 11.8 , (Bekker, 1206b 30 - 1207h 19), and the Eude- 
mian Ethics, VIII. 2, (or VII-14 in some editions, (Bekker, 1246b 37 - 
1248b 11). 2 
1. The Loeb editions: 
Geconomica, the Magna Moralia, by G. C. Armstron, 1947, and 
The Athenian Constitution. The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues 
and Vices, by H. Rackham, 1952. 
2. G. Lacombe, Aristoteles Iatinus, Codices, Pars Prior, 2nd edition, 
1957, p. 72. 
. _ý . 
.. +++. w+. º.. .. - -ýy-r L "Yý mac: r : Y": -. ". ý .. "": ý" .... '... .. 
w 
.-.. 




-Q C. Cr 




121 fi :, ei 
Z 42 Co Z ad 
v ýcýü ý°ö"uö 
Z%9" c ä 2-u ` 
`. 7 c+ umc24=- L - N a.. Vi 
. 
Tw" ~QCQL ta, ý 
c os ä P N. 4 ü i. C G +a ^ 






. ; =-r -0 c"ö 
m 19 0,0 -o. > " p l ce -Z: c(Z0 QJ 
- .-Y 
c: e; 
"< r-` 41 
1uM 
4 t r u - Co) 
es C ýý 
' 
ýý O sVi _ 
4) 0 





o/ "O ,p rj b. 





ei >< wZ 
. 
aý W (A ý ý^ o 




t. m2 c. = 
.. >2 Y, '0 t3 ' ' . 1' a 
tA 91 t! . C- 
9m " ?. 
tt aG - w 
?xdW 3 'o ` r .r 
`ý C 
.Y . 'ý FaW .o ku y 
u 
?ý?. Ö ýý OäCx ý" 
W to tj "C% o_a. .. ý+ 
' "ý ad'o t'O .r" ý wk 
!_w 
Wp.,, 
ti "W c«ü Q x




















d- °e ci =: ac ý" ' eta c` 
y tý ypr. ur, *_ 






'' r ý. C rr`, 
u>OwCpCO- G° y 6ý7 'p :: pCv N pia G "" 
OG it u 4. " OOy ++ uyyOCC3a. .. ä 
oý .. tp 
O L:. Cy e6 Oý+ ""ý fl+ v '.. - F. 'ý G º"' y 67 Cs 
"a at O 
yC +r >ý ca Cu a"' lu Z. O- -. Y>= Z. sacZ ++ > 
>C lii GrtN° CO ,ý3d 
rr O 
1. -a y 
"ý 
dO a°+ 
°OGd ce OG Cl Giý 
t, "o ° ýý "" e°ö°u -- . 
Z., d im y' u ýa in X) 
mu 0° 
ö00ü 
Gý °' "öy. , t7 
üCüG t7 





3 C^" 0ýýä lu r_ 
mýäß .5-" 
t.. ü CC OGv .rG> is r. 




0° äi d C; ss. " 





Cä, %. Z. 
om 
4) >x 7 
Chi V 
10 y °c O 6K) L-° 
^G 







äº ý.. yL cg 
'C3 .-u. yV... yL .-CCO-O 
OÖVCV G° OV p'C 
duN e" 
CZCC 




ä öp C '= e«. 
C^ CO5 






ixCvv. ^G u 
"d ` 
ý'" VV 
Z .: d"u, G a+ yo 4). 0 o 
"ý 'o "_ c" "-Eta 'a Ii: u 
rC 
7 
c t' 14- v 
.+r. r. ý+ Obw 
"}' LVO tl 6ý "ý LVv -0 
=C ""e ,. CGCe 
dy LL G 'O e0 yONd. 
" 
rn O ._C tp >°v 
. 
°ý 7 e., dC .C "G 
VG 
yyG O" C .ý '= 
vdiO 
ýo ̂ a 3 
«. ", oo .c .2 ýO .. »G.. 5 .r3 "o to ... ý0 3 'v .ý .ý3m M- e, ao. a 3 .o 
rr 
.. ý 
Y dE! 1! c 
W 
ý+ 






ýd t0 ý. 








aV, R ,WY .pWt. 
s 
vn. 
^- cö .:: 
41 






`W OW "W W to 
00 
-_ 
- ý' 4 Y `W 
Zöö 




3`QO R~ Wm `t7 
-. 
tl 
k .WOY. 0ä.. Y. WOC 
vi cýO 
ý3 : vt0a-0 Y C! öa >tg. t^ gzb tl Wö wW "yeL ueV 3 
-3 WZo 300 >, ' ýý '9 Ya fi Wk `c ög Z l- Au Z- e CS 0 
ý] s(: N tC 












,C 1- pbý 
t- 
9, 
C t` ý! 
ý. 
. w. 
'ý b3 yr 
"ý`ý 
R: ,ZL F- 
Oo .W 
sý N 
>c`x"ý en `O 21. O ý` 
YYkW `a O- 
"ý 
a. Y `c 









°W ý" wx m :j .W 








pd t-týtlG0 W tw " 
W(A 
be0 f--9a p0 Cb 
Z, to 
waaa ýa 0,0 1- 
tl ýtl tl ö tl Xee oY3 





ý9- Ybýýý_ "v 
Zt; `-ömaý! 










"ýýir d tl tl 
J! 






"V rsL=CGd? y '~ 
ý (' S- 
.-Gýý rte. 
fr 
G Ce. ý Cam, 
vLý5CZÖ 
>% O-c -` -ý s Z. ^L 4i -r 
_ 
lp "' -2 O=4ON 
"C GL=w"Vv +" 
G 
<' 'G L. 
yU 
-C (+ C 
"' Va°COiO4 "O Ö Co 
VC 
_Z U 
.. r W_ U r- _ 
w=t 7> O vý «C "S7 tr 
LÖ äÖ CK-: 
-- .C-L0> 
43 > 'r r (Vö 
d-d ca 




L C _ "cc 
r- Ci^w y[ Idu c Co 
8r 
-V 
.ýZ. wOt. e! 
Lwas Z" yvCy., O er r- 
~ 
'er :: 
++ aOCU ,dCOUU EGGv. 
-- LqwS V 
`" Ö Gw Qý ýU Gv C 4ý OU'8OÖC 
>b 0 
-u.. y y; s. 




... o, w7 ^ý uOu e0 
,,, a o' i.. 2 "- uauC2Vm0 .nc°.., u'o o ' .. .-ia. "^+ v .C as Mu3°u b0 i .., F, i, w vugZ 0cs-= m 
-3 
üoövge C; ýe(noC3oýýLu 
Qi ya º"ý i: ý 3 w« eQ VCrO>7pp... -' 
Ö UO 0> 
(`" yr0öC=rö gLi 41 Cý t° u>, d0 üC ý" Zy >, 
3Mü. 
^ m 
j vo cc U CT U bp, CqOZCCy O=CC4 _° 'L7 
U 
W) 
1) v) CM fj 
ii -, *x !c 
0 Clo d= Co > 
.+ 'J «4 
V "> Z f"" 
- 





aeu. _ ,, coý 
Q 6i awU$ lti 'U V ir" « L. cn V= s» m 7.. C 
m C` ö eC-( wUý; cis cg 
, ýC 
VC pL. 
















C, ""`ý it1. 
Co U, 
.C7 "O 
ü d> C O. e ei -ra 
C it C O^ 
`ý Cl. >C 
"= 
e 
°G.. ý v e0 w3 vl w 
ß. v ýT 
m t. oo m 
z e- ýo 















S. '' WäY =b t 
"°3 (t 
`a - fd 
tA°` 







`9- O'W C; - 0 




ýtl"d5 i d ,. 
"d la`! -, 
3^ 
i ei Yg ý` byW 'O (3. d1 `-" >. W we 
`a 
i wW E' `d 
t-I 








`, ̀ ^W" WIE` Ym 
(x 
b ý'(O `? (O ýý"O 
`ý 
ýýC ý lý ] {'f , gy. 
"ý 
- 
40 en i-: " 
^^ 
t 12 
k io e t-> ., p. ( S. ti d >> gWoW 
i .p "W ýý ýý ýý O "d " tW 
ýQ 





? 3" e to m oö YiW 
1- -ö 
', w °bý 
WY 
`3 
ýö'W ý3" ý'° OY?. ýo (r 
«o'd 





TidO Co OiWW 
d (ý i ,-1x 
13 ýý-i° iI1 d3 
ti ö 
'< 
.dop tl m 
(ik 
ýO ^W k, 
< 
" 




00Z Co 0 
41 t0 cs er *0 Z ; Z* 
du Z .- .- 41 to 4) W 









cis 0 t. 0 
b9 9) 41 




yO of OWV t0 
Vyy 
y rya 
HuMß. de O^: Cw eC 
U" OpV. it >C '9 ', C 
41 
1' COG aq eý0. 
rt 
ZWG:,, 40 , ", 
U IL) Z. y^ 
lu OH - "' ``a., ö c2. "ä i) +a'r+ 
. 
3 -0 vý ° ý"" ýs to ^" o. C a'tiÜý°°uä. ý'' c3. "-r-ßIU C(L)a, 




m> vGcc a> cui °' 
'^ Q 
, tä -- G" C 
ei"U 
118) Gicý.: ä KGG« in. =i. º"iw. 
Ö Cý 
GCi.: 
o -» n 
.ýad ca Z, n .. ý .aa a' a 
z- IJ k. 
d lkd b a. c aYo 
Oa 
ý" fC` 






ý. "ý ä `ýý ä3.3 Wý°. t3 W 
Ev 
'k 1; (39 
>-. % - 2` Wm 
CCL. o %u 
dd öt- 




Ey X. d' fn doWw 'ý' 
Na +Cý a 0 
`2 
Xb `-go a -0 W tp- - 
ej 
<. 
Z .ýttt! k t0 -C 
daN 
W ýO W `a 
w W 7 >`ý 
, 1x`d tý 
ýr 
ý ýW OýdW {ý W "ý I- ä; 
4. r- te" ;d 1- 
YbN "d 'wd 
60 k- -i: 40 
ý! 24 W-ä%Zm OO 
' 
Rw ,ýQ.; 
" 'O W .. '3 ýG "". OdDN d'vý d 'd . 
I 
., 






C. ' e1 r y 
tl 'a. _ oeu 
Y`ý 
r 96 



















ci º. üü3M 
L~'. b swr 
c3ýaýde 
U 





j: $ü c r. U" >,; 
t Og 





















ýrt ke y 
öbpb Lk 'O e eý i 














. i. "O 
vnÖ v 
"s- G00: .uw, " ý 
. Oý Yd 
y 






1, Kb wk 




' e mº ä 









v^ +ý ý".. k i: 1.0- V[ 1V11YqM gG ýG V V° ,VO tý p .-b ý0 V , 1,1 sa pw aDV ++ CoÖVC aº ayý^ ý°. - _ý eaGvt. 
'4ö.,. ý 
Eýý° ýý ýe ýý+ 
ý`~"mý 
ýoö i0 ý'"ýv& 
ý: 
'c ""g öcý 
-mot `I' 
aMb . 1:. 
L' ^' W -ý 
a° 4r yv °° N .«vü 'ý G' 
w ý"1 .ý,. 
., ý: 7oýe., "Y4. Iuüwuee .ý 
ýo G 
.cR. -' u s.. MV 
"o .+u >+'3 as >, öo '° `ow 
c3 öe 
rr ++ CVe.. 
i+ 











oVVp.. uo Co Vo., ++ VV 4+ C ?ý£Vca. 
_v a. r`ý ßuu3 'ý umu "_ "c 
ü- ý.: ? ß" cucvua 
m' 
oow c' =u .2 
E. yvmC, 3, 
uemiecýý=. -; ,.... > 
w`8iý. c'c"ßý°a üü ö. W c. zu aaý>öoc°''icv''äý3üo"ý"ýao°ä, =c`°ý4a--U°c° 
:Le3 to"ý 
, '? u "' 
[e 
,_aü 
°' uöc Ö" u c- [u v=^ u .ý a. C cý c"... Q'ý... c t' vu ým V m-0 0M = p... .C 
uC,,, = 44w. Cu., -VvA . OCc02a uo o. a a e avat ++ .ý3 'p0 a" ýý 4w = -cy - 
4, -bE °'ý o . 





rV. v. Cm ob ý. ý .'w 
Y° 
vv Q'ý ++ "ý as 
Od vi p7 
v[ Gam. 
,. 









edrV+ ýý D V+a d O'O"'*a G'0... , º[ýv " 
C .Z . 
`ý. 10 Co IC t0 OZ- öo 
ÖC 





.GC an C; 
'G 










jä 10, -{ 
Y 
<a ö cö .p 
"ý, t3 





oW 'ý` W 
ýy. tyN+j ýý 














ý° X ý. W "k W 'ý Ö 
"CS yW.. 
z 




ýý ý+ 1ý 
`ý 
1ý 
W ýW Y '9- 1 ,d r0 WbO 
vLý. 
`b Q. o-r . ýy o Q) 11 0a+s Ci W+ .daW "o WowF. 3 ý.. a 'ý 
X j. y F, 
. ý'° (O W 'ö 3 Io 
ý` dob .d 'W.! CC NW .ok 








ý3t öp3 v°i 
ýý "A- (ý YWOr 
"O wW ý "ý! 
d awO 
"ty X "" 
ä 
fý a >< ?+kYý 
r `fý O `W 
ýýN ý'... 'w b 
r3 






W ti N 0bo'd 1ý 





ý'"ý `p t0+ 
kF 'a ah mN 
"a'ý 3" b ýý.. e°, 
.rNNOý. OYO 1" b 
ý+ Oö tý tý+ W /G ^ 'C t: ý. 
wý 
`3 Iyý'ö NY", '3 
-" 1%c ac 'F rW 
"W ,r tý 
"C ,YW 
"W C iW RObN "q r0 Q 




-1 -t - 
` '". tw -cb.. 
°. CCä 
_ý` 
V OC °' uCu ý+ Cuuw. 
Ka 
£` ZOwCO.. 
CCCe °ý CCNG ;Ch 
tu. w rti 
ä 7== ü" vyvic; v 











L CC i in vi-^rc 
CI 
V. m= 




ý=ü>, cümos''ý ýý ° ää+ o°c^oou c `" ~ o; Ous Oý uu 
C75du &0 cö> 
0t: 
>,. r. 
oL 00 0 
="- 
"c a+ tc-ý ., yp c ., at ac ,-cuv, +, c .3 
L' .. ̂ . 4: 'ý' 
Cu 
on O v. to v 't 
aG rui to hC H7 O- "ý OpyC 
EOir.. 
CüuO 4'+ w 1".. cu eE . '. ' 4+ .- O- 
LO S' O a4 
-0 
N. 4 uC Q+ 
C 
r. a 'L7 
Vwu 
_ý 
14 -. uZý9uÖwM ºu". Ör 




ät 'te a 
.OoZ. 
















{u ý' y 't7 » +s a0 un 
"a. 
S ++ .,, 
ECdtpV 
ýu O Ci 
41 44 a ü -O V 
Ce,, a as u3 k"^ ü 
d. C 
rti 
L" sý u 
E". Q 13 00 "°; 
49 
Wc : 'ý ca Co ec aho .e_y eo "ý 










tCi U +' OÜwa d+ 
Z r. aO p+ w7WOC 40 
u 
913 u `d ä Lý d 
c',, ~ tý"C 41 
0.4` c2 






aw " rye ýs-ý .d ww sQ 
%ý " ýi 'j !i%. ,ýZý r" 
16. 
`" 'ý *ý ý .. a 
ýt 
.. _. 




-iy Fter. . %L . 
-n4 .T". 
ýO tl ttni ýiý d 
1' a ear 
ýý 
OW "tl -~L 'g b 
ti `a A. b 
%. V- aW 
i. 
tö le j< to 
ýwý rr !-' 
'x 
x ;"yOt. - we ,Wt., 
MA to -, 3 O 1- W >. >'ý ýO i. moý- 
Wd `O W 
t- -. 3 k- '. tl Y to 
ý`3 (^ 110 tl -d °x D- 
: 
to Y 
tvr ma 2-ti- ".. b :'O s-`ý toI 
d 
p. ti . >- 
`. 
o_ .. 
1! k ?. Y"! O- > .. 
3 
.s sd qWpac , 
vy 
_b 
mOd -j Q .r1. to 
t 1- atbr 
º7 
4'ýpwrq '" tW`e- F- W'd 
>d 
"O. d-Z W 
WO =. 4e 
'O+ý19.. .a We1; tw W 
1- t0 ?'0 Qbr-. 
p 'SpO to 
w 





Q d C.. a 
t' "-W 
1- Nr JA 
N" .p 
ýW ýw tl e 
ýý 
Am 
p9 Iwe. apa0O 
tt. x "p -5--b O 
tl 1. .d -Ö CL 
C in v ,ýrN 
VS. 
40 . 




W rj3 öW F- -z S- 
jä 
1W -r t" !-'? 
c ^'e 




t3 Qý `g.. ä ". W' 
0 L'dr d bö 
äb3 






`O W .p . 9, cr tr 'fl 
a 
3ýriu- iý QWWb t3 ýý 
äý tb '.. " ýO 
N Y]p. 
ý t"'p 
ýý"ip- W "ýi 
^W "' .d eý, 




. rý' ýd iýý`'. 
'tr'. 
d 
f{-. t+d? i Fr" 
1ý rA'. . ...! . 
ý. h 
: ''ýFWi d ý, O ýd. ýýd ý` '. ýýW+ 
iý WW fW 





- tS2 - 
i 
%0 eC COY S7 4. r 41 v ad 4a d Ab >, ho~ ü yCj CY e4-1 d, uOE 
b0 uobY0 w" c 
trp 
u) 1- 
bo cs . -0 :ji q0 14 
" 
t- V« 




ý. 0 °C-u F'. 






Z h: sc".. Y ce Eý c ._ -o of Q +: c) --uc: 4 :30 «- qj to 
vý ° 
JM 
öo«' c^d E ö4) 
2 3.4) 1. -= . fi 4a llj 41 
o ö; 
IM'y ° 
ý'o ä"''=u m 
r. r 
ý «, ý`«°. a:: c hvoZMIDu; ouo=eou"a''. ý>ý V 3ýoeocý 4) 40 
`ý c4 .a .M ºu.: CC 







º~. .C ." 
Yt OgUYVý, ,Vy,,, 




`O to VV 















.asgü 2'9 a 
;: 2 °'Zr ;aV +ý ö 
"Zgo la cCM5ad "g "V 
-to 
0" X0V".. « :. o ^' Or 
.... s oý 
0. eu0 *Z 4& w .. Y.. u .+ü CZ =
ö> 
u) u0ac, x a^0 44 0 z3 .5'. yy c° C C" M "l0613 YWVNrm= c3 cm ýý "% w ty Gt, in °. » vbi Vvu 'L'.: ep Q °=c4 uci.; b., aU= K2 tolu°uý; r.. sýy, y 
rý oC `ýi ^ GYi 
ry 







YO^v EO 'ý' YüyM 
y w, Cod 
00 3Y., 
", 
w Ir n- °ý Y .ýv ,73 
"G 
Y r. 41 
«- 
. "" u. 
+' vYV *' 7M .-Y eb Yu .+ r"' 
CS. o t.. Y. i6 do u 0 ., "ý Z; E ao C_yV 4VnY3«aG. Vö a"Ce 4°+ ar 'C .OVCO be-- G£3 "vGiý. 
Or ýy 
15 
±"ý tw ä"T.. ip i', "ý3"Z 'e 'r 
y`ý ess'».;:, i 
,t 






Wir; c-a. «ti 
OA W 1-L `egyrwW*!. " .. *\J -+ 
d ?<a w-, '. d m- 
e. rL 
G to a co p' e! oY .ý" 
d'. 
it "''°ý a ... t^týj ° 
ý" -- t-tQ p, 
Od>Ob`Np 






ýVýw't3 -a "ý( 
CYd3 is faW 
O`ýý d 
=d 
.°~w d °" 
.>e .3ab$. p 
IQ 3 
a 1- 
;e ý''ä ý "ý u2 ý- 
fi 
s d std oob. o 2. .. d.. ö'ýw býÖ pd 40 &ý+d k 






Ein Od +d ýp `W ý`r' 
ý"rý ýd ýO 
ý' 
10- ak -tE a "d 
Ob "d ,y L-. 
i. r ! to `O kd° In 4 .r.. OZ, °G 
cz. ä fybi wj .rat wd t- W 2, WkOYW 
40 w. r ºy rý 
Wd ýW + 
F, 
ý+0 
W wW `ý r' 
k- 
ý°Oe +a 
"ý+ "O p `a tö 
ý. wd Y^ 
. 
mod d ýE' '° dö ks ks$.: Ö 
ý(3 csw t .ý 
ýy: sýöfd aýtý° "aö 
d: °öE°e" 
3 iý Wduöo t3 `k 1. 
wý aybp 
ýb ýý d .i"i °rY dý 
aY "p 





dmWb ý` ! "'W 
b GL ä w_ 'rU ~ 
o 
'W t d'O wý G 
L! .Y 
?ý d_tý ýý tý oo , 
°ý d t3 ý3 ý .`»_i 
" `p ýý :" 
"äa 





l. tom>bp"O `O .. w"rC°ý°'ý w,. eC `! l wp 
wä: 
3. ý0 Y .] iºAr + `+ wý" ... . 
C'S 60 
- 
'd ý9- d ý9-w okod 1- ýýtý 








ýy.. tZa. SP 
67 L V Cri 
I 
dj r Gam, 
yý r'" i .+ 
ýý 
"" V>qC 6i = _^ 




bit 1 -2 :2 .x ei - 
`. 3
pCSC"vyE«. 









v: y "^ 'C r+ ViC .Cý, O >! `" arg CgLO 
r- E_". 9, E C' m 16. 
""" py >> 67 .O^ ^O - 
10 C. ry 'L7 >> 
4a uQC8. 
da -yC C' 0yc,,,, 
14 A. 13 
3 C="ýJ C. }a°t°v"y 
c°v >'= y ý; 
ýj-- ci ä+" n- A. 
al 4) M .Z0C.. ý'. ^ 
,ECd 
"C IVO ß' y ""' ,CC i+ CrPm 
t_ 
LuC a+ C "&0 y too s.. 
ý. ' Öq 
+VrOO0 
r+ ,O14 "'ý 
Ö 
ýy ü iC q{ ý0 +a y 
ö0 ý+ at ý0 pC8CCß as r- OCt_ 
L it '.. bCC 
d+ QCOc ""+ vL be m c- 
2 
ý0 .Y1,1 OO ä0 0V 7= yVi OVQCO "fl"a0+ MD G'C '^ C+ +ý. 
º 




3'° =. '`°" Zý eZp 4_e 
wVe3: º. "i
ü 
`O ss. Cpö 
. 






... a! ý.. ff L `Ö . 
4r O as r" aý .aL_ 




"1 äw u"v$$yöýur4=ö« ° üü sir s 
jSý R n"' "GCe1. b. C " ý0 "" F. ra VL 
ýý+ *' L+ vQCg .e 









öl ävu 'a S u. p'o vuO. " 
Co 40 v ºy. aa3p ömü v-7 ° 
u:. 









O ýir Oý ý+ýMbý' : fit . ýý' M10. 
lt'% 
. GO WY "'10 rN3 .öOW, 
W 
.J- ltS 
~. 0 Z-! t "d- 
ý Q'C Qt -e , 
-- ---. 
-. xy ßä ". tä w-- 
.. 
Yrk p^ W aY... ýýýb t" 
Ib3`A- N9NKwxo. %0 
3. fibd W C` y: 
. 
L2 >, 40 CL :tW3'kW3W">mmN ýi .$r!. .4 
war o 
býG 
?`WN °m'360 b'd ý '.. 
ä 
. 
%0 u %0 -4# 40 '0 X t. ZL+ -W 
ZC-=14- -'^ 
'Y (WdW0 
pr d 60 
k 
NCO tl'0 
>Z CZ, t. E" W "g, 
ý 
d i` W 
i(O 
p 45 W-O ýs<a ýý ld V-.. o 
YoaOZ. Y 1. W ý''O ö? c ti's 
L "W bW 
"ý 
ö 'C 
WYl. Ni "1y öW .ý0 "W . 
ý"a {`'. ý. ýi k 
.ýV "R 
QW !O. MOX 
,p 




*Z }_ F-* 
WWvOO. t^ la iC .O 
ý'ý ^^ i'7 
Nu 0N 
60 
ýi (1ý aSp YbO 
-W ° 40 
" R, l% .°< .ö . 
~' FO 
at v~ W C! ýO Oil bW lC N-dWN . 'p- O "j l C- 
a"W 1- 
Id 12 




la "W -$Z' ä ti öm° ej ' 
'O -, 0 
j. dkp oö öJ >C'O 
d Z. Ft- 
t 
%, c> p° 
.vd 
"ö Q^ " ^' ýv 
"ý. k lr 
4bu tl k` bidW", "Y `a . 
.rW 







e 111 C) riöv4`W ýý ,-"pC "" ti bdWNdOYO vý 
5.0 a 
ýW "ý 
0w"3 ö ý= ä60 gYcb'o t- 0'Z b3!! ^ -U2 , 
`o ýQ ödxb. asa. d d ,ýWý, W 
ö, 3 cI1 ~a 
ßd'1" Y ^W Y 
ý'W 




m---- ääý'ý, =1. CEaor. cEa3a)M. - U ýý 40 60 OaQüCU .C°v7CC .C cg 22Od 
. 
°. ý V 4+ "y .CUQy vUi 
ý' °! `+ v 
"p 
Q y, ý 
d 
CC a+. - 
a Fj U" 





14 cd 4) fi 7 ap 
y lu cnn O c0 :äI [ 
U ,u 
r~. 
° ý" "O Ö 
g2, u 
eq .C .C3° 
Co wOUOU 'Q' WO "C ,3a 45 0ý daOto as t. 
Z S7 VÖ~ua.. 
'' 4) ep 
t' y uu °' .- 'O «r C 93 
Op 
'd ýY c is Q0 00 U a) s 4°. Cac 00 UC0>U "a uýeuý a ývcy ., w, a °. ýor. a ., 18 
{/j 'C ý^C 'C uvu 'C w°a°öO 04 ed v .CuC. UOd . 61 C q= .CM'MMyaf. a+ CJ . ºa y ++ ++ 4C 
ra 
to 
my,, . "C. ý as ýÖ 
h° 
lu 
EW,, cd Cd 
`° uvuV 
.E ru. uü 
Cß. 
1. 
°: 0 In 
, 
fl üö°. y 
"L 





u5 Cc". a. 
ai Vc. 'cl ° y-5 yOuU+U te 
r-. CyyU 
CM 4a : c: 0 r- qj ca Z 





o u" uo c'°' Z. °: e ouE Co u. e 3auu ti -*J .- 4) w i= b- ba Q du U -2 22 pj UO 67 00 *le y 4C y0 ,QQüyQ0U 41 qa ,ýCCuvUa~ 'ß A trCruE m= 
ý0 
^_ .uA. a iO "Q 
:3 r- U^ rýi pa +u+ ̂Q 
b QC a: 0v 
.w OC as 
. 74 E 4C aC-, LL ý' OG 
W u"' up 
öü 
eýo~ 
ü :; E ^ýö'ö: ý c 
ea 
y 
ý+ Uürä Co 
p tr aUü Vi COCU r' tb4. + 
a 
aöýöööwwa uLý, w, ý^ý' ar ä 60 uY 43 c0 
Clo 
ffl c4 
. +. "ý+ ". tw D ýº tNat .ý. Nt 'X q , sue' t' W-. Xj 






















17- iý Q tW a 
,ý tý 
^d 
"Y t!. 1 O-. Oöä ºtý" 
t5 Wdbd ^t }. Oyba ©p «d b ', L e" e 
., a t! "W tp NAk 
ý'O ýa w"dýC, a .,. 
k^ 
,am ,dNp 
tý'y O "ý'W Ltv 
rý "' 
d jC'd X Öýý`ýtai N "' °d p" 
N4" 




'j O ty: 






wWd "' t! ý' t- -E 
Yö 
bi Z$ qA Wp. 
aä ýd ýýtý ", GO oG 
.b° 
mod. "o 
XW "o "  Wö3 ö0 öd ate 
^ý° 
X 2. "d a ýw 
W `y ti öö `c ä? ö.. m 
rO 
wsbA 




W O' rZt 
k-ýd d ý`" ý. ^ v%ý cý _ 
r .: 
ZL !"t , 4,. "F. SC 









t' "" n 
"r' ä i0 
bV po'3id Oy ý'' 
Z, '; p tj'i a"> <W t0 3ýG twöt. 0 ei, "ö Ö ti"W Wjt Vd 
. 
is 
bd ým ý, "+ OöW wr t. ý k 














G. VCC a°.. 
^" C L"" ` lý 















o aCi .,,.. 




.CEx aýi N^C"Lv^ 4' m a0 uduQ 
.0Z 






C^.,. v ýO.. C to 
4) C *"C) 
rÖvy 
4L"O ýý Q 
b-4 
E to.. cy 
.Cyy 
60.2 ++ .20. 
>Z0. V°7OC- 
r- ei Cy 
"C ->- "« ^ .-c . 






. . ti .-rü. 
!2
14 w. *4). 
i= 
,CE0 
Co 4) 0 .e . r. -ý ci of "`°ep 40 -ci -i aH ! 1fl11j ö ß°S ä_ 
V 
4) qLj 
O uV 4) JD h 








uýý ccL. c o. r gao .ým IU O7u 14 .. as t6 ry ý+ y .aO F' 1. m"r. d 
3u 
cs r. 
+' 4a G° 
., ai 
¢ 
"°' °3 ^- "c 'a GVvc3> *4" O -- .-GO>, 
rz cl 4a *I c-- 
p en yrw ýy 
4' Jcc im 0. 








c4 ei u 
4ý cc c4 ca >0 c3 to ja PJ 4j 4a 
NN 
..?. 1- 7 












k"p ý"Fý ý 3ý. W ä'd 





°_ Vl 'd 
d p+ G0 oW ,oYYppö+: . 
Qý ý> ý'Q 
tö ^'.. ° ýa 
.ýp... dkb3.1- .,. 
o ,ö 
ß'a4 




«d JE Wtp ýö d ý'ý d+ ... 
b 
. '9 Y~ 
<ý `ý dd ut3. uýÖcý Y'b%w 1- ?u 
tC 
W ,, r 
`e z bei., ödväW 
1IH t"ý 
t'Y- 
C32 . ýiv ". 
k b -t to .lOä- 
ý' 




ömWoQ ,d "d 
,ed 
21 °e '` wö 40 ne= 
tR a d, W 




"ä 1Q- ($2',: 4p tý 
'? 
l 
db `' Ö kQ- ? `Q cO .e in "' 







öco cý a 
x"91 
19 
b"o Y'O' d 
td a`ö 
ýý 3- 
ý ci^ w4 d''w .Fed , 
ý(E 
W>? o ýd 00 bWt. 3 
"ý Ww V1 
t0 
"b . 'cam Nd `' tý is 
Qt"? d.. 
" 
O öý ... tp 
Q a{G +O ýW 
" -! ý 
ý" "d k 1- -'o "ýiiý 
km ~I- k -- 




= C'O a" :CocC u'C it Cü 
si C 5- cs -cEm2ü äff, T 
6ý aý p 110U 4itfl' 
r- 1. EG ; lJi y .. 
t. 
vi C -Z3 ci 
-6. b i= 0r 
Cd 
43 
0) 0 >C. 
















uC :ci -c wP3 
.sw :: Z C L+ vy; O-. 
"ý 
- +' =GCG. 
C 
ay7"" ,,, 
e .. ý. 
C 
.ýc=".. 
f+ a' t«. uC 
°i avSaO3? C° r+. - Oö a°r 














m ýwÖ "r: 
ý+ý 
C ii w ß'"E 
C 
cý 
C=. uv.! 2 
3..! 
c 
_-m be w0i. 
2 
aC  a`ý u"2y Im. "c 
"> 
++ y "? CC "- 'oüA 
i3 G t' ° .C2 `' d 6ý t) 0 
Tö 
v- vC->, m X. "e .... L 1« dw .- 4a 41 ". 
C lu -C > "c 0u m0 
'ý eo C oo . +C ma.. . ca. uyo°ýuý. coE. 
utlMIU 00G GräV^'"y0a. u 
VC wýaCGWrý+Ct^v DCEe 
C+; ' ý" fr'C. r, f'. 00 
Ö 
C'ý" bO, C~.. ýrý NO vy"r°. ` u. V+ u °. 
E. T" .du m ýe. v .owms.. 
Emm 











t5 00 .Oa Z" (ý tl 
CF 3ÖOi; M` 
. 
FWem1. a O y, bW .WmdF0 w- yF 
'd aö 
cä4 W3 t3 E 
,b"ä».. 
:äu 
>- -K O"W '%f (O UW to . <Z. Z$ 




'o pbN .ýmY 
"d `o 
gpC, Y 1w c% 
ro' oE 
(S 






ýd YCöd .WN (a -3övv iJ Ma ý" Q 
40 b. e 
>4. W tw 
to .o -a aCy. ,. E"( 64 
ms ý 
b. 4 









.ý to D0dl us:. '. 
`. 
Z" 
(O bö W 'tl ýC p 




Xä om 3 C` "" 




t : ýg r co Wd duo r '. 
e= EZ; '`; 
a2,2, Z -", OWY. p 1- 4. "ý r'Cko .i.. 3 bqadRdo .ý tl .cEeo.; 
v 
.re? 
tW 'Oq 6° p "r x 
E' mä- 
dd sý ? to W+wY`. deC tj * C'am' V mY (w oaoadu tl .W Gý eCm 
(( 
pYö tl Y . W" 
ý: (! ý `. y 
Ö 
V. J; "o'lýL. iV F"ý%i. F". C 
OW "d 





A brief commentary on the reconstructed text of the De bona , 
fortuna. 
To begin with, we must accept that we are dealing with some 
of the most' textually corrupt passages in the entire Aristotelian 
corpus. What seems to be Aristotle's thought is itself difficult- 
but-the fragmentary manner in which it is now presented to'us exacer- 
bates what would in any case demand serious intellectual effort. 
The text'is made up of a mass of snippets of-arguments which can over- 
lap, end`suddenly, 'or just disappear. As a result 'we are given' 
thoughts and ideas on the'topic of'fortune or luck, or some develop- 
ment'from such thought and ideas, but no consistent line"of argument. 
On the contrary, the reconstituted text of the De bona fortuna quite 
clearly presents variant conclusions within itself -as for whether 
divine providence is the cause of fortune or not, for example. It 
will be better then to treat the text of the De bona fortuna, as it 
is reconstituted, as'one treats the fragments of the Pre-Socratic phi- 
losophers, and not as a coherent text unified in itself. 
` Despite all these difficulties, however, the'ideas that the 
text provides are amazingly suggestive and one can appreciate how 
Thomas might have responded to them. It will'be the scholarly, rat- 
her than the speculative task of the latter part of this chapter to 
show howeThomas actually did use them. For the time being., -we-will' 
glance aver some of the themes which emerge. 
One problem which reoccurs at several places in' the text is 
whether we are to take Good Fortune as referring to' outward circam- 
stances, over which the fortunate man has no control, or as refer- 
ring to a man's own impulses or actions over which he has, or takes, 
-158- 
no rational control. 
1, The-text sometimes seems to take one option, 
and sometimes, the other. On the whole we will concentrate on the 
second. 
One theme which is consistently followed, is, that Fortune can- 
not be understood in terms of rationality or man's reasoning processes. 
"Fortune is not a kind of intelligent perception or a rational ruling. "2 
Fortune operates in. a sphere beyond our competence where we have no 
control or effective action. 
3 What is more, it does not operate ac- 
cording to any regularity. Because of this, the question is raised 
as to whether we should seek to understand Luck or Fortune in terms 
of causality at a11.4 If we say something is "caused" by good for- 
tune, we might mean, in the case of external circumstances, that the 
circumstances caused the good fortune; in the case of a man's own 
actions we might mean that he did whatever he did by his character, 
or his nature, spontaneously, and it happened to be lucky. But in 
both these explanations, something other than luck or fortune is. seen 
as the cause. To say and mean, 'It was caused by good fortune', is 
to say that there was no cause and these events just happened and 
turned out to be fortunate. To say something is "caused" by good 
fortune is to say that it was not caused according to any rational 
plan or project but that it just happened: it is to admit that we 
cannot give a rational. explanation for why it happened in what_tuirned 
out to be the right place, at the right time, in the right way, for 
the fortunate man. And if there is no rational explanation, then 
there can also be no prediction of when such good fortune is likely 
to happen again - it is purely 'fortuitous'. 
1. Magna Moralia, (henceforth referred to as MM) sections 1, 
10 and 12, and Eudemian Ethics, -(henceforth referred to as EE) section 
23.2. MM 2.3. MM 1-2, EE 4-5, MM 5.4. MM 10, EE 10-11. 
-159- 
4 
So, Aristotle rules out any weycf equating fortune with some 
form of reason, and this leaves him with understanding fortune in 
terms of either nature or divine providence. 
1 At various points 
the text rules out the notion of a divine origin for fortune because 
this would make God either incompetent or unjust., 
2 
or it would imply 
3 
that God had favourites. The sole possibility remaining - if di- 
vine providence is ruled out - is that fortune pertains to nature. 
4 
But two objections are raised against this. Firstly, that 
nature produced things in a regular fashion whereas fortune is irre- 
gular and unpredictable. Secondly, that if fortune is an aspect 
of nature then it is nature and not fortune which is the cause of the 
fortunate activity of the fortunate man: he succeeds because he has 
this particular sort of character or nature and one would therefore 
expect, and predict, that such a man would normally - naturally - be 
5 fortunate. 
The enquiry, therefore, comes to an impasse. It isýruled out 
that Good Fortune pertains to the reasoning faculties of man but there 
are serious objections to equating it with either divine or natural 
causality. Hence the speculation has to move to a different level. 
Section EE 12-13 reopens the question along quite a different line 
of approach. 
ý... are there not some impulses in the spi- 
rit that arise from reasoning and others from irra- 
tional appetition ? and are the latter not prior ? 
because if the impulse caused by desire for what 
is pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would 
merely proceed by nature towards what is good in 
every case. If therefore, some men have good na- 
tures - just as musical people, though they have 
not learnt to sing, have a natural aptitude for it - 
and without the aid of reason have an impulse in 
the direction of the natural order of things and de- 
1. MM 4" 2. MM 4.3. MM 5.4. EE 8-9, EE 13. 
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sire the right thing in the right way at the right 
time, these men will succeed even although they 
are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the 
others will sing well although unable to teach sin- 
ging. And men of this sort obviously are fortu- 
nate - men who without the aid of reason are usu- 
ally successful. Hence it will follow that the 
fortunate men are so by nature. ' 
This fragment is open to the objections outlined above; that on this 
understanding a man is fortunate by nature. What is significant, 
however, is the attention drawn to the non-reasoning appetitive drives 
in man. If a man's nature were equipped with such a non-reasoning 
drive that what he desired was the right thing at the right time and 
in the right way, then he would have no use for reason or wisdom: in 
fact these would cripple his natural rightness. 
' Fragment MM 8 echoes 
a similar line of thought. 
'Luck, then, is a natural instinct, not guided by 
reason. For the fortunate man is he who has an 
unreasoning impulse towards good things., and more- 
over obtains them; 
eoýýv c;. 4 11 cu rjAa. ýoýasS ýSCLS c dap e. º Týx1 E: 
r, v 
Ö 'MEN %C``Dv CXMiV CýýJýV r o' -rcx 
1cLCI, 
VD t 
T: +ý. rwJ ert1-ýýýkcývwý , 
There are four points here. Good Fortune is said to be a natural 
impulse, and this, secondly, is further described as a non-reasoning 
impulse, presumably prior to reason; thirdly, it is said that this 
drive is towards good things; and, fourthly, that it is successful, 
that it attains what it aims at. The fragment continues: 
... But this comes by nature; nature has im- 
planted in our soul something which impels us 
irrationally towards our advantage. And should 
you ask one who is thus favoured why he thinks 
fit to act as he does, he will tell you he does 
not know, but merely sees fit to do so. His 
case is like that of men inspired; for they too 
have an unreasoning impulse towards some parti- 
cular act. ' 
1. EE 23. 
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The metaphor of inspiration will be looked at shortly. The point 
being made is that there is a pre-rational drive in man towards what 
is for his advantage and perhaps the fortunate man has a natural non- 
reasoning drive which is so perfectly attuned to the natural order 
of things, and presumably to the particular circumstances surrounding 
him in a given situation, that he does not need to use his reasoning 
faculties. 
This 'dreamt of the totally fortunate man is an attractive and 
suggestive one, but for our study of St Thomas' thought, the signifi- 
cance of these passages, (EE 12-13 and MM 8), lies in the way the 
point made here is further developed in EE 20. 
-'Yet someone might raise the question whether for- 
tune is the cause of precisely this - our forming 
a desire for the right thing at the right time. 
Or on this showing will not fortune be the cause 
of everything - even of thought and deliberation ?' 
The enquiry now is not about the generally fortunate man but about 
how any man comes to the right decision in a particular circumstance. 
The enquiry ceases to be an empirical one and becomes-a metaphysical 
one: EE 21 crystallises the question: -- 
'But this is what we are investigating -, what is 
the starting place of motion in the spirit ?' 
We are not now asking about the source of fortunate activity but about 
the source of any form of human activity, rational or non-rational. 
Why does a man begin to deliberate about something he has not delib- 
erated about before ? Why does a man have a particular drive towards 
something when he has not experienced this particular drive before 
this moment. 
l 
1. An answer to this question might lie in seeing the exter- 
nal object or stimulus as determinant. For Thomas this has its, place- 
but one still has to ask why the will, in its freedom determines to " 
respond or to refuse to respond to the possibility the stimulus pro- 
vides. 
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It is significant that all Thomas' paraphrases of the De bona 
fortune are taken from the sections we are now dealing with. 
I Ob- 
vious]. y here is the germinating seed which the De bona fortan pro- 
vided for his thought. EE 21 continues: - 
'The answer then is clear; as in the universe, so 
there everything is moved by God; for in a manner 
the divine element in. us is the cause of all our 
motions. ' 
It is clear, as we shall see, why St Thomas was to use this text first 
of all in an argument against the 'Pelagiani'. 
2 It continues: - 
'And the starting point of reason is not reason 
but something superior to reason. What then can 
be superior even to knowledge and intellect, ex- 
cept God V 
If the investigation is now into the starting point of motion in the 
spirit, 
3 then it is no longer enough to posit either reason or a natu - 
4 
ral drive. 'Everything is moved by God'. As we shall see, with 
such an axiom, Thomas, confronted by the task of presenting a cohe- 
rent cosmology, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, could unite all things 
and all motions within creation into the single unity of the divine 
plan. 
5 The question remains however of how human freedom can be pre- 
served if God and/or a pre-rational impulse are presented as the ori- 
gin of human motio. 
There is yet one further development possible from the scat- 
tered arguments of this text; a development more of a theological 
nature than of a metaphysical or empirical kind. 
'Or is it because he is loved by God, as the phrase 
goes, and because success is something from out- 
side ? as for instance a badly built ship often 
gets through a voyage better, though not owing to 
1. EE 1248a17 - 32, =, p. 39 2. S. C. G. III. c. 92.3. EE 21 
and above p. 167.4. MM 8 5. see p. 187 below. Also 
Lonergan, p. 80, 
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itself., but because it has a good man at the helm. 
But on this showing the fortunate man has the 
deity as steersman. But it is strange that a 
god or deity should love a man of this sort and 
not the best and most prudent. ' (1) 
Here we seem to have an obvious correlation with the Gifts of the 
Spirit as Thomas will present them in the Secunda Pars. It is this 
very text which Thomas is referring to in IaIIae, q. 68, a. 1, when he 
introduces his theory of the two principles of motio in man, one in- 
trinsic, (reason) and one extrinsic, (God). 
ý... at etiam Philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. de 
Bona Fortuna. ' 
The, other passage from the De bona Fortuna in q. 68, a. 1., which Thomas 
paraphrases at the end of the article, is found in EE 23. 
'And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they 
have within them a principle of a kind that is 
better than mind and deliberation (whereas the 
others have reason but have not this): they have 
inspiration or Eu©uciýc-ýöý ) but 
they cannot deliberate. ' 
Thomas' paraphrase is: - 
'Et Philosophum etiam dicit, in cap. de Bona For- 
tuna, quod his qui moventur per instinctum divi- 
num non expedit consiliari secnndum rationem hu- 
manam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum; 
quia moventur a meliori principio quarr sit ratio 
humana. I 
It is as well to point out that whereas Thomas is talking in terms 
of the originary impulse to any movement in man, Aristotle, in this 
particular passage is referring to the activity of deliberating. 
Bat the'importance of this passage and its paraphase is not 
just that Thomas uses it at this important juncture, at the culmina- 
tion of his argument in q. 68, a. 1. If we follow O'Connor, 
2 
we might 
see its importance also in how it was translated in the medieval 
latin text'which Thomas might have used. In the-printed latin edi- 
1. EE 6-7.2. O'Connor, pp. 144-147. 
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tion of the De bona fortuna of 1482, the term il-\j Gvcº, --, clucd or 
ev 8ußIFI 
- even the modern critical editions cannot determine 
which is correct - is translated as 'divinos instinctos', and in some 
of the earlier manuscripts is translated as Idivinos instinctus'. 
I 
O'Connor comments: - 
'One cannot help but wonder whether this may not 
have been the source of his terminology for the 
prompting of the Holy Spirit., instinctus divinus 
and interior instinctus, which appear in this 
article. ' 2 
It is, in fact, precisely at this point where he uses his paraphrase, 
that Thomas first introduces the term instinctus to replace the term 
inspiratio. And with this change in terminology Thomas has completed 
the groundwork of his theory of the Gifts, and from there onwards, 
throughout the rest of the Secunda Pars, he discusses the Gifts in 
terms of this 'instinctus'. 
In an Appendix devoted entirely to this matter, O'Connor con- 
eludes in the following way. The length of the following quotation 
reveals the present writer's debt to his work. 
'Thomas chose the term (instinctus) in preference 
to another which was available to him, namely in- 
spiratio, inspiration. The choice seems to have 
been quite deliberate ... 
This choice is all the more striking in that in- 
s iratio was a term well established in theolo- 
gical usage, whereas instinctus as a noun had re- 
ceived comparatively little use in any context. 
Nevertheless, he does not simply replace the 
one term by the other. In IaIIae, q. 68 he begins 
his exposition of the nature of the Gifts by de- 
claring that they are in us by divine inspiration, 
and goes on to explain that their effect is to 
make man promptly mobile to divine inspiration. 
With that, however, the term inspiratio drops out 
of the discussion almost completely, and is re- 
placed by instinctus ... 
After a minute examination of the way Thomas 
uses these terms, my conclusion is that instinctus 
1.0_ or, pp. 144 and 146. . 2. ibid., p. 145. 
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was chosen in"order not to specify in any way what- 
soever the nature of the Holy Spirit's action. 
Inspiratio, the term traditionally used for the 
action of spirits upon man, designated a type of 
action :.. Instinctus, however, does not designate 
a type of action at all. It refers to that by 
which an action is provoked or elicited. In pre- 
sent context, it does not designate the action of 
the Holy Spirit directly, but only indirectly, as' 
that which somehow initiated the human action under 
`consideration. Moreover, it is free from all the 
associations with which the term inspiratio has 
been coloured'by'long theological tradition about 
divine (and diabolical) inspirations. Hence, 
when a man is said to act by the instinctus of the 
Holy Spirit all that this means, so far as the 
force of the word itself is concerned (we are not 
concerned here with doctrine), is that the action 
was brought about by the influence of the Holy Spi- 
rit. Nothing whatsoever is. specified about the 
nature of the influence, or the form it has taken, 
e. g. whether it was an impulse, invitation, illu- 
mination, strengthening, or the like. 
When, on the other hand, the term inspiratio 
is used at the beginning of this treatise, it does 
not refer to anything other than that same influ- 
ence which, however, it designates directly, con- 
trary to Thomas' usual preference. Why then is 
it used at all ? Presumably for dialectical mo- 
tives: to introduce the topic in the usual and 
traditional language before replacing it with lan- 
guage which was both unusual and, because of its 
abstractness, more difficult. (1) 
With this comment from O'Connor, we will pass on to look at how 
Thomas used this text at various important junctures in his mature 
theology. This study will not be taking us away from the study 
of the Gifts of the Spirit but rather will highlight the issues in- 
volved in Thomas' mature theory regarding their importance. 
1. O'Connor, Appendix 5, pp. 131-132. 
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St-Thomas' use of the De Bona Fortuna. 
St Thomas uses the De bona fortuna explicitly in the following 
passages. There are difficulties regarding the date and place of 
the writing of the various texts but as these difficulties are of no 
serious concern to our own project we can be content to accept Weisheipi's 
conclusions. 
' 
Summa Contra Genitiles, III, c. 89, c. 92. (Naples/Orvieto, 
c. 1261-3). 
De Mal2, q. 3, a. 3, obj. XIa and resp.; q. 6, a. 1. (Rome 1266-7). 
Summa Theologiae, Ia pars, q. 82, a. 4, ad3um. (Rome/Viterbo 1266-8) 
Qaaestiones de guolibet, Ia. 7. (Paris 1269). 
Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4; q. 68, a. 1; q. 80, a. 1, obj. 3 
and ad3um; q. 109, a. 2, adlum. (Viterbo/Paris 
1268-70) 
_ De - 
Sortibus, 4 (Paris 1271). 
Deman, in his study of Thomas! use of the De bona=fortuna, ° begins by - 
citing two texts dealing with the same problem, and, in contrasting 
them, shows how Thomas' use of this work led him to deepen his in- 
sight into the metaphysics of the actus humanus. The first test is 
De Veritate q. 22, q. 12, Which can be dated 1258-9: utrum voluntas in- 
tellectum et caeteras animae-vires moveat. Deman focuses on the second 
objection and its answer. 
'Si voluntas movet intellectum ad snum actum, tunc 
sequitur quod intellectus intelligat qula voluntas 
vult ipsum intelligere. Sad voluntas non vult 
aliquid nisi inteliectum. Ergo prius intellectus 
intellexit ipsum intelligere quam voluntas illud 
vellet. Sad antequam intellectus hoc intelligeret, 
oportet ponere quod voluntas illud wellet, quia 
ponitur intellectus a voluntate moveri. Ergo est 
abire in infinitum; vel dicendum quod voluntas 
non movet intellectum. ' 
Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aguino, his life, thought and 
work, 1973, pp. 355-402. I have also used the Indices of the Leonine 
Edition Opera Omnia, vol. XVI, to ascertain that there are all the role- 
vent references. 
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And the answer Thomas gives is: - 
#Ad secundum, dicendum quod non est procedere in 
infinitum; statur enim in appetitu naturali quo 
inclinatur inteUectus in suum actuin: ' 
This simple answer is replaced by a far more elaborate one when the 
same problem is posed in Deman's second text, Prima Pars, q. 82, a. 4, ' 
ad3um. 
'Ad tertium dicendum qmd non oportet procedere in in- 
finitum, sed Statur in intellectus sicut in primo. 
Omnem enira voluntatis motum necesse est quod prae- ' 
cedat apprehensio: sed non omnem apprehensionem 
praecedit motus voluntatis. Sed principium con- 
siliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum 
principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, 
ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Etidemicae: 
et per hunc modum ostendit quod non eat procedere 
in infinitum. ' 
The most significant change here is the absence of arty reference to 
'natural appetite' in the later answer. This does not mean that 
Thomas no longer sees any role for 'natural appetite!., but it no longer . 
can serve as a satisfactory answer to the question: the same question 
posed in EE 21 - 'What is the starting-place of motion in the spirit ? '; 
riý -tiffs KtiýrIlaewS ä? X'\ Ev 1.1 Thomas continues to dis- 
play his noted 'intellectualism', giving priority quite clearly to the 
act of understanding over the act of volition, but the will now is 
seen as moved at its most originary level not by the human intellect, 
for that would involve the regression ad infinitum, but by this 'higher 
intellectual principle', which is God. The source of all decision- 
making and understanding is taliguod principium intellectivum altius 
intellectu nostro, quoll est Deus'. It is no coincidence that Thomas 
referes to the De bona fortuna here because he has universalised the 
-ei 
ideas Aristotle thrashed out in dealing with the particular problem 
of good fortune, (see EE 21 and page 162 above). 
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Deman uses contrasts like this one between De Veritate, q. 22 
and the Summa Ia, q. 82, not only to show up the significance of the 
De bona fortuna, but also to attempt to date when Thomas first read 
or used this text. His conclusion is that between writing De Veri- 
tate q. 22 and the Summa Contra Gentiles III, " c. 89, Thomas first came 
across this work: in other words, at the beginning of his move from 
1 
Paris to Italy around 1259-60. To back up his case, Deman cites a 
whole host of Thomas' earlier works indicating passages where one would 
expect Thomas to use the De bona fortuna and arguing from the absence 
of any references to it before 1259-60,, that Thomas was not acquainted 
with it. 
2 Certainly what can be stated is that if Thomas did know 
this work it does not seem to have had any significance to him until 
around 1260. As we noted above in chapter 3, other factors, espe- 
cially his reading of the Greek Fathers and the documents of the early 
Western Councils against Pelagianism and his subsequent awareness and 
rejection of semi-Pelagianism, might have stimulated his interest in 
the De bona fortuna as a useful tool for his later theology. 
3 
We will be examining each of the references to the De bona for- 
tuna in turn but we will take a thematic approach. Thomas used the 
De bona Fortuna to develop a sophisticated analysis of the intrinsic 
receptivity of the human intellect and will. We will therefore fol- 
low through his use of this text under three headings: 
1. the receptivity of the will at its most originary level, 
quoad exercitium. 
2. the De bona fortune and the role of rationality. 
3. Divine Providence and the act of choice. 
ý-N. 
1. Deman, p. 42.2. ibid., pp. -42-43. For corroborating 
evidence see the references toBo uillard,, Weisheipl and Schillebeeckx 
below, p. 71 . 3. above p. 74ff. 
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1. The receptivity of the will at its most originary level, 'quoad 
e xercitium'. 
The argument here will be developed by examining in turn four 
texts in which St Thomas explicitly uses the De bona fortuna. They 
are: - Prima Secundae q. 9, a. 4. 
Summa Contra Gentiles, III c. 89. 
De Malo q. VI, 1. 
Prima Secundae q. 105, a. 2, adlum. 
Prima Secundae g. ý9, a. 
4. 
We have already looked at Prima Pars q. 82, a. 4. There Thomas 
gives what might be called an 'intellectualist' answer to the question 
of what moves the will to act: in other words,, he posits the priority 
of intellect over will, even though he further, refines his basic model 
by presenting as the originating intellectual apprehension, an intel- 
lectual principle higher than human understanding, God. In our next 
two texts however., this Aristotelian model of the passivity of the will 
before the intellect is renounced. In the De Malo and the Summa IaIIae, 
Thomas presents a distinction between the specification of the will , 
and the exercise of the will. The intellect causes the specification. 
of the will - in this the priority of the intellect is retained - but 
the actual exercise of the will is the result of its own self- motion. 
The will therefore has its own freedom of movement, guoad exercitium, 
to act or not to act, no matter what the stimulus from the intellec- 
tual apprehension. Only as regards absolute beatitude is the will 
determined, ouoad exercitium, of necessity. 
1 Lottin suggests that 
Thomas was concerned to develop a metaphysical structure which allowed 
1. IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4; q. 10, a. 2; q. 13, a. 6. See Loner, 
pp. 93-97. 
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more freedom to the will because of the doctrine of determinism taught 
by the Parisian Averroists from the 1250s onwards. 
1 
But if the will is free, regarding whether to act or not to 
act, what motivates the will to act or not to act ? What wills the 
will to will ? Here it is the De bona fortuna which provides the 
catalyst for Thomas' mature thought. In Prima Secundae q. 9, a. 4, the 
question posed is: utrum voluntas moveatur ab aliguo exteriors prin- 
cipio ? As regards the determining of the will by the intellectually 
grasped object, guöad specificationem, the external object does move 
the will, but, if the will is free, quoad exercitium, then neither the 
intellect nor anything external can determine it. But Thomas ques- 
tins this, the obvious development from his own theory. 
'Sed eo modo, quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, 
ad hunc necesse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo prin- 
cipio exteriori moveri. Omne enim quod quandoque 
est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia indiget 
moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod 
voluntas incipit velle aliquid cum hoc prius non vel- 
let. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad 
volendum. I 
Here we see an application of Thomas' general theory of motio, which 
we looked at above. 2 Thomas accepts that the will can be said to 
move itself in that in deciding on a certain tend' the person concerned 
wills also the 'means' to that end, but what initiates the fixing on 
a certain purpose ? He gives the example of a man who decides to be- 
come healthier and who takes the appropriate course of action: the 
question still remains, what initiated this project ? 
'Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse 
est quod incoeperit veile sanar i ab aliquo movente. 
Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsa ad vole ndum, opor- 
tuisset quod medianta consilio hoc ageret ex aliqua 
voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere 
in infinitum. Undo necesse est ponerequod in pri- 
mum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu 
1. Lottin, 'Liberte hnmaine et motion divine' R. T. A. M. 7 (1935), 
pp. 52-69,156-173.2. See above ch. 6, especially 22. 
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alicujus exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles con- 
cludit in quodam cap. Ethic. idemicae. 1 
It is interesting that the term linstinctus' occurs here as in our 
own text on the Gifts of the Spirit. Gilby has an interesting foot- 
note at this point on the by now familiar argument against regression 
ad infinitum. 
'It is not argued that you have to come to number 1 
within a 'series of events, but that you have to go 
outside them. Thus, applied to the present ques- 
tion, you have to look to act that is not delibe- 
rate to explain a set of deliberate acts, and to a 
mover from outside to explain the will's automatous 
activity'. (1) 
This is precisely the way Thomas answers the objections to his con- 
clusion. 
The first objection is a serious one: if one is led to posit 
an external principle to the will's own act, does this not destroy 
the voluntary nature of the will's motio ?2 
by agreeing: - 
Thomas begins his, reply 
'Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de ratione voluntarii F 
est quod principium eius sit intra. ' 
He does not deny that there is an intrinsic principle to the will's 
activity, only that this alone, on examination of its own structures, 
is sufficient. 
... sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinse- 
cnnº sit primum principium non motum ab also. 
linde motus voluntarius, etsi habeat principium 
proximum intrinsecum, tarnen principium primum est 
ab extra, sicut et primum principiuin motus natura- 
lis est ab extra, quod scilicet movet naturam. ' 
The-will now is presented as only one case of a general law. AU 
created natures fulfill their natures by means of their own intrinsic 
principle of motio, and this principle is brought into activity by 
1. Gilby ed. vol. 17,9 p. `72.2. see`IaIIae q. 6. 
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t 
the first moving principle, which is external-to it. The will, 
which by nature acts in a voluntary manner is brought to act in a 
voluntary manner by the extrinsic first moving principle; 'ex instinc-- 
tu alicujus exterioris moventis ut'Aristoteles concludit'. 
1 
But is not any such form of external stimulus inevitably a vio- 
lation of the will's freedom ? This is the second objection in this 
article and it is important to us if we are to'understand how the Gifts 
of the Spirit might operate in the human will. Thomas replies: - 
"'dicendum quod hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti 
quod principium sit extra., sed oportet addere quod 
nihil conferat vim patiens, quod non contingit dum 
voluntas ab exteriors movetur; nam ipsa est quas 
volt, ab alia tarnen mota. Esset autem motus iste 
violentus, si esset contrarius motui voluntatis, 
quod in proposito esse non potest, quia sic idem 
vellet et non vellet. ' 
what we are to picture here is not a mere passivity on the part of 
the will, still less a reluctant inertia, but a sort of active recep- 
tivity. The extrinsic principle does not work 'against the grain' 
of the will, but with it. 'When, as elsewhere, this extrinsic prin- 
ciple is clearly identified as the Creator God, we are not to envisage 
an alien force violently moving the human will, but the Creator pro- 
videntially working through the very natures he has created. 
2 
However, in this article, Thomas does not cal]. the external 
principle of motto, 'God', as he does in Prima Secundae, q. 68, a. 1, 
but, at most, characterises it with the Aristotelian title of 'First 
Mover'. Now this is important because it highlights the fact that 
Thomas can give two types of argument to illustrate the relationship 
between the human will and the Creator God. In the next passage we 
vi]. 1 examine, Thomas' argument will rest on the nature of the ordered 
1. corpus of this article. 2. IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2; Ia, q. 104, 
a. 4 corpus, adlum, äd2uin; Ia, q. 104, a. 5. 
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stractures within creation and how their relationships are used instra- 
mentally by the Creator; and later still, we shall present another 
example of the same structures, regarding the human intellect this time, 
in the relationship between the Lex Aeterna and human rationality. 
1 
But here., in this article, another type of argument has been used; 
one based on an examination of the'intrinsic nature of the human will, 
resulting in the need to posit a radical receptivity at its most ori- 
ginary level, The answer to the third objection concludes this argu- 
ment, 'and opens up a vista of`the other, cosmological, argument. 
'Ad tertium dicendurn quod voluntas quantum ad ali- 
quid sufficienter se movet, et in suo ordine, sci- 
licet sicut agens proximum; sed non potest seipsam 
movere quantum ad omnia, ut_ostensum est., unde in- 
" diget moveri ab alio, sicut a primo movente. ' 
The will is its own master in its own frame of reference, but that 




Contra Gentiles III, c. 89. 
.Eý, 
The very title of this chapter links it in with our dL cussion 
so far: Quod motus voluntatis causatur a Deo, et non solum a notentia 
voluntatis. The context of the chapter, is a discussion of Divine Pro- 
vidence. Thomas' claim is that Providence rules all things; abso- 
lutely nothing is independent of God's purpose and power. . 
This ob- 
viously raises the problem, regarding the will, of man's freedom. - 
Thomas opens this chapter by accepting that some Christian writers 
have tried to preserve the notion of human freedom by holding that 
God causes man to will, but does not cause him to will this or that 
particular thing. In other words, man has absolute freedom of choice 
1. see below p. 196 ff. 
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and God's providence works on this. freedom only through the influence 
of external events on man. Thomas himself, at an earlier stage in 
his career, held a view similar to this, but by the time of his stay 
in Italy and his second Paris Regency, he was denouncing such a theory 
as Pelagian. 
1 If such a theory was accepted, then Gods providence 
would be restricted to. external events and the area of man's free acts 
of choice would be autonomous, free from God's sovereignty. 
Note that what Thomas, at this point in the Summa Contra Gen- 
tiles, is primarily interested in, is not how the human will operates, 
but in the universal ordering of Providence and how the will has a 
place true to its on nature within this cosmological sweep. Hence 
divine causality, because of its absolute infallibility, must extend 
not only to the power of the will but also., to its acts. He defends 
this claim by reasserting an even greater one. This larger claim 
is based on his preceding exposition of the ordering of the cosmos 
as a whole, (chapters 67 and 70). 
'Item: Deus non solum dat rebus virtutes, sed 
etiam nulla res potest propria virtute agere nisi 
etiam agat in virtute ipsius, ut supra (c. 70) ost- 
ensum est. Ergo homo non potest-virtute volunta- 
tis sibs data uti, nisi in quantum agit in virtute 
Dai. 
God not only gives powers to created things., but no thing can act by 
its own power proper to itself, unless it is acting through God's 
power. It follows from this, applying it. to the question in hand, 
that man cannot use the, power of the will. natural to him except in 
so far as we posit the activity. of God. 
2 Every movement of the will, 
therefore, is caused by the will of God. 
3 
1. see Lonergaýn p. 101 and p., 39 for references and a discus- 
sion of this. See also above P. 70 . 2. S. C. G. 
III, c. 148. 
3. For a modern trenchant defence of this theological viewpoint, see 
H. McCabe, 'God', New Blackfriars, 1980, pp. 408-414,456-470.; 
1981, p. 4 - 16. 
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Here we have then a point'like that in IaIlae, q. 68, a. 1, '-'where 
two major themes are linked together., viz. the profundity of man's 
volition and the unchallengeable sovereignty of God in his Providence. 
One relates to an Augustinian interest in the archeology of the human 
will; the other to a Diorrsian vision of the ordered relationship 
between God and his creatures. Given this, it is significant that 
precisely at this point, to bind the two together, Thomas quotes the 
De bona fortuna. 
'Ideen: arguit adhunc Aristotleles in octavo Ende- 
"'micae Ethicae per hunt modum: Hujus quod aliguIs 
intelligat, consilietur., eligat, et velit., opor- 
tet aliquid esse causam, quia omne novum oportet 
quod habeat aliquam causam. Si-autem est causa 
eins aliud consilium, et alia voluntas praecedens, 
cum non sit procedere in his in infinitum, opor- 
tet devenire ad aliquod primum. Hujusmodi autem 
primum oportet esse aliquid quod est melius rat- 
ione. Nihil autem'est melius intellectu et rat- 
ione nisi Deus. Est igitur Deus primum princi- 
pium nostro: um consiliorum et voluntatum. ' 
De Malo, g. VI. 1 and Prima Secundae q. 105, a. 2, adlum. - 
Inýthe last line of this paraphrase of the De bona fortune, 
Thomas presents God as the first principle of our willing and of our 
acts of: deliberating, taking counsel and making choices. In this 
reference to the activity of decision-making he is being true to the 
general drift of the De bona fortuna: but this is not the usual way' 
he uses that text. Aristotle is concerned with the problems of 
choice and correct decision-making, but Thomas uses the text as if 
it referred to questions about the will. Why is this ? What lies 
behind it ? That Thomas does use the text in this way is highlighted 
in our present text, (De malo, q, VI. 1. ), ''entitled, 'De election humana 
seu libero arbitrio'. ý After presenting various theories, he intro- 
duces his own solution with a rather casual reference to the De bona 
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fortuna, almost as if the text were well-known and quite self-expla- 
natoryr 
'Relinquitur ergo, sicut concludit Aristoteles in 
cap. de Bona Fortuna. quod id quod primo movet 
voluntatem et intellectum sit aliqua supra volun- 
tatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus. ' 
It cannot be claimed that this is clearly what the text of the De bona 
fortuna presents - if it can be said to present anything clearly - but 
this is certainly what Thomas has got out of it. He has read it crea- 
tively rather than critically and, in this way, it has become a cen- 
tral element in his thought. What is significant about this passage 
is that the attention is not focused on the faculty of free-judgement 
itself but on what is presupposed by it - the basic powers of the in- 
tellect and the will. 
There are two points to made here: one relates to Thomas' 'eise- 
gesis' of the De bona Fortuna; the other to the . way his understanding"i', 
of liberum arbitrium has changed by the time of his later thought. 
In both cases there is a similar movement in Thomas' work, in this 
later period; a movement away from dealing with individual problems 
in isolation - free judgement or good fortune - to a deeper metaphy- 
sical penetration of the underlying and presupposed principles. And 
in both cases, this deeper metaphysical, rather than moralistic, ana- 
lysis, is particularly evident in regard to the human will. Lonergan 
gives a good summary of Thomas' creative eisegesis of-the De bona for- 
tuna. 
'By juxtaposing Aristotle's theory of chance and 
fortune with Aristotle's theory of prudence, " Eude- 
mus has been faced with the difficulty that not 
only the imprudent sometimes make good out of sheer 
luck but also the prudent have to be lucky. For 
the prudent man in the concrete-is prudent because 
he takes counsel; but even if he-takes counsel 
about taking counsel, one cannot suppose an infi- 
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nite regress. What accounts for the initium 
consiliandi ? Erdemus answered by dividing men 
into three classes, the imprudent, the ordinary 
prudent and those favoured few whose initiam con- 
siliandi comes from an instinctus divinus ... I 
This would seem to be a fairer exegesis of the De bona fortuna than 
Thomas' in the De Malo, but Lonergan continues, making the point that 
we are trying to emphasise. 
ý... But St Thomas with his firmer grasp of wider 
principles saw that the need of some divine in- 
fluence was universal; indeed the problem of the 
initium consiliandi was but a particular case of 
the more general doctrine of Aristotelian promo- 
tion. And thus it is that we find St Thomas 
attaining precision in his account of the initium 
consiliandi only in the measure that his theory 
-of the will and of its premotion develops'. (1) 
I As regards liberum arbitrium, this is not the place to develop 
a major analysis of this difficult concept. The point to be made is 
that liberum arbitrium alone - as an isolated problem - is not the 
focal point of Thomas' mature thought on the actus humanes. Indeed, 
if we follow Lonergan, there seems to be a progressive de-centering 
of-this concept. 
... in his Commentary on the Sentences he rejected I St Albert's view that the Liberum arbitriuwn was a 
. third faculty distinct from both intellect and will. In the second place this term liberum arbitrium 
loses its place of importance; it had its origin 
in the Stoic autexousion and it persisted until the 
-Prima Pars with distinct questions devoted to it 
and to the will; but in the Prima secundae there 
are sixty-three articles in a row, and though all 
treat of the will., the term liberum arbitrium 
fails to appear in the title of a single one. ' (2) 
Instead of focusing on the freedom of the act of judging,.. then, Tho- 
mast later thought focuses on, what-is presupposed by it, the freedom 
of the intellect and the freedom of the will onoad exercitium. Al- 
ready., in the Prima Pars, Thomas had taken the decisive step of pla- 
ýý- 
1. Lonergan, p. 100.2. Lonergan, P. 93. 
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cing liberum arbitrium in the will and not in the intellect because 
1 its characteristic act, choice, electio, is in the will. He no 
longer sees it as inevitably bound up with rational deliberation 
- as Aristotle does in the Nicomachean Ethics - because he posits 
it of angels who know-by pare intuition. 
2 In the Prima Secundae, 
however, in q. 6-17., there is an even greater development. There the 
term is, as it were, 'deconstructed' and its characteristic act, i. e. 
electio, is seen not as simply correlated with it but as part of a 
whole host of elements - consensus, consilio, uti. 
3 
- all of which 
involve the interaction of the will and the intellect., so that Tho- 
mas can say, regarding consensus, that the intellect assents to a 
choice in as much as it is moved to do so by the will. 
4 So far has 
he moved from the _.. notion of the passivity of the will 
before the intellect !1 °' 
The important point being made within this obscure litany of 
scholastic terminology, is that if we have correctly posited a recep= 
tivity of"the will, then it follows, given-also this more sophisticated 
analysis of the act of electio, that within the act of choice - in 
which man's freedom as an agent is exhibited - that there is also a 
receptivity. We posit then a receptivity within man's most charac- 
teristically autonomous act. For the moment, to sum up, we can say 
that within any act of choice we have to posit two initiatory movers; 
man's intellect, quoad specificationem, and, in the will's own self- 
movement guoad exercitium, an extrinsic principle, 'guod est Deus'. 
That'this summary is consistent with Thomas' own solution, and 
that he used the Do bona Fortuna to articulate it, can be shown by one 
1. 'Ia, q. 83.2. on this, see the footnote by K. Foster 
in Gam. vol. 9, pp. 178-179.3. IaIIae, q. 13-15.4. IaIIae, 
q. 15, a. 1, ad3um. 
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further quotation, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 2, adlum. Here Thomas is presenting' 
his theology of man's need for grace and the objection raised is that 
man is master of his will and therefore can will good without the need 
of grace. 
'Utrum homo possit ve1Ze et fasere bonum-absoue 
gratia: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo est 
dominus suorum actuum,. et volendi et non volendi, 
propter deliberationem rationis, quae potest 
, flecti ad unam parter vel ad aliam. Sed quod 
deliberet vel non deliberet, si hujus etiam sit 
dominus, oportet quod hoc sit per deliberationem 
praecedentem. Et cum hoc non procedat in infi- 
nitum, oportet quod Einliter deveniatur ad hoc 
quod liberum arbitrium hominis moveatur ab aliquo 
exteriors principio quod est supra mentem humanam, 
scilicet a Deo, ut etiam Philosophus probat. 
Unde mens hominis etiam sans non ita habet domi- 
nium sui actus quin indigeat moveri a Dec; et 
multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis infirmi 
post peccatum, quod impeditur a bono per corrup- 
tionem naturae. ' 
The interesting element in this quotation for our own purpose at the 
moment is that here Thomas speaks not-of the will or the intellect 
being moved by God, as the external principle, but the liberum arbit- 
rium being moved in this way. Once again, it is significant that 
Thomas refers back to the De bona fortuna at this crucial point. 
2. - The De bona fortuna and the role of rationality. 
'On the other hand, it is surely impossible to re- 
gard Fortune as a kind of intelligent Perception 
or rational Ruling; for their domain also exhi- 
bits an orderly sequence and invariability which 
Fortune lacks; so that where there is most of 
Intelligence and Rationality, there is least of 
Fortune or Luck; and most of the latter where 
there is least intelligence'. (1) 
The De bona fortuna quite clearly rules out any idea that reason could 
be the initiating source of human motio in the fortunate man as ! fortu- 
nate'. Its very significance is that it calls. into question the ratio- 
1. MM 2. 
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nalist ethics of the Aristotelian system of the virtues. But, the 
De bona fortune cannot be read as a coherent text and in answering 
the central question of what initiates motio in'the fortunate man, 
it presents two quite distinct answers; one regarding the a-rational 
or pre-rational in man; the other, relating to the supra-rational. 
EE 12-13, provides us with the first: - 
... are there not some impulses ' (°Pynt) in the 
spirit which arise from reasoning and others from 
irrational`appetition ? and are not the latter 
prior ? because if the impulse carried by desire 
for what is pleasant exists by nature, appetition 
would also merely by nature proceed towards what 
is good in every case. If therefore some men 
have good natures ... and without the aid of rea- 
son have an impulse in the direction of the natu- 
ral order of things and desire the right thing in 
the right way at the right time, these men will 
succeed even although they are in fact foolish and 
irrational ... 1 
(1) 
As for the second, we can take EE 21 as an example: - 
'But this is what we are investigating - what is 
the starting-point of motion in the spirit ? 
The answer is clear; as in the universe, so there, 
everything is moved by God; for in a manner the 
divine element in us is the cause of all our mo- 
tions. And the starting point of reason is not 
reason but something superior to reason. 'What 
then can be superior even to knowledge and intel- 
`-lect, except God. ' (2) 
Thomas quite clearly favours the latter, as we have seen, but he does' 
not totally dismiss the former, even though, as we saw in the first 
example from Ia, q. 84, a. 4, he cannot accept 'natural appetite' itself 
as'a sufficient solution to the problem in hand. 
3 The De bona for- 
tuna, in fact, sets up two disjunctions: ' one, a-distinction between 
the irrational impulses in-man and reason; the second, a similar dis- 
tinction between human reason and a divine instinctus. Thomas' 
achievement is to negate these disjunction and present, as it were 
1. EE 12-13. ' 2. EE 21.3. see above p. 167. 
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within one 'flow' of Divine Providence, the harmony of the pre-ratio- 
nal, rational and supra-rational in man. Two areas of research are 
therefore forced upon us. Firstly, what is the relationship'between 
man's rationality and his a-rational or pre-rational powers ?1 And, 
secondly, what is the relationship between his reason and the supra- 
rational power, 'quod est Deus' ? Once again we must be aware that 
Thomas does not use the De bona fortuna within its own terms but with- 
in the terms of his own wider metaphysical analysis. Indeed we might 
give the next few paragraphs, dealing with our first question, the 
title, 'How Thomas does NOT use the De bona fortuna'. 
The appetitive inclination of any thing follows from the nature 
of the thing that it is, it is therefore called 'natural appetition'. 
In creatures endowed--with sensitive and intellectual powers by nature, 
the type of inclination is bound up with the kind of'knowledge they 
possess. Thus plants and animals, endowed with sensitive natures 
respond directly to sense-stimuli within the fixed pattern of their 
natural inclination. The higher animals,, °however, endowed with a 
more complex and integrated kind of sense - knowledge - per sensum 
et aestimationem naturalem - share in some form of voluntary activity 
which only intellectual beings possess to the full, that is, purposive 
activity. 
2 We can say therefore that man, as an ensouled body, has 
three kinds of inclinations; -a natural one, (he is influenced by 
gravity, for example), a sensitive one, (he is drawn by what he per- 
ceives), and a rational one, called the will, (by which he is drawn 
to what he understands as good and/or convenient, and to which, in his 
freedom, he can decide to act upon or not). 
_ 1. To call this latter "animality" would pre-determine 
the 
question by presenting man as animal plus reason. As we shall see.. 
Thomas and Aristotle present a more sophisticated model in which man's 
"lower" powers are human and not animal: they participate in his rea- 
soning. 2. IaIIae, q. 6, a. 2. 
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Two questions are therefore before us. How does the rational, 
appetite, the Will, govern the sensitive inclinations ? and do these 
latter have anything to offer towards the fully human act, the actus 
humanus ? Thomas follows Aristotle in the Nicomachean rather than 
the Eudemian Ethics. There, in the last chapter of book one, Aris- 
totle writes: - 
'But there appears to be another element in the 
soul which, though irrational., yet in a manner 
participates in rational principle. In self- 
restrained and unrestrained people we approve 
their principle, or the rational part of their 
souls, because it urges them in the right way 
and exhorts them to the best course; but their 
nature seems also to contain another element 
beside that of rational principle, which com- 
bats and resists that principle ... But this 
second element also seems, as we said to parti- 
cipate in rational principle; at least in the 
self-restrained man it obeys the behest of prin- 
ciple - and no doubt in the temperate and brave 
man it is still more amenable, for all parts of 
his nature are in harmony with principle. 
Thus we see that the irrational part, as 
well as the soul as a whole, is double. One 
division of it, the vegetative, does not share 
in rational principle at all; the other, the 
seat of the appetites and of desire in general 
does in a sense participate in principle, as 
being amenable and obedient to it, (in the sense 
in fact in which we speak of 'paying heed' (AöyoJ 
c-, (ci ) to one's father and friends, not in the 
sense of the term 'rational' in mathematics). 
And that principle can in a manner appeal to the 
irrational part is indicated by our practice of 
admonishing delinquents, and by our employment 
of rebuke and exhortation in general. 
If on the other hand it be more correct to 
speak of the appetitive part of the soul also 
as rational, in that case it is the rational part 
which, as well as the whole soul is divided into 
two, the one division having rational principle 
in the proper sense and in itself, the other obe- 
dient to it as a child to a father. ' (1) 
Aristotle and Thomas have a view of man's rationality which is at 
quite a distance from Descartes 'res cogitans'. The key notion seems 
1. Nicomachean Ethics, I. 13, translated by D. P. Chase, Every- 
man Series, and, for Thomas, see IaIIae, q. 24, a. 1, ad2nm; Ia., q. 81, a. 3. 
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to be the concept of 'participation', so that the a-rational inclina- 
tions in man are open to sharing in his rational appetite, the will. 
On the one hand, the sensory impulses have a "role to play - man's un- 
derstanding is, after all, based on what he receives through the senses - 
and, on the other hand, reason is to control'and not dominate, in some 
tyranical sense, the whole of his being. On this last point Thomas 
has an attractive paraphrase of Aristotle. 
... sicut Philosophus dicit, ratio, in qua est 
voluntas movet suo imperio irascibilem at concu- 
piscibilem; non quidem despotico principatu, 
sicut niovetur Servus a domino,, sed principatu 
regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines regun- 
tur a gubernante, qui tarnen possunt contra mov- 
ere. linde at ira3cibilis at concupiscibilis 
possunt in contrarium movere voluntatem; at sic 
nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis`moveri. ' (1) 
There is then a place for the inclinations of the sense-faculties, but 
it is only in-as much as these inclinations are under the supervision 
of reason - to accept or check them - that these have moral signifi- 
cance. 
2 In themselves they are more or less powerful drives towards 
certain choices but it is man's reason and rational will which deter- 
mines the choice and it is this determination, whether, to accept or 
reject, which gives the resulting action a moral content. The weak- 
ness of the first argument from the De bona fortune, (EM 12-13), is, 
that it makes the act of a fortunate man an a-moral act and therefore 
one lacking in full humanity: it would make man the instrument used 
by his appetites or inclinations (öy i& t) rather than seeing man as 
using all his receptivities and potentialities and acting in his whole- 
ness. What is more, this argument overlooks the fact that just as 
man, in his natural inclinations, is absolutely fixed, so man, in his 
appetites, is relatively determined into fixed patterns of response. 
1. IaIIae, q. 9, a. 2, ad3um, see also, q. 17, a. 7.2. Ia 
q. 81, a. 3, ad2um. 
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Only through his use of reason is man free and capable of responding 
adequately to the whole complexity of situations which confront him. 
The first argument, therefore cannot stand by itself but can still 
. be useful to establish the role of the a-rational inclinations with- 
in the act of choice. - As we have seen, Thomas is increasingly fas- 
cinated by the freedom of man's rational appetite, the will, even-as 
regards reason itself. His later thought on the act of choice, elec- 
tio, will therefore be highly nuanced and will be at quite-a distance 
from Cartesian or Nietzscheen philosophies of rational man and his will- 
power. 
So, the a QýCCtº of the De bona fortuna are relegated to a role 
as part of a greater whole. The first argument of the De bona for- 
tuna claimed that it was the instinctual promptings of man's pre-ratio- 
nal inclinations which leads a man to make fortunate choices without 
using reason. Thomas has made reason dominant but left a place, with- 
in the rational act, for such inclinations. For him, after all, man's 
understanding is based on what he receives from the senses and not 
from the external senses only but from the unified internal senses of 
the vis aestimativa, the sensus communis, the imaginatio and the vis 
memorativa. 
1 These elements which form man's ratio particularis can 
have ,a major effect on the determinations made by the will and intel- 
lect. As Thomas rather laconically remarks: - 
I... actus et electiones hominum Bunt circa singu- 
laria; unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensiti- 
vus est virtus particularis, habet magnam virtutem 
ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo ut ei 
aliquid videatur sic vel aliter circa singularia. ' (2) 
But even here we are not to think in terms of irrational ö? Nai but 
in terms of the habitus which the ratio Darticularis, as participating 
1. Ia, q. 78, a. 4.2. IaIIae, a. 9, a. 3, ad2um. 
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in reason, has acquired. 
'Qnamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensi- 
tivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, 
secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogi- 
tativus vel imaginativus. Unde etiam Philosophus 
dicit quod consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memo- 
randum; quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operan- 
dum ex imperio rationis. ' (1) 
Consistently, then, Thomas focuses on reason and on the habitus which 
perfect it and all the other powers which, in'whatever way, partici- 
pate in it. For Thomas, the man with virtuous habitus is the freest 
and least predictable of men. Working through what is reasonable in 
any particular set of circumstances, (Prudence), and not through fixed 
habits or emotional reactions or convention, he is more' open to the 
unexpected. 
The significance of this constant preference for habitus rather 
than `'t'ýº in regard to the Gifts of the Holy Spirit is brought out in 
article three of question 68: utrum dona Spiritus Sancti sint habitus. 
As Gilby points out, this article is 'one of the most important and 
most original elements in his theory of the Gifts'. 
2 But its origi- 
nality does not lie in how Thomas has used the De bona fortuna. on 
the contrary he has refused to use its model of the a-rational 
of man, and instead, Thomas has dared to use the model of habitus, 
from the Nie omachean Ethics even within the supernatural order. 
The Gifts are not "drives" but habitus. And the reason he gives for 
this is the same as the objection raised against this first argument 
on p. 180 above: if the Gifts were non-rational drives man would 
be used by them as a tool or instrument. 
'Tale autem in$trnmentum non est homo; sed sic agi- 
tur a Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam agit, inqu htum 
est liberi arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu. ' (3) 
1. IaIIae, q. 50, a. 3, ad3um. 2. Gilby Ed., pp. 18-19 foot- 
note. 3. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 3, ad2w. 
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If then everything other than reason is thus integrated by habi- 
tus into man's purposive self-orientation, it remains to see how this 
autonomous activity of man yet relates to a higher ordering without 
the destruction of its freedom and rationality. It has already been 
noted that the term 'participation' has an important role even in Aris- 
totle's thought. 1 For St Thomas, heir to a rich Neo-Platonic tradi- 
tion, the term is even more important. Just as the higher integrated 
interior senses of men and the higher animals participate in rationa- 
lity in a limited way, so man's rationality is but a derivative parti- 
cipation in a higher intellectuality. Man is not the centre of the 
intellectual universe. This is the 'Copernican Revolution' which 
Thomas' treatise on the Angels is designed to bring about in our minds. 
2 
We are not to see man as the intellectual creature par excellence, but 
as the lowest f of intellectual life within creation. God alone, 
as Actus Purus is total self-Intelligibility, and the angels, intellec- 
tual of their very being, understand by intuitive intellectual insight. 
Angels- immediately comprehend the intelligible forms of what they 
understand, but man has to work on what he perceives through his senses, 
and starting from a limited insight, he has to strive to understand, 
more, not by intellectus but by ratio. Only in man do we have to 
posit an intellectus possibilis and an intellectus agens; only man, 
of all intellectual creatures, has to strive laboriously to under- 
stand by reasoning and not by insight, 'discurrendo et componendo et 
dividendo'. 3 Man's rationality is not, then, the pinnacle of crea- 
tion - as we tend to assume in our modern anthropocentric cosmology. 
Rather it is a limited participation in the intellectual life seen 
1. see above p. 183 on Nic_omachean Ethics, I, 13.2. Ia, 
q. 50-64.3. Ia, q"58, a"4; q. 58, a. 3; q. 79, a. 8, a. 2, a. 3. 
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most clearly in creation in the case of the, angels; and this itself 
is only a derivative example of the pure self-intelligibility of God, 
expressed in the Verbum Dei, and the Divine Ideas. 
1 
Given this 'Copernican Revolution', the significant phrase from 
the De bona fortuna, 'an intellectual principle higher than 'reason'.. 
presents fewer difficulties. 
3. Divine Providence and the act of choice. 
Here we will examine Thomas' use of the De bona fortuna in the 
following texts: Summa Contra Gentiles IIIc. 92 
De Sortibus, c. 4. 
De Mato q. 3, a. 3. 
Prima Secundae q. 80, a. 1, obj. 3 and ad3um. 
(uaestiones Quolibetales q. 1, a. 7. 
Let us begin by analysing chapter 92 of book III of the Summa 
Contra Gentiles entitled; Quomodo dicitur alicuis bens fortunatus et 
quomodo adjuvatur homo a superioribus causis. In great contrast to 
the chaotic way in which the ideas of, the De bona fortuna are expres- 
sed, Thomas, in this chapter, presents a complete and coherent over- 
view of all the 'a-rational} forces acting upon rational man. The 
solution is not presented in terms of either one influence or another 
- nature or the divine - as in the. De bona fortuna, but as a whole, 
hierarchy of possible, influences which can operate independently_or_ 
in unison. 
'Cum igitur homo sit ordinatus secundum corpus sub 
corporibus coelestibus, secundum intellectum vero 
sub angelis, secundum voluntatem autem sub Deo, 
1. Ia, q. 34, a. 3; a. 14, a. 3. 
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potent contingere aliquid praster intentionem 
hominis, quod tarnen est secundum ordinem coeles- 
tiwn corporum, vel dispositionem angelorum, vel 
etiam Doi. ' 
Man is neither the pinnacle of creation, nor an isolated self-enclosed 
unit within it; rather., he is open and receptive to various 'higher' 
influences. As regards the influence of the'celestial bodies, Tho- 
mas deals with the question posed by the De bona fortan, 
in what way can nature be said to be the cause of good fortune ? 
'Quamvis autem Deus solus directe ad electionem ' 
hominis operetur, tarnen actio angeli operatur ali- 
quid ad electionem hominis per modum'persuasionis: " 
actin vero corporis coelestisper modum disponentis, 
in quantum corporales irnpressiones coelestium corpo- 
rum in corpora nostra disponunt ad aliquas elec- 
tiones. Quando igitur aliquis ex impression coe- 
lestium corporun, et superiorum causarum secundum 
praedictum modum inclinatur ad aliquas electiones 
sibi utiles, quarurn tarnen utilitatem propria rations 
non cognoscit, et cum hoc ex lumine intellectualium 
substantiarum illuminatur intellectus eins ad ali- 
quid eligendum sibi utile, culus rationem ignorat, 
dicitur esse bene fortunatus; et e contrario male 
fortunatus quando ex superioribus causis ad contra- 
ria eius electio inclinatur ... ' 
The influence of nature, then, is not over man's reason and will, but 
only over his senses and passions; it is therefore only an inclina- 
tion - though it could be a very strong one - towards certain choices. 
Even angels do not so influence man as to determine his choices - to 
accept this would be to destroy man's freedom. The difference be- 
tween the influence of the celestial bodies and the angels is that 
whereas the celestial bodies affect passions in man's senses., in his 
physical body, the angels similarly dispose a man towards certain choices, 
but by presenting intellectual considerations to his mind. These can 
either be a suggestion with the reasoning why it is good, or they can 
be just a suggestion. In the latter case, Thomas, quite clearly echo- 
ing the De bona Fortuna, (MM 9 ), writes :- 
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'Qnandoque enim illuminatur intellectus hominis ab 
angelo ad cognoscendum solum quod aliquid est bonum 
fiert, non autem instruitur de ratione propter quam 
est bonum, quae sumitur ex fine; et ideo quandoque 
homo aestimat quod aliquid sit bonuni fiert, si tamen 
quaereretur quare, responderet se nescire; unde 
quando pervenit in finem utilem, quern non praecon- 
sideravit, exit sibi fortuitum. Qnandoque vero per 
illuminationem angeli instruitur etiam quod hoc sit 
bonuni, et de ratione quare est bonum, quae dependet 
ex fine; et sic quando perveniet ad finem quern prae- 
considaravit, non erit fortuitum. ' 
It is clear from the last sentence of this quotation that Thomas quite 
clearly sees the problems raised by the experience of good fortune as 
only more sensational examples of a wider problem; that of the inter- 
relationship between man's free, rational,, and therefore moral choices 
and his openness to other 'exterior' causalities. It is not the pre- 
sence of external influences which determines whether an act should 
be termed fortunate or not,, because such influences are commonplace. 
What determines the characterisation 'fortunate' is how man might act 
under such influences without the full understanding of the meaning of 
his choices. 
(Perhaps at this point a certain danger should be pointed out. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to prove that the De bona for- 
tuna was responsible for all, or even a great part, of Thomas' later 
theology. The fact that we are concentrating on this particular text 
at the moment might give that impression. Rather the point is to 
show that it was an important book, that it provided important ideas, 
by which Thomas could unite in a synthesis insights from many sources; 
Augustine, Pseudo-Denis, Damascene and others. It is becoming clear., 
as this chapter progresses, that the De bona fortuna is being used 
within larger models provided by such sources. ) 
If the angels and the celestial bodies can influence a man to- 
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wards, certain choices, and can strengthen his carrying out-of, those 
choicest. God alone can determine his choice and infallibly support., 
What man has decided to do. God alone, as we have seen in ., ' 
p. 174 above, can act directly on man's will not only ad specifics--- 
tionem, but ad exercitium. His Providence, then, is absolutely cer- 
tain, and no part of creation, not even man's free acts of will and 
choice are independent of it. 
'Sciendum eat etiam, quod-vis, -active-spiritualis, naturae sicut eat altior quarr corporalis, ita 
etiam eat universal ior: unde non ad omnia ad 
quae se extendit humans electio, se extendit dis- 
-positio coelestis corporis. Pasrsus virtus huma- 
nae animae, vel etiam angels eat particularis in 
comparatione ad virtutem divinam, quae quidem 
est universalis respectu omnium entium. Sic 
ergo aliquod bonum accidere potest homini etiam 
praeter propriam intentionem, et praeter incli- 
nationem coelestium corporum, et praeter ange- 
lorum illuminationen; non autem praeter divi- 
nam providentiam, quae-est gubernativa, sicut- 
et factiva entis in quantum eat ens: ende opor- 
tet quod omnia sub se contineat. Sic ergo ali- 
quid fortuitum bonuni, vel maluni potest contin- 
gere homini, et per comparationem ad ipsum, et 
per comparationem ad coelestia corpora, et per 
comparationem ad angelos;, non autem per compa- 
rationem ad Daum. Nam per comparationem ad 
ipsum non solum in rebus humanis, sed nee in* 
qualibet alia re potest esse aliquid casuale et 
improvisum. ' 
We are gradually changing the focus of attention away from the 
De bona fortuna onto wider issues, but that the book was of signifi- 
cance to Thomas in this area is-clear from two lesser issues which 
arise from-his vision of the universal sway of Providence: on how 
consulting lots can be. a-valid way of making. decisions, as in Acts 
of the Apostles, ch. 1., v; 26; and, on the role of the devil as an 
external principle of man's actions. In both of these cases Thomas 
explicitly quotes the De bona fortuna. As for the first - De Sorti- 
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bus c. 4 - on the question of how consulting lots can be efficacious, 
Thomas begins by saying that how one answers the question depends on 
how one understands the course of human events, as fixed, as free, or 
as guided by Providence. If man's actions are free and totally auto- 
nomous, then: - 
'Manifestum est autem quod humanarum reram eventus 
plurimi ab actibus humanis dependet, unde nee even- 
tus humanarum reram per praedicta possunt praenosci. t 
But if Providence rules through such activities, then there is a Pro- 
vidential ordering not accessible directly to human reason. Such 
an ordering might be made manifest to a man not by the use of his rea- 
son but by using non-rational means - like Lots - which Providence 
uses to help a man choose not in terms of his own reasoning but in 
terms of a higher order, the order of Providence. Thomas uses the 
De bona fortuna at this point both to show that man might receive a 
non-rational prompting to consult lots, and that, in a more general 
way, man's purposive activities are themselves, in their freedom, tak- 
ing place within the wider ordering of Providence. 
I 
'Hoc autem non solum auctoritate divina firmatur, 
sed ex sententiis philosophornm patet. Aristo- 
teles enim in libro de Bona Fortuna sic dicit: 
Hominis principium non ratio, sed aliquis melius. 
Quid igitur erit melius scientia et intellectu 
nisi Deus ? Et propter hoc bene fortunati vocan- 
tur, qui si impetum faciant, diriguntur sine 
ratione existentes; habent enim principium tale, 
quod eat melius intellectu et consilio. ' (2) 
As regards the role of the devil in determining or influencing 
human choices., the De bona Fortuna is taken as a basic starting point 
for the discussion in two of the major texts. In the De Malo q. 3, a. 3, 
1. On the conditions under which it is valid for the Chris- 
tian to consult lots, see IIaIIae, q. 95, a. 8. The De bona fortuna is 
not referred to here but this is a piece of pastoral advice rather 
than metaphysics. 2. De Sortibus c. 4. 
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the. eleventh objection begins: - 
'Praeterea Philosophus II Ethic. Eudemiorum inqui- 
rit . quid sit principium operationis in anima, et 
ostendit quod oportet esse aliquid extrinsecum. 
... Hoc autem principium in bonis quidem dicit 
esse Deum, qui non eat causa peccati, ut supra 
ostensum eat. Cum ergo homo incipiat altere, 
velle et consiliari ad peccandum, videtur quod 
oporteat hujus esse aliquam extrinsecam causam., 
quas non potest esse alia nisi diabolus. Ipse 
ergo est causa peccati. ' 
This parallel between God and the devil as extrinsic causalities, has 
a certain neatness about its but obviously cannot recommend itself to 
a member of an Order still fighting Manicheism. 
'Ad undecimum dicendum quod Deus est universale 
principium cujuslibet consilii at voluntatis at 
actus humani ... sed quod error at peccatum 
at deformitas accidat in consilio, voluntate at 
actione human, hoc provenit ex defectu hominis. 
Nec oportet hujus aliam extrinsecam causam assig- 
nare. ' 
But in a similar reply in the IaIIae, q. 80, a. 1., ad3um., he presents a 
more sophisticated response which allows some area in which the devil 
does operate. 
'Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus est universale prin- 
cipium omnis interioris motus humani; sed quod 
determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana., 
hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a 
diabolo per modem persuadentis vel appetibilia 
proponentis. ' 
The devil is put in his place - not another God, but an angel, who can 
only use those means open to angelic powers. Thomas is consistent in 
using the hierarchical scheme sketched out in the Summa Contra Gentiles. 
In the corpus of this last article cited above., Thomas repeats 
the refrain now so familiar. The human will can be moved ad exerci- 
tium; tab eo cuod interius inclinat voluntatem ad vollndum. Hoc 
autem non est nisi iasa voluntas, vel Deus. ' As we have seen from 
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Thomas' overview of the various causalities which operate within God's 
Providential order and purpose., this way in which God acts within the 
motivations of the human will is only one, (the most amazing and dif- 
ficult to grasp), of the ways he uses all created natural causalities 
'instrumentally' to fulfill his will. ' This technical term of 'instru- 
mentality' should not suggest that God uses his creatures as mere 
tools, destroying their natures. This point has to be made especially 
in regard to the human will. IaIIae, q. 6, ä. 5 raises the question whet- 
her any extrinsic action is not, of its nature violent, and therefore 
a violation of the human will. In the ad secundum, he replies: - 
'Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut naturale dicitur 
quod est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita volun- 
tarium dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem 
voluntatis. Dicitur autem aliquod naturale dupli- 
citer: uno"modo quia est a natura sicut a princi- 
pio activo, sicut calefacere est naturale igni; 
also modo secundum principium passivum, quia sci- 
licet est innate inclinatio"ad recipiendum actio- 
nem a principio extrinseco ... Et similiter volun- 
tarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo 
secundum actionem, puts cum aliquis vult aliquid 
agere; alio modo secundum passionem, scilicet cum 
aliquis volt pati ab also. Unde cum actio infer- 
tur ab aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur 
voluntate patiendi, non est simpliciter violentum, 
quia, licet illi qui patitur non conferat agenda, 
confert tarnen volendo pati: ende non potest dici 
involuntarium. ' 
The principles outlined here do not just refer to the human will but 
are of general application. Anything has a natural inclination not 
only to act in a certain way but to be open to receive certain forms 
of stimuli - 'innate inclinatio ad recipiendum actionem a nrincinio 
extrinseco'. It is in this way that the human body is open to the 
influence of the heavenly bodies by virtue of its own nature. Given 
the hierarchical structuring of the cosmos within divine providence, 
then any nature has a certain openness to motio from a higher nature. 
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As we shall see, within the Neo-Platonic model of participation, each 
rank within creation is not isolated in. itself but is participated ins 
and participates in, the rank below and above it. This intrinsic 
openness to being fulfilled by means beyond one's own intrinsic re- 
sources is technical referred to as notentia obedientalis, 'obediential 
potency'. 
Now as regards the human intellect, man is open to the influ- 
ence of the angels, but as regards the human will itself, man is de- 
termined by no created powers at all. In this lies the root of his 
freedom. As regards the will, then., we have to emphasis crucially 
important points. Firstly, in that the proper activity of the will 
is voluntary by nature, it is not enough to talk about a kind of 'open- 
ness' but we must envisage a positive receptivity on its part: a kind 
of receptivity which involves a voluntary act of the will rather than 
a static acceptance. Secondly, the extrinsic agent of the will's 
receptive voluntary activity is no agent within creation, it is not 
another agent alongside other agencies, it is God alone. 
1 
To conclude, we can take our final case of Thomas' use of the 
De bona Fortuna as something of a confluence of the various themes 
we have looked at; a confluence, moreover, which takes place in the 
area of grace, thus refocusing the present discussion back on to the 
concerns of chapters one to five. In the Questiones Ouodlibafales 
q. 1, a. 7, the question is put: Utrwn homo absque gratia per solum natura- 
lem arbitrii libertatem Dossit se ad graham praeparare. Having ex- 
plicitly attacked the 'Pelagiani' he goes on to emphasise the priority 
of the divine movement of grace to the 'created' habitus'of grace. 
I. ' IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4 and a. 6; Ia, a. 105, a. 5; S. C. G. III c. 147, 
C. 88., c. 89; Ad Romance 8, lect. 3. 
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ý... sed ad hoc quod homo praeparet se ad habitum 
consequendum non indiget also habitu, quia sic 
esset procedere in infinitum. Indiget autem 
divino auxilio non solum quantum ad exteriora 
moventia, prout scilicet .. ex 
divine 
providentia procurantur homini occasiones salu- 
tis, puts praedicationes, exempla et interdum 
aegritudine et flagella; sed etiam quantum 
ad interiorem motum, prout Zeus cor hominis in- 
terius movet ad bonum ... Et quod hoc necessa- 
rium sit, probat Philosophus in quodam c de 
Bona Fortuna. Hoc enim agit voluntate; volun- 
tatiF autem principium est electio, et electio- 
nis consilium. Si autem quaeratur qualiter 
consiliari incipiat, non potest dici quod ex 
consilio consiliari inceperit, quia sic esset 
in infinitum procedere. Unde oportet aliquod 
exterius principium esse quod moveat mentem huma- 
nam ad consiliandum de agendis. Hoc autem opor- 
tet esse aliquod melius human mente. Non ergo 
est corpus caeleste, quod est infra intellectua- 
lam virtutem, sed Deus ut Philosophus, ibidem, 
concludit. Sicut ergo omnis motus inferiors: m 
corporum, quae non'semper moventur, principium 
est motes caeli, ita omnium motuum inferior im 
mentium principium est a Deo movente. Sic ergo 
nullus potest se-, ad gratiam praeparar, e, nec ali- 
quid boni facere, nisi per divinum auxillium. 1 (1) 
1. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 1, a. 7. The De bona fortuna 
is used in a similar way, but only implicitly referred to, in had 
Corinthios c. 3, lect. 1. 
8. RATIO, LEX ET GRATIA 
- Lex et Ratio Practica 
- Grace: Lex Nova, Lex Evanzelii 
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It has become clear by now that Thomas' analysis of man's acti- 
vity in terms of the two principles of movement in man is the basic 
structuring model both of the Prima Secandae-and of his treatment 
of the Gifts of the Spirit. The intrinsic principle of movement,, 
1 
(motio), is man's reasoning; the extrinsic principle moving man to- 
wards the good is-God. These two principles however are not to be 
seen as alternatives but as complementary: a point which he makes 
quite clearly in question 68 itself. 
"Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia, inquantum'sunt 
contra bonuni rationis, wntrariantur virtutibus,. ' 
inquantuin autem sunt contra divinum instinctum 
contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur 
Deo et rationi, cujus lumen a Deo derivatur. " (2) 
What we need to do now is to examine in more detail how it is that 
reason and God - the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's dyna- 
mism - can be so closely and harmoniously associated: idem enim con- 
trariatur Deo et rationi. In doing so, we will not only be increasing 
our understanding of the significance of Thomas' presentation of the 
Gifts in the Prima Secundae, but also, we will be preparing the ground 
to understand the interrelationship between the virtues and the Gifts 
which is the theme of the Secunda Secundae, which we will examine in 
Part Three. 
It is in question 90 of the Prima Secandae that'Thomas begins 
to analyse the extrinsic principle of man's motto. 
"Consequentur considerandum eat de principiis ex- 
terioribus actuum. Principium autem exterius ad 
malum inclinans eat diabolus, de cujus tentatione 
in Primo dictum eat. Principium autem exterius 
movens ad bonum eat Deus, qui et nos instruit per 
legem et iuvat per gratiam. (3) 
1. See above p. 5 and p. 29 . 2. IaIIae, q. 
68, a. 1, ad2um. 
3. IaIIae, q. 90, intro. 
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Some points have to be made here. First of all, what is to be taken 
as the meaning of 'principium exterius' ? The Gilby translation uses 
the phrase, 'the objective principle of human activity', in order to 
oppose it to the 'subjective principle' of human reason while trying 
to avoid any idea of external imposition. Certainly, 'extrinsic' 
is not to be taken as 'externals, in that God works within man just 
as much as do man's own reason and will. 
1 In regard to seeing lax 
as such an 'objective principle' Gilby points out. 
I . vom. .I 
"Principle, that from which anything in any manner 
starts. A real principle 1s a cause when a re- 
lationship of dependence is involved. 'Objective' 
is inserted in the translation so as not to sug- 
gest an externalism not proper to law as such. 
The response to positive law imposed on us may be 
'artificial' but the Eternal Law and the Gospel 
law of grace shape inner voluntary acts springing 
from persons born in human nature and reborn in 
the Spirit. (2) 
We are not then talking about, primarily, external conformity to pub- 
lie order with which we normally associate the idea of law, but, 'as 
our central focus, the directing of inner voluntary acts. It is im- 
portant to bear in mind that we are talking about principia: we are 
trying to answer questions about the origins of certain actions, and 
not the distinguishing characteristics of their final form. Meyer 
gives a neat summary of Thomas' thought on principia. 
"In company with Aristotle and Averroes, St Thomas 
attempted to define clearly the line between prin- 
ciple and cause. According to the Aristotelian 
concept, principle is something primary, whether 
in the order of being, of origin, or of knowledge; 
it is that from which something proceeds in some 
-'"way, (a quo aliguid procedit auocumgue modo). 
The concept of principle also contains the idea 
that it does not depend on anything else and that 
everything else in that particular genus depends 
on it. Every cause is a principle but not every 
principle is a cause. The concept of principle 
1. IaIIae, q. 9, a. 6; q. 10, a. 4.2. Gam., vol. 28, p. 22 
footnote. ' 
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is the broader of the two ... Cause always implies the essential distinction between itself and that 
which it causes, but the principle may be consub- 
stantial with that of which it is the principle. " (1) 
Another point to be made is that Thomas is restricting the dis- 
cussion to the 'principium exterius movens ad bonum: the devil, as a 
creature, an angel, tempts man towards evil in a way that is not para- 
llel to the way God moves man towards'the good. 
2 Restricting the 
discussion then to man's movement towards good as originating in a 
'non-subjective' principle, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of ways 
in which God acts as the 'non-subjective' principle of man's activity. 
"Deus qui et nos instrait per legem et iuvat per 
gratiam. " (3) 
'God who helps us by grace and, through law, builds us up, trains us, 
equips us or prepares us'; and through both law and grace moves us 
ad bonnet. We shall follow through this distinction in this chapter: 
first, looking at the relationship between human reasoning and lax; 
and then at the interrelationship between reasoning (ratio).,,, ]-ex and 
grace. 
Lex et Ratio Practica. 
4 
Immediately, the notion of movement, which we looked at in chap- 
ter 6 comes once more to the fore. In question 93 of the Prima Secun- 
dae Thomas presents two ways of discussing the wisdom of God. In 
terms of divine wisdom making things we can call it 'Art' but in terms 
of divine wisdom moving all things to their appropriate tend? we call 
1. H. Meyer, The Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, St. Louis, 
tr. F.. Eckhoff, pp. 25 -257; see also Ia, a. 33, a. 1.2. See above 
p. 192.3. IaIIae, q. 90, intro. 4. In this section, I have 
found the following works particularly useful. J. Finnis, Natural 
Law and'Natural Rights. Oxford, 1980. J. E. Naus, The Nature of the 
Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, Rome, 1959. 
G. Grisez, 'The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary 
on the Summa Theologica IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2) in A. Kenny, (ed. ), Aquinas: 
A Collection of Critical Essays, London, 19 69 , pp. 340-382. 
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lax or law. 
I This teleological thrust will underpin all our subse- 
quent discussion, but what is the role of man's intrinsic principle 
within this teleology of the good ? Thomas has earlier quoted the 
Pseudo-Denis. 
"In actibus autem 'bonuni' et ! malum' dicitur per. com- 
parationem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, 
'Bonuni hominis eat secundum rationem. esse malum autem 
quod eat praeter rationem". (2) 
We are forced to ask therefore, what the relationship between law and 
reason might be if they both relate to the good. And this is the 
first question Thomas asks - utrum lex sit aliguid rationis. His 
3 
answer ist 
"Dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est at mensura 
actuum, secundum quae inducitur aliquis ad agen- 
dum vel ab agendo retrahitur. Dicitur enim lex 
a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem - 
at mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est 
principium primum, actuum humanorum ... Rationis 
enim est ordinare ad finem, qui est-primum prin- 
cipium in agendis secundum Philosoph=". (4) 
The 'end', (or, finis, or-telos), is the first principle of our acting, 
according to Aristotle, and it is the function of reason to plan for 
an end. The idea of purpose is the key note here, --in human acts, -in 
all. kinds of lax, and, ýgenerally, in practical-reasoning as a whole. 
5 
It is clear that we need to examine the interrelations-between 
'bonuni', 'ratio', Ileac and IfinisI, as.. Thomas uses these terms. 
The first point to be made is a crucially important-one regarding the 
term 'ratio'. Thomas is quite clearly referring, in this section on 
'Lex', not to-ratio speculativa but to ratio practica, 'auae ordina- 
tur ad opus'. 
6- 
The 'object' of practical reasoning is not a state 
1. IaIIae, q. 93, a. 1.2. IaIIae, q. 18, a. 5. - 3. , IaIIae, 
q. 90, a. 1.4. IaIIae, q. 90, a. 1.5. See J. E. Naus, The Nature 
of the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas Rome, 1959. 
Also Ia, q. 79, a. 11.6. IaIlae, q. 94, a. 2. - 
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of affairs as it exists but the state of affairs which a man aims to 
bring into existence. We are not to understand this as applied specu- 
lative reasoning - as technology is applied science - but as the human 
reason working in quite a different fashion. The 'truth' of practi- 
cal reason is not the conforming of the mind to the nature of reality 
'outside' the mind, as in speculative reason, but the achievable pro- 
ject of conforming the world to what the man aims to bring about in 
the world. To put this in other words, the 'object' of practical 
reasoning is the tfinis' of its project which it conceives of as a 
'good'. 
The second point - again, crucially important'- is how we are 
to understand-'bonuni' as Thomas uses it. Against all modern presup- 
positions we are not to understand it as relating primarily to mora- 
lity. Morality, for Thomas, has an important but secondary role 'in 
human affairs. "When he discusses the term tbonum' in q. 6 of the'Prima 
Pars, he defines it in terms of completion or fullness of being. 
Only God is complete Be-ing, Actus Purus, and so only God is absolu- 
tely Good. As for created beings who-lack this absolute existence 
in as much as they exist they are good. 
1 Within their limited exis- 
tence, all creatures'aim at the fullness of their particular nature 
and this is their 'good': 'omnes appetunt suam perfectionem adimpleri' 
2 
All creatures then, strive towards a greater flourishing of their nature: 
'bonum est quod omnia apnetunt'. 
3 
Now man, as rational, uses his rationality to achieve his parti- 
cular fulfillment - eudaimoiiia, beatitudo, 'human flourishing'. 
4 This 
1. And this goodness, and existence, is real and inherent - see 
the important article, Ia, q. 6, a. 4.2. IaIIae, q. l, a. 7.3. IaIIae, 
q. 94, a. 2.4. A term. used extensively by Finnis apt because of 
its implication of activity and not static 'happiness', see Finnis, 
p. 130. 
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has two consequences. Firstly man chooses his projects - or, regarding 
his 'animality', choose how to accept and gear the natural determinants 
of his nature, viz. how to survive, when and in what circumstances to 
have children, how to organise and structure society. 
1 And, secondly, 
man as rational, is not determined to any one particular scheme or pro- 
ject of action. Man, unlike the animals in their fixed sensory-res- 
pones, can choose among whole hosts of patterns of apparent 'goods', 
and in this freedom of choosing lies his-freedom. 
2 Only when con- 
fronted by the absolute and utter Goodness of God is man incapable of 
choosing any other project or 'good'. 
It is significant that morality has not yet entered into our 
account so far. Whilst reason and law are geared towards producing 
virtue or morality,, the virtuous life is not understood by Thomas as 
an end in itself but the means by which human flourishing is brought 
about. Here Thomas breaks with Aristotle by presenting the necessity 
of positing a further level of human flourishing beyond that of the 
life of the virtues. For Aristotle, eudaimonia, human flourishing, 
might be regarded as 'the effective possession in action of a ratio- 
nal over-all plan of life'. 
3 But., for Thomas., the soul's nature is 
such, as potential to all things, that it cannot be its own self-ful- 
fillment but can find total fulfillment, in its infinite potentiality, 
in the infinite goodness of the Summum Bonum. 
4 The virtuous life, 
then, is a life whereby all the potentialities of human nature are 
geared within, and not towards, man's reasonableness; for this is not 
the purpose of life but the means by which that purpose can be achieved.. 
1. See the three levels of natural law in IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2. 
2. Ia, q. 83, a. 3.3. J. M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aris- 
totle, pp. 96-97,121-125, cited Finnis, p. 130.4. IaIIae, q. 2, a. 7. 
Grisez, p. 362 has some interesting comments on the difference between 
Aristotle and Aquinas on this. 
-202- 
viz. total human flourishing, beatitudo. Reason, A(and law), is the 
measure and rule of means towards the end. Moral good, (i. e. that 
which is in keeping with reason working towards an end), is a means 
towards this non-ethical 'Good'. Morally bad actions are therefore 
seen as less perfect means, and even counter-productive ways, of ful- 
filling the aim of human flourishing. 
I 
"In actibus autem 'bonuni' et 'maluni' dicitur per 
comparationem ad rationem, ut Dionysius dicit, 
'bonuni hominis est secundum rationem esse, maluni 
autem quod est praeter rationem'. Unicuique 
enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam 
formam, et maluni quod est praeter ordinem suae 
formae. Patet ergo quod differentia boni et 
mall circa objectum considerata. comparatur per 
se ad rationem, scilicet secundum quod objectum 
est ei conveniens vel non conveniens. Dicuntur 
autem aliqui actus humani vel morales secundum 
quod aunt a ration. " (2) 
But morality is not simple rationality: there are pre-rational drives 
in man as part of his nature and these form the basic data, on'which 
reason is to work as the measure and directing rule. In this'way 
the potential acts of man become 'human acts': , undertaken 
purposively ', freely and voluntarily, in accordance with his ratio- 
nal nature. 
-Having established this interrelationship between the terms., 
lbonum!, (finis' and 'ratio practical, let us move on to see how these 
terms are used in relationship with lex naturalis. Again the crucial 
point to bear in mind is that we are discussing ratio Dractica not 
ratio speculativa. In IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2, Thomas begins his main-arga- 
ment by pointing out the difference between these and drawing a para- 
llel from one to the other. 
"In his autem quae in apprehensione hominum cadunt' 
quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit 
1. IaIIae, q. 18, a. 5, ad2um. 2. IaIIae, q. 18, a. 5, see also 
IaIIae, q. 71, a. 2. 
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sub apprehensione eat ens, cujus intellectus inclu- 
ditur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et 
ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non 
est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur super 
rationem entis et non entis; et super hoc princi-° - 
pio alia fundantur, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Meta. 
Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in appre- 
hensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod 
cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae 
ordinatur ad opus. Omne enim agens agit propter 
finem, qui habet rationem bona et ideo primum prin- 
cipium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra 
rationem bona; quae est, bonuni est quod omnia appe- 
tunt. Hoc est ergo primum principium legis, quod 
'bonuni est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitan- 
dum'; et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta 
legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia ills facienda vel 
vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae quae 
ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona 
humana'. '. (1) 
Just as the first principle of theoretical reason, based on the intel- 
ligibility of being, is the principle of non-contradiction, so the 
first principle of practical reason, based on the intelligibility of 
the 'good', (as-we have presented-it here as, 'that which all things 
strive fort), is 'the good is to be done and sought for, and evil is 
to be avoided!. We must be clear that this principle is to be under- 
stood as a principle and not as a premise to every argument. Just 
as the principle of non-contradiction is not used explicitly in every 
argument of theoretical reasoning but is presupposed. as a necessary 
structuring principle for any argument to function, so in the case 
of this principle of practical reasoning. We should stress here 
again, that by practical reasoning we do not mean theoretical reason- 
ing applied to the world but man anticipating and acting towards what 
he aims to achieve and bring about: 'ratio practica quas ordinatur 
add'. What is being claimed, here is that this basic principle 
is presupposed within all such orientations towards a r7 project: 
1. IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2. On this article, and on what follows, 
see two important essays by Grisez and Donagan in Aquinas: A Collec- 
tion of Critical Essays, edited by A. Kenny,, (1969). " 
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'bonum est faciendum et proseauendum, et malum vitandum'. 
Now this basic principle is common to both practical reasoning 
and to lea naturalis. Are we therefore to take these as synonymous ? 
The answer is No. Natural Law, in the restricted sense in which Tho- 
mas uses it, is man's practical reasoning in relation to the drives 
which man experiences in himself by nature; those things, 'guae ratio 
practica naturaliter aporehendit esse bona human al. Practical reason- 
ing does not work for man as if within a colourless range of limitless 
possibilities but within the realities of man's inclinationes. 
"Quia vero bonuni habet-rationem finis, maluni autem 
rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia ilia ad 
quas homo habet naturalem inclinationem ratio nat- 
uraliter apprehendit ut bona, at per consequens 
ut opera prosequenda, at contraria eorum mala at 
vitanda. 
Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationem natura- 
lium est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. Irrest 
enim primo inclinatio homini ad bonuni secundum 
naturam in qua conmmnicat cum omnibus substantiis; 
prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit con- 
servationem sui esse secundum suam naturam;. at 
secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem 
naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservator at 
contrarium impeditur. 
Secundo irrest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis 
specialia secundum naturam in qua communicat cum 
caeteris animalibus; at secundum hoc dicantur ea 
esse de lege naturals quae natura omnia animalia 
docuit, ut est commixtio maris at feminae, at edu- 
catio liberorum, at similia. 
Tertio modo irrest homini inclinatio ad bonuni 
secundum naturam rationis quae'est sibs propria; 
sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem adýhoc 
quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, at ad hoc quod 
in societate vivat; at secundum hoc ad legem natu- 
ralem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodo inclinationem 
spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod 
alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, at 
caetera äuiusnodi quas ad hoc spectant. It (1) 
Grisez has a comment on this passage which it will be worth while to 
quote in fall. 
1. IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2. 
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"Here Aquinas indicates how the complexity of human 
nature gives rise to a multiplicity of inclinations, 
and these to a multiplicity of precepts. It is 
noteworthy that in each of the three ranks he dis- 
tinguishes among them an aspect of nature, the in- 
clination based upon it, and-the precepts that are 
in accordance with it. Nature is not natural law; 
nature is the given from which man develops and 
from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding 
to its distinct strata. These tendencies are not 
natural law; the tendencies indicate possible ac- 
tions, and hence they provide reason with the point 
of departure it requires in order to propose ends. 
The precepts of reason which clothe the objects of 
inclinations in the intelligibility of ends-to-be- 
pursued-by-work - these precepts are the natural 
law. Thus natural law has many precepts which are 
unified in this, that all of these precepts are 
ordered to practical reason's achievement of its 
own end, the direction of action toward end". (1) 
Natural law, then, is the set of principles by which man's acti- 
vity of practical reasonableness is self-consistent with his own means 
and ends. Augustine at one point grieves over the blindness of his 
fellow-men : 
"Man has undoubtedly the will to be happy, even when 
he pursues happiness by living in a way which makes 
it. impossible of attainment. What could be more 
of a falsehood than a will like this". (2) 
It is this aim of self consistency with all his nature in n. an'sIrea- 
sonableness that the precepts of the natural law underpin: the good 
is 'auod conveniat ordini rationis'. 
3 
"Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione 
deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem 
ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rations et habet 
, rationem mali;,, si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem,, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem 
boni". (4) 
The interplay of the terms, 'conveniens' and Idebituml here is signi- 
1. " Crisez, p. 358. Also V. J. Bourke, 'Right Reason as the 
basis for moral actions', in Tommaso d'Aauino nel suo VII Centenario 
vol. 5, Naples 1974, PP. 122-127. Bourke holds that 'right reason' 
is the central notion in Thomas' moral philosophy and not natural law 
which is dependent on the notion of 'right reason'. 2. Civ. Dei., 
XIV. 4. Augustine has a different notion of natural law which we will 
not go into here. 3. IaIIae, q. 18, a. 1, ad3um; a. 5, a. 8. 
4. IaIIae, q. 18, a. 9. 
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ficant. The terms are deliberately-vague because Thomas, like Aris- 
totle, did not expect scientific exactitude within the complexities 
of moral philosophy. 
1 
Lex, like reason, is a principle of ordering within man's acti- 
vities. Unlike Augustine, who sees lax as a negative, curbing factor 
on man, a remedy for sin, Thomas seesx as a positive directing in- 
fluence, a potestas directiva, not essentially a potestas coactiva. 
2 
For this reason .. ex, although it can be stated in imperative formulas, 
can also include counsels of a non-obligatory kind. The focal point 
3 
of lex as of ratio practica, is the tend' aimed at, and, in the light 
of this tend', some things can be seen as necessary for its achieve- 
ment and some things as helpful but not necessary. Lex, as an expres- 
sion of ratio nractica, is an expression of reason as prescribing not 
asserting. As such it is said to prescribe direction or tendency, 
or said to 'communicate a tendency', or 'give a rule or canon whereby 
actions are-. framed'. 
4 Like so many. major terms in Thomas' thought 
it is to be used analogically, regarding every level of creation, and 
can even be ' . within the discipline of theological language) to 
the Trinitarian. life of God and to the Trinity's relation to creation. 
5 
As. regards creatures lower than man, they receive direction passively, 
and so. are said to be used by law rather than use it themselves: Tho- 
nmas holds that this is to speak of ?, ex improperly rather than essentially. 
1. On the whole-question of whether natural law theory does or 
does not illicitly, derive 'ought' statements from 'is' statements -a 
debate we cannot go into here - see, especially, Firnis; pp. 33-36 and 
GGrisez, p. 380; also IaIlae, q. 94, a. 2.2. IaIIae, q. 93., a. 6; q. 95, a. 1. 
3i Grisez, p. 366. - 4. The latter expression is Hooker's, in Laws 
of Ecclesiastical Polity, 1.3.1., quoted by Gib, vol. 28, p. 7. 
5. On Vey Ia, q. 34, a. 3; on the Ideas, Ia, q. 15 and q. 44, a. 3. On 
the Verbum in relation to Lex Aeterna, IaIIae, q. 93, a. 2. On the Spirit 
as Lex Nova, IaIlae, q. 106, a. 1. 
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For this reason., Thomas uses the term lex naturalis strictly only in 
relation to man. 
"... etiam animalia irrationalia participant ratio- 
nem aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. 
Sed quia rationalis creatura participat. eam intel- 
lectualiter et rationaliter, idea participatio legis 
aeternae in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur: 
nam lex est aliquid rationis ... In creatura autem irrationali non participatur rationaliter: unde non 
potest dici lex nisi per similitudine, n". (1. ) 
By-'natural law' we do no mean then what creatures do naturally but 
rather the way in which mans natural drives are directed by reason. 
Man is purposive even at a pre-rational level. 
I R... omnis operatio rationis at voluntatis deriva- 
tur in nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam ... Nam omnis ratiocinatio derivatur a principiis 
naturaliter notis; at omnis appetitus eorum Quae 
sunt ad finem derivatur a naturali appetitu ul- 
timi finis; - at sic etiam oportet quod prima 
directio actuum nostrorum ad finem fiat per legem 
naturalem. " (2) 
Natural law is the ordering by reason of the natural drives of man. 
But it is at the same time more than this. Precisely as such an 
ordering by reason of what is natural to man it is also a participa- 
tion by reason in a greater ordering, that of the Lex Aeterna. This 
is the hub ofýour own interest in this topic. Here the 'hinge' be- 
tween man and a greater divine ordering is man's rationality - his 
intrinsic principle of motto - but with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, 
the 'hinge' between these two levels of analysis is something other- 
than reason. Now both the Gifts, as part of-grace, and -while 
an expression of ratio, are both said to be 'extrinsic' principles 
of man's motio, his self-motivation. We need to see, therefore, why 
man's intrinsic principle of ratio is not sufficient by itself. 
i In the conclusion of q. 90, a. 4, of the Prima Se-cundae, Thomas" 
1. IaIIae, q. 91, a. 2, ad3um, also q. 91, a. 6.2. IaIIae, q. 91, 
a. 2, ad2um, also, q. 94, a. 2, ad2um. 
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sums up the points he has made: - 
"Et sic ex, quatuor praedictis potest colligi derini=' 
do legis, quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam ratio- 
nis ordinatio ad bonuni commune, ab eo qui coram 
conmiunitatis habet, promulgata". (1) 
The only two points which we need to take up here are that the law 
is instituted for the common good and is made by one in authority. 
Too much of our discussion so far could convey the impression that 
Thomas sees man as an isolated agent: nothing could be further from 
the truth, although one must admit that the central article on the 
natural law - IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2. - seems to be one of the few places 
where this communal dimension is explicitly stated. As part of his 
very nature man is seen as a social-being., and so law, and ratio nrac- 
tica, must include the interrelations between men, in order to achieve 
the fullness of human flourishing, Now too often, and yet-for good 
reasons, we' see social, positive" law as curbing and restraining, but 
Thomas, true to his basic insight, claims that the law is primarily 
not negative, but educational. 
"Deus qui et nos instruct per legem et juvat per 
gratiam". (2) 
Law, in its objectivity outside man's mind is not only an ex- 
pression of practical reasoning but also an education of it through 
man's inter-personal relations. It exists not just to manifest the 
rules of practical reasonableness but to produce them and bring them 
about. Practical reasonableness - the life of the virtues - does 
not come easily to man. 
"... homini naturaliter inest quaedam aptitudo ad 
virtutem; sed ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse est 
quod homo adveniat per aliquam disciplinam". (3. ) 
Each man has to be educated by others. Unlike the animals, no man 
1. IaIIae, q. 9Q, a. 4.2. IaIIae, q. 9A, intro. 3. ' IaIIse, 
q. 95, a. 1, see also IaIIae, q. 55, a. 1, a. 2, a. 4, ad2um, ad3um, ad4um. 
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is born-complete in the ability-to achieve his-own potential for ful- 
fillment. Each man grows into his full moral self only through his 
social education. The virtuous man is the freest man but he achieves 
this freedom of practical reasonableness only through discipline. 
"Sicut etiam videmus quod per aliquam industriam '' 
subvenitur homini in suis necessita. tibus, puta in 
cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quaedam habet a 
natura, scilicet rationem et manus, non autem ip- 
sum complementum, sicut caetera animalia quibus 
natura dedit sufficienter tegumentum et cibum. 
Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de facile invenitur 
homo sibi sufficiens, quia perfectio vitutis prae- 
cipue consistit in retrahendo hominem ab indebi- 
tis delectationibus, ad quas praecipue homines 
sent proni, et maxime juvenes, circa quos est effi- 
cacior disciplina. Et ideo oportet quod huius- 
modi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem pervenitur, 
homines ab alio sortiantur". (1) 
Law-here, in this educative sense might appear to be merely a 
curbing of. man's wayward. and wasteful tendencies but it serves prima- 
rily, to awaken him to further possibilities of development and human- 
flourishing.  Man's freedom exists within his practical reasonable- 
ness: 
2 
yet this itself exists and acts within the objectivities of 
man's nature-and his existence within society and history. The in- 
dividual's-practical reasonableness exists and is educated within an, 
existing societal-framework, with all its traditions, customs and edu- 
cative processes; as it were, within practical reason's own'externa-il, 
lised 'exo-skeleton' of the structure of law. 
Given this particular view of law as an extrinsic-principle of 
man's motio, it is not too amazing to find a Thomist like Thomas Gilby 
claiming that to be lawful is to be free. There are obvious diffi- 
culties here: we are all only too aware of evil laws and of whole 
1. IaIIae, q. 95, a. 1.2. Strictly speaking, man's freedom, 
for Thomas, is located in electio, choice, the exercise of liberuin 
arbitrium, freedom of decision. Ia, q. 83, a. 3. 
-210- 
societies which corrupt and deprave man; but these difficulties can 
be met within Aquinas' outlook; the point at the moment is to arti- 
culate Aquinas' model of law in its clearest presentation. Gilbt' 
writes: - 
"To be lawful is to be free, for to be lawful in the 
proper sense of the term is to act with responsibi- 
lity in accepting the law and making it your own; 
to be under the law otherwise is to have the law 
only in an extended sense, and, in man., is to suffer 
its force or to be punished". (1) 
What is involved here is a positive assent to the reasonableness of 
the extrinsic law in such a way that it becomes part of one's own self- 
determining practical reasonableness. This assent is to be a posi- 
tive and not merely a neutral one. It is to be seen as a widening' 
of one's own horizons. 
2 (If we have difficulty in grasping this in 
terms of civil, positive, law, then perhaps we might understand it 
in terms of the way a monk or friar might see the constitutions or 
laws of his religious order: Thomas would hold, however, that the 
model is also to hold of civil society. ) As for the wicked, Thomas 
claims that they are subject to the law - in our normal, modern, way 
of understanding this - on two counts. Firstly, because their natu- 
ral instinct for what is virtuous, the exercise of practical reason, 
is depraved, or rather diverted or deflected by vice, and, secondly, 
that their natural knowledge of what is a 'bonuni' is obscured by their 
3 
passions and their habits of sinfulness. For the good, however: - 
"In bonis autem uterque modus invenitur perfectior: 
quia est supra cognitionem naturalem boni superaddi- 
tur eis cognitio fidei et sapientia; et supra natu- 
ralem inclinationem ad bonuni superadditur eis inte- 
rius motivuni gratiae et virtutis". (4) 
1. Gilbt', vol. 28, p. 170.2. Synderesis is the habitus 
of consenting to one's own larger fulfillment by consenting to the 
basic principles of natural law, its act is called conscientia; see 
Ia, q. 79, a. 12, a. 13 and IaIIae, q. 94, a. 1, ad2um. 3. IaIIae, q. 93, a. 6. 
4. IaIIae, q. 93, a. 6. 
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Now, in a way, we have perhaps made too large a jump here, in the argu- 
ment. The quotation refers to the infused theological virtue of faith 
and its corresponding Gift of the Holy Spirit, sapientia, in relation 
to knowledge of bonum, and to grace and the (presumably) infused moral 
virtues, in relation to man's inclinationes. But this quotation does 
fit into our discussion here because it relates to this central notion 
of assent or consent by ratio to lex. Grace, as gratin sanans, frees 
man to use his practical reasoning correctly; as gratia elevansý it 
equips him with a greater knowledge and insight than reason can provide 
of the wider form of lex, the Lex Aeterna, and it equips him also with 
the ability to freely consent to the educative tendency of that lex. 
Our discussion of the relationship between ratio and ].: sex has 
moved on to the introduction of the notions of assent and freedom. 
From this point we could anticipate the culmination of St Thomas' trea- 
tise on ' the 'law' of grace, the I, ex Nova, the new law of freedom. 
... et hoc modo spirituales viri non sunt sub lege, 
quia per caritatem quam Spiritus Sanctus cordibus_ 
eorum infundit, voluntarie id quod legis est, im- 
plent. 
... ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi est libertas". 
(1) 
But what we need to examine first is howýthis working out of human 
practical reasonableness within the extrinsic principle of Lex Natu- 
ra_ (and Lex Humana), is also to be seen, in the larger context of 
creation and providence, as not an isolated activity within creation 
but as a 'participation' in a larger ordering, the Lex Aeterna. 
We must adroit that Thomas' approach to this topic is the re- 
verse of the one we have followed so far. We have moved on from dis- 
cussing human practical reasonableness in terms of the natural law 
1. IaIIae, q. 93, a. 6, adlum. T. Gilby rightly points out at 
this point that the Fear of the Lord is yet also a Gift of the Holy 
Spirit; on this ' . see 
below p. 291 ff. 
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and human laws and now we are moving on to see 'how we might make a 
deeper sense of this-in terms of a larger ordering., Thomas does the 
opposite. At his inauguration as a Master in Paris in 1256, he took 
as his text., 'Rigans mates de superioribus suis; de fructu operum 
tuorum _satiabitur terra', as his theme of the unity of theology. 
I 
The same approach is the over-all plan of the Summa; he moves from 
God to creation, and from the Lex Aeterna to Natural Lax and Human 
Laws. Appreciating this movement of thought can help us to see the 
significance of his treatise on the angels. Here, Thomas provides 
a brilliant exposition of the nature of understanding in the angels 
and in man. This treatise is nothing other than a 'Copernican Revo- 
lution' in terms of epistemology. Man's intellectual activity, 
through reasoning, is not at the centre of the intellectual universe 
but is at its fringe. Man's understanding is almost as much akin 
to the lowly sense-knowledge of'the animals as it is to'the purely 
intellectual understanding of the angels. It is at a far greater 
distance from the centre-of the intellectual universe, the Triune 
God's own self-understanding in the Verbum Dei. 
2 If we are to move 
on to examining the nature of the Lex Aeterna, we must beware of pro- 
ceeding too quick], y. Human reasoning - dividendo et comnonendo - 
is not the norm of intellectual life and the Lex Aeterna is not to 
be understood as rationality writ large: rather, human rationality 
is to be seen as an imperfect and derived 'participation' in that Iiex 
3 
Aeterna. 'Participation' is a philosophical model which already 
had a 
, 
long history to it before St Thomas' time, and his own use of 
4 it is still open to much debate. It is used by Thomas in two main 
1. Weisheipl, pp. 101-102, see also IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 1, ad2um on 
the Gift of Wisdom where Thomas uses the text, 'de sursum descendens', 
(James 3.15). 2. See Ia, q. 34. On angelic and human understanding 
see especially Ia, q. 58, a. 3, a. 4.3. Ia, q. 91, a. 2.4. The litera- 
ture on the concept of participation is extensive. The two, now classic.. 
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ways. Firstly to express causality of a particular kind, 'exemplar 
causality'; and, secondly, following on from this, to allow for a 
play, of similarity and difference. between the exemplar cause and the 
derived imitative existence of that which shares in a lesser way in 
the nature of the exemplar cause. Because of this play of both simi- 
larity and difference within the participation model, we cannot claim 
to understand the Lex Aeterna because we understand the various forms 
of lex - of nature, of natural law, of human and divine law - which 
'participate' in it in derivative ways. All we can claim is that we 
can make sense of them in terms of it. It is a 'second order' con- 
cept: 'it must not be treated as a theory which could guide investi- 
gation and verification of suggested norms in an of the four orders 
(in which laws operate); rather it is a speculation about why those 
norms whose holding has been appropriately verified or established 
do hold'. 
1 
"The Thomist theory of participation is not a re- 
port of experience, but a theorem in the general 
explanation of all states of affairs by reference, 
ultimately, to creative uncaused causality". (2) 
Within the uncaused causality of God which-the. Lex Aeterna model pos- 
tulates would be included not just the various forms of l, ex, and the 
norms of the arts and the laws of natural sciences, but also what is 
considered-from ,a human standpoint as matters of coincidence or, good 
or bad fortune. , 
Just, as it would be wrong to apply the norms of 
science-to-legal reasoning, or legal reasoning to the artist's inten- 
(4 con. ) works are: L. B. Geiger, La participation dans la nhilo- 
sophie de S. Thomas d'Acuin Paris, 1942, and, C. Fabro, Participation 
et causalit selon S. Thomas d'Aquin, Louvain, 1961. The present 
writer has found the easiest entry into the topic through a very clearly 
written article; T. A. Fay, 'Participation: the transformation of Pla- 
tonic and Neo-Platonic thought in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas', 
Divus Thomas, 76, (1973), PP. 50-64. For further references see the 
bibliography under the names Geiger, Fabro, Ho, Greenstock, Kondoleon, 
Little, Marion, Philippe and Wright. Also Finnis, chapter XIII, pp. 
371-413. 
1. Finnis, p. 390.2. ibid., p. 402. 
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tion for his work of art, so it would be wrong to apply simply one 
form of derived participation - for example - rationality - to 'pic- 
ttireI the over-all model of Lex Aeterna. 
Now., given all this., Thomas can claim that the moral goodness 
of a human act depends more on the Lex Aeterna than on human reason- 
ableness. He can say this without taking back anything we have dis- 
cussed so far, 
"Dicendum quod'in omnibus causis ordinatis effectus 
plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, 
quia causa secunda non agit nisi in virtute primae 
causae. Quod autem ratio humana sit regula volun- 
tatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet 
ex lege aeterna, quae eat ratio divina; unde in 
Psal., dicitur, 'Multi dicunt Quis ostendit nobis 
bona ? Signatum eat super nos lumen vultus tui, 
Domine. ' Quasi diceret, lumen rationis, quod in 
nobis eat, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona et 
nostram voluntatem regulare inquantum eat lumen vul- 
tus tui, idest a vultu tuo derivatuin. Unde mani- 
festum eat quod molto magis dependet bonitas volun- 
tatis humane a lege aeterna quam a ratione humana; 
et ubi deficit humane ratio, oportet ad rationem 
aeternam recurrere". (1) 
The metaphor of light used here might be elaborated in terms of our 
own metaphor of the Copernican Revolution. Human practical reasoning 
is not a 'sun', a self-sustaining form of enlightenment, but a 'moon' 
Which enlightens only in as much as it. reflects the light of the true 
'sun', the Lex Aeterna in the Verbum Dei. 
2 Thomas is not here attempt- 
ing to undermine human reasoning; indeed in the next article he gives 
grounds for holding that a mistaken conscience is, binding: - 
"Unde dicendum quod simpliciter omnis voluntas discor- 
dans. a ratione, save recta, sive errante, semper est 
mala". (3) 
-, A. IaIIae, q. 19, a. 4.2. See also IaIIae, q. 109, a. 1., ad2um, 
where Thomas criticises Augustine's theory. of-illumination, Our own 
model of the 'moon' is misleading if it suggests that reason does not 
have its own natural light and is totally passive. 3. IaIIae, 
q. 19, a. 5. 
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Rather he is seeing human reasoning as a form - albeit derived and 
limited - of the divine 'ratio', and, as such, he is asking us to 
imagine a situation where human reasoning might-be insufficient and 
man would need to rely directly upon the wider realm of intellectua- 
litt' within which his reason is situated. 
' There are cases, especi- 
ally in the Christian life where such a situation does arise, but the 
norm is clearly to have human reasoning working within the ordered 
relationship with the Lex Aeterna. 
"In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula 
proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema 
est lex aeterna ... Manifestum est autem ex prae- 
missis, quod omnis actus voluntarius est malus 
per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis 
aeternae, et omnia actus bonus concordat rationi 
et legi aeternae". (2) 
Reason is called the proximate, or homogeneous, standard., while the 
Lex Aeterna is called the supreme or prime standard of human conduct. 
. ., r' 
Grace: Lex Nova, Lex Evangelii. 
It is possible to suggest occasions- where man's conduct might 
be ruled not according to reason directly - his proximate or homogen- 
eous standard - but by this prime or supreme standard, the Lex Aeterna. 
It is precisely in this area that we find the Gifts of the Spirit loca- 
ted. 3 In the following text on the infused virtues the point sug- 
gested is that human reason can function only within a narrow spec- 
tram within the Lex Aeterna. By consenting freely to the educative 
tendencies of the Lex Aeterna,, man can act beyond the range of his 
own reason by relying on the same external principle which underpins 
his own rationality. 
1. Strictly speaking 'ratio' should not be used of God, see 
Ia, q. 14, a. 1, ad3um, q. 14, ä. 7 and q. 85, a. 5.2. IaIIae, q. 21, a. 1. 
3. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 1, a. 2. See chapter 2 above. 
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".... virtus hominis. perficit ipsum ad bonum. Gum 
autem ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et or- 
dine, ut Augustinus dicit ..., oportet quod bonum 
hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. 
Owe quidem est duplex ... scilicet ratio humana 
et lax diving. Et quia lex diving est superior 
regular ideo ad plura se extendit: ita quod quid-. 
quid regu'latur ratione humana, regulatur etiam 
lege divina; sed non convertitur. 
Virtus igitur hominis ordinata ad bonuni quod 
modificatur secundum regulam rationis humane, 
potest ex actibus humanis causari inquantum hujus- 
modi actus procedunt a ratione, sub cujus. potes- 
tate et regula tale bonuni consistit. Virtus 
--. vero ordinana hominem ad bonuni, secundum quod modi-, 
ficatur per legem divinam et non per rationem 
--humanam, non potest causari per actos humans, 
quorum principium est ratio; sed causatur solum 
in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo hujus- 
modi virtutem definiens Augustinus, posuit in de- 
fin itione virtutis: ouam Deus in nobis sine 
nobis operatur. (1) 
As regards intelligent creatures - men and angels - the Lex Aeterna 
is not completed by their consenting to their natural fulfillment, 
but by their consenting to share in a form of life which is beyond., 
their own abilities, that of God himself. Here the derived form of 
the Lex Aeterna is expressed as the Lex Divines-) which itself, for men, 
2 is historically articulated as the Old Covenant and the New Covenant. 
This New Covenant, this new canon of direction, is given to 
men only as part of a relationship of knowledge and love which we call 
grace. The infused virtues and the Gifts structure and develop this 
relationship but it is essentially the gift of the Holy Spirit. 
"Et ideo principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia 
, Spiritus sancti, quae datur Christi fidelibus. " (3) 
"... principalitas legis novae est gratis Spiritus 
sancti quae manifestatur in fide per dilectionem 
operante". (4) 
As we have noted above, man can either be subject to the rule of Lex 
in which case it is only in an improper sense that he can be said to 
1. IaIIae, q. 63, a. 2.2. IaIIae, q. 91, a. 4.3. IaIIae, 
q. 106, a. 1.4. IaIIae, q. 108, a. 1. 
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have the law., or he can freely consent to the ordering of lex and so 
open himself to a greater form of human flourishing and fulfillment. 
This consent needs to be a positive and receptive one and not a merely 
neutral acceptance. In terms of the New Law of the New Covenant it 
is only by union with the Holy Spirit, in the relationship of knowledge 
and love which is called grace, that man can consent to this new order- 
ing and tendency and so act divinely and humanly beyond his rationality. 
As man freely consents to his own rational direction of his inclina- 
tions by the habitus we call virtues, so he can freely consent to this 
more-than-rational direction by the theological virtues of charity, 
faith and hope, and the infused virtues which flow from them, includ- 
ing the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. 
1 
'r... animus hominis non movetur a Spiritu Sancto, 
nisi ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur ... Prima 
autem unto hominis est per fidem, spem et cari- 
tatem. Unde istae virtutes-praesupponuntur ad 
dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum". (2) 
For Thomas the movement of thought from law to grace seems to 
be an easy and smooth one. flex', at its highest, seems to be trans- 
formed into something beyond itself; annihilated in its completion 
and become, grace. 
3 It seems to the present writer that the term 
flex' had some meaning for Thomas which we, with our modern categories 
of thcught, find almost impossible to grasp. For him the movement 
from law to grace appears to require little or no explanation. 
4 For 
us, at times, it almost defies explanation. Yet in as much as this 
1. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2, a. 3, a. 4.2. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 4, ad3um. 
3. The relationship between IaIIae, q. 106-108, and IaIIae, q. 109, is 
far from clear. See also in S. C. G. III, 147-150 where liivinum auxi- 
lium' becomes 'aratia Dei'. 4. St Thomas was quite aware of St 
? aid's theology constructed on the battlefield between his own concepts 
of 'law' and 'grace': he was also aware - lovingly aware - of St 
Augustine's stress on the difference between the spirit and the letter 
of the law. But St Thomas' concept of flex' is none of these. 
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topic baffles us, so much do we fail to grasp what is hidden in Thomas' 
presuppositions; vital presuppositions which are the architectural 
foundations of his vision of the whole cosmic order of providence and 
predestination. 
An attempt at gaining some insight can be initiated by recalling 
some of the major themes which have already emerged. Firstly it is 
only too easy for us, as modern readers, to fail to appreciate that 
within Thomas' view of man there is presupposed both a communal dimen- 
sion and a teleology. 
"We cannot begin to understand St Thomas until we 
realize that for him man is fundamentally charac- 
terised in two ways: no man is entire unto him- 
self (homo est animal socials) (1) and every man 
is goal-seeking proprium est naturae rationalis 
ut tendat in finem quasi se azens vel ducens ad 
finem) (2). and, further, that these two features 
of his being are so intimately interconnected 
that his being has to be thought of not merely 
as a being-with but as a being-towards, or, com-' "" 
positely, as a being whose destiny it is con- 
sciously to enjoy sharing being-towards. Be- 
cause every man is not merely goal-seeking but 
, 
made for community, he will want the goal he 
seeks to be a shared one, a community goal: his 
fulfillment is to be found in his doing his bit 
for a common good along with others doing their 
bit, his satisfaction is to come from playing 
his part in the symphony of society". (3) 
The notion of friendship, then, is not something suddenly added to 
the notion of law from outside it; it is presupposed throughout. 
This communal dimension of law is precisely'what distinguishes it 
from man's reasoning. 
4 
We might probe further into the theme of friendship by refer- 
ring back to the-classical -as opposed to scriptural -origins of 
this theme in our Western tradition. Aristotle remarks, 
A. Ia, q. 96, a. 4; IaIIae, q. 90, a. 2, q. 94, a. 2; IIaIIae, q. 57, a. 1, 
q. 58, a. 1-2.2. IaIIae, q. l, a. 2.3. M. Lefebure, Gilby, vol. 38, 
p. xia. 4. Above p. 208ff. 
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"Lawgivers seem to make friendship a more important 
aim than justice". (1) 
The reason given for this is that justice is the virtue of rewarding 
deserts within an already consitituted community, but friendship is 
required for that initial constitution. 
2 For Aristotle, and for Tho- 
mas, the polis is a'koinonia. 
3 This is so different from our modern, 
bourgeois, liberal view of the state that it is only by an effort that 
we can appreciate and remember it. When Thomas introduces charity - 
amicitia Dei - as the foundation of the new community of mankind and 
God, he is taking up all that the Western tradition, pagan and Chris- 
tian, presents at its best and showing how it is enlarged, increased 
and divinised by grace. 
It is in this new koinonia, this new commonwealth, of mankind 
and God, that justice is transformed back into love. 
... when marl are friends they have no need for jus- 
tice, while when they are just they need friendship 
as well, and the truest form of justice is thought 
to be a friendly quality". (4) 
This is Aristotle not Aquinas. Thomas extends this divine gift of 
friendship not"only to be the foundation of the new 'law' of grace, 
but also the foundation' stone of the whole creation. 
5 
A second theme'that has emerged is that of consent to the law. ' 
Only the man who appropriates the law into himself so that he acts 
spontaneously 'has' the law and is not 'under' it. This is all the 
more true with the new 'law' appropriate to the glorious liberty of 
the children of God. 
"Quicumque ergo agit ex seipso, libere agit; qui 
vero ex also motus, non Qgit libere. I3-le ergo, czui vitat mala, 
non ouia: mala, sed propter mandatum Domini, 'non est liber; 
sed qui vitat mala quiamala, est liber. Hoc autem 
1. Nic. Ethics. ii55 a. 24.2. ibid. See A. MacIntyre, 
After Virtue, (198279 P. 147.3. Pol. I. 1: 1252 a. 1, see Finis, 
p. 157.4. Nic. Ethics, 1155 a. 25.5. On divine mercy having 
priority over divine justice, see Ia, q. 21., a. 3, a. 4. 
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facit Spiritus Sanctus, qui mentem interius perfi- 
cit per bonuni habit=, ut sic ex amore caveat, ac 
si praeciperet lex divina: at ideo dicitur liber.,, 
non quia subdatur legi divine, sed quia ex bono 
habitu inclinatur ad hoc faciendum quod lex divina. 
ordinat". (1) 
Man's consent to appropriating into his own spontaneity the new 'law' 
of grace is a response of love and joy. The new 'law' of the gospel 
may appear to be more burdensome but Thomas quotes Augustine: 
... non sunt gravia amanti, sed non amanti sunt 
gravia" (2) 
This spontaneity, joy and promptitude is a result of the infused vir- 
tues - and the Gifts of the Spirit - which are ramifications of charity. 
Moreover, consent within this new 'law' is not as a consent to 
means towards an tend' - as in other forms of hext - but is consent 
3 
to the tend? itself. 
"Natura enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout est 
principium et finis naturalis boni: caritas 
autem, secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis 
et secundum quod homo habet quamdam societatem 
spiritualem cure Deo. Addit etiam caritas super 
naturalem dilectionem Dei promptitudinem quamdam 
et delectationem ... ". 
(4) 
This self-appropriation of the new 'law' is to be seen in terms of 
'play' rather than 'duty'. 
5 Just as a man works for an 'end' but 
'plays? - tennis, chess, listens to opera, enjoys company, etc. - for 
the sheer delight in it, as an tend in itself', so the 'play' of the 
new 'law' of friendship is said to be already a foretaste of the total 
hunan flourishing of Beatitude. 
6 
In a sense, it has no 'end', no pur- 
pose beyond itself. 
. 
1. In 2 Cor., cap. 3, lect. 3.2. IaIIae, q. 107, a. 4. 
3. Hence the theological virtues are said to have God themselves as 
their 'ob ectum', IaIIae, q. 62.4. IaIIae, q. 109, a. 3, adlum, a-4- 
5. My terminology is obviously modern but can be justified in terms 
of Thomas use of Augustine's emphasis on joy and delight, and on the 
distinction between the 'spirit' and the 'letter' in IaIIae, q. 106, a. 1 
and elsewhere. 6. See below p. 301 ff. 
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Finally,, all. forms, of '. ex' are teleological as well as conmm- 
nal. The life of friendship. with God, thongh*begun on earth, in via, 
will be completed only, in heaven, in patria. 
1 There all the poten- 
tialities. of, human flourishing will be actualized in the activity of 
beholding the Beatific Vision. This, is not an lend' within the natu- 
ral order-but the 'end', of the whole, created order itself. 
"... gnae haec". beatitudo non est aliquid naturae, 
sed naturae finis". (2) 
We have studied the extrinsic principle of man's movement to- 
wards the good as expressed in terms of law and grace. This has ex- 
panded our awareness of the context in which the Gifts of the Spirit 
are said to operate. The teleological theme has emerged as a dominant 
one. Law, like the Gifts. of the Spirit, has been presented as educa- 
tive; giving direction to man' further fulfillment within and beyond 
the scope of his own capabilities. The notion of consent is crucial 
here, both, as we have seen in earlier chapters, in the receptivity 
which the Gifts provide, and, in terms of law, in the major distinc- 
tion between 'having the law' and 'being under the law'. This free- 
dom which a man has who 'has the law' is sited within a communal dimen- 
sion expressed, in terms of grace, as amicitia, the shared life of 
friendship. We have seen too how the use of the model of 'partici- 
pation' has allowed all the various forms of law - natural, human and 
divine, - to be presented as harmonious derivations from the Lex 
Aeterna. Our discussion of Natural Law has shown too how all man's 
potentialities and drives are taken up in these higher orderings of 
1. This tension will be the subject of the final chapter dealing 
with the teleology implicit in Thomas' treatment of the Gifts of the 
Spirit, below p. 291ff. 2. Ia, q. 62, a. 1. 
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reason, law and grace. Earlier, in chapter 4, we ncted how the var- 
ious individual Gifts of the Spirit relate to the whole spectrum of 
man's potentialities and drives, as do the acquired and infused vir- 
tues. With this larger context for our subsequent discussion, we can 
now pass on to Thomas' treatment of the Gifts in the Secunda Secundae 
where he studies this interrelation between virtues and Gifts in the 
whole harmony of man's movement towards fulfillment to which God in- 
vites him. 




In theprologue to the Secunda Secundae, Thomas-outlines his 
plan for dealing with all matters relating to morality in general under 
the headings of the three theological and four cardinal virtues. The 
discussion'of each virtue will be followed by a discussion of the Gift 
which Thomas considers to correspond to that virtue. This means that 
in the Secunda Secnndae we cannot have an adequate understanding of 
either virtue or Gift-if we'try to understand them separately. The 
virtues perfect man's free use of his natural powers; the Gifts do the 
same but from a source outside man himself. ` These two movements are 
not to be seen as alternatives, nor even as parallel movements. ' There 
is only one activity under study here - that of man's autonomy. 
1 But 
this autonomous activity needs to be analysed in terms of its two prin- 
ciples, man himself, and God. 
2 The interplay between virtue and Gift, 
which is a theme of the Secunda Secundae, 'reflects the interplay be- 
tween activity and receptivity within man's life under grace. 
What should also be borne in mind is', that'Thomas never identi- 
fies the instinctus of the Spirit in the Gifts with any definite kind 
of inspiration. He deliberately uses the term instinctus to avoid 
specifying any one way in which the Spirit is active through the Gifts. 
3 
We are therefore not looking for any one form'of activity which we can 
contrast with that of the virtues. At times it may be pre-rational 
or pre-volitional, at others, the Spirit may work within and through 
the activity of the virtues, as in the'Gift of consiliwn. 
4 We are 
dealing then with one single human activity but seeing its as it*were, 
in two dimensions. 
. 
1. Prologue to the-Prima Secundae:. 'restat ut consideremus 
... de homine secundum quod et 
ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi 
libernm arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem'. 2. The ba- 
sic division of the Prima Secundae, see IaIIae, q. 49, intro, and above 
p. 3.3. See above, p. 33 . 4. See below, p. 280ff and 
above, p. 114. 
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There are significant changes between the two parts of the Secun- 
da Pars regarding the roles of various individual Gifts: the cases of 
the gifts of piety and understanding, (intellectus) being the main exam- 
ples. Previously, Thomas had followed the main scholastic interpreta- 
tion on the virtue and Gift of piety, seeing it as having a twofold 
function, one in regard to God and one in regard to men as the image 
of God. In his earlier works Thomas had emphasised the latter aspect, 
as had Albert and Eonaventure. 
1 In this way, piety was seen primarily 
as compassion. 
2 In the Secunda Secundae, however, its richer theocen- 
trio nature is stressed. 
3 This, as O'Connor points out, is a return 
4 
to the insight of Augustine. But this particular change in detail 
is only an example of a change in mood in which the Gifts are discussed 
in the Secunda Secundae. Here all the Gifts are discussed in a more 
theocentric trajectory. This is manifestly clear in the dominant role 
assigned to the theological virtues. 
In both his Commentary on the Sentences and in the Prima Secun- 
das Thomas had assigned no Gifts to the theological virtues which unite 
an and God. In the Commentary on the Sentences he'had followed the 
arrangement of the parent text and divided the Gifts between the con- 
templative and active lives. In the Prima Secundae this division is 
transposed into a division between the reasoning and appetitive facul- 
ties of man with the former further divided between man's speculative 
reason and his practical reason. In the Secunda Secundae, however, 
it is precisely the theological virtues which provide the basis for 
his arrangement of the Gifts. 
1.. III. Sent. 34.3.2.; IaIIae, q. 68, a. 4. See O'Connor, p. 127. 
2. IalIae, q. 8, a. 6, ad3um. 3. IIaIIae, q. 121, a. 1. See below p. 291. 
4. O'Connor, p. 127. 
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Commentary, on the Sentences 
Principle - According to the needs of the two lives. 
Contemplative Life 







regarding others piety 
irascible emotions fortitude 
concupiscible emotions fear 
Principle - According to the functions of the faculties. 
Speculative Reason Practical Reason 
apprehension , 
intellectus apprehension consilium 
judgement wisdom judgement scientia 
ADuetite 
regarding others piety 
regarding oneself against fear fortitude 
against concupiscence fear 
a 
Secunda Secundae 
Principle - According to the virtues. 
CHARITY is the root of all the, infused virtues and Gifts. Allied with 
it is the, gift of WISDOM. 
HOPE, working through charity, is allied with the Gift'of filial fear, 
or FEAR OF THE LORD. 
1. This table is partly based on one given by O'Connor, O'Connor, 
p. 130. With three of the Gifts, the latin name has been left untrans- 
lated - intellectus, scientia and co_. Any modern English trans- 
lation would be misleading and by retaining Thomas' own terminology it 
is easier to remember his own interpretation of them and to-see them as 
terms used also in his epistemology and general philosophy and not as 
uniquely 'religious' terms. On consilium in particular see below, p. 
280. 
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FAITH, working through' charity, is allied with: - 
INTELLECTUS, as understanding and insight, 
SCIENTIA as judgement through created things. 
Nfan's judgement through divine realities is perfected by 
WISDOM). 
The Infused Cardinal Virtues: - 
PRUDENCE, as perfected practical reasoningdirecting all the moral vir- 
tues, is allied with the Gift of CONSILIUM. 
JUSTICE is allied with the Gift of PIETY. 
COURAGE is allied with the Gift of FORTITUDE. 
TEMP NCE is allied, in a secondary way, with the Gift of FEAR OF THE 
LORD. 
So it is now within a clearly theological context that the ac- 
tions and motivations of man are discussed. The same theocentricism 
which caused the change regarding piety, caused an even greater change 
with the Gift of understanding (intellectus). The 13th century tradition 
had limited this Gift and the Gift of wisdom, (sapientia), to the area 
of divine contemplation, and limited knowledge, (scientia) to the use 
we make of temporal goods and our earthly activity. 
1 This corresponded 
to the division between contemplative and practical understanding which 
Thomas took as his basis in the Commentary on the Sentences. Peter 
Lombard had in fact made this division authoritative and all the Scho- 
lastics followed it. Now, however, Thomas undermines it. The Gift 
2 
of intellectus is now said to be engaged with practical matters as well 
as with truths to be contemplated. The traditional strict division 
between divine matters and human matters is thus removed. Both are 
now seen within a theocentric whole. 
Dicendum quad operabilia humana secundum quod in se 
considerantur. non habent aliquam excellentiae alti- 
tudinem; sed secundum quod referuntur ad regulam 
legis aeternae, et ad finem beatitudinis divine, 
sic altitudinem habent, ut circa ea possit esse in- 
tellectus. (3) 
1. See O'Connor, p. 125.2. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 6. See below 
p. 246ff. 3. IIaIlae, q. 8, a. 3, adlum. 
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Man's activity is the matter for the Gift of intellectus because it 
is a manifestation of the Lex Aeterna and an expression of man's pur- 
posive drive towards Beatitude. = Nothing here is taken away from nfan's 
humanity, rather it-is enhanced by being fully acknowledged both in 
itself and within this larger framework of the divine plan of Provi- 
dence. 
One further introductory point ought to be made regarding the 
Gifts in the Secunda Secundae. Although Thomas assigns each Gift to 
a virtue, and although he is concerned to show that each Gift is dis- 
tinct in its nature, yet it does seem as if"we are not to understand 
this schema as presenting seven discrete sectors of the moral life. 
Just as the virtues are interrelated in a complex but hierarchical unity, 
so are the Gifts. But the way the Gifts relate to each other, and to 
their corresponding virtue, is polymorphic. Charity and wisdom are 
united as the triumph of personal communion between man and the three 
persons of the Trinity. It is not clear how wisdom can be said to 
'perfect' charity in any way; rather it is a manifestation of the 
unity of the will (charity) and the intellect, (wisdom) in the triumph 
of grace. Thomas is no longer bound by his own schema. 
1 Similarly, 
fear. does not-'perfect' hope, but, as being the first of the Gifts 
creating a basic docility to the Spirit, is a vital aspect of the vir- 
tue of hope. -What seems to follow from this approach is that no one 
pairing of virtue and Gift is to be taken as a fixed molecule of the 
moral life. The Gifts interrelate so that one can say that just as 
fear of the Lord, is the first Gift, opening up man's responsiveness 
and docility, and being a permaný3nt dimension of this; and as wisdom 
is the culmination of the Gifts, so cons_ is not so much a distinctive 
1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 4. 
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entity as the mode in which the Holy Spirit moves the rational crea- 
ture to act. What the Giftsýof the Spirit seem to be, then, is a 
series of aspects of what is meant by man's openness to the Spirit's 
promptings. The discussion of each Gift is, as it were, an essay in 
some dimension of man's openness to the sanctifying Spirit. 
Yet, having-said all this, and appreciating the use both of Aris- 
totle's moral philosophy of the virtues and the larger theocentric vi- 
sion and dynamism, still a certain unease remains. One might ques- 
tion the justification for categorising all man's moral life, in all 
its complexity, into this schema of seven virtues, four of them Greek 
and philosophical, three of them Christian and theological. . 
And yet 
how is one to present an ordered analysis of the Christian moral life ? 
Thomas, in his Prologue, - is well aware of the difficulties and presents 
this as the scheme he will use in-this text-book. 
1 It has the advan- 
tage of being orderly and, uniting philosophy and theologsr, it presents 
a clear-educational method for beginners in theology. But the real 
problem-lies not so much in the basic structure but in its further de- 
velopment in relation to the Gifts. Along with each virtue, opposing 
vice and associated precept and corresponding Gift, Thomas also links 
to each Gift a particular beatitude and an associated fruit of the 
Spirit. - It is here that one feels that the desire for order and cla- 
rity of-presentation is controlling the material, and Thomas himself 
admits to certain hesitations. 
2 Augustine had united the Gifts fron 
Isaiah with the Beatitudes from Matthew. 
3 The Scholastics had fur- 
ther incorporated the fruits of the Spirit into this ordering. 
4 The 
detailed working-out of this scheme cannot but appear forced and artificial. 
1. Prologue IIaIIae. 2. IIaIIäe, q. 121, a. 2; q. 139, a. 2. 
3. ` De sermone domini, 1.4. P. L. 34., 1234-1235. There is atranslation 
and discussion in O'Connor, p. 91.4. O'Connor, p. 107. 
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Nevertheless, even though the precise assignment of particular Gifts, 
beatitudes and fruits cannot bear too much weight and may be the re- 
sult of a scholastic emphasis on systematisation, yet there is a deeper 
metaphysical structure underlying this systematisation. Thomas' basic 
model for analysing human activity is in terms of the schema, essence- 
-powers-habits-acts-fruition. 
1 The beatitudes correspond to acti- 
vity flowing from the perfecting habitus of the virtues and Gifts in 
man's faculties: the fruits correspond to the accomplishment of this 
perfect activity. 
2 
One further point is that, in the Secunda Secundae, Thomas is 
not writing a monograph on the Gifts, or even on the virtues. The 
Gifts cannot be understood as if they were isolated erratics but only 
as embedded within man's whole movement towards God, ad patriam. A 
study of the Gifts inevitably involves then certain forays into Tho- 
mast treatment of related areas, for example, on the virtue of faith. 
Moreover we must also respect Thomas' use of. analogr: that certain 
concepts can be transposed, with qualifications and modifications,,. from 
the human, to the angelic, to the divine level; and from nature to 
grace. It is in this way that Thomas presents the intellectual Gifts 
and virtues of wisdom, intellectus and scientia. Unless we appre- 
3 
ciate these wider visions, which Thomas presupposes, we cannot appre- 
ciate his particular treatment of the individual Gifts. 
1. See above p. 49 and below p. 302.2. See below p. 303. 
3. Prologue IIaIIae. 
9. THE, INTELLECTUAL GIFTS ALLIED WITH FAITH AND CHARITY 
- The Gifts of Intellectus and Scientia 




Thomas associates the Gifts of scientia and intellectus with 
the theological virtue of faith. Of the other two intellectual Gifts, 
wisdom is associated with the supreme and prime virtue of charity, and 
cons_ with the infused virtue central to the moral life, infused 
prudence. We shall deal first with the Gifts relating to faith. 
The Gifts of Intellectus and Scientia. 
Obviously we cannot give a full account of Thomas' treatise 
on faith and so we will restrict our discussion to the major central 
topics and to points which relate particularly to the Gifts of the 
Spirit. Thomas associates the two intellectual Gifts of scientia 
and intellectus with the virtue of faith and so these will be our 
prime area of study. However, if we are correct in claiming that 
Thomas now treats the seven Gifts as interconnected and, as it were, 
seven modes of the Spirit's activity in man rather than seven distinct 
areas, then we cannot just correlate these two Gifts alone with the 
virtue of fttb. Above all, just as faith is vivified only in as much 
as it is united with charity, so faith and all the Gifts are united 
with charity and wisdom. Nevertheless, having said this, the associa- 
tion between these two intellectual Gifts and the virtue of faith is 
obvious. Faith is, above all, a form of knowledge. 
But if faith is a kind of knowledge, it is knowledge that is 
based on neither a direct apprehension of its object of knowledge, nor 
on demonstrative proof of the existence of that object. It is know- 
ledge of another kind. 
'A1io modo intellectus assentit alicui non quia 
suffic3enter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per 
quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam 
partem magis quarr in. aliam. (1) 
1. IIaIIae, q. 1, a. 4. 
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Faith, then, is in a way akin to opinion in that it cannot rationally 
prove the correctness of its stance. It differs from opinion however 
in that it. does not waver in an uncommitted fashion. On the contrary, 
it is precisely committed to the stance it has taken. In this way it 
is akin to knowledge or logical reasoning in that it involves full 
assent to the position that it arrives at. Faith, of its nature, is 
then intellectually unsatisfying because it is impossible to both 'know' 
1 
and 'believe" at the same time. 
As regards faith in God, the assent of faith is faith in God 
as Veritas Prima. 
2 It is faith in what Truth itself has revealed 
about Truth itself, God, and, in a secondary fashion., about what per- 
tains to God. 
3 God as Veritas Prima is both the medium and the mes- 
sage of faith, both the content and that which evokes the assent of 
faith. 4 For Thomas, Christian faith is not directly faith in the 
Bible, the Church or the articles of faith, but faith in God. 
5 Every- 
thing else, within the area of faith, is a result of mants human need 
to express what is simple in itself in terms of propositions, articles 
and images. 
Actus enim credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, 
sed ad rem; non enim formamus enuntiabilia nisi ut 
per ea de rebus cogritionem habeamus, sicat in scien- 
.. 
tia ita et in fide. (6) 
It is in believing God and believing in God that, man has faith; the 
rest, the articles of faith, follow from, this. 
But how does God educe man's other-than-rational assent to a 
rational stance ? Firstly, why is it necessary for man to assent to 
what is beyond his rationality ? Thomas answers this question in 
1. IIaIIae, q. 1, a. 5.2. IIaIIae, q. l, a. 1.3. IIaIIaa, 
q. 1, a. 1.4. IIaIlae, q. 1, a. 1.5. Put at its clearest in 
IaIIae, q. 113, a. 4, obj3 and ad3um. 6. IIaIIae, q. l, ad2um. 
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terms that belong to a cosmological scheme with which we are now very 
familiar.. 
Dicendum quod in omnibus'naturis ordinatis invenitur 
quod ad perfectionem naturae inferioris duo concur- 
runt: unum quidem gýqq Rý secundum proprium motum; 
aliud autem quod est"mo um superioris naturae ... 
... Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet imme- diatum ordinem ad Deum. ... Natura autem rationa- lis, inquantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis 
rationem, habet immediatum ordinem ad universale es- 
sendi principium. Perfectio ergo rationalis creatu- 
rae non solum consistit ineo quod ei competit secun- 
dum suam naturam sed in eo etiam cruod ei attributur 
ex quadam. supernaturali participatione divinae boni- 
tatis. ..... Ad quarr quidem visionem homo pertingere 
non potest nisi per modem addiscentis a Deo doctors, 
secundum illud Joann., Omnis gui audit a Patre et 
didicit venit ad me. Hujus autem disciplinae fit 
homo particeps non statim sed successive secundum 
modus suae naturae. Qnnis autem talis addiscens 
oportet quod credat ad hoc quod ad perfectam scien-° 
tiara perveniat, sicut etiam Philosophus dicit cuod 
oportet addiscentem credere. Unde ad hoc quoll homo 
perveniat ad perfectas visionem beatitudinis paeexi- 
gitur quod credat Deo tamquam discipulus magistro 
docenti. (1) 
Man therefore needs to be a pupil, and a docile pupil, to have insight 
into what is beyond him. What he cannot establish by his own intel- 
lect he must take on trust from Truth itself as a beginner needs to 
accept on trust what his teacher tells hixn The picture given here 
is of a life of faith rather than a single act of faith: a picture of 
God continually instructing man not at one instant - statim - but 
throughout a life of faith - successive, secundum modum suae naturae 
This picture of a constant and close tutorship is identical to the one 
presented in regard to the Gifts in question sixty-eight. 
2 Faith is 
not an act but avirtue, a habitus; a permanent disposition within 
man's understanding. It is a settled pattern of appreciation with 
which*the'divine'rreality can be assented to. 
1. IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 3.2. IaIIae, q. 69, a. 1, a. 2. 
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"Ita etiam per habitus fidei inclinatur mens homi- 
nis ad assentiendum his quas conveniunt rectaw 
fidei et non aliis". (1) 
Like the Gifts, faith is-a habitus which sets up a pattern of recepti- 
vity to further divine impulses. Like the Gifts, it is infused by 
God. It is part of 'habitual' grace in man which makes him receptive 
to the movements of 'actual grace'. 
2 
But if we are to see how God educes man's assent to what He 
teaches, then we need to say more, and, interestingly enough, the lan- 
guage here is again similar to that used of the Gifts. The content 
of faith, -comes ex auditu, by preaching and teaching, but the assent 
of faith comes not just from an intrinsic conviction of what is prea- 
ched, nor just from man's free judgement - that would be Pelagian - 
but from a movement of assent within man caused by God. 
"Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est princi- 
palis actus fidel, est a Deo interius movente per 
gratiam". (3) 
There are then two motives for belief, but the internal one is the most 
important. 
"... ille qui credit habet sufficiens inductivum ad 
credenduzn; inducitur enim auctoritate divine doc- 
trinae miraculis conlirmatae, et, quod plus est, interioriinstinctu Doi invitantis. Unde non levi- 
ter credit". (4) 
The central activity of faith is the habitual responsiveness of man to 
the instinctu Dei invitantis. 
But if faith, like the Gifts, is an infused habitus, and if, 
like them, it is a habitus which permanently disposes man to be recep- 
tive to the impulses of God within him, it differs"from'the Gifts in 
that it operates solely within human rationality and the human will. 
1. IIaIIae, q. 1, a. 4, ad3um. 2. See IaIlae, q. 109, a. 9. and 
below p. 246 . 3. IIaIIae, q. 6, a'. 1. '° 4. IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 9, ad3um. 
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Despite the grandeur of faith, Thomas is quite clear that faith is a 
strain and an intellectually unsatisfying form of knowledge and one 
which will undoubtably pass away in patria. For this reason he re- 
interprets, the'traditional phrase, credere est cum assensione co stare 
It was thought that the phrase, and the ideas'behind it, were Augustiners, 
but it is of twelfth century origin. 
' Thomas reinterpreted it in terms 
of Aristotelian epistemology. while accepting that faith is vivified 
when united with charity., and while accepting that the will is-invol- 
ved in the act of faith, Thomas also stressed the intellectual nature 
of faith. He has no place for an understanding of faith in terms of 
blind love or blind faith; voluntarism or Kierkegaardian existentia- 
lism. He takes co tare in the traditional phrase to refer to the 
Aristotelian understanding of man's mode of intellectual activity, 
reasoning. 
"cogitatio proprie dicitur motus animi deliberan- 
tis nondum perfecta per plenam visionem verita-} 
tis". (2) 
There is an incompleteness in human -ratiocination which is completed 
When full understanding, (intellectus) is achieved. In regard to faith, 
however, cogitation is intrinsically incomplete and unsatisfied, in- 
herently imperfect. A quotation from the De Veritate will make the 
point clearer than the relevant passage in the Summa. 
... fides habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectionis: perfectionis quidem est"ipsa fir- 
mitas, quae pertinet ad assensum; sed imperfec- 
tionis est carentia visionis, ex qua remanet ad- 
hunc motus cogitationis in mente credentis. Ex 
lumine igitur simplici, quod est fides, causatur 
id quod perfectionis est, scilicet assentire; 
sed in quantum illud lumen non perfecte participa-'%'; `' 
tur, non totaliter tollitur imperfectio intellec- 
tus: et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet 
inquietus". (3) 
1. For an excellent and detailed discussion on this phrase, see 
T. C. O'Brien, in Gilby, vol. 31, pp. 205-215.2. IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1. 
3. De Veritate, XIV, 1, ad5um. 
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What then does the Gift of intellectus add to the virtue of 
faith with which it is linked ?1 Thomas begins with a dubious piece 
of etymology, taking intelligere to mean intus legere, that is, "to 
read within', to penetrate to the basic essentials of a particular 
matter. He contrasts the activity of man's senses with his intellec- 
tual understanding of what his senses provide. 
"nam cognitio sensitiva occupa_tur circa qualitates 
sensibiles exteriores, cognitio autem intellective 
penetrat usque ad essentiam rei. Objectum enim in- 
tellectus est Quod acid est, ut dicitur in de Anima". (2) 
In question eight, article seven, he returns to this comparison when 
he linkes this Gift with the beatitude, 'Blessed are the pure in heart 
for they shall see God'. , The cleansing of the heart in regard to in- 
ordinate affections is achieved by the other Gifts and virtues which 
pertain to man's affectivitp., but as regards the vision of God there 
is a second, an intellectual, cleansing. r... ;, - 11 1 
"Alia vero munditia cordis est quasi completiva res- 
pectu visionis divine; et haec quidem est mundi- 
tia mentis depuratae a phantasmatibus et erroribus, 
ut scilicet ea quae de Deo proponuntur, non acci- 
piantur per modem corporalium phantasmatum, nee 
secundum haereticas perversitates; et hanc mundi- 
tiam facit donum intellectus". (3) 
What needs to be assumed here is that it is basic to Thomas' epistemo- 
logy that man's intellectual understanding is always dependent on his 
senses. 
4 The world which surrounds man and with which he is in con- 
tact-through his senses, is not immediately intelligible to him. 
Man's creative intellect mast work on his sense experience, (hp antas- 
_), to provide him with ideas, (species), by which he understands 
reality. - These ideas, it must be stressed, are not what man under- 
stands, (id guod intelligitur), but that by which he understands rea- 
lity, (id quo intelligitur). Even in regard then to his natural 
1. IIaIIae, q. 8.2. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 1.3. IIaIlae, q. 8, a. 7. 
4. On this see Ia, q. 79. 
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environment, man does not have an immediate intuition of reality but 
acquires understanding-only-through a process of intellectual activity. 
Within this process man is dependent on sense-data, imagination, lan- 
guage, 'concepts, ideas and symbols; all of them in themselves rooted 
in sense experience. Simple understanding then intellectus, is not 
itself such a simple matter and needs to be checked, -correlated and 
disciplined to avoid error and mistakes. Moreover human understanding 
is not just a matter of simple apprehension but of understanding com- 
plex states, events and propositions. Here the process is more ex- 
tended involving the use of reasoning. 
"Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intel- 
ligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est 
procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud ad veritatem 
intelligibilem cognosce ndam". (1) 
Reasoning is a movement from a simple understanding to a perfect under- 
standing. The angels, as purely intellectual-beings, do not use'this 
process of comparison and analysis, but it is natural to man, a ratio- 
nal creature. 
2`'' 
But the Gift of intefectus is compared with our first'insight 
into the nature of things, our first apprehension of their reality, 
and not to discursive reasoning. Hence the contrast with sense ex- 
perience, which may or may not correlate with reality outside us. 
The Gift of intellectus, " then gives an assurance of the reality of the 
things of faith; a certitude about the reality beyond the images, 
3 
symbols and creeds 'of the faith. 
But should we not ask whether this penetrative certainty about 
the matters of faith is actually. compatible with faith ? Have,. we not 
moved out of the area, of faith into that of knowledge ? Yet as Thomas 
1. Ia, q. 79, a. 8.2. ibid.., also, IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 1, ad2um, 
Ia, q. 54-q. 58.3. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 8, adlum. 
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made clear in, the preceeding questions it is impossible both"to believe 
1 and to know at the- same time. -, The Gift of intellectus must be under- 
stood as, operative within faith and not outwith-it. This is the im- 
portent point raised in article two of question eight. 
Thomas presents. two sets of distinctions. As regards under- 
standing, he-distinguishes between perfect and imperfect understanding. 
Perfectryunderstanding, the end of the reasoning process, is impossible 
within faith where.. tmotus-cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus!. 
2° 
Bat imperfect-understanding is possible. 
"Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligi imperfecte, 
quando scilicet ipsa essentia rei, vel veritas 
propositionis non cognoscitur quid sit auf quo- 
modo sit; sed tarnen cognoscitur quod ea quae ex- terius apparent veritati non contrariantur, in- - 
quantum scilicet homo intelligit quod propter ea 
quaeeaterius apparent nonest recedendum ab his 
quas sunt fides". (3) 
Now as regards faith,. there is also a distinction to be made between. --ý- 
those matters which have a bearing towards faith and are open to cor- 
relation from the human sciences, such as facts recorded in scripture; 
and those matters, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, which are 
strictly of faith alone. 
4 Putting these two sets of distinctions. to- 
Bether, Thomas holds that we can have perfect knowledge of the things 
that bear on"faith, but only imperfect, though genuine, knowledge of 
the things of faith itself. 
Rather than providing an increase in data for faith, then, the 
work of this Gift is more purgative than accumulative. 
5 It works 
within man's life of faith to penetrate through false conceptions of 
1. IIaIIae, q. 1, a. 5.2. De Veritate, XIV, 1, ad5um, quoted 
above p. 234 . 3. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 2.4. This is an important distinction and follows a 
, 
pattern common in Thomas' thought; the most 
important corresponding pattern of argument is in IaIIae, q. 106, a. 1 on the New Law and those things which dispose a man towards it or govern 
the exercise of it. 5. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 7. 
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God and his ways to give a certain strength and assurance within the 
intellectual inquietude which results from this imperfect but genuine 
knowledge. The Gift, in relation to the things that bear on faith, 
and in relation to the symbols and propositions which are the articu- 
lations. of faith, ensures that these elements are accepted in the right 
sense: it gives an assurance that we are not mistaken in the meanings 
we assign to them. Faith works through the limitations of reasoning: 
this means that believers have to work with limited concepts, fragmen- 
ta. ry truths and, at any one time, can only. have a certain angle or 
particular approach to the mystery of the Godhead and His workings 
among mankind. The Gift of intellectus provides a penetration which 
unifies this body of truths into a harmonious whole. But this takes 
place within faith. It does not involve the acquisition of more data 
but rather a penetration of what is presented by faith. 
"... donum intellectus est circa prima principia 
cognitionis gratuitae". (1) 
Just as there are common naturally evident principles of thought which 
man has and uses to understand and to organise his understanding, so 
in the life of grace, there are basic principles which establish and 
structure the life of faith. 
2 By giving an assurance, an instinctus, 
as to the correctness of the principles of the life of faith, the 
Gift leads a man to penetrate the meaning of his life in grace, even 
though he may be unsure, at an intellectual level, of the exact lan- 
guage of the propositions of faith. 
3 The Gift provides the key to 
unlock the treasury beind the symbols of the faith. In this way it 
can be said that faith is enlargeä by the Gift, even though nothing 
is added to faith. 
I. ' IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 7., ad2um. 2. , ibid.., and a. 1, adlum. 
3. q. 8, a. 4, ad2um. 
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The contrary of insight is dullness: not being able to get to 
the heart of the matter; not seeing the wood for the trees. ' 
1 And 
'the heart of the matter' in'the life of faith is man's supernatural 
destiny, beatitudo. -A man endowed with the Gift of intellectus may 
not have scientific insight into the articles of faith, but he can 
accept them as bearing on his movement towards God, his tend' or telos, 
which is salvation. 
2 
And this provides the key to grasping how this Gift works with- 
in faith. The principal element of the New Law is 'the very grace 
of the Holy Spirit given to those who believe in Christ'. 
3 And this 
relationship of grace and friendship-love is established in man through 
the infused virtue of charity. 
4 This is made quite explicit in art- 
icle four of our present question. It is followed immediately by a 
secondary, but still prime, principle of the New Law; that man is 
called and led towards a supernatural destiny. The Gift of intellec- 
tus penetrates and unites the things of faith in the light of these 
two principles or rather, this one joint principle. The Gift, like 
all the Gifts, is based on this relationship between God and man: - 
"caritas amicitia gnaedam est hominis ad Deum". 
5 
A friendly relationship which will culminate in the Beatific Vision. 
"Undo nisi usque ad hoc moveatur a Spiritu Sancto 
intellectus humanus, ut rectam aestimationem de 
fine habeat, nondum consecutus est donum inteUec- 
tus, quantumque ex illustration Spiritus Sancti 
alia quaedam praeambula cognoscat". (6) 
All the elements-of faith are united in this light and so even-the 
most naive of-the-'simple faithrult are-'endowed with it.? 
So far., we have concentrated-on the function of this Gift in 
1. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 6, adlum. 2. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 4, adlum, ad2unm, 
ad3um; q. 8, a. 5. - 3. IaIIae, q. 106, a. 1.4. IIaIIae, q. 23, and 
q. 8, a. 4.5. IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 1.6. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 5. 
7. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 4, ad2uin. 
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relation to the imperfect but genuine knowledge man has of the things 
of faith. Recalling the distinction made in article two, we can now 
turn to look at the role of this Gift in relation to those things which 
lead to faith or flow from it. Thomas does this in article three. 
"Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, donum intellectus 
non solum se habet ad ea quae primo et principali-°' 
ter cadunt sub fide, sed etiam ad omnia quae ad 
Einem ordinantur. Operationes autem bonas quem- 
dam ordinem ad fidem habent. Nam fides per dilec- 
tionem operatur ut Apostolus dicit. Et ideo do- 
num intellectus etiam ad quaedam operabilia se ex- 
tendit, non quidem ut circa ea principaliter verse-, 
tur, sed inquantum in agendis regulamur rationibus 
. aeternis, quibus conspiciendis et consulendis, 
secundum Augustinum, inhaeret su erior ratio quae 
dono intellectus perficitur". 1 
Having recalled the distinction of article two, Thomas. immediately 
focuses'on what flows from faith, that is, 'good deeds'. Quoting 
St Paul, he holds that, fides per dilectionem oDeratur : the direc- 
tion of the life of Christian lov'e'through man's activity is also, in 
a secondary way, a matter for the Gift of inteilectus. 
In giving the Gift of intellectus a role as regards practical 
reasoning in this way, Thomas is breaking the pattern of the intercon- 
nection of the Gifts which he established in the Prima Pars. He ad- 
rnits this quite explicitly. 
"Videtur autem quibusdam quod donum intsllectus 
distinguatur a dono scientiae et consilii per 
hoc quod ilia duo pertinent ad practicam cogni- 
tionem,, donum autem intellectus ad speculativum; 
a dono vero sapientiae, quod etiam ad speculati- 
vam cognitionem pertinet, distinguitur in hoc 
quod ad sapientiam pertinet judicium, ad intel- 
lectum vero capacitas intellectus eorum quae 
propuntur, sen penetratio ad intima eorurn. 
Et secundum hoc supra numeram donorum assigna- 
vimus. 
Sed diligiter intuenti dornun intellectus non 
solum se habet circa 
1. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 3. 
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speculanda, sed etiam circa operanda, ut dictum 
est. 'Et aimiliter etiam donum scientiae circa 
utrumque se habet, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo - oportet aliter eorum distinctionem accipere". (1) 
We can tabulate Thomas' earlier model as follows: 
Insight (intellectus) Judgement (iudicium) 
Speculative Reason Gift of Intellectus Gift of wisdom 
Practical Reason Gift of Scientia Gift of the Spirit's 
Counselling. 
In the Secunda Secundae, however, this sharp distinction between spe- 
culative and practical reasoning is overcome. 
2 
Faith, working through charity, is perfected, 
as regards understanding and insight, by the Gift of Intellectus. 
as regards judgement from created things by the Gift of Scientia. 
as regards judgement from divine realities, by the Gift of Wisdom. 
Now we have established already that the Gift of intellectus 
penetrates to the significance of the things of faith by revealing 
them in terms of the teleology of grace. 
3 But man's goal of beati- 
tude is itself a part of the over-all dynamism of the divine plan: 
predestination is itself part of providence. 
4 A man's own movement 
towards fulfillment by means of his moral activity is then a working 
out of the Lex Aeterna. Hence the Gift of intellectus gives man an 
insight and guidance into the direction and significance of his moral 
activity by revealing its intrinsic interconnection with the over- 
arching purpose of God. This line of thought takes us back to the 
I ;., I 
1. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 6.2.. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 4.3. IIaIIae, 
q. 8, a. 5 and above p. 239 . 4. Ia, q. 22, intro. 
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Prologue of the Prima Secundae and to our own chapter on Ratio, Iex 
et Deus. In fact the significance of the three quite remarkable re- 
sponses to the objections in article three will be lost unless what 
was developed in that chapter is borne in mind. The similarity in 
expression and thought is quite clear. 
"Ad prirrium dicendum quod operabilia humana secundum 
quod in se considerantur non habent aliquam excellen- 
tiae altitudinem; sed secundum quod referuntur ad 
regulam legis aeternae, et ad finem beatitudinis divi- 
nae, sic altitudinem habent, ut circa ea possit esse 
intellectus. 
Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum pertinet ad digni- 
tatem dons, quod est intellectus, quod inte]ligibilia 
aeterna vel necessaria considerat, non solum secandum 
quod in se aunt, sed etiam secundum auod aunt regulae 
quaedam humanorum actuum; quia quanto virtus cognosci- 
tiva ad plura se extendit, tanto nobilior est. 
Ad tertium dicendum quod regula humanorum actuum est 
ratio human at lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. 
Lex autem aeterna excedit naturalem rationem. Et 
ideo cognitio humanorum actuum secundum quod regulan- 
tur a lege aeterna excedit naturalem rationem, at in- 
diget supernaturali Imnine dons Spiritus Sancti". 
Thomas is fighting the common presupposition that the Gift of intellec- 
tus relates only to speculative and not practical reasoning. 
What-is envisaged here is a participation in the Lex Aeterna, 
but not a participation in terms of reason, as in the case of Natural 
Law, but a participationby-the direct movement of the Holy Spirit 
through the permanent disposition of receptivity which the Gift of 
intellectus produces in man under grace. Now this relationship be- 
tween the Gifts and the Lex Aeterna has never been stated so clearly 
before. In the Prima Secundae, the Gifts were said to make man re- 
ceptive to the promptings of the Holy Spirit and the two principles 
of motion were described as reason and God, ratio et Deus. 
... dona Spiritus Sancti se habent ad hominem in 
comparatione ad Spiritus Sanctum sicut virtutes 
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morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in compara- 
tione ad rationem". (1) 
Now in regard to this particular intellectual Gift - and that it is 
intellectual is the crucial point - the prompting of the Spirit gives 
an assurance and a unity of vision into how human deeds are to exhi- 
bit the higher ordering of the Lex Aeterna. The present writer has 
found only one similar reference in the Prima Secundae. 
"Praeterea, humane voluntatis nonest nisi duplex 
regula; scilicet ratio, et lea aeterna, ut supra 
habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem in 
ordine ad rationem; dons autem in ordine ad legem 
aeternam Spiritus Sancti, ut ex dictis patet". (2) 
This is a strange passage. It occurs in an objection and. therefore 
must be taken with great caution, but Thomas, in his reply to the false 
argument which is developed from this passage does not question this 
presentation itself. On the other hand, it can hardly be taken as 
a major point of Thomas' thought if it occurs only here in an obscure 
passage in a far from central question. Nevertheless both sentences 
refer back to other questions to establish their validity. The phrase, 
'the eternal law of the Holy Spirit' is an interesting one and although 
it does not occur elsewhere does show the unity of Thomas' vision of 
God moving all things in a single but variegated movement back to hire. 
For our own purpose at the moment however, what we need to cla- 
rift' is the relationship between the prompting of the Spirit and the 
Lex Aeterna. The Lex Aeterna is the cosmic order by which all things 
are preserved and directed to the fulfillment of their specific natures. 
3 
This dynamic ordering is not to be seen as something independent of 
God but a reflection of the divine purpose and will regarding creation. 
As we saw in chapter 8, for Thomas all law is teleological and educative: 
1. Iallae, q. 68, a. 3.2. IaIIae, q. 69, a. 1, obj. 2.3. IaIlae, 
q. 91, a. 1; q. 93; Ia, q. 103, a. 1, a. 2, a. 5. 
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it is a construct of the mind - divine or human - for the direction 
and guidance of this movement towards fulfillment. Now as there are 
two principles of human activity, two sources of man's spontaneity, 
God and reason; so there are two constructs of direction in practical 
reasoning, the Eternal Law, and human reasoning; the latter being a 
human participation in a limited way in the former. As law and practi- 
cal reasoning are geared towards an tend', the discussion of the Gift 
of intellectus must take place within a context- of providence and fina- 
litt', or rather, predestination and salvation. The Gift of intellec- 
tus, then, is a prompting by the Spirit, (principium exterius) by which 
man is given an insight into the directing order of Providence (Lex 
Aeterna) impossible for human reasoning and insight alone. To put, 
the matter at its simplest, we can quote scripture. 
"Yet among the mature we do impart wisdom, although 
it is not-a-wisdom of this age or of,. the rulers of 
this age, who are doomed to pass away. But we im- 
part a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God 
decreed before the ages for our glorification. 
None of the rulers of this age understood this; 
for if they had they would not have crucified the 
Lord of Glory. But, as it is written, "What no 
eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man 
conceived, what God has prepared for those who love 
him, "God has revealed to us through the Spirit. 
For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths 
of God ... no one comprehends the thoughts of God 
except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not 
the spirit of the world but the, Soirit of Cod, that 
we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God". (1) 
To make sense of the distinction between the Gifts of intellectus 
and scientia we need to understand a basic division within St Thomas' 
1. I Cor. 2, v. 6-12. Thomas' own commentary on this text, 
(C. II, lect. 1 and 2), is instructive and brings in many of the themes 
discussed so far: the 'mature' are perfect not only in intellect, Ised 
etiam secundum voluntatem et affectum bene disponi ad diligendum et 
operandum'. 
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epistemology because the Gift of scientia is taken to be the counter- 
part in the area of faith to iudicium, or judgement, in general mat- 
ters. ' 
In the Summa, Thomas discusses this topic in Prima Pars, ques- 
tion sixteen, but there is a much fuller discussion in De Veritate. 
2 
Truth is defined as the conformity between the thing as understood 
in the mind, and the thing as existing in reality. Hence, to know 
this conformity, and not just the thing is to know truth. The human' 
mind can therefore know simply, and, in a secondary fashion, know that 
it knows. The primary, simple apprehension of what a thing is, is 
called intellectus, understanding: the secondary activity is called 
judgenent. or iudicium. Now we must be careful not to misunderstand 
'judgement' as referring merely to conscious 'knowing-that-one-knowst; 
the data for psychologists or philosophers. By 'judgement' Thomas 
means that, in all our basic ways of putting understanding to use - by 
language, thinking, analysing, comparing and the rest - we are impli- 
citly affirming or denying the conformity between idea and thing. 
Anthony Kenny, in a recent book, makes a useful transposition into 
modern English of the terms intellectus and iudicium. He contrasts 
'thinking of x', with, 'thinking that x ... '; and contrasts, 'knowing 
about x', with, 'knowing that x ... '. The second, 'judgement' always 
presupposes the first, 'understanding': we cannot assert or deny that 
the tree is likely to fall without thinking about the tree. Behind 
all our use of language and all our different ways of thinking then, 
Thomas holds that we must make two presuppositions. One, that we have 
some basic insight into what we are talking about, or that we under- 
stand the words we are using; and, secondly, that we are implicitly 
1. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 1.2. De Veritate 1.9, also Periher- 
meneias 13.26. 
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or explicitly making judgements by means of these words or concepts. 
1 
Now as regards the intellectual Gifts within the life of faith,, 
it is clear from all this, that the Gift of scientia, (and the Gift 
of wisdom), presupposes the Gift of intellectus. The latter gives 
an insight into the things of faith., -the Gift of scientia perfects 
the 
ability to judge what things are to be believed and what is not a mat- 
ter of belief. 
2 But we also need to distinguish between the judge- 
ment perfected by the Gift of scientia from that perfected by the Gift 
of wisdom. 
"... donum scientiae est solum circa res humans, 
vel solum circa res creatas". (3) 
It relates to what is to be believed in relation to human and creatu- 
rely matters for our understanding. Thomas follows the traditional, 
and Augustinian division between wisdom and scientia. First he quotes 
Augustine : ,,. 
"Rerum divinarum scientia proprie sapientia nuncupe- 
ter; humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obti- 
neat". (4) 
And then he also states: 
It0. ý cum. homo per res creatas Deum cognoscit, magis 
videtur hoc pertinere ad scientiam ... quam sapien- tiam". (5) 
The Gift of wisdom, judges created things in the light of divine reali- 
ties,. but the Gift of scientia judges divine realities through created 
things. , .. 
There is one further break with the general pattern of thirteenth 
century thought in this question. In the Prima Secundae. this Gift is 
seen as perfecting practical reasoning only.: now it relates to both 
speculative and practical reasoning. 
6 
J. E. Naus, in a detailed study, - 
1. The, matter is obviously more complex than our presentation 
here, see A Kenny, Aquinas, 1980, p. 61ff. 2. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. , ad2um. 3. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 2.4. IIaIlae, q. 9, ä. 2, sed contra. 
5. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 2, ad3um. . 
6. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. . 
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entitled, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to Saint Tho- 
mas Aquinas, has pointed out the identity of these two forms of reaso- 
ning in Thomas' mature thought. He writes: - 
- "It has been proposed, and we believe correctly, 
that in his earlier works St Thomas leaned more 
towards a real distinction between speculative 
and practical, between scientific and ratiocina- 
'tive intellects, while in his later works he 
held their identity". (1) 
Oar present subject would seem to be exhibiting signs of this wider 
change, but rather than entering into this large and difficult area, 
we might just draw attention to Thomas' own explicit reason for the 
change here. 
"Fides autem primo et principaliter in speculatione 
consistit, inquantum scilicet inhaeret primae veri- 
tati. Sed quia veritas prima est etiam ultimus 
finis, -propter quern operamur, inde etiam est quod 
fides ad operationem se extendit, secundum illus. 
Gal., Fides per dilectionem operatur. Unde etiam 
oportet quod donum scientiae primo quidem et prin- 
cipaliter respiciat speculationem, inquantum sci- 
licet homo scat quid fide tenere debeat. Secun- 
dario autem se extendit etiam ad operationem, se- 
cundum quod per scientiam credibilium, et eorum 
quae, ad credibilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agen- 
dis". (2) 
Faith is not just speculative but is also the source of right direction 
because the Veritas Prima is also the telos of all human activity - the 
end or telos in a process of speculative reasoning. 
3 Hence, the Gift 
of scientia is concerned first with giving man a certainty of judgement 
about what he ought to believe, and, as following from this, it also 
ensures that these matters of faith become the directing principles of 
his actions. The scriptural text - Fides per dileotionrm operatur - 
plays a central role, in Thomas' treatment of faith, 
4 
and of the whole 
new law of grace, 
5 
and also in bis , discussion" of 
the Gift of intellectus. - 
1. Naus, op. cit., p. 19.2. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 3.3. Iallae, 
q. 8, a. 2; q. 94, a. 2.4. IIaIIae, q. 4, a. 3.5. IaIIae, q. 108, a. 1. 
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This text and the argument that accompanies it function then as impor- 
tant conceptual tools within the theolog5r of grace. 
"... fides ad operatiomm se extendit ... ". (1) 
We are seeing here a minor example of 
,a 
major theme. But whereas in 
the case of the Gift of intellectus, the text and argument are used 
to show that there is also a practical dimension to the work of'this 
Gift, here the argument is made to work, as it were, in reverse. The 
tradition had always presented scientia as involved primarily in man's 
active life and his practical reasoning. Thomas continues to accept 
this role, as we have seen. What is new is that he has now said, quite 
explicitly, that this Gift is primarily - primo et principaliter - 
speculative. 
2 
But what sort of speculative reasoning does this Gift perfect ? 
A-knowledge of God based on insight into what is, to be believed and 
what is not of belief: a knowledge based on grasping the significance 
and relevance of the doctrines of faith and what follow from them. 
Whereas wisdom and charity, as we shall see, are united in love with 
the divine. realities they contemplate, the Gifts of intellectus and 
scientia operate within'the discipline and darkness of faith-knowledge. 
Scientia comes to understand God and his ways through pondering on the 
nature-of himself and his world in the light of faith. 
3 The light-of 
faith in this regard, does not illuminate spiritual realities but re- 
veals-the supernatural significance of human and creaturely realities. 
4 
But this-is not to be identified simply with the theological study., 
scientia divine, because what is presented by this Gift is not just 
1. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 3. One wonders how this phrase might re- 
late to that phrase attributed to Aristotle, 'intellectus speculati- 
vns per extensionem fit practicus', see Naus, on. cit., p. 24ff. 
2. IIaIIaa. q. 9, a. 3.3. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 2, ad3um, adlum. 4. IIaIIae, 
q.. 9, a. 2, ad3um; q. 9, a. 4. 
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knowledge but, knowledge of the lend' of Beatitude. 
... operabilia humane secundwn quod in se conside- 
rantur noon habent aliquam excellentiae altitudinem; 
sed secundum quod referantur ad regulam legis aeter- 
nae, et ad finem beatitudinis divine, sic altitudi- 
nem habent ... ". 
(1) 
It is this last point whichwill help üs grasp the significance 
of Thomas' thoughts on the beatitude assigned to this Gift. The Gift 
of wisdom sees the creation in terms of the divine goodness and beauty 
and with it is linked the beatitude of joy and peace. But the Gift 
of scientia, in an article in which., as Gilby rightly says, the thought 
with 
is more poignant than the words, Thomas linksithe beatitude of mourning 
and weeping. 
2 What seems to be hinted at here is a compassionate dis- 
cernment of the complexities of love gone wrong, of the convolutions 
of pride and sin, of man's failings., -mistakes and misunderstandings. 
If charity and wisdom together give an insight and discernment about 
the beauty and harmony of the'divine plan of providence, scientia grasps 
the meaning and significance of particular things, events and states 
of affairs in the light of faith given to the believer; and it sees, 
as a result, the fracturedness, the incompleteness and the dis-order 
of the present manifestation of that same divine plan for man and crea- 
tion. We must repeat that the Gifts do not provide more data for faith 
or make more things known, they function by making things better known. 
One aspect of the Gift of scientia, it would seem, is that it makes 
things better known by, as it were, a poetic insight into the lacri- 
mae rerum and the 'still, sad music of humanity', into the pathos of 
humanity and creation _. It is a knowledge through sympathy and 
compassion, issuing from the light of faith and resulting in the gift 
of tears. A knowledge which yearns for the consolation which will be 
1. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 3, adlum. 2. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 4. 
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given in heaven, in patria, to the blessed who mourn. 
As we shall see with all the Gifts, there is a difference be- 
tween the work of each Gift in via and in patria. 
1 This distinction 
in regard to the Gift of inteLlectus opens out the idea that. in this 
life there is also a negative dimension to its operation. 
"... duplex est Dei visio. Una quidem perfecta, 
per quam videtur Dei essentia. Alia vero im- 
perfecta per quam, etsi non videamus de Deo quid 
est, videmus tarnen quid non est; et tanto in 
hac vita Deum perfectius cognoscimus, quanto ma- 
gis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu 
comprehenditur. Et utraque Dei visio pertinet 
ad donum intellectuss prima quidem ad donum in- 
tellectus consummatum, secundum quod erit in pat- 
tia; secunda vero ad donum intellectus inchoa- 
tuun, secundum quod habetur in via". (2) 
In this life there is this negative, pruning and disciplining role of 
the Gift of intellectus by which we appreciate that all our conceptions 
of God fall far short of his reality. As regards the Gift of scientia, 
the work of the Gift is manifest in via, in this sense of the disordered 
nature of creaturely existence. In patria, all things will be re-ord- 
ered towards God, and mourners will be comforted. 
3 
The Gift of Wisdom 
Thomas, in his prologue to the Secunda Secundae, says that he 
will discuss the intellectual virtues of wisdom, intellectus and-scien- 
tia, along with the Gifts which share the same name. 
4 This is not 
just a matter of systematisation, but presupposes his, appreciation of 
the play of similarity and difference within the conspectus of man's 
moral life: a conspectus which is not disjointed but perfected, by 
grace. We have seen already how Thomas' distinction between the opera- 
tion of the Gifts. of-scientia and intellectus. follows on from his analysis 
1. IaIlae, q. 68, a. 6, and see below chapter 11.2. IIaIIae, 
q. 8, a. 7.3. IIaIIae, q. 9, a. 4.4, Prologue IIaIIae. - 
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of man's natural reasoning. 
1 So, similarly, the Gift of wisdom is 
presented as distinct from the intellectual virtue of wisdom but is 
not yet wholly removed from our normal understanding of what we mean 
by 'wisdom'. Hence, Thomas begins by referring to Aristotle in the 
2 
opening sections of the Metaphysics. Wisdom is the knowledge of 
the most fundamental principle, the highest cause, the most fundamen- 
tal reality, and, in the light of this knowledge, the wise man judges 
all other matters, both theoretical and practical, and in understanding 
them, he arranges them in their order of significance. One can talk 
about a man being wise in some particular discipline or craft -a scien- 
tist, an architect or a boat-builder - or, at a more general level, one 
can talk about a wise man per se. For the former, wisdom would amount 
to a firm understanding of the basic principles and the methodology of 
the particular craft or discipline: for the latter, it would be under- 
standing all reality in the light of the most fundamental cause of its 
existence, God. This latter would be, in different ways, the wisdom 
of the metaphysician, the theologian, and, our present topic, the wi. s- 
dom of the lover of God. 
In the first. question of the first article of the Summa, Thomas 
asks not whether what we might call 'natural theology' is possible but 
whether, given the nobility of this natural wisdom, sacra doctrina is 
necessary. The burden of proof lies with the claim of theology that 
a wisdom based on what has been revealed is necessary and that the wis- 
dom of metaphysics is not, sufficient. And even when. this claim-is,,, 
justified, Thomas, still holds that man can find wisdom through reason,, 
alone, albeit with very great difficulty., 
_ ._ 
"Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata a' 
paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione 
1. See above p. 245 . 2. In Meta. 1.2.982 a. 8. IIaIIae, 
q. 45, a. 1. 
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multorum errorum homini proveniret; a cujus tarnen 
veritatis cognition dependet tota hominis salus, 
quas in Deo est". (1) 
There is too much at stake for such uncertainty, and sacra doctrina 
provides a greater assurance of truth. , 
But more than this., it deals 
also with truths unknown except by revelation from God, above all, the 
gift_of the fulfillment of man's super-natural end in communion with 
God. The wisdom of sacra doctrina is a 
, 
form. of judgement based on 
the highest form of truth, God's own self-knowledge, which he communi- 
cates to others in revelation. 
Bat how does this form of wisdom differ from the Gift of wisdom ? 
As we have seen before, the difference between the activity of a vir- 
tue and that of. a Gift is not a difference in what is accomplished but 
in the manner of accomplishing its object. 
2 
"Cam. iudicium ad sapientem pertineat, secundum dup-. 
licem modum judicandi dupliciter sapientia dicitur. 
Contingit etiam aliquem iudicare uno modo per modum 
inclinationis,, sicut, qui habet habitum virtutis 
recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem 
agenda inquantum ad illa inclinatur, unde et in R 
Ethic. dicitur auod virtuosus est mensura et regnla 
humanoram actuum. Alio modo per modum cogmitionis 
sicut aliquid instructus in scientia morali posset 
iudicare de actibus virtutis etiamsi virtutem non 
habet. 
Primus igitur modus iudicandi de rebus divinis 
pertinet ad sapientiam quae ponitur donum Spiritus 
Sancti; secundum illud I Cor. Soiritualis homo 
iudicat omnia, et Dionysius dicit, de Div. Nom. 
quod Hierotheus doctus est non solum discens sed et 
patiens divina. Secundum autern er modus iudicandi 
pertinet ad hanc doctrinam secundum quod per stu- 
dium habetur; licet ejus principia ex revelatione 
habeantur". (3) 
Given that the basis of both forms of wisdom is Godfs own self-knowledge, 
the means by which this wisdom is achieved differs. In one it. is ac- 
quired by human effort, by study and reasoning; activities perfected 
1. Ia, q. 1, a. 1.2. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2, adlum. 3. Ia, q. 1, 
a. 6, ad3um. 
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by the virtues. In the other, it is described as wisdom, per modum 
inclinationis and is attributed to charity and the Gift of wisdom to- 
gether. 
1 
Here, with this phrase we have hit upon a very rich field indeed. 
As is clear from the example given, this form of knowledge is not re- 
stricted to the life of grace. The virtuous man does not have to rea- 
son out every point of every action because, by having this virtue, he 
has an inclination to act in keeping with it. It is a second-nature 
to him;, connatural to him because of the orderliness of his passions- 
under this virtue. 
Now this idea of acting per modum inclinationis, is extended to 
the" 'second-nature' of the infused virtues and Gifts of the man under 
grace. And here a further theme comes in: - 
... Hierotheus doctus est non solum discens sed et 
patiens divina". (2) -" 
This connatural knowledge of divine matters is said to come about not 
by notional understanding but by the actual experience of the divine. 
This is then explained in terms of the infused virtue of charity, that 
friendship-love which unites God and man. 
"Hujusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitts ad 
res divinas fit per ceritatem, quae quidem unit 
nos Deo". (3) 
Charity and wisdom, then, provide a Wisdom per modum inclinationis 
Which is rooted in an experiential union with God. We need to look 
at this notion in more detail. 
The Summa-Theologicae, and Thomism in general, presents the 
appearance of a highly structured and scientific system of argumentation. 
1. ' IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 1, ad2ums q. 45, a. 4, ad2um. 2. Ia, q. 1, a. 6, 
ad3um. 3. IIaIlae, q. 45, a. 2. 
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It can appear then to be cold and over-rational, having little place 
for the realm of the emotions, for value-perceptions, ' and for the nuances 
and complexities which are the scope of the modern humane sciences, such 
as literature, history or psychology., At one level, 'this view of the 
Summa is quite correct. Thomas explicitly limits the scope of his work. 
In article eight of question one of the Prima Pars - utrum haec scientia 
sit araumentativa - he states that the Sunnna is to be developed along 
purely scientific 'argumentative' lines. He does not deny that God 
should be approached affectively, but neither does he claim that scien- 
tific theology is the whole sum of Christian wisdom. His work is to 
be a scientific or Iärgumentativef study of revealed truths. He does 
not deny that there is a place for the wisdom of contemporary monastic 
theology; he is merely limiting himself to'the theology of the schools. 
1 
is 
Now this the methodology he has chosen: where he could be criti- 
cised is if he does not examine, or cannot examine, within the terms of 
this methodology, the area of affective knowledge. The following para- 
graphs will show how unfounded any such criticisms would be. Certainly 
Thomas' analysis of this area is bound to lack the warmth and splendour 
of Augustine and Bernard, but that he gives space for, and studies scien- 
tifically, the area of affective knowledge cannot be denied. 
2 
Throughout the Summa a common theme is that knowledge of the 
truth is achieved in two ways. 
"... cognitio veritatis est duplex. Una pure specu- 
lativa. ... Alia autem est 
cognitio veritatis 
affectiva". (3) 
Fr Marin-Sole has conveniently catalogued the various phrases by which 
1. On the methodology of monastic, saniential theology, see J. 
Leclerq, The Love of Learning and Desire for God 1961 . 2. For 
all that follows, I am using V" White, 'St Thomas and Affective Know- 
ledge'., Blackfriars vol. XXIV (1943), pp. 8-16; vol. XXV (1944), p. 
126f., pp. 321-328.3. IIaIIae, q. 162, a. 3, adlum; Ia, q. 1, a. 6, ad3um; 
IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 2, "- IIaIIae, q. 97, a. 2, ad2um. 
2 
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these two modes of-knowledge were described by St Thomas and we can 
begin by merely listing them, adding the translations by Victor White. 
Of the first kind of knowledge, it is designated as: 
- per usum rationis (by the employment of reason) 
- per rationis n sitionem (by rational inquiry), 
- per modem cognitionis (by the method of cognition), 
- cognitio sneculativa (speculative cognition), 
- per studium et doct am (by study and teaching), 
- scientia argumentativa (knowledge attained by way of argumen- 
tation, i. e., by logical processes), 
- scientia discursiva (discursive knowledge) 
- ex iudicio rationis (by rational judgement). 
Of the second kind of knowledge, this is said to be; 
- affective, 
- per connaturalitatem (by connaturality), 
- per modum inclinationis (by the the way of inclination)., 
- per viam voluntatis by way of the will), 
- notitia erimentalis (experiential awareness), 
- per amorem through love), 
- sine discursu (without discursus), 
- onasi ex habitu (as it were arising from a habitus), 
- cognitio absoluta et simplex (absolute and simple cognition). 
(These two groupings do overlap somewhat, for example, -=noti- 
tia ex habitu and notitia experimentalis, can also be applied 
to certain forms of purely intellectual activity). 
It is important to stress that we have not yet made any mention 
of affective knowledge of God. The list of phrases above refers to 
value-perception and affective knowledge as part of man's ordinary know- 
ledge of the world around him and his activity in it. When Thomas 
does discuss man's affective knowledge of God he moves from the known 
to the unknown; from the presupposition of such knowledge as part of 
man's general intellectual abilities, to its more restricted scope in 
regard to the Creator who is not part of his own creation and not an 
object for man's sense-based understanding. If then the term 'conna- 
tural knowledge' is used analogously, we need to establish its prime 
analogate, its most ordinary sense in terms of man's natural under- 
1. L'Evolution homogene du Dogme catholicue, (2nd ed. ), p. 363. 
Fribourg, 1924, quoted by V. White, op cit., pp. 10-11. 
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standing and judgement before we go on to apply it to the Gift of 
wisdom. 
All that is not God needs to change; needs to become more than 
it is in order to become itself. 
1 Even the angels, who change only 
once and in an instant are not created with the fullness of their own 
being. 2 All other` creatures change within the temporal duration'of 
their existence. 
"Just because no finite being is sufficient to it= 
self, not its own good, its own end, it has a posi- 
tive inclination to undergo change; and its incli- 
nation will be predetermined by its nature and its 
"'properties - by the kind of thing it is ... it is their natural or connatural tendency; it is of 
their nature so to behave". (3) 
Now of all creatures having inclinations connatural to themselves, we 
can make a basic subdivision: there are 'those which act without any 
knowledge and just from nature, (naturaliter), such as plants; and 
those which act from knowledge of one kind or another, (intentionaliter). 
Of these latter, animals act through sense apprehension, men through 
'sense and intellectual apprehension, and'angels through intellectual 
understanding alone. Among sentient creatures there is not just an 
inclination beyond themselves due to their natures but, because of'their 
natures as sentient, an inclination based on apprehension of what is 
other than themselves. This apprehension involves value perception, 
4 
even in animals. In animals, this ability to grasp value and to act 
upon it is called the vis aestimativa; in man, the rational animal, 
where it interreacts with intellectuality, it is called the" senses coei-' 
5 tativus or ratio narticularis. 
1. For the following, V. White, op. cit., pp. 324-328. 
2. Ia, q. 62.3. V. White., op. cit., p. 324.4. Ia, q. 78, a. 4. 
5. For Thomas, human reasoning is not simply added to man's animal 
nature but there is an interaction of sense and intellect,. appetite- 
and will. Consequently, for Thomas, man's sense-powers are greater than 
that of animals because of their greater sophistication and complexity. 
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To move one stage further, connatural inclinations based on 
sense appreciation are called appetites; inclinations based on appre- 
ciation of what is good or not good is called the rational appetite, 
the will. But the will is found not only in mere potency or in act 
but also in an habitual condition of acting in a certain way or incli- 
ning towards a particular object. Not only can I be drawn to a par- 
ticular good which I have perceived, or actually be drawn towards it; 
I may also have a disposition, (acquired or given), to be drawn in 
this way. This is a habitus of the will; it is something, more than 
mere potency but less than full act, but it is a positive and more or 
less constant quality which inclines me to be drawn towards a particu- 
lar object or set of objects. If the 'object' is a morally good one 
we call this quality a virtue, if it is morally bad, it is called a 
vice. These dispositions constitute a tsecond natural in their pos- 
sessor. It is connatural or second nature to the just man to act 
justly because he has a constant inclination to act in this way: to 
be a just man is not merely to do just things, it is to act justly with 
spontaneity, ease and pleasure. 
A man makes himself. Within the wide limits of his human nature, 
a man becomes What he makes of himself, either a vicious or a virtuous 
man, by building up patterns of dispositions. A habitus is not the 
same as a habit. A habit is a fixed, predetermined pattern of response 
which limits the freedom of the will to act in unusual ways. A habitus 
is a disposition of the whole man to act in keeping with the drive of the 
rational will. 
We must therefore posit two kinds of connatural inclinations 
within man. One kind., following on from his nature as a rational ani- 
mal: these include not only the tendencies of his animal nature but 
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also the intellectual assent to the first principles of reasoning. 
1 
And the second kind follow from his acquired second nature, arising 
out of what a man has made of himself in response to his experiences. 
This is the whole area of moral philosophy for Thomas and, his master, 
Aristotle. But all this emphasis on 'inclinations' is not to suggest 
that the life of the virtues-is not based on reason. On the contrary., 
the virtueý'of Prudence, as'we shall see, involves the application of 
reason to every group of contingent events. But the virtues do not 
work in a mechanistic way: by them, man is not turned into some form 
of computer but achieves the perfection and integration of all his huma- 
nity., volitional as well as intellectual. How a man has made himself 
will determine how he appreciates a particular situation and determines 
how he will use his reason within it and how he will act, in response 
to it. 
"Habitus vero proprium est ut inclinet potentiam 
ad agendum quod convenit habitui inquantum facit 
aliquid videri bonuni quod ei convenit, maluni autem 
quod ei repugnat. Sicut enim gustus dijudicat 
sapores secundum suam dispositionem, ita mere homi- 
nis .d ijudicat de aliquo faciendo secundum suam habitualem dispositionem; unde et Philosophus dicit 
quod gualis unusguisaue est talis finis videtur ei". (1) 
The activity of reasoning for the virtuous man is in no way then the 
purely speculative reasoning of the moral philosopher, but the appli- 
cation of reasoning within an area with which the man has a certain 
affinity or connatural experiential knowledge. Such a man has an 
affinity with his subject, a discernment by familiarity. Hence, Tho- 
man can claim that sometimes the mind of man tends to the truth by a 
certain natural inclination, even though he does not see the reason 
of the truth. 
2 Here, we are not far from the model of thought which 
Thomas uses, at a super-natural level, in relation to the activity of 
1. IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 11.2. In Physics, 1. lect. 10. 
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the Gifts. 
Given all that has now-been said on the idea of judgement by 
connaturality at 'a natural level, we now need to apply these same in- 
sights in relation to the infused virtues and Gifts. - Man 
by his na- 
ture is open to a 
. 
larger existence than that with which he is born. 
He has to make himself, by means of the virtuous life, into the full- 
ness of what he is to be by nature, hit, interfused with this natural 
dynamism of man there is a°further-form of growth. - He is called also 
to a supernatural destiny. The virtuous dispositions of this, super- 
natural life are not however acquired by men through experience but 
given to them as a gift by God. - These are the infused dispositions 
of-the theological virtues, the infused moral virtues and the Gifts 
of the Spirit: the-subject matter of the Secunda Secundae. By these 
also man acts not just, per usual-rationis: -but by connaturality. -What 
is more, within this life of friendship-love between man and God, in 
this area beyond the capacity of man's natural reasoning powers, it 
would seem to be the case-that mans understanding per usum rationis 
is less certain than his understanding by familiarity, per amorem. -- 
If we examine metaphysically the very origin of man's desire 
we must first, of°all posit some form of inclination. Desire is. first 
of-all-an inclination and not an experience; - it is being drawn to 
things, other than oneself-prior to any question of, intelligibility. 
Being drawn to other things is the basic movement in man bi which he -_ 
builds himself up to fulfill his infinite potential as"an intellectual 
creature. Now when we analyser. man's rational appetite, the will, we, 
see, in contrast, that the' inclination of the will is a bond of attrac-' 
1. C. Ernst,. 'Transcendence and Spontaneity in the Metaphysics 
of Morals', Dominican Studies (1954), VII, pp. 66-67. 
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tion to the intelligible good, to value, in other words. The will 
is drawn not to a particular good, as are man's sense inclinations, 
but to a particular thing seen as good, evaluated as good. " How is 
this passive principle of inclination transformed into the active prin- 
ciple of the will, the moving-force, the dynamism`of man's life ? 
For Thomas, the answer, at its most skeletal, is love, Amor. 
1 'Man 
is not just drawn towards particular goods by his sense-appetite: " 
love creates a world of purposive ends and purposive activities around 
man; ahuman world of significances, 'values and meanings. It pro- 
duces a bond of affinity, of relationship, and, at its height, of union.. 
with that which is outside man's own self. 
2 All other emotions and 
the whole activity of man's understanding presupposes love. 
3 
Now by this amor intellectus, we assume the interaction of'know- 
ledge and will. An object is known and therefore loved and, as it is 
loved, the intellect is moved by the will to an even deeper knowledge. 
For Thomas, knowledge, is knowledge of an object as it exists in the 
mind of the knower, and love relates to the object as it exists in rea- 
lity. Bat knowledge is prior to love. one can only love what one' 
knows. 4 Nevertheless, something can be known imperfectly, or, only 
in ageneral sense, and yet be loved perfectly. It can happen, there- 
fore; that something is loved better than it is known. 
5 But there is 
a dialectic here. The more one loves someone or something, the less 
satisfied one is with a general, superficial'knowldege. - Love, then, 
provides the'dynamism by which one moves to"ä further, deeper intellec- 
tual appreciation. 
1. IaIIae, q. 26, a. 1. Thomas divides love into amor sensitives 
which is a 'passion', a passive principle in the sense-appetite, and amor 
intellectivus seu rationalis which is in the will. It is of the latter 
that we are speaking here. On the various species of love, see IaIIae, 
q. 26, a. 3, a. 4; on dilectio, caritas, amicitia and concuoiscentia. 
2. IaIIae, q. 26, a. 2.3. IaIIae, q. 27, a. 4; q. 28, a. ; Ia, q. 20, a. 1. 
4. IaIIae, q. 27, a. 2.5. IaIIae, q. 27, a. 2, ad2um. 
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"Amans vero dicitur in amante secundum. apprehensio- 
nem, inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali 
apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad 
amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad 
interiora ejus ingeditur. Sicut de Spiritu Sancto, 
qui est amor Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor., quod scruta- 
tur etiam profunda Dei". (1) 
This general 'dialectic of love' used throughout the Summa, 
2 is applied 
in particular-to-the relationship between faith, charity, and the Gift 
of wisdom. . The, first. kind of knowledge relates to faith,, the love is 
charity,. and the deeper appreciation and knowledge, (intellectual-but 
based on love), is the judgement by connaturality which is the work of 
the Gift of wisdom.,,, 
Now it must be made clear that the Gift of wisdom in an intel- 
lec tual gift, even though it is so closely associated with-charity. 
Love provides the, dynamism for this-growth in understanding, and love 
provides the bond of., connaturality, but wisdom is an intellectual vir- 
tue. 
3. More specifically, the Gift of wisdom relates to the intellec- 
tual act of judgement, like scientia, and not to simple insight, like 
the Gift of. intellectus. 
4 Sapientis est ordinare. 
5- 
-. The-wise man 
assesses and judges all things in their correct ordering-and-relation- 
ship. With, the, Gift of-wisdom even . 
the qualities of God are correctly 
understood by the prompting of the Spirit 'who searches even the depths 
of God'"6 Moreover this judgement by connaturality with-things divine 
is, not, only_contemplative but, practical as well.? . In the light, of 
this assessment of things divine, the wise man judges all human acti- 
vity in its relationship . to. God and his providence. 
8 This judgement 
of all things.,., human and divine, is not based solely on reasoning but 
a 1. IaIIae, q. 28, a. 2. - 2. -'The Dialectic of Love in the Summa'-, 
Gib, vol. 1, Appendix 10, pp. 124-132., 3. IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 2. . 4. IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 2, ad3um, and see above, p. 245.5. In Metanhy- 
sics, Prologue. 6.. -IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 1.7. IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 3. 
8. IIaIlae, q. 45, a"3, a. 4. 
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on connaturality, union and 'experience' of God but it is a form of 
intellectual judgement and knowledge none the less. 
The reasoning Thomas gives for this necessary union of faith 
and love, wisdom and charity, of human knowing and loving at their zenith, 
is not found, as one might expect, in his analysis of human psychology 
in the Prima Secundae, but, significantly enough in his treatise on the 
Trinity in the Prima Pars. Just as the scientific methodology of the 
Summa can blind us to the role of affective knowledge within it, so 
the structure of the Summa as a whole, can blind us to the Trinitarian 
dimension of his theology. From Prima Pars, question forty-four, to 
the end of the Summa, Thomas discusses creation but this whole analysis 
takes place in the light of Prima Pars, question forty-three - de mis- 
sione divinorum personarum - the sending ad extra of the Son and the 
Spirit. Question forty-three is the cardinal question of the Via, 
articulating the whole. 
1 Regarding the intra-Trinitarian processions 
of the Son and the Spirit, Thomas, following the tradition which went 
back to Augustine, spoke of a procession, secundum emanationem intellec- 
t and, alia permodum voluntatis, quae est nrocessio amoris. 
2 The 
basic paradigm, then of the duality within unity of knowledge and love 
is found at the very heart of the Trinity. As for the sending of these 
two Persons and the created effects of these missions in those creatures 
capable of receiving them, Thomas again stresses unity and diversity 
within unity. 
"... quantum ad effectum gratiae sic communicant 
-duas missiones-in radice gratiae, sad distingu-- 
unter in effectibus gratiae, qui sunt illumina- 
tio intellectus at inflammatio affectus. Et sic 
1. The most recent author to appreciate this is P. E. Persson, 
Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in'Aguinas, tr. R. MacKenzie, 
Oxford, 1970, pp. 91-224. For an older authority, B. FSroget, Do 1 ! habi- 
tation du S. Esprit dans les ames justes, (Paris), 1898.2. Ia, q. 34, a. 2; 
q. 37, a. 1. 
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manifestum est quod una non potest esse sine alia, 
quia neutra est sine gratia gratum faciente nee 
una persona separatur ab alia ". (1) 
-y- 
At the heart of the Trinity and at the perfection of the Christian life, 
knowledge and love cannot be separated. Even if the illumination of 
the mind is appropriated to the-Verbum Dei, we are not to understand 
this as any other than Verbum Spirans Amorem. 
"Verbum quod insinuare intendimus cum amore notitia 
est". (2)' 
The Begotten Wisdom of-God - sauientia genita - unites himself to man 
through the virtue of love, (caritas), and within this love, gives also 
the Gift-of wisdom; this infused wisdom is not the cause of the charity 
relationship, it is the'effect of it. 
And this relationship of love is not just one of friendship but 
of adopted sonship through the Spirit`and-the Son. Thomas is quite 
clearly grounding himself on Romansl-chapter eight. In receiving the 
Gift of wisdom'a man enters into the state of being a son of God. 
3 
It is within this intimate relationship of adopted sonship that the 
connatural knowledge of the Gift of wisdom operates. 
4 "" 
We are now in a better position to appreciate what Thomas might 
mean by a 'man 'tasting' or experiencing God through the Gift of wisdom. 
Thomas in common with the whole tradition held that God'is present in' 
all creation by essence, -'power and presence, but that he is present to 
rational creatures by grace in a special way in keeping with their na- 
11 - 
tures., which alone are capax Dei, capable of receiving this more intimate 
1. Ia, q. 43, a. 5, ad3um., 2. Ia, q. 43, a. 5, adlum; ad2uin. In 
Augustine, De trinitate IV. 20. (PL 42.969)., 3. IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 6. 
4. Hence the beatitude "... they shall be called the sons of God" attri- 




"Super istam modum autem, communem est unus specia- 
lis quo convenit naturae rationali, inque Deus 
dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et ama- 
turn in amante. Et quia cognoseendo et amando 
creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad 
ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus 
non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali sed 
esse habitare in ea sicut in templo suo". (2ý 
This 'inhabitation' of God, which has its roots in Johannine and Pau- 
line spirituality, refers to the constant presence of the Trinity in 
the essence of man's soul by grace. It is an abiding presence and not 
& transient and intermittent-one. 
For Thomas, however, iit is impossible for man to know the essence 
of his-own being: he cannot therefore experience directly the presence 
of God in the 'essence of his soul. 
3 
Man knows himself in-reflection 
on his own activity; by reflecting on his own activity; by reflecting 
upon his powers of willing and knowing. 
4°a It is in the' same.. indirect 
way., in reflecting upon his loving and knowing, that he experiences, '- 
his relationship and union with the Triune God. 
5 
- This 'quasi-experi- 
mental' knowledge of God is more a matter of a non-conceptual''touching' 
or 'tasting' than of)direct,, laiowledge. 
6 
We can recall what has been established regarding the connatura- 
lity which flows from the acquired virtues and apply it at this higher 
level: that as a man has made himself to be, so will his openness and 
receptivity to new experiences-be enhanced. 
"Sicht enim gustus dijudicat sapores secundum suam 
dispositionem, ita mens hominis dijudicat de ali- 
`quo faciendo secundum suam habitualem dispositio- 
nem, unde et Philosophus dicit quod, ualis uni- 
quisque est, talis finis videtur ei". 7 
The same point has been made by- a- modern theologian. 
"The capacity for answering, in other words, "the 
1. Ia, q. 12, a. 1; a. 4, ad3um.. 2. Ia, q. 43, a. 3.3. IalIae, 
q. 112, a. 5.4. Ia. q. 87.5. IaIIae, q. 112, a. 5.6. IIaIIae, 
q. 97, a. 2, ad2um. 7. IaIIae, q. 24, a. 11. 
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sphere of resonance within us capable of taking 
up and digesting an appeal from outside - or from 
our innermost depth - influences the magnitude 
and depth of our experience". (1) 
Thomas brings out this notion of a capacity to 'experience' God, to 
'taste' and 'touch' the divine, most clearly in his discussion of the 
vice opposed to wisdom, that is, folly, (stultitia). 
2 He quotes Isi- 
dore, 
"Stultus est qui propter stuporem non movetur". (3) 
'The fool is one who is not moved through, dullness',. He lacks the 
necessary sensitivity and taste: the fool has blunted senses and a 
dull heart. In contrast,, the wise man in his sensitivity and discern- 
ment has a certain receptivity and therefore a capacity for discrimi- 
nating and penetrating judgement. This capacity for experiencing the 
divine comes from the infused virtue of charity but the intellectual 
act of udgement which flows from-it., pertains to the intellectual 
Gift of wisdom. The opposite of, the Gift of wisdom is not then simple 
ignorance but a dullness and coarseness of judgement. 
4 This blunting 
of one's sensitivity for judgement is sinful: if it is a result of a 
habitual coarsening of perception by concentrating on things less than 
Good. In a contrary fashion, as one's. sensitivity to divine matters 
5 
increases through growth incharity, so does one's ability to judge 
divine things through the Gift of wisdom, and not only divine matters, 
but all other things in the light of this experiential knowledge of 
God. 
"..., ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altis- 
simam, per quarr de aliis certissime judicator, et - 
secundum quarr omnia ordinari oportet". (6) 
Our experience of God within the Gift of charity-wisdom is, (as 
is quite in keeping with Thomas' basic model of movement), the result 
1. E. Schillebeeckx, The Christ 1980 , p. 33.2. 'IIaIIae, 
q. 46, a. 1.3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. IIaIIae, q. 46, a. 2. 
6. IIaIIae, q. 45, a. 1. 
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of the experience of being moved. E. Schillebeeckx, in an essay, 
which shows perhaps his earliest interest in the notion of experience, 
writes: -' 
"The experiential aspect of the act of faith, which 
has disappeared in post-Tridentine speculation 
about the act of faith, 'has once again been accorded°" 
its proper place ... Neglect of the 'mystical aspect 
of faith$ in the Fathers and the scholastic authors 
of the High Middle Ages has led to the act of faith 
'being regarded more or less as a conclusion drawn 
from successful reasoning". 
He also adds, concerning the term instinctus, so important to our own 
area of research: - >ý., ý-. 
"The instinctus in its original Greek meaning of 
enthusiasmos, (with which Aquinas was familiar 
and which he quoted) might well have provided Seek- 
ler with a better indication of the direction in 
which he should have looked. 'Enthusiasm' implies 
not only a being attracted, but also an experience, " 
a state of being moved that is experienced in the 
person himself, but cannot of its own accord be ex- 
plained by him because a deeper mystery is active 
within it. Seckler places too low a value on the 
real aspect of experience that is present in the 
act of faith. In Seckler's view, grace becomes 
something like a non-conscious modality of human 
life, (a typical affirmation of anti-Reformation 
theology), as though grace were a purely entitative 
elevation of our existence without our human psy- 
chology being affected in the process There 
certainly is a nonconceptual element of experience 
in Aquinas' pre-Reformation synthesis, even though 
this is embedded in his concepts and affirmations 
of faith, (the enuntiabilia). Insofar, however, 
as there is an experience in faith, this experience' 
does not refer directly to God's: revelations of 
himself, (this would be the visio beata), but to 
the value and the relevance of the truths to our 
human existence, to a certain state of being moved 
in this existence that cannot be explained from a 
human point of view, but that is experienced as a 
gift from elsewhere, a gift that on reflection, 
can only be experienced as a grace - the work of 
God's Spirit in us". (1) 
Schillebeeckx's thought has developed a great deal since 196 Q and the 
1. E. Schillebeeclcc, 'The Non-Conceptual Intellectual Element 
in the Act of Faith', Concept of Truth and Theological Renewal, 1968, 
p. 31, p. 74. 
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notion of experience is now a central one in contemporary theology. 
1 
At the moment we can only note this and note also how Schillebeeclac 
explicitly refers back to his Thomistic legacy and, in particular, to 
the idea of connatural knowledge. 
2 
Charity and wisdom are the perfection of man's whole nature, 
and, precisely as such, they are also the perfection of man's relation- 
ship with his Creator. 
3 Now - and this is to introduce a whole new 
area of thought - just as all creatures participate in Being, in God's 
Being, so rational creatures also participate in God's providence by a 
participation in operation, in activity. 
4 In the life of grace, they 
have the dignity of initiating and enacting prudential and therefore 
providential purposive programmes. In this too, in their prudential 
actions, they experience God indirectly. In his Commentary on Corin- 
thians, Thomas writes: - 
"... quia Deus est in omnibus rebus per suam actio- 
nem, inquantum conjupgit se eis, ut dans esse, at 
conservans in esse. In. sanctis autem est per ips- 
sorum sanctorum operationem, qua attingunt ad Deum, 
at quadammodo comprehendunt ipsum, quae est dili- 
gere at cognoscere". (5. ) 
'God is in all things through his action: he is in the sanctified through 
their actions'. 
The Gifts of intellectus, scientia and wisdom are not just con- 
1. The bibliography is already extensive. The present writer 
has found the following particularly useful in relation to this present 
topic. Concilium, no. 113, (1979); E. Schillebeeclcc, The Interim 
Report, 1980. , The Christ, 1980 , pp. 17-81, pp. 473-5; K. Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, 'Nature and Grace', pp. 
165-188; vol. III, 'Reflections on the Experience of Grace', pp. 86-91. 
2. The Christ, p. 475.3. On the idea of 'assimilation', see Ia, 
q. 103, a. 5, and F. Rousselot, The Intellectualism of St Thomas, tr. J. E. 
O'Mahony, 1935 , and J. H. Wright, The Order of the Universe in the 
Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, Rome, 1957, p. 63 ff. 4. Ia, q. 105, a. 5; 
q. 23, a. 8, ad2um. 5. In 2 ad Cor., 6.3. 
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cerned with speculative reasoning but with practical reasoning also. 
It is time for us to move on to the fourth intellectual Gift, the 
Gift of consilium. 
10. THE INFUSED CARDINAL VIRTUES AID THE GIFTS OF CONS_ UM, 
FORTITUDE AND PIETY 
- The Centrality of Prudence 
-A Receptivity to the Ordering of Reality 
-A Receptivity to Advice from Others: docilitas, 
eubulia, and the Gift of Consiliurn 
-A Receptivity to One's Own Nature: An 'education 
sentimentale1 
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We move on now to the Gifts which relate to the infused cardi- 
nal virtues, leaving the intellectual Gifts which are allied with 
faith and charity, and leaving aside for the moment the Gift of fear 
which is linked to the theological virtue of hope. To clarify the 
situation it may be as well to present once more an-analytical table 
of how Thomas arranges the Gifts in the Secunda Secundae. 
The Theological Virtues 
Virtue Gift 
Charity, as the root of all the infused 
virtues and Gifts. wisdom 
Faith, working through Charity, 
a. the intellectual act of 
apprehension. intellectus 
b. the intellectual act of 
judgement 
i. from divine realities. wisdom 
ii. from created realities. scientia 
Hope, working through Charity under the 
aspect of filial fear. fear of the Lord 
The Infused Moral Virtues 
Virtue Gift 
Prudence, perfecting practical reasoning, 
directing the moral virtues. consilium 
Justice piety 
Courage fortitude 
Temperance fear of the Lord. 
In the introduction to the Secunda Secundae, Thomas says that 
all moral philosophy can be reduced to a discussion of the virtues and 
these in turn can be reduced to seven - three theological and four car- 
diner virtues. All the moral virtues are assigned in this way to one 
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or other of the cardinal virtues. Hence, in the table above, we are 
to take, 'Justice' or 'Fortitude' to refer also to all those sub-vir- 
tues which are related to them. 1, The Secunda Secundae is a theologi- 
cal treatise in which the natural values of justice, temperance and 
the rest, are presented with respect and shown to be enhanced and, trans- 
formed under grace. The Gifts are interwoven with this dominant theme, 
reaffirming the triumph of grace within man under charity. 
We have already discussed the significance of the changes 
between the various arrangements of the Gifts in Thomas' career. 
2 
Let us focus on only one point which is highly relevant to the task 
in hand at this juncture. Only in the Secunda Secundae is the virtue 
of prudence mentioned-in relation to the Gifts. This cannot be be- 
cause Thomas was unaware of its importance in the Prima Secundae be- 
cause he discusses it there in great detail. 
3 The problem was, pre- 
sumably, that in dividing the Gifts between the faculty of reasoning 
and the faculty of appetite, it was difficult to deal adequately with 
a virtue which unites both. Now, in the Secunda Secundae, prudence 
and its allied Gift of cons_ are placed at the centre of the dis- 
cussion of man's moral life. It is claimed that what charity is to 
the infused virtues, prudence is to the moral virtues. 
4 And if pru- 
dence is central, so then is the Gift of the Spirit's counselling. 
What has to be said about this Gift can be said quite simply by refer- 
ring to question fifty-two, 'article one. 
"Est autem proprium rationali crsaturae quod per 
inquisitionem rationis moveatur ad aliquid agen- 
dum: quas quidem inquisitio consilium dicitur. 
Et ideo Spiritus Sanctus per modum consilii crea- 
turam rationalem movet. Et propter hoc consi- 
lium ponitur inter don, a Spiritus Sancti". (5) 
1. An enormous number in the case of these two virtues. 
2. Above . p. 223-229.3. IaIIae, q. 57-61.4. IIaIlae, q. 51, a. 2 
and q. 23, a. 7.5. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 1. 
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"Ad tertium, dicendu. ýn quod filii Dei aguntur Spiritu 
Sancto secundum modum eorum, salvato scilicet Libero 
arbitrio, quae est facultas vvoluntatis et rationis. 
Et sic inauantum ratio a Spiritu Sancto instruitur 
de agendis, competit fills Dei donum consilii". (1) 
The Gift of consil_ is not some particular form of inspiration over- 
riding the human mode of deciding and acting but it is a further dimen- 
sion within that particularly human mode of deciding and acting which 
is referred to as liberum arbitrium, free judgement, or, less correctly, 
free will. Thomas made the same point in Prima Secundae, question 
sixty-eight. 
"Tale autem instrumenturn non est homo; sed sic 
aguntur Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam agit, inquan- 
tum est liberum arbitrium". (2) 
The same point is made here more precisely because it is prudence which 
perfects man's free judgement and the act of choice, (electio), which 
follow from that judgement and which is the manifestation of man's 
freedom. 
The centrality of prudence. 
In introducing his analysis of the moral virtues, Thomas makes 
quite explicit his disagreement with Socrates. Socrates, he claims, 
held that all the virtues are intellectual: if a man possesses full 
knowledge then he will be perfectly virtuous. 
"Hoc autem procedit ex suppositione falsi. Pars 
enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino ad nutum, 
sed cum aliqua contradictione. Unde Philosophus 
dicit quod ratio i. mperat apoetitivae princiDatu poli- 
tico, quo scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui 
habent jus in aliquo contradicendi". (3) 
Man's rationality controls his life and action not as a despot but as 
a constitutional ruler who governs by coordinating and directing elements 
1. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 1, ad3um. 2. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 3, ad2um. 
3. IaIIae, q. 58, a. 2. 
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and groups which have their own dispositions and drives. 
"Sic igitur ad hoc cuod homo bene agat, requiritur 
quad non- solum. ratio sit bene disposit, a per' tiabi- 
tum virtutis intellectualis, sed etiam quod vis 
appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtu- 
tis moralis". (1) 
Thomas is not an intellectualist as Socrates was but follows his mas- 
ter, Aristotle. We have seen how the natural law is not composed of 
abstract principles of speculative reason built up into a system but 
is a rational appreciation of man's basic drives and inclinations, 
and is, precisely as such, a rational participation in the Lex Aeterna. 
2 
Man's appetitive drives - properly perfected by virtues - and not just 
man's rationality exhibit the order of providence and predestination. 
A man may know, speculatively, what is right but he will not use this 
knowledge, in terms of practical reasoning, unless his appetites are 
also perfected'within their on order of operations. Moreover, it 
is the will, the rational appetite of man, which is after all, the 
motus, the driving force in man's nature. 
3 We must therefore posit 
virtues in the intellect, in the appetites, (the moral virtues) and 
also in the will, (charity and justice )"4 
... aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae 
non inclinatur ad utendum, sed fit potens specu- 
lari verum in his quorum habet scientiain. Sed 
quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente volun- 
tate. Et ideo virtus quae perficit voluntatem, 
ut caritas vel justitia, facit enim bene uti hujus- 
modi speculativis habitibus". (5) 
Prudence is at"the centre of the human moral act, (actus humanus) be- 
cause it involves right reasoning and insight, a docility and recep- 
tivity on the part of man's appetites and the right ordering of his 
rational appetite, the will. Man's acts are purposive; he acts for 
an 'end'. By his intellectual ability he selects purposes, by his 
1. Ibid. 2. Above p. 211.3. Above p. 169ff" 
4. Ia, q. 567.6.5. IaIIae, q. 57, a. 1. 
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rational will he fixes on them and moves towards them, but it is by 
the virtue of prudence that he chooses means, in keeping with the end, 
by which he will achieve his purposes. Prudence then is an intellec- 
tual virtue. To be 'good' involves doing good and, in the complexity 
of man's activities, this involves not only a rightness about 'ends' 
but about the choice or means to those ends and a rightness too about 
the-manner, the circumstances and'the timing of the choice of these 
means. 
1 
- Prudence is an intellectual virtue because, although dealing 
with a'whole host of other mattersýit is primarily concerned with deli- 
beration, choice and putting into action such decisions as are deter- 
mined in this way. -- Yet prudence is also a. moral virtue, although, 
as it were, 'materially' rather than 'formally', because, unlike the 
other intellectual virtues-it is concerned with achieving objectives. 
Hence-it-involves the interaction of man's appetites and his rational 
will so that he will succeed in fulfilling the means to-the end upon 
which he has determined. 
2 In this, prudence is aided by the moral 
virtuesýof justice, temperance and courage, which, in turn, participate 
inýman's purposive, rational, activity by means of the virtue of pru- 
dence. ý .., . 
The whole area of man's-prudential activity, that is, the whole 
area of, choosing the means by which best to achieve one's projects, is 
an-area within which certainty is not possible. Inevitably, one has 
to deal with contingent matters, individual events, and particular,. 
often unique, situations. Thomas, following his master Aristotle, 
and deeply indebted to the "ticomachean Ethics, is fully aware of this. 
Withinýour"own teat dealing with the Gift of cons_ he makes this 
clear. 
1. IaIIae, q. 57, a. 5.2 IIaIlae, q. 47, a"4. 
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"Sed quia humans ratio non potest comprehendere 
singularia et contingentia quae occurrere pos- 
sunt., fit quod co itationes mortalium sint timi- 
dae. et incertae Drovidentiae nostrae. ut dic tur 
Sap. Et ideo indiget homoin-inquisitione consi- 
liit dirigi a Deo qui omnia comprehendit; quod 
fit per donum consilii ... " 
(1) 
But this need for divine advice in regard to the working of infused 
prudence is only a greater and particular example of the need for ad- 
vice and deliberation within the operation of all forms of prudence. 
Unable to achieve the certainty possible in speculative reasoning, 
man, in his practical reasonableness, needs to be receptive to advice 
from others, sensitive to the actual circumstances confronting him in 
each case, and receptive too to his own potentiality to respond in 
ways outside his customary manner, receptive to his own sense of what 
is judicious. The perfection of these three kinds of receptivity 
are the allied virtues of prudence which Thomas, following Aristotle, 
entitles, eubulia, synesis and gnome. 
2 The Gift of receptivity to 
the Holy Spirit counselling (consilium) is an enlargement of these 
ordinary receptivities within the relationship of grace. We win 
therefore discuss the significance and place of the Gift of the Spi- 
rit's counselling within the terms of these three kinds of receptivity. 
Before doing so, however, we need to make two further points. 
Firstly, the virtue of prudence relates primarily to action, to doing 
things for the sake of an 'end'. Taking advice and making enquiries 
is only the first stage of acting prudentially: such preliminary de- 
liberations have to be followed by-a decision on a course of action 
and then the actual undertaking of the action decided upon. - Here, 
however, we are concentrating only on this first stage. Our justifi- 
cation for this is Thomas' own treatment of why this Gift is called 
1. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 1., adlum. 2. IIaIIae, q. 51. 
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consilium and not judgement or command, judicium vel praeceptum. 
"... judicare et praecipere non est mots, sed moven- 
tis. Et quia in donis Spiritus Sancti mens humans 
non se habet ut movens, sed magis ut mota ... inde 
est quod non fait conveniens quod donum correspondens 
prudentiae praeceptum diceretur vel judicium, sed 
consilium; per quod potest significari motto mentis 
consiliatae ab alio consiliante". (1) 
The Gift of consilium is not to be confused with the charismatic Gift 
of giving counsel to others. 
2 It is something man receives which is 
then subsequently integrated into his cooperation with divine grace in 
his activity of deciding and enacting. 
The second point is that although we are concentrating on these 
three allied virtues of prudence we need also to be aware of the com- 
plexity intrinsic to the virtue itself. As prudence has to deal with 
empirical, contingent and individual matters, the virtuous man needs 
to be able to draw on his memory and his foresight, on an insight into 
what needs to be done and on what is actually before him, and on a 
docility to advice, teaching, sound reasoning, and on a feeling for 
caution and circumspection. Thomas deals with all these intrinsic 
elements of prudence in turn. 
3 
Man needs to be receptive in all these 
areas not for some form of contemplative insight but precisely to en- 
sure the rightness of his activity. 
A receptivity to the orderine of reality. 
Josef Pieper, in his book, The Four Cardinal Virtues, has done 
more than anyone else to transpose ThomasI insights on the moral vir- 
tues out of their scholastic categorisation so alien to our own thought, 
I... IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 2, adlum. -2. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 2, ad2um. 
The Fauline charismatic gifts are gratia gratis data and not gratia 
gratum faciens. 3. IIaIIae, q. 49; memoria, providentia, ni telli- 
aentia. solertia. 'docilitas, ratio. circumspectio. cautio. See Pie- 
per, op. cit.., pp. 10-22, for illuminating discussion of these in 
modern language. 
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into modern prose,, making them accessible to modern sensibility, it 
is as well then to'quote him on this topic, having first recalled a 
basic dictum which we have already come across several times before: 
Bonum hominis sit seeundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit. 
1 
"The-intrinsic goodness of man - and that is the 
same as saying his true humanness - consists in 
this, that 'reason perfected in the cognition of 
truth' shall inwardly shape and imprint his voli- 
tion and action. In this fundamental principle 
of Thomas Aquinas is summed up the whole doctrine 
of prudence ... 
... Whoever rejects truth, whether natural or 
supernatural is really 'wicked' and beyond conver- 
sion. And from the realm of 'natural' philoso- 
phising, the realm which the supernatural 'presup- 
poses and perfects' we may call to mind Goethe's 
saying: 'All laws and rules of conscience may 
ultimately be reduced to a single one: to truth'. 
We incline all too quickly to misunderstand 
Thomas Aquinas's words about 'reason perfected in 
the cognition of truth'. 'Reason' means to him 
nothing other than 'regard for and openness to 
reality' and 'acceptance of reality'. And 'truth' 
to him nothing other than the unveiling and reve- 
lation of reality, both natural and supernatural 
reality. Reason 'perfected in the cognition of 
truth' is therefore the receptivity of the human 
spirit to which the revelation of reality, both 
natural and supernatural reality, has given sub- 
stance. 
Certainly prudence is the standard of volition 
and action; but the standard of prudence, on the 
other hand, is the ipsa res, the 'thing itself', 
the objective reality of being. And therefore 
the preeminence of prudence signifies first of all 
the direction of volition and action towards truth; 
but finally it signifies the directing of volition 
and action towards objective reality. ý The good 
is prudent beforehand; but that is prudent which 
is in keeping with reality". (2). 
Leaving aside man's natural grasp of the reality of the created world 
to which he belongs, for our present task we need to see how man, en- 
dowed with the infused virtues and the Gifts of intellectus and scien- 
tia and wisdom sees this same world as providentially organised and 
1. See above p. 199''. 2. J. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Vir- 
tues, Notre Dame, (1966), p. 8. 
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as exhibiting the working out of the divine plan of predestination 
and the recapitulation of all things in Christ. 
Now this move from prudence to providence is not as abrupt a -- 
movement of thought for Thomas as it might be for us. The very terms 
prudentia and providentia are much more closely linked than our trans- 
lations of them., Thomas, in discussing divine providence can feel 
free to interchange them. 
"Et secundum Nunc modum prudentia vel providentia 
Deo convenire potest". (1) 
Prudence is understood as acting to order matters for a particular 
purpose or end, and, developing an analogy from this human activity, 
God is said to order all things in creation to the end which he pre- 
destined for them. 
2 Creation as a whole has a purpose and each thing 
within creation in fulfilling its nature, is acting within the harmony 
of this single plan. 
What is more, man, given his nature as the 'image of God', ful- 
fills his role in the divine plan in as much as he acts prudentially. 
As we noted above, as part of the Gift of wisdom, Thomas claims that, 
'God is in all things through his action: he is in the sanctified 
through their actions'. 
3 Man's own purposes are not at odds with 
the divine plan; properly perfected, they are, in themselves part 
of the enactment of divine providence. This is the significance of 
the marvellous Prologue to the Secunda Pars. Prudence deals with 
the choosing of means to fulfill his purposes. This can in no way 
be understood in terms of the saying 'the end justifies the meant: 
on the contrary, the means chosen are to be an 'incarnation' of the 
ideals of man's fulfillment within the circumstances of human life. 
Man fulfills the divine plan not in his passivity but in his activity. 
1. Ia, q. 22, a. 1.2. Ia, q. 22.3. Above p. 267. 
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In as much as a man takes himself in hand, enacting and achieving his 
pradential"purposes, he is not asserting his independence from God but 
entrusting himself more fully into the hands of God. For Thomas this 
is no, paradox*but clarity itself. 
In our previous chapter on the Eternal law, we stressed repeatedly 
that the universe is intellectually, not rationally, structured but can 
be appreciated by'means of man's rationality as having"a more-than- 
-human-rational ordering. Similarly, the providential ordering of 
creation in its dynamism is not a mechanistic one but a prudential 
one. The' receptivity within the human virtue of prudence is then 
a receptivity to the differing dynamisms within creation. 'A recep- 
tivity to creation as it exists and not as we would fancifully have 
it to exist, Prudence involves accepting what particular means in 
these particular circumstances will lead to the good determined upon. 
Now the infused virtue of prudence opens man to more elevated influences 
than thöse'of his own immediate created environment. Thomas uses the 
example of how water naturally falls due to gravity but how it is also 
receptive to the influence of the moon, thus producing the tides of 
the sea. 
1 ', Man, in a similar way, is also influenced in his activity 
by the real world around him with all its interconnecting d namisms, 
but is also influenced, in his reason and will, by the 'drift' of pro- 
vidence as God reveals it-in the life of grace and charity. There is 
then a greater 'tidal' influences on man; a 'movement' to which he 
only becomes receptive through the virtue of charity and the virtues 
and Gifts which flow from it. 
Hence acquired and infused prudence, (perfecting and not des- 
troying'acquired prudence), can have different notions of what'is to 
1. IIaIIae, q. 2, q. 3. See also Gi vol. 23, Appendix 3, 
p. 247 ff, 'The Infusion of Virtues?. 
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be done and, executively, how their projects are to be achieved. 
Acquired prudence, -for example, working through man's practical rea- 
sonableness and the dictates, of the Natural Iaw, might-quite rightly 
choose means of self-preservation when faced with danger. The pru- 
dence that flows from the relationship of charity, on the other hand, 
working through insight in to the Lex Aeterna, to be true to itself 
and not 'sham prudence', might choose the way of martyrdom. Here 
we see how grace gives the insight that man's reasonableness is it- 
self a participation in an ordering greater than the merely rational 
and man's drive towards the good is itself a participation in a greater 
good than that of his own finite nature. In this way, acquired pru- 
dence can pose a threat for the Christian if it restricts-the deter- 
mining factors for decisions to naturally experienced realities and 
works against this enlargening of perspective. 'Christian prudence, 
however, means precisely the throwing open of this realm and, (in faith 
informed by love) the inclusion of new and invisible realities within 
the determinants of our decisionsS1 Once again we need to appreciate 
the interconnection of the Gifts in the life of man under grace. 
Here the Gifts of intellectus, scientia and wisdom are of crucial im- 
portance to the proper functioning of prudence and the Gift of the 
Spirit's counselling. Man moves himself by means of his reason and 
will, but. in this wider dimension of the providence within Which his 
experience of reality is situated, man needs to rely on that other 
dimension of his autonomous activity, that second principle of his 
own dynamism by which he is moved rather than the mover. As man's 
reasoning is a participation in the Lex Aeterna, and his will is a 
participation in the movement of providence, so his self-movement by 
1. Pieper, op. cit., p. 37. 
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reason and will is a rhythm sustained within a greater movement, that 
of the " Spirit of God. 
"Dicendum quod principium motivum inferius adjuva- 
tur praecipue et perficitur per hoc quod movetur 
a superiori motivo principio, sicut corpus in hoc 
quod movetur a spiritu. Manifestum est autem quod 
rectitudo rationis humane comparatur ad rationem 
divinam sicut principium motivum inferius quod . 
movetur ad superius, et refertur in ipsum; ratio 
enim aeterna est suprema regula omnis humanae rec- 
titudinis. Et ideo prudentia, quae importat ratio- 
s rectitudinem, maxime perficitur et juvatur 
secundum quod regulatur et movetur a Spiritu Sancto; 
quod pertinet ad donum consilii ... ". (1) 
... Et quia in donis Spiritus Sancti mens humana 
non se habet ut movens, sed magis ut mota ... inde 
est quod non fait conveniens quod donum correspon- 
dens prudentiae praeceptum diceretur vel judicium, 
sed consilium; per quod potest significari motio 
mentis consiliatae ab alio consiliante". (2) 
Receptivity to advice from others: Docilitas, Eubulia and the Gift of 
Consilium. 
"Dicendum quod consilium proprie importat collatio- 
nem inter plures habitam; quod et nomen designat. 
Dicitur enim consilium, quasi considium, eo quod 
multi consident ad simul conferendum". (3) 
We need not dwell too much on Thomas' etymology but on what it shows 
of his use of the term consilium. Our modern word 'counsel' can too 
easily be taken as a purely religious term whereas Thomas links it 
with people sitting down together in a council or assembly to discuss, 
debate and thrash out the best course of action. For this reason, 
'deliberation' might be one word that could be used to translate consi- 
lium. 4 Or, drawing on modern pastoral care techniques one might call 
the Gift, 'the Gift of the Spirit's counselling'. Because prudential 
activity deals with particular circumstances and conditions, delibera- 
tion among several people is more likely to be successful than the 
1. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 2.2. IaIIae, q. 52, a. 2, adlnm. 
3. IaIIae, q. 14, a. 3.4. Gilby does this in Gi1by, vol. 17. 
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judgementtof any single individual. 
1 No man is altogether self-suf- 
ficient in matters of prudence. 
2 Hence the need for a docility and 
openness to-advice, especially from one's elders and those of more 
experience. 
3 Developing this a little further, Thomas also presents 
eubulia as an allied virtue of prudence. This is the cast of mind 
of making adequate inquiries, proper research, and accepting good ad- 
vice before one makes important decisions. 
4 
Now how is this normal receptivity as part of the deliberating 
process taken up and given a new existence and new scope in the life 
of grace ?5 We can examine this by looking at one of the central 
texts in-Thomas' treatment of graceý-Prima Secundae, q. 109, a. 9. Eßt 
this point Thomas has introduced his two models of grace: that grace 
is both an habitual gift and also a divine help, a_ or motio. 
-"..., homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auailio Dei indiget. . Uno quidem modo quantum ad aliquod habi- tue donum, per quod natura human corrupts sane- 
tur, et etiam sanata elevetur ad operanda opera 
meritoria vitae aeternae, quae excedunt proportionem 
naturae. Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae, 
ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad 
ýprimum auailii modum, homo in gratia existens non 
indiget alio auxilio gratiae, quasi aliquo habitu 
also-infuso. - Indiget tarnen auxilio gratiae secun- 
dum alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad 
recte agendum". (6) 
The-Gifts, as part of gratia gratum faciens, are part of the first 
. 
type of grace mentioned here. But, by their nature, as we have seen, 
they provide a receptivity and docility for this second form of grace. 
There are two reasons for this second kind of need. The first is. 
based on general metaphysical considerations. 
"Primo quidem ratione generali, propter-hoc good supra - dictum est, nulle res creata potest inquemcumque ac- 
-tum prodire, nisi virtute motionis divine". (7)- 
1. IaIIae, q. 14, a. 3.2. IIaIIae, q. 49, a. 4; IaIlae, q. 14, a. 4. 
3. IIaIIae, q. 49, a. 3.4. IIaIIae, q. 51, a. 1, a. 2.5. IIaIIae, 
q. 52, a. 1, adlum. 6. IaIIae, q. 109, a. 9.7. Ibid. 
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It is the second reason which concerns us here in the question of how 
man can decide correctly, free from victimisation from his sinfulness, 
and seeing reality and truth with clarity. 
"Secundo ratione speciali, propter conditionem sta- 
tus humanae naturae; quae quidem licet per gratiam 
sanetur quantum ad rnentem, remanet tarnen in ea cor- 
ruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quarr ser- 
vit legs peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom. Remanet etiam 
quaedam ignorantiae obscuritas in intellectu ... 
... Propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia 
etiam nos ipsos non perfecte cognoscimus, non pos- 
sumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat, secun- 
dum illud 2M., Cogitations mortalium timidae, et 
incertae providentiae nostrae. Et ideo necesse 
est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegarnur, qui om- 
nia novit et omnia potest". (1) 
The thought here is quite clearly closely related to our present topic 
of the difficulties of human deliberation and the Gifts of the Spirit 
operating within this area. Man, even under grace, still needs direc- 
tion and protection from God. 
"Et ideo neccese est nobis ut a Deo dirigarnnr et 
. protegamur". (2) 
The words used here deserve closer inspection: we might see them in 
terms of a maternal and paternal concern and involvement; 'protection' 
and 'direction'. 
3 This is not reading too much into the text because 
the relationship of grace is neither neutral nor static; it is a con- 
tinuous involvement of God with the creatures he loves. He leads 
them, guides them and protects them from harm. Properly understood, 
the Thomist theory of habitual grace cannot be taken as giving man 
the ability to act supernaturally independently of God. On the con- 
trary, from the point of view of man, still weakened and impaired by 
the effects of sin, it establishes a permanent dependence and recep- 
tivity of man on God; in all his fully human activity, he is guided 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. An idea developed by M. Lefe- 
bure in an unpublished paper on this article. 
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and protected by the love of God. How much more is this the case 
with that-most characteristic act of man's freedom, his making choices 
after prudential deliberation. 
1 Grace is both gratia sanans and gra- 
tia elevans. 
2 
, =It heals the effects of sin which disorder the basic 
perception'of: reality and truth, and it 'elevates' man to share in 
the divine life, and cooperate in the divine plan of predestination. 
3 
And yet, still within this high vocation of man under grace, and with- 
in-the healing which grace begins in man, there is still the frailty 
of humanity. In a rich, and quite moving, insight, Thomas says, 'we 
do not even know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for 
our good'. 
4 
Given this continuous protection and guidance by God, doubly 
necessary because of the dis-ordering of sin which still remains under 
grace, and because of man's new elevated state, we can appreciate a 
central theme in Thomas, treatment of the Gifts; a theme which is 
exhibited in various metaphors, key phrases and scriptural quotations. 
"Medicos etiam qui perfecte novit artem medicine 
potest per se operari; sed discipulus ejus, qui 
nondum est plena instructus, non potest per se 
operari, nisi ab eo instruatur", (5) 
A receptivity to one's own nature: an 'education sentimentale'. 
As we have seen already, for man to act virtuously he needs not 
on17-a rightness of reasoning but a disposition in his appetites to- 
wards acting in accordance with what is judged to be reasonable. 
This does not mean a suppression of the appetitive drives in man but 
a controlling of them. 
6 
We can see that his has both a negative and 
a positive dimension. 
1. Ia, q. 83, a. 3.2. IaIIae, q. 109 3. Above, p. 267. 
4. Quoted above, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 9.5. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2.6. IaIIae, 
q. 59, a. 2, where Thomas distinguishes his own theory from that of the 
Stoics. 
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When Thomas analyses the virtue of prudence he also contrasts 
it with related vices, with imprudence, with negligence and with 'sham' 
prudence, that is, with cunning, guile and cheating. The root of all 
these vices, he claims, is covetousness and lust: not only sexual 
lust, which is the most powerful form of lust, but all immoderate 
straining for possessions to uphold one's sense of security and impor- 
tance. These passions undermine one's sensitivity to reality and 
distort one's perception of the truth. Pieper, again, gives us a 
very clear example of this. 
"Thomas adduces true-to-being memory as the first 
prerequisite for the perfection of prudence; and 
indeed this factor is the most imperilled of all. 
Nowhere else is the danger so great as here, at 
the deepest root of the spiritual-ethics), process, 
the danger that the truth of real things will be 
falsified by the assent or negation of the will. 
The peril is the greater for its being so imper- 
ceptible. There is no more insidious way for 
error to establish itself than-by this falsifica- 
tion of the memory through slight retouches, dis- 
placements, discolourations, omissions, shifts of 
accent. Nor can such falsifications be quickly 
detected by the probing conscience, even when it 
applies itself to the task. The honesty of the 
memory can be ensured only by a rectitude of the 
whole human being which purifies the most hidden 
roots of volition. Here it becomes apparent how 
greatly prudence; upon which all the virtues de- 
pend., is in its turn dependent at its very funda- 
ments on the totality of the other virtues ... ". 
(1) 
Here the infused virtues of justice, temperance and courage and their 
allied Gifts of the Spirit, piety, fortitude and the fear of the Lord, 
come in as auxiliaries to prudence. 
2 
Bat the role of these moral virtues and Gifts is not merely 
negative. -Again and again Thomas, following Aristotle, repeats that 
the reason governs the other faculties of man not as a despot but as- 
a constitutional ruler. 
3 Alisdair McIntyre, in a recent book aimed 
1. Pieper, op. cit., p. 15.2. See the table on p. 225 
above. 3. Ia, q. 58, a. 2. 
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at returning moral philosophy to the study of the virtues, holds that 
a theory of the virtues can fulfill two roles. Firstly, they can be 
seen as freeing man from 'victimisation' by his own emotions and desires, 
but, secondly, they can also be seen as giving man the ability to de- 
cide which drives'to cultivate and encourage and which to inhibit and 
reduce. He adds: - 
"Virtues are dispositions not only to act in parti- 
cular ways, but also to feel in particular ways. 
To act virtuously is not as Kant was later to think, 
to act against inclination, it is to act from in- 
clination formed by the cultivation of the virtues. 
Moral education is an 'education sentimentales". (1) 
Referring to-Aristotle, he points out that excellence of intelligence 
and excellence of character must go together: otherwise prudence be- 
comes mere cunning and manipulation; a view endorsed by Thomas. 
2 
However, when we come to examine the three remaining infused 
moral virtues - justice, temperance and courage --it-is significant 
that Thomas has very little to say about the Gifts which relate to 
them. ' A clue to this slackening of interest can be found in the 
third answer to q. 139, a. 1. 
"Ad tertium dicendum quod donum fortitudinis respi- 
cit virtutem fortitudinis, non solum quod consistit 
in sustinendo periculo, sed etiam secundurn quod 
consistit in quocuznque arduo opere faciendo. Et 
ideo donum fortitudinis dirigitur a dono consilii, 
quod videtur praecipue esse de melioribus bonis". (3) 
As prudence is the formative virtue of all the moral virtues, so the 
Gift of divine counselling and advising is interfused with all those 
K« 
Gifts linked to the moral virtues. This seems to be clear proof that 
Thomas does not see the sevenfold Gifts as relating to seven discrete 
areas of activity, but as a sevenfold plenitude, interfusing all man's 
activities in via, on his way, by faith working through love, to his 
1. A. MacIntzyre, After Virtue (1982). p. 140.2. IIaIIae, q. 55. 
3. IIa3Iae, q. 139, a. 1, ad3um. 
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p atria in heaven. 
There is a hierarchy within the moral virtues. 
"Bonuni autem rationis est hominis bonuni, secundum 
Dionysiuin. Hoc autem bonuni essentialiter quidem 
habet prudentia quae est perfectio rationis. 
Justitia autem est ejus boni factiva: inquantum 
scilicet ad ipsam pertinet ordinem rationis ponere 
in omnibus rebus humanis". (1) 
Justice is the application of the right ordering which reason ascer- 
tains in each situation, the exercise of the virtue of prudence. 
Prudence and justice then, are dimensions of any human activity. 
Prudence is located in the intellect; justice in the will., in the 
dynamism of man's activity. 
2 But these faculties of man can be under- 
mined and disordered in their execution by man's feelings and passions. 
As all these forms of emotional response can be connected under two 
headings - feelings of fear or aggression, ('irascible' appetites), 
and feelings of desiring or of abhorence, ('concupiscible' appetites) "ý 
- there are two subordinate moral virtues which render these appetites 
docile to prudence and justice. Hence the quotation above continues: - 
"Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservativae hujus boni: 
inquantum scilicet moderan. tur passiones, ne abdu- 
cant hominem a bono rationis. Et in. -ordine harum 
fortitudo tenet locum praecipuum: quia timor peri- 
culorum mortis maxime est efficax ad hoc ouod homi-. - 
nem faciat recedere a bono rationis. Post quam 
ordinatur temperantia; quia etiam delectationes 
tactus maxime inter caetera impediunt bonum rationis". (3) 
Elsewhere, Thomas gives priority to courage over temperance because 
like prudence and justice it perfects one's relationships with others 
whereas temperance is primarily concerned with one's own inner ordering; 
and, the common good is greater than the individual good. 
4 
The Gift of piety is linked to the infused virtue of justice, 
the Gift of fortitude is linked to the virtue of courage, and the infused 
1. IIaIIae, q. 123, a. 12.2. IIaIIae, q. 58, a. 4.3. IIaIIae, 
q. 123, a. 12.4. IIaIIae, q. 141, a. 8. 
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virtue of temperance is perfected by the Gift of the fear of the Lord. 
1 
For his contemporaries., 'piety' was almost synonymous with 'compassion' 
for one's fellow men. 
2 In the Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas 
following through his basic model for the Gifts at that time, held 
that the Gift of piety brought a 'divine measure' to this compassion 
and mercy between men. 
3 Now he returns to Augustine's more theo- 
centric notion of pietas and sees it as a filial piety towards God, 
the expression of a relationship' of adopted sonship which includes 
all men on the basis of their relationship to God. In as much as 
this Gift is then linked to the infused virtue of justice, it re-orien- 
tates all the many facets of justice into this theocentric ordering of 
filial piety and respect. 
4 But we must beware of failing to appre- 
ciate Thomas' view of justice. As we found in the chapter, Ratio 
Leas et Dens, Thomas characterises man as being purposive and a social 
animal. Since the sixteenth century.. Western thought has been domi- 
nated by 'bourgeois' moral philosophy in which the individual self, 
(certain only of its own inwardness), exists in a totally neutral area, 
(society) in which he freely negotiates relationships of dependence 
and independence, ('freedom'). Medieval man led a communal existence 
and his presuppositions, his view of man and society, reflect this. 
Man is seen as existing within a framework of relationships. By his 
very birth he is indebted to others, to his parents, his kin, his fel- 
low citizens. The virtue, (not the Gift) of piety, is the right 
ordering of reasoning within this network of relationships. The Gift 
of piety is then a further dimension of this already rich notion of 
1. Piety, IIaIIae, q. 1? _1*; Courage, _IIaIIae, q. 
139; Fear of 
the Lord, cý. 19 and q. 141, a. 1, ad3um. 2. See O'Connor, D. 127 and 
IIaIIae, q. 68, a. 6, ad2um. 3. O'Connor, p. 127.4. The Gift. of 
piety is explicitly linked with the virtue of justice and not just 
the virtue of piety. IIaIIae, q. 121, introduction. 
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man in society striving for a common good along with others to whom 
he is bound by debts of reverence and respect. The Gift of piety, 
like all aspects of grace in Thomas' theology, -must be taken as a per- 
fecting and not a destruction of what is already provided by nature. 
Hence, just as man is by nature both a social and a goal-seeking being, 
so the new law of grace involves the gift not only of Beatitude but of 
friendship. The Gift of piety is the gift of due respect and reve- 
rence within the new commonwealth of the adopted sons and daughters 
of God. 
1 
But this commonwealth of God, established in grace, is only 
fully realised in heaven. There is an eschatological dimension to 
all the Gifts, but this aspect becomes particularly clear when we exa- 
mine Thomas' treatment of the Gift of courage or fortitude. Just as 
the virtue of prudence-has to deal with the contingencies of human 
life, so a man needs courage against all sorts of dangers, fears and 
anxieties, expected and unexpected. What is clear from this is that 
the Gift of courage or fortitude is to be seen not as 'aggressive' 
but as 'enduring'. 
"fortitudo importat quamdam animi firmitatem ... 
... et haec quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis et in malts perferendis, et praec 
praecipue in arduis bonis et malts". (2) 
We noted above that the virtue of justice was more than a constant 
repetition of just deeds, it included a firm and stable disposition 
to act justly. Similarly, the key note here also is a firmness of 
purpose in the face of difficulty and opposition. Now as regards 
the life of grace, what man strives for is beyond his own strength 
and competence, and what opposes his purpose has the power to destroy 
1. On the idea of the commonwealth of God see St Thomas' com- 
mentary on Enheians. 2. IIaIIae, q. 139, a. 1. 
I 
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his life. The Gift-of fortitude then involves not just a firmness 
of mind in resisting fears, but also resisting fear of death, and not 
just death, but martyrdom. It is, Thomas points out, the ability to 
face martyrdom which most clearly exhibits the infused virtue and Gift 
of courage. 
1 
... St Thomas is not principally concerned with the display of courage in attack, but with its dis- 
play in endurance. Our life is difficult in all 
its aspects, and even more difficult as virtue in- 
creases. We must learn to overcome fear if we 
are to live fully; fear of personal injury, of 
loss, of reputation, or property, fear of death 
above all. If we face death with courage and 
have come to terms with it, the rest will follow. 
To come to terms with death. we have to know where 
we hope to end; all else depends on the goal, 
which for Thomas is eternal union with God in 
truth and love. The way through this life is 
one of involvement in God's creation, with the 
things and above all, with the people, whom we 
encounter. That is why we need a long view in 
our difficulties, large mindedness and generosity 
in our use of material goods, patience and perse- 
verance at all-times. That is why, if we are to 
come through heroically, we need the special assis- 
tance of God which we call the Gift of Courage 
which will lift us to a heroic endurance far above 
what we could otherwise undertake". (2) 
This passage shows how the Gift of fortitude must also be understood 
as involving the theological virtue of hope. The Holy Spirit inspires 
a firmness of mind, a confidence, that God will lead a man through dan- 
gar., and through death, to eternal life. 
3 It is this confidence which 
allows a man to take a long view of his difficulties and encourages him 
in his patience and perseverance. Obviously the Gift of the Spirit's 
counselling, (consilium), is not separate fron this endurance and, 
given also the Gift of peity, we can see this Gift as the gift of coura- 
geous filial endurance, trusting in God's promises. what is more, 
along with hope is the Gift of a filial fear of the Lord, a fear of 
1. IIaIIae, q. 124, a. 2.2. A. Ross, Gilby, vol. 42, p. xxiv. 
3. IIaIIae, q. 139, a"1. 
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moving outside the relationship of adopted sonship with God. Filial 
fear of God and a firmness against creaturely fears are two aspects 
of man under grace. It is time for us to look at the theological 
virtue of hope and the Gifts of temperance and filial fear associated 
with it. 
1!. TAE TELEOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT 
- Hope and Fear and Temperance 
- The Gifts in patria 
The Gifts, the Beatitudes and the Fruits of the Spirit 
4 
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Hope and fear and temperance. 
Previously Thomas had never assigned a Gift to the theological 
virtue, of hope. In the Commentary on the Sentences he held that 
while God cannot be known by the intellect, dependent on the senses, 
in this life, he can be the 'object' of charity and hope which are 
based in the will, and therefore these virtues do not need Gifts to 
aid them. - They already have, intrinsically, a superhuman measure 
to their operations and therefore do not need a Gift, as Gifts were 
presented in the Commentary. 
' In the Secunda Secundae, however, in 
keeping with the scheme outlined in the Prologue, Gifts are now assigned 
to both charity and hope. Bat these two Gifts - wisdom and the fear 
of the Lord - arenot assigned to have parallel functions. It is 
never claimed that the"Gift of wisdom perfects or aids charity in any 
way. Thomas is consistent here; charity does not need a Gift, and 
we have followed both Labourdette and O'Connor in seeing wisdom as 
the culmination of all the Gifts, being part of the flowering of all 
the implications and ramifications of a life rooted in the divine ami- 
citia of charity. 
2 As for the theological virtue of hope, however, 
Thomas now associates the Gift of fear with it, as preserving, pro- 
tecting and extending hope. The Gift of fear makes man under grace 
afraid of separating himself from God on whose help he relies absolu- 
tely; and this divine fear, colouring all man's actions and drives, 
acts as a check against all that would undermine this absolute reliance 
on God. There seems to be here, a definite enrichment of insight into 
the range and the dynamics of the theological virtue of hope. 
We have already noted that Thomas recovered an older, more theo- 
centric notion of the Gift of piety. What we might call a more anthro- 
1. III. Sent. 33,1,4; 27,3,3; 34,1,1, ad5. See O'Connor, p. 116. 
2. See the discussion on this topic in O'Connor, p. 126r. 
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pocentric notion of the Gift of piety - whereby pietas is a benevolence 
to one's fellow man as the image of God - dominated Thomas' thought 
until the Secunda'-Secundae. Now, the Gift of piety is understood 
not so much as a particular kind of activity but as relating to human 
prudential and just'activity enacted within the awareness of the'pater- 
nal care and loving guidance of God. It is this filial aspect, re- 
orientating man's most characteristic activity which we now take up 
again in'this chapter""but'now our interest is in seeing within this 
graced prudential activity a further teleological dimension. Man 
under grace'is still, in via 'still in movement towards his homeland 
with God. This is obviously where the theological virtue of hope 
enters our discussion. "' 
"objectum'snei est bonuni futurum arduum possibile 
haberi". (1) 
The 'arduous' difficulty of achieving'the object of theologi- 
cal hope is that this object, life with God in patria, is beyond the 
scope of human effort and reasoning. Man is absolutely dependent on 
God to achieve the good that he yearns for, which is God himself. 
2 
In terms of Aristotelian causality., God is both the final cause of 
theological ho, P, its tend', and also its efficient cause, that by which 
this end is achieved. 
3 The Gift of fear relates to God as the effi- 
cient cause of theological hope. Obviously it cannot relate directly 
to the 'end' of hope because man cannot fear goodness itself. 
4 There 
is no opposition then between hope and the Gift of fear because what 
is feared is not loss of 'what one hopes to obtain by divine aid., but 
rather fear of disregarding God's own help to that end. 
5 
As regards both hope and fear we need to be clear that we are 
1. IIaIIae, q. 17, a. 1.2. IIaIIae, q. 17, a. 2.3. IIaIIae, 
q. 17, a. 4.4. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 1.5. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 9, adlum. 
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distinguishing the emotional reactions from the virtue or Gift which 
are 
bear the same name and dealing only with the latter. The theologi- 
cal virtue of hope accepts man's absolute dependence on God's guidance 
and protection to achieve the difficult good that he yearns for, God 
himself. This virtue and the Gift of fear are both habitual dispo- 
sitions - habitus mentis - which make man's faculties responsive to 
the ordering of reason and the Spirit. 
2 Now theological fear, as a 
fear of moving outside the relationship between God and man which the 
virtue of charity-friendship establishes, can be understood in two 
ways. It could be seen firstly as a fear of the punishment due to 
such transgression as a penalty., and this is called 'servile fear'. 
Thomas allows a preparatory role for this servile fear in terms of 
conversion to God out of fear of punishment, but this is to give way 
to a second kind of fear, 'filial fear'. It is this filial fear which 
3 is the Gift of the Holy Spirit. This is not a fear of punishment but 
a fear which is allied with the Gift of piety by which a man is fearful 
of offending God as a son is wary of offending his father, not out of 
fear but out of attachment and bonding. 
4 Thomas does allow for a 
certain continuation of servile fear but he tries to distill away any 
notion of servitude from this fear of punishment. In keeping with 
5 
St Paul's treatment of grace in the Epistle to the Romans, Thomas in- 
sists that the Spirit the Christian receives is not a spirit of timi- 
dity or slavery, 'but a spirit of sonship which cries out 'Abbas Father'. 
6 
In 'a later question on the relationship between penance and fear, 
1. IIaIlae, q. 17, a. 1, a. 5; q. 18, a. 1; q. 19, a. 9. Thomas deals 
with fear as an emotion in IaIIae, q. 41, as_a vice in IIaIIae, q. 125, 
and as a gift in IIaIIae, q. 19. These are not to be confused. The 
unique case of the flowering of this Gift in Jesus is dealt with in 
IIIa, q. 7, a. 6.2. IIaIIae, q. 17, a. 1, adlum. 3. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 9. 
4. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 2, ad3um. 5. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 4.6. Romans, 
8.15; cited in IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 2, ad3um; a. 4, sed contra; a. 6, obj. 3um. 
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Thomas gives us a chronology of how man grows in grace from servile 
fear to the fear that belongs to sonship. 
"Alio modo possumus loqui de poenitentia quantum 
ad actus quibus Deo operanti in poenitentia coope- 
rs. Quorum actuum primum principium est. Dei 
operatio convertentis cor ... Secundus actus est 
motus fidei. - Tertius actus est motus timoris 
servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorurn a peccatis 
retrahitur. - Quartus actus est motus spei, quo 
quis, sub spe veniae consequendae, assumitpropo- 
situm emendandi. - Quintus actus est motus cari- 
tatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum 
seipsum, et non iam propter supplicia. - Sextus 
actus est motus timoris filialis, quo, propter 
reverentiam Dei, aliquis emendam Deo voluntarius 
offert". (1) 
It is growth in the life of charity, of amicitia Dei, which changes 
servile fear into filial fear. As charity increases, so the fear 
of separation from God also increases, but, equally, any idea of ser- 
vility decreases and is replaced by a filial bonding of love. Charity, 
hope, filial fear and piety are all then interrelated. 
This filial dread of separation from the guiding relationship 
with God., the only means by which man can achieve his ultimate flou- 
risking and beatitude, has ramifications in all aspects of man's life 
and re-orders all his activities. 
... timor Dei comparator ad totam vitam humanam 
per sapientiam Dei regulat am sicut radix ad arborem". (2) 
At every level of his life it makes man receptive and docile to the, 
action of God. In this sense, fear is the first of the Gifts. 
3 
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. 
4, For this reason,. 
the Gift of. fear is, not only linked, in a primary way, with the vir- 
tue oP. hope9 but also, in a secondary Way, with the virtue of infused 
temperance. 
5 The difficulties involved in responding to God's help 
in the movement towards him include the temptations of the flesh. 
1.. IIIa, q. 85, a. 5.2 IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 7, au. 3. IIaIIae, 
q. 19, a. 9.4. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 7.5. IIaIIae, q. 141, a. 1, ad3um. 
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The Gift of fear allied with temperance, "perfects as it were the asceti- 
cal, negative side of this movement of man in via ad patriam. If we 
take the basic axiom of the natural law as, our starting point, we can 
make-this clearer. If, 'the good is to be sought after and done and 
evil is to avoided', 'then our concentration at the moment is on the 
evils which are to be avoided on this filial journey of return and 
assimilation to God. 
This ascetical side of the life of grace is dealt with by Tho- 
mas not only in regard to the virtues, but, once again, in his central 
treatise on grace. There he uses the topic of 'justification' to 
bring out the idea that the movement- towards God, auae terminatur in 
bonuni aeternum divinae participationis, inevitably involves a contrary 
movement away from the life of sin. 
1 Our present topic is not then a 
minor one but part of Thomas' teaching on the new law of grace. The 
moment of conversion from a state of sin to a state of justice - right 
ordering - is presented as instantaneous, but man's incorporation of 
this new life into his own nature, through his activity, takes place 
in time, throughout the duration of his life in via. Unlike the vir- 
tues of prudence, justice and courage, the virtue of temperance does 
not deal directly with a right ordering in man's relationship with 
others'and with what is, -around him, but solely with man's own 'internal' 
right ordering of himself. 
2 
Man is"a matrix of forces. The same forces of self-preserva- 
tion., self-assertion and self-fulfilLrnent with which he is endowed by 
God, can, when dis-ordered, work to his own destruction. When re- 
ordered by grace and reason, through the virtue of infused temperance 
1. IaIIae, q. 113, a. 5, a. 6, a. 9.2. It therefore ranks as the 
lowest of the moral virtues, because the common good is greater than 
the individual good, IIaIIae, q. 141, a. 8. But see also the answer to 
the third objection in this article, for a modification of this view. 
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these same forces can be co-ordinated into the unity and wholeness 
of man's aims and projects. The infused virtue of temperance, working 
with charity, hope. and fear of the Lord, involves a curbing, restraining 
and a positive re-ordering of man's powerful drives in his own best 
interest; that is, in the interest of maintaining and deepening his 
right relationship with God in friendship, by which alone he can achieve 
what he hopes for. 
The, Gift of filial fear brings a restraint within all man's 
activities for a distinctive reason, out of reverence for God, out 
of filial docility, and, along with the other Gifts and especially 
wisdom, out of an experiential awareness of the awesome goodness of 
God. This is a 
, 
form of fear, of awe, which is not be met with by 
the virtue of courage and self-assertion; it is the awe of the crea- 
ture before his Creator and Saviour. The Gift at its fullest perfec- 
tion, then, is not just a negative, curbing factor in man's life but 
a positive reverence and submissiveness before God within the tension 
of familiarity and awe which characterises man's adopted sonship. 
Developing this even further, Thomas can hold that even Christ 
had the Gift of the fear of the Lord, as Isaiah had prophesied. 
1 
Certainly Christ could not fear God in the sense of fearing to be alie- 
nated from him, but he was endowed with the Gift in that the Spirit 
led him, in the deepest way possible to man, to have a reverence for 
the overwhelming goodness of God. Given this Christocentric model 
of the Gift at its height, Thomas claims: - 
"Et ideo de ratione doni timoris non est illud malum 
quod respicit timor, sed eminentia illius boni, sci- 
licet divini, cujus potestate aliquod malum infligi 
potest"-. (2) 
1. IIIa, q. 7, a. 6.2. IIIa, q. 7, a. 6, adlum. 
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If the Gift of fear is then this filial and awe-inspired docility of 
man to God and the working of his providence, it follows then that, 
as the psalmist says; Initium sapientiae timor Domini .1 
"Cum enim ad sapientiam pertineat quod human vita 
reguletur secundum rationes divinas, hinc oportet 
sumere principiuin, ut homo Deum revereatur, et ei 
se subjiciat; sic enim consequenter in o nmibus 
secundum Deum regulabitur". (2) 
"Timor autem castus vel filialis est initium sapien- 
tiae, sicut primes sapientiae effectus". (3) 
The Gift of filial fear is not the, as it were, chronological beginning 
of wisdom, but the first manifestation of the life of charity and wisdom. 
The Gifts " in patria I. 
In article six of our central question, Prima Secundae, question 
68, Thomas asks, utrnm dona Sancti Spiritus remaneant in patria. For 
his sed contra he quotes from Ambrose's De soiritu sancto. 
4 
.. This quo- 
tation was a stock-piece in the tradition and had been used by the Lom- 
bard to show that the Gifts were virtues. 
5 Thomas uses it here to 
prove that the Gifts are at their perfection in heaven: he takes it 
as a reference to the superabundance of the outpouring of the Spirit 
in heaven and takes the phrase 'seven spiritual virtues' to refer to 
the Gifts as he has analysed and described them. 
"Sed contra est quos Ambrosius dicit, Civitas Dei 
illa, Jerusalem coelestis, non meatu alicujus flu- 
vii terrestris abluitur; sed ex vitae fonts pro- 
cedens Spiritus Sanctus, cujus nos brevi satiamur 
haustu, in illis coelestibus spiritibus redundan- 
. tius videtur affluere, piano septem virtutum spiri- tualium fervens meatu". 
The Gifts then should be studied not only as they exist in via, but 
as. they exist in heaven. For other theologians who held that the 
1. Ps. 110. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 7, sed. contra. 2. IIaIIae, 
q. 19, a. 7.3. Ibid. 4. De spiritu sancto, 1.16,157-8, PL. 16, 
770bc. Labourdette, D. S. 'Dons', col. 1585.5. IV Sent. 1.3, d. 34, 
c. 2.. 'Haec dona virtutes esse Arnbrosius ostendit'. 
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Gifts were remedies'for sins or aids against human weaknesses, it was 
obvious that there would be no place for the Gifts in heaven. For 
Thomas, however, the Gifts are seen at their clearest in heaven. 
... sicut patet per auctoritatem Ambrosia induc- tsm". (1) 
Bat his thesis does not depend solely on this eisegesis of Ambrose 
but on his own theory of the Gifts. 
... ratio est quia dona Spiritus Sancti perfi- 
ciunt mentem humanum ad sequendam . mo tionem 
Spi- 
ritus Sancti; quod praecipue erit in patria, 
quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur 
lad Cor., et quando homo erit totaliter subditus 
Deo". (2) 
Given his theory that the Gifts render man docile and receptive to 
the instincts of the Spirit, then it does follow directly that this 
receptivity' will be at its zenith in heaven. If they are rooted in 
charity - in a loving experiential knowledge and in a connaturality 
to the workings of the Spirit - then it is not difficult to accept 
that they will remain in heaven, and, indeed, that they will exist 
in a more characteristic way there than in via. But if this is all 
consistent it is stillnot clear what nature the Gifts will have in 
heaven and what relationship of similarity and difference we have to 
posit between their existence then and their existence as we know it, 
and have analysed it here. 
3 
Thomas goes on to provide a list of similarities and differences, 
using a text of Gregory the Great. 
4 However any helpful insights 
gained from this are counterbalanced by his totally unconvincing reading 
of this piece of patristic rhetoric as if it were a literal scholastic 
analysis of the particular matter in hand. Nevertheless, once again, 
- 1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 6.2. Ibid. 3. On the similar pro- 
blem in relation to the virtues, see IaIIae, q. 67. Charity remains, 
now in perfection; faith and hope disappear but the other virtues re- 
main 'formally'. 4. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 6, ad2um, text, Gregory the Great, 
Moralia, 1.32. x"75,547. 
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it is not Thomas use of authorities which establishes his argument 
but the consistency with which he follows through the principles he 
has established regarding the Gifts. Throughout the Secunda Secun- 
when dealing with each particular Gift, Thomas raises the ques- 
tion of how each Gift will exist in heaven. 
1 Often he deals with 
this question within the space of an objection, more commonly it is 
also raised in a more general way in dealing with the beatitude attached 
to each Gift, but in the case of the Gifts of fear and consilium, 
obviously more difficult, he devotes an entire article to the problems 
invvollred. The Gifts assigned to the infused moral virtues obviously 
present more difficulties. In heaven they will not have the same 
'matter' to work on: there will be no anxieties or doubts for consi- 
lium; no fear of sin or disobedience for filial fear and piety; no 
difficultities for fortitude to endure. Yet they remain, and accor- 
ding to Thomas' principles, exist in their fullest state in heaven. 
Regarding the Gift of consilium, he presents his reasoning in 
terms of the basic model around which he has structured all his work 
on the Gifts, that of movement. 
"... alia est dispositio ejus quod movetur dam 
movetur, et alia dam est in termino motus". (2) 
Until this point we have been examining the Gifts in the process of 
man's self-movement by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, now we are 
trying to establish-their nature at the tend-point' of this movement. 
Hence, on the Gift of fortitude, he says; 
r'dona non habent eosdem actus in patria quos habent 
in via, sed ibi habent actus circa perfruitionem 
1. Courage, q. 139, a. 1, ad2um. Fear, q. 19, a. 11. Deliberation, 
q. 52, a. 3. Piety, q. 121, a. 1, ad3um. Intellectus, q. 8, a. 7. Scientia, 
q. 9, a. 4, ad2um. Wisdom, significantly enough is not discussed at 
in this context; there is no problem of the continuation of charity- 
wisdom in heaven. 2. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 3. 
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finis. Unde actus fortitudinis ibi est perfrui 
plena securitate a laboribus et malls". (1) 
The 'end' of the movement of the Gifts is the same as the 'end' of 
man's whole dynamism, the Beatific Vision of God and this is not to 
be conceived of as a static cessation of activity in rest but as the 
fullness of human flourishing. 
2 To clarify this point we can look 
at the Gift of intellectus, associated with the virtue of faith. 
This Gift functions within the obscurity of the life of faith and yet 
faith will be replaced by knowledge in heaven. 
3 whereas with the 
Gifts associated with the moral life we had to posit a change in 'mat- 
ter', here we have to posit a change in 'condition'. As we noted 
above, the Gift of intellectus works in an 'ascetical' mode in this 
4 life. 
'ý... etsi non videamus de Deo quid est, videmus 
tarnen quid non est; et tanto in hac vita Deum 
perfectius cognoscimus, quanto magis intelligi- 
mus eum excedere quidquid intellectu comprehen- 
ditur". (5) 
How can this continue in heaven ? The answer is that it does not 
continue in this condition in heaven. The Gift of intellectus under- 
stands all things in their relation to the Lex Aeterna. 
6 
In heaven 
this relationship will be evident and vibrant; on earth it is expressed 
more properly by negation than by affirmation. 
What Thomas is doing then is not merely filling out the im- 
plications of the schema he has set up around the Gifts; he is using 
the Gifts to express the positive active nature of the Beatific Vision. 
Each of the Gifts is transposed to have a totally positive role and 
while at first sight this might seem forced and unconvincing, as in 
the case of fortitude quoted above, still it does present a further 
1. IIaIlae, q. 139, a. 1, ad2um. 2. IaIIae, q. 1-q. 5. 
3. IIaIIae, 
q. a, a. 
5; q. 5, a. 1.4. See above p. 250.5. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 8. 
6.. IIaIIae, q. g, a. 3, ad3um. 
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richness within Thomas' idea of the nature of man's final relationship 
with'God. Thus filial fear remains in heaven because the will of the 
blessed is not characterised by inertia or indifference but by a posi- 
tive avoidance of non-subjection to God. 
1 The awe of the blessed be- 
fore God is enhanced by this Gift. It is an awe which arises not 
from'insecurity bt from perfect security within which their sense of 
creatureliness before the divine remains. 
2 
As regards the Gift of consilium, Thomas introduces a slightly 
different point. God, he claims, is the cause of our knowledge not 
only at the time at which we acquire it but for as long as we remain 
in possession of it. 
3 The Gift of consilium in heaven is therefore 
to be understood as God's sustaining of the knowledge of the blessed 
rather than, as in via, the enlightening of their ignorance. What 
this brings out is the radical dependence of the blessed on God. 
Now, and this is the crucial point, if the Gifts are seen at their 
clearest - in their essence - in heaven, then it is this radical de- 
pendence on God even, and especially, within man's most characteristi- 
cally human activity in via which lies at the heart of Thomas' work 
on the Gifts. Just as Thomas uses the treatise on the angels to illus- 
trate the nature of human reasoning, so this model of the Gifts as they 
exist in heaven throws light on their real nature in via. 
The Gifts, the beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit. 
Man is to grow in charity as his life progresses, and as cha- 
rity increases man's docility and receptivity to the Holy Spirit 
is hei. ghtened. 
4 In grace, man knows God, sicut cognitum in cognoscente 
5 
et amatum in amante; in glory, homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat 
1. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 11.2. IIaIlae, q. 19, a. 11, ad3um. 
3. IIaIIae, q. 52, a. 3.4. IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 4, a. 5, a. 6, a. 7, a. 8, a. 9. 
5. Ia, a. 43, a. 3. 
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perrffecte; 
1 for grace nihil est aliud Quam cmaedam inchoatio ploriae 
2 in nobis. , 
While there is a great difference between man's life in 
movement towards God, in via, under grace, and his life in glory, in 
Datria, when he has, reached the term of all his strivings, yet these 
two should not be so. strictly separated as not to see, even in this 
life, something . of. 
the transformation of grace into glory. 
3 This 
is. the point at which Thomas' treatment of the relationship between 
the Gifts and the. beatitudes enters our discussion. 
"cum Beatitudo sit actus virtutis perfectae, omnes 
Beatitudines ad perfectionem spiritualis vitae per- 
tinent". (4) 
Thomas' linking of the Gifts with the beatitudes and the fruits 
is without doubt a result of the pressure of the tradition of scholas- 
ticism. 
5, The Summa is, after all, a basic textbook and Thomas is pre- 
senting the basic. stock of the tradition into which his pupils are to 
enter. He accepts Augustiners correlation of the last of the Gifts 
with the first of the beatitudes and follows it through dutifully. 
Nevertheless he himself shows, at times, a certain impatience with 
the limitations-this structure imposes on him and he admits that dif- 
ferent alignments from Augustine's could be acceptable. 
6 
However,. having established this3it does not follow that there 
is no merit in what Thomas presents within this traditional schema. 
He defines the beatitudes as acts and not habitus. They are acts 
which the infused virtues and Gifts make possible; the fruits of the 
way of life created by these infused habitus. Now taking this analysis 
7 
1. Ia, q. 93, a. 4.2. IIaIIse, q. 24, a. 3, ad2um. 3. IaIIae, 
q. 69, a. 2, ad3um. 4. IIaIIae, q. 19, a. 12, ad1um. 5. For details, 
see O'Connor, pp. 99-109; Augustine, De sernone domini 1.4. PL. 34, 
1234-1235. There is a translation and discussion in O'Connor, p. 91. 
6. IIaIIae, q. 121, a. 2 and q. 139, a. 2.7. All the beatitudes are 
'fruits' being outstanding and perfect. The term 'fruit' is wider and 
includes any virtuos act in which a man takes delight. IaIIae, q. 70, a. 2. 
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AP 
one stage further, he claims that the beatitudes are more the result 
of the-Gifts of the spirit than of the infused virtues. 
I This tiny 
point gives us a fascinating insight into the movement of Thomas' 
thought here. He is not merely correlating beatitude and Gift for 
the sake of conforming to the tradition, even though that point must 
not be overlooked and accounts for the unconvincing nature of his 
account in detail. What he°is saying is that the life of the beati- 
tudes, is possible only through that docility and receptivity to the 
Holy Spirit which the Gifts bring about. The beatitudes, as human 
acts and part of a human life, cannot be accounted for except by refe- 
rence to this docility and dependence as a permanent feature of man's 
life under grace. 
What is more, the beatitudes as part of grace and also manifes- 
tations of grace as inchoatio gloriae, 
2 
are forms of human activity 
which merit the eternal beatitude of the Beatific Vision. There is 
then in the beatitudes a dynamic tension between present merit and 
future rewards, between beatitudes and Beatitudo. 
"... beatitudo est ultimus finis humanae vitae. 
Dicitur autem aliquis jam finem habere, propter 
spem finis obtinendi ... Spes autem de fine con- 
sequendo insurgit ex hoc quod aliquid convenien- 
ter movetur ad finem, et appropinquat ad ipsum: 
quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad Einem 
autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropin- 
quat per operationes virtutum; et praecivue per 
operations donorum, si loquamur de beatitudine 
aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in eam 
inducit Spiritus Sanctus, ad cujus obedientiam 
et sequelam per dona perficimur". (3) 
If in our modern empirical mood we were to ask for evidence 
of the Gifts of the spirit, then, according to Thomas, one would point 
to those adopted sons and daughters of God in whom the life of grace 
1. IaIIae, q. 70, a. 2.2. IaIIae, q. 69, a. 2.3. IaIIae, 
q. ̀69, a. 1. 
dl 
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had flowered into the activities of the beatitudes. 
1 These are flowers 
which will bear fruit only in heaven; the fruits of the Spirit. 
2 
For Thomas, following Augustine, fructus combines the notion of enjoy- 
ment, (frei), and completion. A fruit is the attainment of something 
which has no further point beyond itself, something in which the will 
finds rest in sheer joy and total satisfaction. 
3 
"Et secundum hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus 
hominis finis, quo debet frei". (4) 
But even in this life, in via, man, endowed with the infused virtues 
and the Gifts, comes to some sort of fruition, some sort of inchoatio 
beatitudinis. It is in this sense that the beatitudes are the fruits 
of the Gifts of. the Spirit par excellence. 
"Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine 
producitur, sic ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur: 
operatio enim est actus secundus operantis, et di- 
lectionem habet, si sit conveniens operanti. Si 
igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum 
facultatem rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus ratio- 
s. Si vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem 
virtutem, quae est virtus Spiritus Sancti, sic dici- 
tur esse operatio hominis fructus Spiritus Sancti ... ". 
(5) 
"Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in 
quibus homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicun- 
tur solum perfecta opera: quae etiam, ratione suae 
perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis quam virtuti- 
bus". (6) 
S 
1. IaIIae, q. 70, a. 2.2. IaIIae, q. 70, a. 1, adlum. 3. IaIlae, 






We have studied St Thomas' treatment of the Gifts of the Spirit 
in the context of the Summa Theologise and, more generally, in the con- 
text of his wider theology and metaphysics. It has been our basic 
premise that the Gifts cannot be properly understood if wrenched out 
of this framework. The strength of'Thomas' argument is precisely 
its coherence within his treatment of larger issues which structure 
the Summa: the general and yet variegated movement of God within his 
creation, in terms of providence and predestination; man's freedom 
and 'capacity' for-God; his intellectual and appetitive powers; the 
two principles of man's dynamism; the role of the infused and acquired 
virtues. By taking one strand within the warp and woof of Thomas' 
theology and studying it in detail and in context, we have presented 
also something of the unity and diversity-within-unity of Thomas' larger 
vision. In particular this dissertation has been not only a study of 
the-Gifts of the Spirit in themselves but also an exercise in discerning 
the articulations of Thomas' theology of grace. 
The approach throughout has been sympathetic. Minor difficulties, 
such as the use of the beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit, have not 
been emphasised so as not to distract from the larger attempt to express 
a certain vision of humanity participating in the life of God. This is 
not to say that the texts have not been critically examined in detail 
but rather that, having been so examined, the main arguments are found 
to be coherent within themselves and within their context. What is 
more, not only does Thomas' work on the Gifts cohere with his larger 
programme, but, taken at the value he himself gives it by presenting 
theýGifts as necessary for salvation, his treatment of the Gifts is 
itself a structuring element within his theology of grace. 
Hence it is at this point that a major question arises. If 
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the Gifts of the Spirit do play an essential role in Thomas' theology., 
then do his insights into this particular aspect of grace have value 
only within-the structure of his theology ? If Thomism is no longer 
the paradigm of even Roman Catholic theologians is it possible to trans- 
fer the benefits of his work on the Gifts into our own type of theolo- 
gical discourse ? -As a conclusion to this dissertation we shall 
attempt to sketch out the lines of how such a transposition might be 
achieved. 
Firstly, certain features of his analysis can be jettisoned . 
without-damage to his major project. Obviously-one could find little 
justification for continuing the link of gifts - beatitudes - fruits. 
More controversial however would be any move to ease the analysis away 
from its moorings in the Isaian text of the Septuagint. The Western 
tradition had focused on the Isaian Messianic prophecy, with its seven 
gifts, in the Septuagint, long before St Thomas, and long after him, 
and still continues to-do so. But the doctrine of the activity of 
the Spirit - was' never restricted to this one text which was itself in- 
terpreted in the light of the whole of the New and Old Testaments, and 
in, 'the-light of the experience of the Church. - Even in our own area 
of research Thomas draws on a much wider notion of the activity of the 
Holy Spirit to analyse this particular aspect of the Spirit's activity 
which-is characterised by these seven named elements and the title 
lthe Gifts of the Spirit'. Nevertheless, while it is clear, to modern 
exegetes at least, that the Isaian text should not be interpreted as 
designating the members of a certain theological category, it is equally 
clear that this is precisely what Thomas and his predecessors, and 
Thomistic successors, have done. 
However, while Thomas does concentrate on these somewhat 
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arbitrary headings of poetic prophecy, he does not allow them to stand 
uninterpreted. In the Prima Secundae they are integrated into his 
philosophical anthropology and in the Secunda Secundae they are re-ex- 
pressed within his theology of grace in terms of the theological and 
infused virtues. This is an important point. As Thomas expressed 
his insights into the particular aspect of the Spirit's activity - 
called, 'the Gifts of the Holy Spirit' - by reference to his philoso- 
phical anthropology and his model of man under grace, so might modern 
writers feel free to transpose them into the ways of thought of their 
contemporaries. Thomas-was bound by the seven names of the Isaian 
prophecy: there is no need for his successors to feel so bound. 
One advantage, however, that the model of the seven gifts gave 
to Thomas and others was that it did allow them the possibility of a 
discursive analysis of exactly how, in detail, the Spirit works within 
man. In a similar way the workings of the Holy Spirit - in this as- 
pect of the 'Gifts of the Holy Spirit' - could be correlated with the 
various dimensions of man as articulated in any current anthropology. 
Thomas' insight is that there is within all the dimensions of man's 
humanity a receptivity which,, in grace, 1s heightened in sensitivity 
so that man can fully cooperate with the instincts of God. To be 
faithful to this insight we do not need to be bound by his particular 
articulations of the major dimensions of what it is to be human. 
One might suggest, as possibilities only, notions such as 'masculinity', 
'femininity', 'dependency', ? care', 'responsibility', 'insight', tre- 
ligious awe'before the numinous', 'playfulness?, 'solitariness', "sor- 
rowt. Thomas' insight on the Gifts could be transferred into these 
or other such notions. The model of the seven-fold presented both 
the idea of fullness and also definite discrete manifestations of that 
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plenitude of humanity under grace. Any transposition of Thomas' work 
on the Gifts should similarly be able to cover all that is thought to 
be'human and also be able to point to the particular manifestations 
of humanity made receptive'and sensitive to the Spirit under each par- 
ticular aspect. The cumber seven and the particular terms of the 
Isaian text need not be preserved as normative but kept out of respect 
for liturgical custom and'common usage within the tradition. 
What should not be lost, however, is the distinction between 
the 'Gifts of'the Spirit' as discussed her., and the 'charismatic' gifts 
listed by St Paul, (I Corinthians, 12. v. 8-10). Thomas' own distinc- 
tionbetween these is expressed as gratia gratum faciens and gratia 
gratis data. The latter are gifts given to individual people for the 
up-building of the Church: they have a direct communal reference and 
are given to some'-and not to others. The 'Gifts of the Spirit', on 
the other hand, are given to all Christians as part of their baptismal 
birth-right. They are given to each individual because they are in- 
dispensible for the salvation of each individual. They are not acquired 
or transitory but permanent dispositions within the new humanity of man 
in Christ. This is an essential distinction for modern Christianity. 
Modern theologies of grace concentrate on the role of the Spirit in 
general and on the pc. rticular charismatic gifts within the Church for 
the up-building of the Church. Too little attention is paid to a theo- 
logical analysis of how in detail the Spirit works in the individual 
Christian. Hence the danger is that the Spirit is understood to be 
so colourless as to be merely an article of faith, or so extravagantly 
colourful as to be the preserve of the charismatic. The insights of 
St Thomas on the 'Gifts of the Spirit' could, if properly transposed, 
be developed to fill this gap. 
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The idea of receptivity is central to Thomas' presentation of 
the 'Gifts of the Spirit'. This is not to be confused with passivity. 
Nor is it to be opposed to activity. It is a further dimension of 
man's being in the graced relationship of love and knowledge between 
man and his Creator and Saviour, his Alpha and Omega, his beginning 
and his end. Linked in with this idea of receptivity are the two 
further notions of 'connaturalitp' and 'invitation'. Man is invited 
into. a relationship in, which he participates in the divine life. As 
he grows in knowledge and love his instincts, reasoning and disposi- 
tions become more attuned and sensitive to the ways of God. This is 
not a matter of passivity but a cooperative endeavour which God ini- 
tiates in man,, and, having initiated, supports, encourages and guides. 
Man needs to be receptive to this constant divine tutelage in order 
to. grow in his connaturality with God. Bat man does not become less 
human by becoming more divine; he becomes more fully human. Because 
this receptivity, if not passive, is also not colourless or neutral 
but human. All the receptivities of various kinds which are part of 
man's complex nature, all his drives and appetites, are made sensitive 
to resonate to the movement of the Spirit. This receptivity is not 
just in the intellectual order of suggestion or guidance but permeates 
like yeast in the dough all aspects of man's nature. 
Man experiences the Spirit by reflecting on his humanity as 
moved. Man's finite nature is of its nature open to the infinity 
of God. In grace that openness becomes a creative receptivity. 
Man becomes responsive to a call beyond himself which is yet felt within 
the depths of his humanity. The wonder of the mystery of grace is not 
only its divine origin but its human forms. Within the finite struc- 
tures of his existence man is given a receptivity to the infinite 
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precisely within those finite structures of his humanity. The mode 
of operation of the 'Gifts of the Spirit' is determined not by the 
nature of the divine mover but by the whole complex nature of man. 
Basic to this, as a presupposition, is the Catholic and Thomist 
notion of a real ontology to justification. Man is changed by grace: 
all the structures and drives of his humanity are both healed and 'ele- 
vated', not notionally., but really and radically. Within the 'friend- 
ship' relationship of grace he is both restored to himself and called 
'higher' to be more than himself by cooperating with God. Here lies 
the need for that docility which Thomas characterises as 'the Gifts 
of the Spirit'. As part of the gift of connaturality and as part of 
the dynamism of God's invitation to man, there needs to be a heightened 
receptivity within man to the ways of the Spirit. Paradoxically, if 
understood as if in terms of creaturely causalities, the more man's 
dependency increases, the more does his self-possession increase. 
The Gifts ensure that man is not passive in the hands of God but recep- 
tine and cooperative; responding personally,, not impersonally manipu- 
lated. 
But man 'in grace' is not yet 'in glory'. His responsiveness 
to the guidance of the Spirit is not only a matter of responding by 
moving towards God, but also of moving away from all that is false 
and perverting. It involves a sensitivity not only to the glory of 
creation but also to its tragedy. The essential need for a receptivity 
such as that characterised by 'the Gifts of the Spirit' can perhaps be 
most clearly seen mirrored in its opposite: hardness of heart, a dulling 
of the senses and a narrowing of the mind; all the self-destructive 
and counter-productive habits in man which victimise him and limit his 
freedom to respond to what is more than himself. This heightened { 
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sensitivity to the ways of God in man and in creation still tin tra- 
vail' leads. notronly to an affirmation of all that is good and beauti- 
ful and true in creation, but also, as by some poetic insight, the 
integration of even sinfullness, suffering, futility and death, even 
crucifixion. Even, perhaps especially, in these too, the dark, nega- 
tiue-dimensions of man and creation, man is opened to the Spirit who 
moves over. the waters. 
i 
0 
Man's great gift of intellectual ability and reasoning is, for 
Thomas, a participation in the Lex Aeterna. The Gifts of the Spirit 
have been understood as a further participation in that divine ordering 
in terms of a graceful responsiveness. Behind St Thomas' view of man 
is a whole Neo-Platonic cosmology. Modern culture lacks any form of 
cosmology and modern theology, with a few significant exceptions, shares 
in the same cultural blight. It would not be sufficient to advocate a 
renaissance of the cosmology behind St Thomas, but neither would it be 
sufficient to dismiss it without perhaps using it as an aid to check 
the Cartesianism endemic in modern thought. Man does not determine 
himself solely from 'within' and there is more 'within' than mere mind 
and will. Modern theological discussions on ethics and salvation 
might benefit from a larger context in which man is not alone at the 
centre of the stage but rather plays an essential part within the con- 
cert of creation. 
The Summa Theologiae, and all St Thomas' theology, is essentially 
theocentric. It has been debated whether it is sufficiently Trinita- 
rian, but that debate need not concern us here. What has been analysed 
in this dissertation is only one aspect of the work of the Holy Spirit. 
In themselves the 'Gifts of the Holy Spirit' are further manifestations 
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of what it means to be 'in grace', to live and grow within the friend- 
ship relationship of love and knowledge between God and man. Man is 
responsive to God because God is so close to him, more intimate to 
him than he is to his own self. Yet this same God, this same Spirit, 
is the moving principle in all creation, not only in terms of grace 
but of nature; of all that lives and all that exists. Thomas' 
treatment of man's graced receptivity to this movement is only part 
of this single yet multiform movement by which all that exists is 
called into being and invited to share in the life of God according 
to its mode. 
God made the angels to show him splendour - 
as he made the animals for innocence and 
plants for their simplicity. But man he 
made to serve him wittily, in the tangle of 
his mind. 
... And no doubt it delights God to see 
splendour where he only looked for complexity. 
(Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons) 
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